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REPORTS OF CASES

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA.

JANUARY TERM, 1913

VOLUME XCIII.

HARRY C. LINDSAY,

OFFICIAL REPORTER.

PREPARED AND EDITED BY

HENRY P. STODDART,

DEPUTY REPORTER.

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BY HARRY C. LINDSAY, REPORTER OF THE SUPREME COURT,
For the benefit of the State of Nebraska.

NOV 28 1913

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CASES DETERMINED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA
JANUARY TERM, 1913.

**STATE, EX REL. GRANT G. MARTIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
APPELLANT, V. FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANK OF OAK-
LAND, APPELLEE.**

FILED JANUARY 16, 1913. No. 17,505.

1. **Statutes: AMENDMENT.** Section 11, art. III of the constitution, "No law shall be amended unless the new act contains the section or sections so amended, and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed," required that the section as amended shall contain all that is substituted for the original section, and the original section shall be entirely repealed.
2. **Banks: "BANKING ACT": CONSTITUTIONALITY.** The proviso to section 45 of the banking law, as amended by the act of 1911 (Laws 1911, ch. 8), and the proviso to the repealing clause of that act which attempt to keep the amended sections in force as to such banks as change to national banks before a specified time, and to repeal the amended sections as to all other state banks, violate the clause of amendment XIV of the federal constitution which guarantees the equal protection of the laws, and are void; but this does not affect the validity of the remainder of the act, since these provisos cannot be regarded as inducement to its passage.

APPEAL from the district court for Burt county:
ALEXANDER C. TROUP, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, and E. J. Clements, for appellant.

Stout & Rose, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

In 1909 the legislature enacted a statute entitled "An act for the regulation, supervision and control of the business of banking, and to provide penalties for its violation." Laws 1909, ch. 10. Section 45 provided for statements to the state banking board once in six months showing the average daily deposits for the period subsequent to the next preceding statement, and that the state banking board shall within 30 days after such statement levy assessments thereon, the first four assessments to be one-fourth of one per cent. of the average daily deposits, and afterwards one-twentieth of one per cent. It was provided that the first statement should be made within 30 days after the act took effect, and the second on the 1st day of December, 1909. Section 46 of the act, as originally enacted, provided that as soon as the assessments were made the bank should "set apart, keep and maintain in their said banks the amount thus levied against them," and that the amount so kept should constitute a "depositors' guaranty fund," payable to the state banking fund on demand for the uses and purposes hereinafter provided. Section 47 of the original act provided that if the funds from any cause prior to July 1, 1910, should be reduced to an amount less than one-half of the one per cent. of the average daily deposits, or after that date should be reduced to an amount less than one per cent. of the average daily deposits, a special assessment should be levied to cover such deficiency not exceeding one per cent. of the average daily deposit in any one year. All proceedings under the act were enjoined by the federal courts. The injunctions were continued in force until the supreme court of the United States determined that the act did not violate any provision of the federal constitution. *Shallenberger v. First State Bank*, 219 U. S. 114. The mandate of the supreme court reversing the decision of the lower court was received and filed in the circuit court on the 30th day of March, 1911. Thereupon the

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legislature of 1911 enacted chapter 8 of the laws of that year, entitled "An act to amend sections * * * 45, 46, 47 and 58 of chapter 8 of the Compiled Statutes of 1909 (being sections 45, 46, 47 of the act of 1909 above quoted, and other sections) * * * and to repeal said original sections * * * as the same now exist, and to declare an emergency." As amended by the act of 1911, section 45 provides that the first statement should be made on the 1st day of June, 1911, and every six months thereafter, and that the assessment should be made on the first day of the month next succeeding the statement. There was no other change made in the section, except that the proviso hereinafter quoted was added thereto. Section 47, as it now is by the act of 1911, substituted the date July 1, 1912, for July 1, 1910, as it was before the amendment. Otherwise the section is unchanged. Nothing had been done under the act while its operation was suspended during the litigation in the federal courts, and the plain purpose of the legislature in amending these two sections was to postpone the commencement of proceeding under the act; that is, to make the statute express the result that had already been brought about by the action of the federal court. This respondent, prior to the year 1909, was a corporation organized under the laws of this state and doing a general banking business, and continued until on the 26th day of May, 1911, when it surrendered its state charter and became a national bank under the act of congress.

In October, 1911, the attorney general began this action in the district court for Burt county to procure a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to file with the state banking board a statement "showing the average daily deposits in the Farmers & Merchants Bank of Oakland, Nebraska, for the six months next preceding the 25th day of June, 1909; for the six months next preceding the 1st day of December, 1909; for the six months next preceding the 1st day of June, 1910; for the six months next preceding the 1st day of December, 1910; and for the period between the 1st day of December, 1910, and the 26th day of May,

1911, exclusive of public money otherwise secured." The district court refused the writ and dismissed the action, and the relator has appealed.

By the act of 1911 the following proviso was added to section 45: "Provided, however, that if any bank now operating under a charter issued by the state desires to go into voluntary liquidation or change to a national bank before the assessments provided for in this section become due and payable, the provisions of this section shall not release said bank from the payment of any assessments now due from it to the depositors' guaranty fund as provided for in chapter 8 of the Compiled Statutes for 1909. In the event that any bank now operating under a charter issued by this state voluntarily liquidates or changes to a national bank before the assessments provided for in this section become due and payable, the provisions of chapter 8 of the Compiled Statutes for 1909, shall, in so far as said banks are concerned, be in full force and effect and shall govern and control, and in the event said bank goes into voluntary liquidation or changes to a national bank before the assessments provided for in this section become due and payable, the provisions of chapter 8 of the Compiled Statutes for 1909 shall be and remain in full force and effect, and the amount due from said bank on the assessment provided for in chapter 8 of the Compiled Statutes for 1909 shall be paid by said bank to the secretary of the banking board; said amount shall be by the secretary of the banking board placed on deposit to the credit of the depositors' guaranty fund in any bank to be designated by the secretary of the banking board, said funds to be subject to the order of the banking board." Also the act of 1911 (laws 1911, sec. 2, p. 85) repealed all of the aforesaid sections "as the same now exist," and to the repealing clause added the following proviso: "Provided, however, that nothing in this act contained, repealing any part of chapter 8 of the Compiled Statutes for 1909, shall be construed to release any chartered bank in this state that goes into voluntary liquidation or changes

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from a state to a national bank before the assessments provided for in this act become due and payable, and in the event any bank operating under a charter voluntarily liquidates or changes from a state to a national bank before the assessments provided for in this section become due and payable, then the provisions of chapter 8 of the Compiled Statutes for 1909, in so far as they affect said bank, shall be in full force and effect and are not repealed by this repealing clause." The purpose of these two provisions and the effect thereof, if they are valid, was to classify state banks, putting those which should continue as state banks after July 1, 1911, into one class, and those which should become national banks or cease to do business as state banks, before that date, into another class, and requiring the one class to pay into the banking fund the amount of all assessments that would have been made under the original act prior to the 1st day of July, 1911, if the operation of that act had not been suspended, and relieving the other class from the obligation to make such payments.

1. The respondent insists that the original sections were entirely repealed by the act of 1911, and that no liability can be predicated thereon; that the provision of section 11, art. III of the constitution, that "no law shall be amended unless the new act contains the section or sections so amended, and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed," requires the legislature to repeal the whole section when it is amended, and that it is incompetent to repeal it in part only. The relator insists that, if the constitution forbids such repeal, then the whole act of 1911 is invalid, and the defendant is liable under the original act. He cites *Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas*, 177 U. S. 28, upon this proposition. In that case it was held: "A repeal of Tex. act 1889, permitting foreign corporations to do business in the state, does not result from the provision of Tex. act 1895, exempting labor organizations, on the ground that this provision is unconstitutional, since, if it were so, the entire act would

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be void and could not operate as a repeal of the former act." (44 L. ed. 657.) The court in that case, however, was considering the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. It was not considering, and had no occasion to declare, the force and effect of the clause of our constitution above quoted. The meaning of this provision is that the section as amended shall contain all that is substituted for the original section, and the original section shall be entirely repealed. The legislature could, of course, repeal the original section, and then so frame the amended section as to contain such parts of the original section as desired. If we consider that the proviso, which is a part of the section as amended, re-enacts the former law, so far as it relates to banks which nationalized before July 1, 1911, and that the whole of the former sections specified in the repealing clause are repealed, and so evade the provision of our constitution in that regard, the question still is, whether, in connection with the other proviso quoted, it is valid legislation.

2. Can banks be classified upon such basis for such a purpose? Amendment XIV to the federal constitution extends the equal protection of the laws to banks and individuals interested in banks. It is contended that to distinguish between banks that continue as state banks and those that become national banks would be allowable for some purposes under the authorities, and that when so classified they may be subjected to different restrictions. The basis for classification must have some relation to the purpose for which the classification is made. Banks may be classified upon the basis of the amount of their capital stock for some purposes. Our statute so classifies them. A bank with a capital stock of \$25,000, or more, may be located in towns and villages of 1,000 inhabitants, but banks with less capital stock cannot. A statute that provided that banks with a capital stock of \$25,000 should be exempt from assessments for the guaranty fund while participating in the benefits thereof, but banks with a less capital should not be exempt from such assessments, would

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not afford the small banks the equal protection of the laws. The federal statute authorizes banks to become national banks and provides the manner of so doing. The statute cannot prevent such action, nor add to the qualifications or conditions prescribed by the general government. Our statute prescribes a penalty of \$50 for each day that the statement of average daily deposits is delayed. If the time fixed for making these statements has not been changed as to banks that nationalized prior to July 1, 1911, it would seem that they are liable to this penalty also, as well as for the specified assessments. If such legislation is valid, banks would be effectually deterred from making such a change. It seems clear that banks cannot be classified upon such a basis for the purpose of subjecting one class to such burdens from which the other class is relieved. It would manifestly refuse the banks so burdened the equal protection of the law. These provisos cannot be considered as an inducement to the passage of the act. It cannot be supposed that so reasonable and necessary legislation, relieving state banks in general from such unconscionable burdens, would not be enacted if banks which became national banks, while the operation of the former act was suspended, were also relieved.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

CHARLES A. CURRIER, APPELLEE, V. SETTY SCHMIDEKE
TESKE ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED JANUARY 16, 1913. Nos. 16,859, 16,862.

1. **Mortgages: FORECLOSURE SALE: INTEREST CONVEYED.** The sale of an interest in real estate on foreclosure of a mortgage can only convey the interest of the mortgage debtor, and where he only owns a life estate that is all that is sold, although the purchaser may have supposed he bought and acquired the whole title.

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2. **Ejectment: LIMITATIONS: REMAINDERMAN.** When the mortgage debtor whose life estate had been sold at the mortgage foreclosure died, the title vested in the purchaser at the mortgage foreclosure sale terminated, and the remainderman owning the fee was then entitled to bring his action in ejectment for possession.
3. **Mortgages: FORECLOSURE SALE: RIGHTS OF PURCHASER.** Where the decree in a case of mortgage foreclosure upon real estate is against the mortgage debtor and his interest in the premises is sold under the decree to satisfy the same, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale will not be deemed to have purchased any greater interest in the premises than that which was appraised and offered for sale; and, where the mortgage sale satisfied only the mortgagor's debt, the purchaser will not be deemed to have acquired any right against an interest in the land which belonged to another who was not made a party to the suit.

APPEAL from the district court for Madison county:
ANSON A. WELCH, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

John J. Sullivan and M. D. Tyler, for appellants.

William V. Allen and Willis E. Reed, contra.

HAMER, J.

This is not the original case reported in 82 Neb. 315, and on rehearing in 84 Neb. 60, although the facts were the same, with one exception hereafter stated. That case was an action of ejectment, and this case is an action of ejectment, and the names in each case are the same; but that case was brought by the plaintiff in this case during the lifetime of Eugene R. Currier, the plaintiff's father, and Eugene R. Currier's interest had been sold under foreclosure proceedings, which are set out in the case referred to. He had owned a life estate in the property in controversy, which the defendants in that case purchased, and the interest which they held expired when Eugene R. Currier died, October 17, 1901. In that case it was held that the action of ejectment was prematurely brought, for the reason that when it was commenced Eugene R. Currier was still alive.

In the instant case the plaintiff and appellee, Charles A. Currier, who is also cross-appellant, brought ejectment in the district court to secure possession of the N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$, section 30, township 21 N., range 1 W., in Madison county. The petition was filed April 17, 1909. Before February 10, 1874, Eugene R. Currier entered the land above described, and on that day received the patent for the same. On the 20th day of September of the year before, he conveyed the land by deed to his wife, Mary J. Currier, in consideration of the sum of \$1. They occupied the land together as their homestead. October 2, 1873, she and her husband, Eugene R. Currier, mortgaged the land to one John Campbell to secure a promissory note for \$300. The note was not paid, and about March 2, 1881, Campbell began an action to foreclose this mortgage. Before this time the owner of the fee, Mary J. Currier, had died. In the foreclosure suit her son, Charles A. Currier, the plaintiff herein, was not made a party defendant, but Eugene R. Currier, the survivor of Mary J. Currier, was made a party defendant, and service upon him was had by publication, and a decree of foreclosure against him was rendered for \$367.87. An order of sale was issued under this decree January 14, 1881, and the "interest of Eugene R. Currier, defendant," was appraised at \$740.07, after deducting taxes as per county treasurer's certificate of \$59.93. This appraisement of the "interest of Eugene R. Currier, defendant," was made July 5, 1881, under an order of sale directed against the land described, "taken as the property of Eugene R. Currier to satisfy a judgment * * * against the said Eugene R. Currier and in favor of John Campbell." The note sued on is described in the petition as signed by Mary J. Currier and E. R. Currier, and the petition recites the following condition alleged to be in the mortgage: "That, whereas said Eugene R. Currier has executed and delivered to John Campbell one promissory note for the payment of \$300; now, if the said Eugene R. Currier shall pay to said John Campbell said sum of money or to his heirs and assigns when the same shall be-

come due, according to the terms and effect of said note, then these presents shall be null and void, otherwise to be and remain in full force." The petition also alleged that "the defendant (Eugene R. Currier) has not paid the amount secured by said mortgage as required by the conditions thereof, whereby said mortgage deed has become absolute." The prayer is "that said defendant may be foreclosed of all equity of redemption or other interest in said mortgaged premises." The legal notice published in the newspaper is addressed "to Eugene Currier, nonresident." It undertakes to notify the "defendant" that plaintiff "prays for decree that defendant be required to pay," etc. The judgment is against "Eugene Currier." The confirmation of sale is against "Eugene Currier." There was a default upon the part of Eugene Currier to pay his debt. In consequence of this default, the decree was rendered against him. The order of sale was issued because he did not pay and satisfy the decree. Under the order of sale it was "the interest of Eugene Currier" in the land that was appraised and sold. That interest was Eugene Currier's life estate. It sold for \$500 to John Campbell, by his agent, F. W. Barnes. If Eugene Currier's life estate in the land sold for enough to pay Eugene Currier's debt as evidenced by the decree, then is there any debt? Seemingly it sold for enough to pay the debt. When the plaintiff's mother died, he inherited the fee from her because she owned the land at the time of her death. When John Campbell purchased the life estate of Eugene Currier at the sheriff's sale, Eugene Currier was thereby divested of such life estate, and the interest sold would have become John Campbell's property but for the fact that the title was taken in the name of Herman Schmideke, through an arrangement with Barnes and Tyler by which they furnished the \$500 for Schmideke, and he apparently was substituted for John Campbell, probably by John Campbell's consent, and by the acquiescence of everybody, but not by an order of the court, and the sheriff's deed was then made to Herman Schmideke and John Campbell

has made no objections since that time. This sheriff's deed bears date November 28, 1881, and by it Herman Schmideke then became entitled to the possession of the land during the life of Eugene Currier, who, as already said, died October 17, 1901, and his debt should have terminated the right of possession of Herman Schmideke as to the plaintiff, who had been the owner of the legal title since his mother's death, and he, by the death of his father, then became entitled to the possession of the land. The return of the sheriff must have advised the court that the bid made by Campbell was confirmed, and a fair inference from the facts is that Schmideke was substituted in his place by consent of the parties as the purchaser, and that he paid the amount of Campbell's bid, because his name appears in the sheriff's deed as grantee. It would seem that the judgment was then extinguished by what was done.

In *Currier v. Teske*, 84 Neb. 60, it was held: "That the sale on foreclosure could only convey the life estate of the defendant, even though the purchaser may have believed he acquired the whole title." This would seem to be too apparent to require a decision. In any event it was so determined in that case. In the same case it was also held: "That an assignment of the bid and purchase will be presumed, and the sheriff's deed will be held sufficient to pass all the rights of the original purchaser to the grantee." It was also said by Judge LETTON, delivering the opinion of the court: "Eugene Currier died October 17, 1901. The defendants' estate and right of possession were contemporaneous with Currier's life, and died with him. This action in ejectment (the old action) was begun nearly ten months before the death of Eugene Currier, and while the defendants were fully entitled to possession of the land. Proper service was had upon all the defendants except Walter Schmideke. As to him, the first service was quashed, and a new summons was served in 1906 after the termination of the life estate." The judgment of the district court in

the former ejectment case brought by Charles A. Currier was in favor of the defendants, and properly so, because Eugene R. Currier was still living, and it was his interest in a life estate, that was purchased under the original foreclosure proceedings. Of course, until Eugene R. Currier died, it must be taken that Charles A. Currier could successfully maintain his action of ejectment. *Hobbs v. Huxtable*, 79 Neb. 340. The present action was brought after Eugene R. Currier died.

Judge LETTON, in the opinion, discusses the effect of the sale that took place, and he says: "The proceeds of the sale of the defendants' interest, therefore, paid the mortgage and extinguished the lien on the plaintiff's equity of redemption. So that, when Campbell sold to Schmid he sold the life estate which he had foreclosed upon and purchased and that alone." He further says: "The purchaser at a foreclosure sale must advise himself of the title he buys, and when the real owner of the fee is made a party he cannot deprive him of any of his rights by the purchase." The doctrine here laid down in the former case would seem to dispose of the present case. The former case was about the same land, between the same parties, and it failed simply because Eugene R. Currier was still living, and therefore the estate of the defendants was not yet terminated, being contemporaneous with the life of Eugene R. Currier.

In the same case Judge LETTON says: "The evidence indicates that one Frank Barnes of Madison had been acting as Mr. Campbell's agent in the matter of the mortgage and that prior to the sale he had also been negotiating with Mr. Schmideke for the sale of the land to him. Judge Teske says he was to buy the land for her then husband Schmideke, and that Barnes procured the sheriff's deed from Schmideke and delivered it to him. The sheriff's deed cites that Schmideke was the purchaser at the sale. Under these circumstances, after the lapse of so many years, considering that Campbell never made any claim that the deed was void, and through his agent accepted and

tained the purchase money and caused the deed to be made to Schmideke, it will be considered that he became by equitable assignment the owner of Campbell's interest in the bid, that the deed was made pursuant to such assignment, and that he thereby became vested with all interests that Campbell then had." In the same case Judge LETTON says, referring to the district court: "The court did not err in directing a verdict for such defendants. This, however, does not constitute a bar to an action brought within the statute of limitations to recover the possession of the land." It will be seen that this court, in disposing of the former case, took occasion to declare that what was then being done would not constitute a bar to a subsequent action by Charles A. Currier to recover possession of the land. As the writer understands, what has heretofore been done in this case leaves an open field for the plaintiff to assert his right to the land and to recover possession of it.

We will consider some of the contentions made by the appellants.

1. It is contended that the right of Charles A. Currier was the right to redeem; that he was the owner of the remainder in the premises after the termination of his father's life estate; that upon the whole estate there was a valid mortgage, and that the burden of keeping down the interest upon this mortgage rested upon the owner of the life estate, but that the burden of paying the mortgage itself rested upon the owner of the remainder. *Tindall v. Peterson*, 71 Neb. 160, 166, and *Downing v. Harts-horn*, 69 Neb. 364, are cited in support of this contention, as, also, 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed.) sec. 1223. In *Tindall v. Peterson*, *supra*, there was an appeal from a decree quieting title in the plaintiffs. One Thomas Tindall had died intestate seized in fee of the land in controversy, subject to two mortgages. At the time of his death the land was occupied as a homestead by himself and his family. When the widow applied to the district court for a license to sell the homestead, or so much thereof as

might be necessary to pay the mortgage debt, and order was granted and the homestead was sold, it held that the proceedings were void—"that a sale of homestead by an administrator, under a license for payment of debts, is without authority of law." *Downing v. Hartshorn, supra*, there was also a consideration of the homestead question. The cases cited are like the case at bar, because in the instant case there was the debt of Eugene R. Currier, and the purchaser of the mortgage sale was bound to take notice of what he purchased. He knew that he only purchased Eugene Currier's life estate, and that he was not purchasing the legal title held in the first instance by Mary J. Currier and after her death by her son, Charles A. Currier. There was an obligation upon the part of the owner of the life estate to pay the mortgage, and he has paid the mortgage through foreclosure, his grantee through foreclosure is entitled to nothing more than what he bought. This was said in *Tindall v. Peterson, supra*: "We are of opinion that justice, as complete as possible, will be done between the parties, by so modifying the former decision of the court as to charge the appellants, as of the date when the first mortgage was paid off, with a sum equal to the present value of the amount of interest the life tenant, the mother, would have been required to pay during the actual continuance of her life, as shown by the record." The material difference between the cases cited and the instant case is that, in the instant case, the owner of the life estate was also a debtor. He was directly indebted to the plaintiff, John Campbell, in the mortgage foreclosure case, and the mortgage was foreclosed against him, Eugene R. Currier, and not against any one else, and the title of the owner of the fee was freed from the lien of the mortgage by such foreclosure. When Eugene R. Currier's life estate was sold, it was sold to pay his own debt. It was sold to pay a judgment against Eugene R. Currier. He did not object to paying his own debt. Can anybody object for him, when he himself neglected to object?

2. It is also contended that Charles A. Currier, the plaintiff, cannot assail the title of the defendants obtained through the foreclosure without first redeeming, or offering to redeem, and in support of this proposition *Loney v. Courtney*, 24 Neb. 580, is cited. In that case it was said: "Where a sale was had under a void foreclosure of a mortgage of real estate, and a sheriff's deed executed, *held*, that the mortgagor in an action to cancel the deed as a cloud upon his title must offer to do equity by paying what is equitably due under the decree, with interest and taxes." In that case the foreclosure was void, or voidable, and there was a sale under a void or voidable decree. In the instant case the foreclosure is not void. It is valid. But it covered only the life estate of Eugene R. Currier, and that only was sold, therefore *Loney v. Courtney* is not in point. *Hall v. Hooper*, 47 Neb. 111, is also cited. In that case the foreclosure is against a deceased person. The mortgagee was in possession under a void foreclosure sale. In *Stull v. Masilonka*, 74 Neb. 309, it was held that if a valid real estate mortgage has been foreclosed, even though the proceedings are void, the mortgagor will not be heard to question the title acquired thereby, unless he pays or tenders the amount of the debt and interest. But in that case the purchasers under the foreclosure, or their grantee, were in possession. The extent to which these cases go is that the foreclosure, though void or voidable, operates as an assignment of the mortgage foreclosed, and that the mortgagor cannot question the regularity of the decree as to one in possession under such foreclosure, without attempting to redeem. Along the same line is *McCabe v. Equitable Land Co.*, 88 Neb. 453. But the cases cited are not analogous to the instant case. In the instant case the foreclosure was valid in so far as it sold the life estate of Eugene R. Currier. That was all that was attempted to be foreclosed. But it was not claimed that the foreclosure was void for any reason. It was valid in any event as to Eugene R. Currier. The owner of the legal title, Charles A. Currier, did

not have to be made a party in order that there be a legal foreclosure of the life estate held by Charles A. Currier was not made a party and the ship of the legal title to the land was not foreclosed. In all the cases cited, the debt in the foreclosure proceedings were had was the debt of the mortgagor under which only his property was foreclosed and sold, leaving no claim against property, as in this case. *Kelso v. Norton*, 70 Pac. 896, is also cited. In that case it was held that when the mortgagor surrenders possession of the property to a purchaser at a void foreclosure sale, the purchaser enters into possession believing himself to be the owner of the premises, the mortgagor will be deemed to have waived his legal right to retain possession. If the mortgagor has assented to the possession thus taken, the purchaser will henceforth be deemed to be "a purchaser in good faith possession." But that case is not at all parallel to the instant case. In the instant case there was no foreclosure of the life estate of Charles A. Currier. He has all the rights of an owner and he has had. He could have waived nothing, because he was not brought into court, and is not shown to have had any knowledge whatever of the proceedings. Nor was it said that Charles A. Currier was a debtor in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Currier was a debtor, and the proceeding was against him, and his property properly paid the debt and a judgment had been rendered against him, and he never appeared about it.

3. It is also contended that Herman Schmitt is the owner or transferee of every right and interest in the land, and is one of the parties to the suit. In support of this contention *Young v. Brand*, 15 Neb. 601, is cited, and "The purchaser under a decree of foreclosure obtains the title of all the parties to the suit, and their title be that which is set forth in the decree." To this it may be said that Charles A. Currier was not a party to the suit brought against Eugen

It would not seem that it ought to be seriously contended that a purchaser under a decree of foreclosure obtains the title to that which is not sold or attempted to be sold. Charles A. Currier's inherited title to the land was not sold or attempted to be sold. Some other cases are cited along this line, but they do not seem to be analogous. No greater interest could be sold than the court got jurisdiction of. The thing which the court got jurisdiction of was the life estate of Eugene R. Currier. When the decree was rendered against him it became a lien on the interest which he had in the premises, and at the sale all the interest he had in the premises was sold to John Campbell. When the return of the sheriff showed the sale to John Campbell and the payment of the money, John Campbell was placed in a position where the deed from the sheriff might be made to him, but by his willingness, and because of the fact that Schmideke paid in the \$500 out of which John Campbell received enough to pay the debt which Eugene R. Currier owed to him, the debt and mortgage were extinguished, and Herman Schmideke's name was substituted in the sheriff's deed instead of John Campbell's. Of course, if John Campbell had insisted in court that the deed should be made to him, the court would have so directed the sheriff, but in that event John Campbell would not have received the money. Suppose that after John Campbell received the money he had insisted that the deed should be made to him, would the court have directed the sheriff to so make the deed, and would the court have allowed John Campbell to hold both the interest in the land and the money? Appellants are contending in this case that Schmideke purchased more than John Campbell had to sell if the deed had been made to Campbell instead of being made to Schmideke. This would hardly seem to be a reasonable position.

4. It is said on behalf of the defendants that Charles A. Currier will not be permitted to redeem because his right to redeem is barred; that he became 21 years of

age in December, 1890, and that he could bring an action at that time to redeem. To say that if under the decree against the mortgage of Currier, his interest in the property securing the debt, there is no necessity for redemption, there is no debt to redeem from.

5. It is said in appellants' brief that the property was taken into open, notorious and adverse possession in 1881, and through himself and his mother in such possession ever since. It is contended that Charles A. Currier might have redeemed at any time after he became of age, and that he did not have to redeem if the mortgage was annulled in a proceeding against his father and his mother's father's life estate in the premises. It is contended that discussion of the right of redemption, and that there is a bar to any proceeding upon the mortgage against A. Currier, the plaintiff. The action brought by Currier is ejectment. He inherited the property from his mother. No proceedings have been brought by which that title has become divested. It is contended that the mortgage does not begin to run against him as to the property until his father died. The statute is not necessary to constitute a bar have no effect. Therefore no bar to his maintaining the action. In *Hobson v. Hurtable*, 79 Neb. 340, the court held that a remainderman's estate in the homestead was not an action in ejectment during the life of the tenant, and the statute of limitations did not run against that possessory action until the death of the surviving spouse."

6. It is next contended "that, as the property was divided one-half interest in the premises between V. Allen and Willis E. Reed, the plaintiffs, and only an undivided one-half interest. The record shows conclusively that Charles A. Currier decided an undivided one-half interest in the premises between Allen and Reed, and that this deed

Madison county." Charles A. Currier testifies: "I have deeded away a half interest in the land to cover the costs of this suit and attorney fees." Further on it appears from his evidence that, if Allen and Reed should be paid a sum of money equal to one-half the value of the land, they would reconvey the land to the plaintiff. The conveyance was therefore made to secure fees, expenses and costs.

In the recent case of *Helming v. Forrester*, 92 Neb. 284, this court held, as announced in the syllabus: "Where parties entitled to the possession of land, in arranging for the commencement of an action to recover such possession, execute to their attorneys a quitclaim deed to an undivided half of such land under an agreement that such deed is to be held as security only for the services to be rendered by such attorneys in their behalf, such deed is in effect a mortgage, and does not render it necessary to join the grantees therein named as plaintiffs in such action." In that case there was the same objection to a judgment for the plaintiffs that there is in the instant case. They had executed to their attorneys a quitclaim deed "to an undivided one-half of the land in controversy." This was held in effect to be a mortgage, and not a bar to a judgment for the plaintiffs. In the concurring opinion in that case it was said: "The quitclaim deed given in the instant case was treated by the parties to it as a mortgage, and was so intended by them. We know of no reason why the defendant should be allowed to have it considered as an absolute conveyance contrary to the intention of the parties to it."

7. It is said in the brief of counsel for appellants: "A foreclosure sale of lands and tenements, unless the decree otherwise provides, transfers to the purchaser every right and interest in the property of all the parties to the action"—citing *Hart v. Beardsley*, 67 Neb. 145, and *Arterburn v. Beard*, 86 Neb. 733. That Charles A. Currier was not a party to the action brought against Eugene R. Currier disposes of the contention. Nothing belonging to Charles A. Currier could be sold, or was sold, in the

proceeding to which he was not a party where the judgment was against another.

At the same time it is proper to consider the fact that the cases cited have nothing to do with the instant case. In *Hart v. Beardslager*, Hart, had made two mortgages, one for \$1,800 and one was for \$500, and the court cited that it was "subject and second mortgage insofar as to be given for \$1,800." In the foreclosure the \$1,800 mortgage was declared invalid. In selling the property the appraiser deducted the \$500 mortgage from the proceeds of the premises sold. The decree itself held that the \$1,800 mortgage was a prior lien, and that the supposed lien should not have been considered. In *Currier v. Beard*, *supra*, this court held that the property had been sold and the defendant's interest in the sale were in full possession of an equitable interest in the irrigation, and the plaintiff purchased the property with notice of the existence of the mortgage. He did not purchase the right of action against the former owner, and that the mortgage was not binding on the deed. As we view the case, the court's decision is for the appellants, if successful, would result in the real estate to be sold out and dispossessed of its interest, without being made parties to the sale brought into court in any way.

In *Tindall v. Peterson*, 71 Neb. 1, 101 N.W. 254, the court said: "That the right of contribution is a right of a life tenant and expires with the termination of the tenancy. At most, survives to her personal representative and not be availed of by her successors in interest in the premises." It is assumed by the court that this is true. If it is, the appellants have no right of contribution. Whether true or not, it is unnecessary to decide. If the life tenant was the debtor, the judgment was against the life tenant, and it is not the sale of the life tenant's interest

life tenant himself or his successor in interest may not complain. The contention made seems to ignore the actual condition of the case.

This is a consolidation of numbers 16,859 and 16,862. There is only one bill of exceptions and one abstract and one set of briefs for the two cases. The petition in No. 16,862 is shown by the abstract and transcript to have been filed on the 17th day of April, 1909, and the petition in No. 16,859 seems from the transcript to have been filed on the same day. The cases seem to have been tried together in the district court. The same judgment is shown by the abstract to have been rendered in each case. The journal entry in the district court shows that one of these cases in that court was numbered 3,185 and the other was numbered 3,907, and that they came on for hearing upon the motion to consolidate both cases, and by agreement of parties in open court they were consolidated; No. 3,185 being consolidated with No. 3,907. At the close of the evidence in the trial in the district court, the plaintiff moved to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him possession of the land in suit and the damages as shown by the testimony and stipulation of the parties, and to find that he had a legal estate in the land in controversy and was entitled to the present and immediate possession thereof. The motion was overruled. There seems to have been no controversy over the fact that the plaintiff was the son of Mary J. Currier, and therefore he must have inherited whatever interest she had. She is shown by the record to have owned the fee to the land, subject only to the life estate of her husband. When she died the plaintiff immediately became the owner of the land, subject to the termination of the life estate of Eugene R. Currier, which had been purchased by Herman Schmideke at the mortgage foreclosure sale.

We think that, since the testimony was undisputed that the conveyance to Allen and Reed was intended as a mortgage and was a mere lien or security on the land for the payment of fees and expenses, the district court erred in

submitting that question to the jury. wrong in giving only an undivided one-half premises to the plaintiff. The plaintiff titled to recover possession of the whole according to the prayer of the petition. the district court is reversed and the case further proceedings in accordance with

BARNES, J., took no part in this decision.

SEDGWICK, J., dissenting.

The purchaser of land at a sale upon mortgage takes the interest of the plain defendant. If one who is not a party to equity of redemption, that equity is a right that the purchaser has by his purchase the lien of the mortgage foreclosed. In purchase takes possession of the land, he mortgagee in possession. As against the holder of redemption he must apply the rents of land in satisfaction of the mortgage and The statute of limitations will run again deem. Ejectment cannot be maintained against mortgagee in possession.

The petition in foreclosure described an order of sale directed the sheriff to sell the land not a life estate. The sheriff published notice intended to sell the land, and reported so. The court ordered that the sheriff "convey to the purchaser, John Campbell, by deed in fee and tenements so sold." The sheriff's deed conveyed the land itself, and not a life estate. The conclusion that the life estate of Eugene R. sold is derived entirely from the statement of appraisal that "the interest of Eugene R. sold, we value at \$740.07." The sheriff describes the land, and says that the land

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sum of \$800; that the taxes thereon are \$59.93. They deducted these taxes from the total value of the land, and appraised the remainder as the interest of Eugene R. Currier; that is, they appraised the land itself as the land of Eugene R. Currier. They were clearly justifiable in doing this, as there was nothing in the record of foreclosure indicating that Eugene R. Currier had only a life estate in the land. They considered that the land belonged to Eugene R. Currier, and therefore his interest was the value of the land, less the taxes due thereon.

The attempt was to foreclose the mortgage and sell the land, and, so far as they sold anything, it was the land itself. This sale did not foreclose the plaintiff's equity of redemption, because he was not a party to the proceeding. His right to redeem remained after the sale the same as it was before, and he might have exercised that right at any time within the statute of limitations.

If the defendant in the foreclosure had held a mortgage upon the land, or a quitclaim deed of an undivided portion, the reasoning of the majority opinion would have led to the same erroneous conclusion.

FAWCETT, J., concurs in the above dissent.

CHARLES A. CURRIER, APPELLEE, V. SETTY SCHMIDEKE
TESKE ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED JANUARY 16, 1913. No. 16,859.

APPEAL from the district court for Madison county:
ANSON A. WELCH, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

John J. Sullivan and M. D. Tyler, for appellants.

William V. Allen and Willis E. Reed, contra.

HAMER, J.

The opinion in *Currier v. Teske*, ante opinion in this case, the two cases being terminated together in this court.

SEDGWICK and FAWCETT, JJ., dissent.

BARNES, J., took no part in this case.

DANIEL B. TAYLOR, APPELLEE, V. AMERICAN RADIATOR COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED JANUARY 16, 1913. No. 17

1. **Contracts: PERFORMANCE: STATUTE OF FRAUDS.** personal services which have been performed during the time of the period for which they were engaged, fully questioned after they have been performed, to be within the statute of frauds.
2. **Appeal: CONFLICTING EVIDENCE.** The length of time made to depend upon whether he "made good" his employment was to continue for a period. He was retained in service three years and increased compensation was voluntarily paid him. *Held*, That, in view of the conflicting evidence authorized in reaching the verdict announced, not be set aside where it was within the testimony of the witnesses.
3. **Trial: INSTRUCTIONS.** The instruction complained of was brief examined, and *held* not to be prejudicial.

APPEAL from the district court for
WILLIS G. SEARS, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Sullivan & Rait, for appellant.

G. W. Shields and *Robert J. Shields*,

HAMER, J.

The plaintiff, Daniel B. Taylor, sues to recover an alleged remainder due for wages. He claims to have been employed by the defendant, the American Radiator Company, as a traveling salesman. He alleges that he began work on the 15th of January, 1906. The evidence seems to show that he worked for the defendant three years lacking ten days. He alleges he was to receive for the first year a salary of \$75 a month and expenses; for the second year a salary of \$100 a month and expenses; and for the third year a salary of \$125 a month and expenses. There are also some items of alleged extra expense money. The plaintiff also sets up that the defendant holds his note for \$79.17, and prays to recover a balance of \$555.85, and interest from January 15, 1909, and costs.

The radiator company answered, admitting the employment of the plaintiff, and alleging that he continued in the employ of the defendant at the rate of \$75 a month from the 15th day of January, 1906, to the 1st day of June, 1907; that from January 15, 1906, to June 1, 1907, the defendant paid the plaintiff \$1,237.50, being the sum of \$75 a month for each month during that period; that on the 1st day of June, 1907, it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff should be paid \$91.66 a month, and that the plaintiff entered upon said employment for the sum of \$91.66 a month, and continued in it from the 1st day of June, 1907, until the 1st day of January, 1909; that from the 1st day of June, 1907, to the 1st day of January, 1909, the defendant paid the plaintiff \$1,741.75, or \$91.66 for each month during that period; that on the 5th day of January, 1909, it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff's employment should terminate, and that the plaintiff should not thereafter be employed by the defendant in any capacity whatever; that on the 5th day of January, 1909, plaintiff and defendant had a settlement, and that at the time of the settlement it was agreed that the plaintiff was

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indebted to the defendant in the sum of \$125 loans and advancements made to him; that on day of January, 1909, it was agreed that it should have a credit in the sum of \$45.83, being of a month's salary, and that the said sum was received by the plaintiff in full settlement of all rendered; that the plaintiff, after receiving credit sum of \$45.83, was still owing the defendant a \$79.17; that on said January 5, 1909, the plaintiff executed and delivered his note to the defendant for of \$79.17, and the same was received as a full complete settlement; that the note was dated January and was made payable on demand; that there was any agreement that the defendant should pay plaintiff \$100 a month and expenses for the second year; it was never agreed that the defendant should pay a month and expenses for the third year; and plaintiff denies that the plaintiff expended \$10.75 for fit on the 10th day of October, 1909; and also that the plaintiff spent for its benefit \$3.25 on the January, 1909. The defendant alleges that it is the owner of plaintiff's note for \$79.17; that it demanded payment thereof and the same has been paid and it prays judgment against the plaintiff with interest at 7 per cent. per annum from the January, 1909, and costs.

The reply denies each allegation of new matter that any new contract was entered into on June 1, 1907, and denies that the plaintiff ever entered into a contract to receive \$91.66 a month after June 1, 1907; that he continued in the employ of the company for the sum a month, and also makes other denials. The plaintiff admits making the note for \$79.17 set forth in the defendant's answer.

Mr. Arthur H. Williamson testified that he was Crary as the Nebraska manager of the defendant company; and also that he dismissed Taylor from the company, and that the note was given in

for the balance of a loan made to Taylor, "plus a certain traveling fund." Whether this note was given in final settlement of a balance admitted to be due from the plaintiff to the defendant might well be in doubt but for the testimony of the witness Williamson, who confines it to a part of the transaction. He testified on cross-examination: "We simply settled up those two notes by taking this other note. *That is all we settled.*" This would seem to exclude any claim of actual final settlement between the parties. Crary seems to have been in charge of *the affairs of the radiator company*. Herman I. Lund testified that Crary said that he would pay \$75 a month the first year, and give Taylor a raise to \$100 a month for the second, and \$125 a month the third year, provided that he made good; that after Taylor had been working there a while Crary told him that Taylor was doing his work well. The plaintiff testified that, before entering upon his employment with the company, Crary told him that there was an opportunity for him if he would work. "He told me it was not an easy job; that if I *made good* the first year he agreed to pay me so much; if I didn't he could not use me." The plaintiff also testified that Crary told him that if he did not make good he would soon find it out. He also testified that he saw James Sheahan and explained the agreement with Crary, and that as yet he had not been paid the money, and that Sheahan told him: "You are worth more money and you are going to get it."

It is perhaps apparent that the plaintiff "made good," because the defendant (1) kept him in his employ three years lacking only 10 days, (2) voluntarily began to pay him more money, and (3) because Crary, who employed him on behalf of the company, recommended in a letter to Sheahan an increase in his pay, and (4) it is not denied that James Sheahan told Taylor: "You are worth more money and you are going to get it." But this was for the jury under the instructions. On a conflict of evidence the verdict of the jury, under proper instructions, should be allowed to stand.

Taylor v. American Radiator Co.

Part of the first instruction is quoted by in its brief, and it is said that this instruction with the ruling of the court touching the services rendered, constitutes error. That instruction quoted reads: "Should you find evidence that the plaintiff entered the defense under a contract for \$100 per month for the service, and of \$125 per month for the third year, and that said contract was still in force the plaintiff's work during the third year had not been changed by the attitude of the defendant, you will find for the plaintiff on said claim the amount of his recovery at the difference between what he actually did receive and what his contract provided for during the time of the service, together with interest at the rate of 7 per cent. on his balance from the time of the contract time to the day of the trial. If you find otherwise, you will find for the defendant, a verdict for the defendant on said claim." Counsel do not point out the error in the instruction. It is also said that the jury did not object to the instruction, and as evidence of the fact the defendant's communication to the court, claimed to be the last communication turned with the verdict, is quoted in affirmance.

"A party cannot predicate error in the giving of an instruction upon the ground that the same is erroneous, unless he has first called attention to the court to such defect, and the court refused to correct the same." *Henry v. Omaha*, 81 Neb. 237; *Olmsted v. Noll*, 82 Neb. 147. The error is not challenged by appellant's brief to affirmance. This rule by the trial court. Defendant is not required to have presented to the trial court a proposed instruction in place of the instruction sought to be corrected. The method by which it is claimed in appellant's brief that the jury reached their conclusion, the affidavit is not made a part of the bill of exceptions. The court, and it is not referred to in the material. The record therefore does not disclose

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tention of the trial court was called to the affidavit. Neither is the matter sought to be reviewed properly before us, because it is not in the bill of exceptions. For these reasons, it cannot be considered. To obtain a review in the supreme court, the parties seeking such review must have presented the questions of law to the lower court. *Gibson v. Arnold*, 5 Neb. 186; *Courtney v. Price*, 12 Neb. 188; *Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. v. Lundstrom*, 16 Neb. 254; *Norton v. Nebraska Loan & Trust Co*, 40 Neb. 394; *Dunham v. Courtney*, 24 Neb. 627; *Batty v. City of Hastings*, 69 Neb. 511.

It is next claimed that the court erred in overruling the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. It is undisputed that the plaintiff did the work. He was to be kept in the employ of the company if he made good. That he made good is perhaps settled by what the company itself did. It kept him. It also voluntarily gave him more after a time than it gave him when he began. If the company did not want him and he was unsatisfactory, it could have discharged him, instead of keeping him three years lacking ten days only. We think there was abundant evidence to submit to the jury. We are unable to discover error in the instructions. The verdict of the jury is conclusive.

It is not the province of this court to reverse a judgment of the district court, where the verdict is rendered upon conflicting evidence and under proper instructions. It follows that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

N. J. MAXWELL ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. WILLIAM STEEN,
APPELLEE.

FILED JANUARY 16, 1913. No. 17,656.

1. **Intoxicating Liquors: LICENSE: APPEAL: RECORD.** Where, on appeal to this court from a judgment of the district court affirming the action of a village board in granting a liquor license, the record

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is silent on the question as to whether or not the license was by authority of an existing ordinance, I not indulge the presumption that there was no such

2. ———: ———: SUFFICIENCY OF PETITION. The reasons for the issuance of a liquor license recited: "The names of the petitioners are not, and were not freeholders in any sense at the time of the filing of said petition, * * * and, if freeholders, were made freeholders for the only and express purpose of enabling them to sign the said petition for the said license." The commission found that the signers to the petition were freeholders, there being no evidence that they were not freeholders. In view of the facts and the faith, the license was properly issued.

APPEAL from the district court for Platte County.
 GEORGE H. THOMAS, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

A. M. Post and R. P. Drake, for appellants.

Albert & Wagner, contra.

HAMER, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court for Platte county finding in favor of the applicant, Maxwell Steen, for a liquor license.

The appellants, who are remonstrants, make no objection to the judgment of the district court reversed because it does not appear from the record that there was a valid village ordinance authorizing the issuance of the license.

In *Foley v. State*, 42 Neb. 233, we held that municipalities and corporations will take notice of their own ordinances and that they stand in the same relation to the municipal courts as do courts of general jurisdiction towards the state; and that, on appeal from a judgment of conviction before a police judge for the violation of a village ordinance, the district court will, upon a trial, take notice of whatever facts the former could have ascertained judicially before the removal of the cause. The appellants, recognizing the rule there announced, attempt to escape its application by citing *Steiner v. State*.

147, where, after quoting the above holding, we said: "But a different rule will prevail with respect to this court, where such matters are not triable *de novo*." But in that connection we also said: "This court cannot undertake to notice the ordinances of all the municipalities within its jurisdiction, nor to search the records for evidence of their passage, amendment or repeal. A party relying upon such matters must make them a part of the bill of exceptions, or in some manner present them as a part of the record." Taking these two cases together, we think the rule is fairly deducible that the village board could take judicial notice of the ordinances of the village, and that the district court may have properly considered that, when the village board issued the license, it did so because authorized to do so by an ordinance of the village, and, the record being silent on the question of the existence of an ordinance, this court will not presume that there was no such ordinance. If the district court erred in taking judicial notice of an ordinance which did not exist, it was the duty of the remonstrants to present some evidence of that fact in the record, which was not done. We cannot therefore indulge the presumption that the district court erred in that respect. As further said in *Steiner v. State, supra*: "A party relying upon such matters must make them a part of the bill of exceptions, or in some manner present them as a part of the record."

The remonstrants further objected to the issuance of a license, upon the jurisdictional ground that the petition was not signed by the requisite number of freeholders. The remonstrance recites: "The names to the said petition are not, and were not, freeholders in any sense at the time of the filing of said petition, so made and constituted for the purpose of becoming signers to said petition, and, if freeholders, were made freeholders for the only and express purpose of permitting them to sign the said petition for the said license." Under the oft-repeated holdings of this court, the above language amounts to an admission that the signers were freeholders, and an allegation that

In re Estate of Walkup.

they were made freeholders for the only and expose of permitting them to sign the petition for This was, in substance, an allegation of a fraud tempt on the part of the applicant to obtain a investing certain persons with a mere nominal real estate, for the purpose of enabling them to petition; an act which we have condemned as insufficient to qualify such persons as signers not unmindful of the fact that remonstrances to ing of liquor license are often prepared by persons learned in the law, and freely concede that the rules of pleadings should not be applied to them. No special language should be required in such cases, but should be required to point out in reasonably plain language, informal though it may be, the persons who claim have been fraudulently or in bad faith made freeholders, and support their allegation with evidence that the applicant may meet the charge with proof to the contrary, if he is able so to do. In the record there is an entire absence of proof to sustain the charge to any of the signers of the petition of the applicant.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is

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IN RE ESTATE OF SARAH E. WALKUP.

JOSEPH H. WALKUP, APPELLANT, V. ISABEL C. WALKUP,
APPELLEE.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 17,931.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas County.
GEORGE A. DAY, JUDGE. *Dismissed.*

John M. Macfarland and Charles E. Foster, Appellants.

John P. Breen, contra.

PER CURIAM.

When an appeal to this court is manifestly frivolous, the record presenting no debatable question, it will be dismissed upon motion.

Upon full hearing, all parties being represented, judgment was entered in the district court for Douglas county upon the pleadings. It appears from the pleadings that in the settlement of an estate of a deceased person in the probate court, while the matter was pending upon a motion for final distribution, the court was about to consider a deed conveying the interest of one heir to another, and an objection was filed to the deed on the ground that it was obtained by fraud. In the objection it was suggested that the objector intended to bring an action in the proper court to set aside the deed. Afterwards, the court having considered the matter from time to time for about three months and no action having been begun in a court having jurisdiction to set aside the deed, the probate court refused to delay the matter longer and entered an order of distribution. From that order the objector appealed to the district court. The above facts appear from his pleading, and upon the hearing a judgment was entered against the objector upon the pleadings. No one will contend that the probate court had jurisdiction to set aside the conveyance on the ground that it was obtained by fraud, and if the probate court had no such jurisdiction the district court could not obtain it by appeal. The district court therefore manifestly did right in entering judgment upon the pleadings. The objector appealed to this court, and a motion is now presented to dismiss his appeal, which, for the reason above given, is sustained, and the appeal

DISMISSED.

Sutphen v. Joslyn.

CLINTON JOY SUTPHEN, APPELLANT, v. GEORGE A. JOSLYN,
APPELLEE.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 16,634.

1. **Judgment: CONCLUSIVENESS: INFANTS.** If an action is properly and regularly brought to quiet title in real estate, and some of the defendants are minors, and service is made as the statute requires, a guardian *ad litem* being appointed for such minors who performs all duties required by the statute, and in good faith presents and protects their rights, the decree rendered upon regular proceedings and trial determines the rights of the minors as well as those of adults.
2. ———: ———: **FRAUD.** J. contracted to purchase land from S., and paid a part of the purchase price. He then discovered that the title of S. in the land had been questioned and refused to complete the purchase. It was then agreed between the parties that S. should bring an action to quiet his title, and, if successful, J. should complete the purchase. *Held*, That, there being no evidence of bad faith in the matter, such agreement did not render the decree in the action so brought invalid as constructively fraudulent.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
ALEXANDER C. TROUP, LEE S. ESTELLE and WILLIS G.
SEARS, JUDGES. *Affirmed*.

Rich, O'Neill & Gilbert, for appellant.

John C. Cowin and J. J. Sullivan, contra.

BARNES, J.

The plaintiff in the court below, now the appellant, commenced this proceeding to have vacated and set aside a certain decree of the district court for Douglas county rendered on the 10th day of July, 1893, against the plaintiff and others, then minors, in an action brought by DeWitt C. Sutphen and Charles D. Sutphen, grandfather and father of the plaintiff, respectively, against George A. Joslyn, seeking to compel Joslyn to specifically perform his contract of purchase from the Sutphens of a certain

five-acre tract of land situated in the city of Omaha, now occupied by Joslyn as his residence. It appears that in the suit in question, it became necessary to determine whether the plaintiffs in that case, the grandfather and father of the plaintiff herein, or this plaintiff, together with his minor brother and sister, held the fee title to the property above mentioned. This question in turn necessitated the construction of a certain will of Emily M. Sutphen, the grandmother of this plaintiff, and the wife and mother, respectively, of the plaintiff in the former suit. It further appears that this plaintiff and his minor brother and sister were made defendants in that action, and a guardian *ad litem* was duly appointed to defend them. The proper answer was filed for them, and the questions involved were duly litigated. The district court decided that the plaintiffs in that suit, under the will above mentioned, took the fee simple title to the land in question, that this plaintiff and his brother and sister took nothing, and thereupon decreed a specific performance of the contract of sale between the elder Sutphens and the defendant Joslyn.

The plaintiff in the present action, more than one year after having attained his majority, brought this suit in the nature of an original bill in equity to have that decree set aside, and for a new trial. Upon a trial of the issues joined the district court dismissed the plaintiff's petition, and from that judgment the plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal.

It is argued that there was fraud in procuring the decree of July 10, 1893. In the present action the district court found specifically that there was no fraud in the decree in question, and from a careful reading of the record we are of opinion that no other finding could have been made.

It appears, without dispute, that on the 1st day of April, 1893, the elder Sutphens entered into a contract with the defendant Joslyn for the sale and purchase of the five-acre tract of land now in question; that the considera-

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tion to be paid was a conveyance to defendant's home in Kountz Place it valued at the sum of \$30,000, an \$10,000 of which was to be cash in payment to be deferred and secured premises; that on the 5th day of April had progressed so far that the elder of the premises in question and ten defendant Joslyn; that it was then ever title the elder Sutphens possessed through the will of one Emily M. suggested by Joslyn that perhaps there was only a life estate in the premises, and absolutely and positively refused to pay and pay the balance of the purchase was thereupon submitted to the counsel, who advised that by the elder Sutphens took the fee to the premises and could convey the same to Joslyn claim thereto on the part of the minors D. Sutphen. But, notwithstanding defendant Joslyn refused to further proceed was determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thereupon the elder Sutphens commenced which the decree of July 10, 1893 in this action took the form of a petition filed against the defendant Joslyn to compel performance of the contract on his part. Joslyn filed an answer, alleging, in substance, that he was willing to specifically perform his contract provided the elder Sutphens could be admitted to the premises. He set out in full the contents of the will of Emily M. Sutphen, and alleged that by that instrument the elder Sutphen held a life estate in the premises; that the fee was owned by the children of the plaintiff, Charles D. Sutphen. Therefore the minors were necessary parties to the proceeding; and prayed that the

suit by proper pleadings, and be required to answer and set forth their rights in the premises. By the order of the district court, the minor children were made parties, were required to answer, and a guardian *ad litem* was duly appointed to represent them. The guardian *ad litem* filed the usual and customary answer in such cases, and there was thus presented for the adjudication of the district court the precise question as to who was the fee owner of the premises in question, and what interest, if any, therein was possessed by the minor defendants under the will of their grandmother, Emily M. Sutphen. That the action was thus brought in good faith, and without any concealment or collusion, there can be no question. We are therefore of opinion that there was no actual fraud in the proceedings of which the plaintiff now complains.

Upon the question as to whether the transaction amounted to constructive fraud: The finding of the district court set forth in an able and exhaustive opinion contained in the record herein is, in substance, as follows: The next question is, did that which was done in fact, no matter from what motive, constitute constructive fraud or fraud in law? And we are again impelled to the same conclusion upon this point, and to hold that it did not. There was undoubtedly a *bona fide* intention between the parties to this sale, on the part of the one to buy, and on the part of the other to sell, and after the discovery of what the purchaser deemed was an obstruction to the title there seemed to be the same good faith desire on the part of both to test its legal significance in the only way in which it could be effectively tested—in a court of justice. Now, it seems to us, if this be true, it could not matter to any one concerned how they agreed to formulate the suit by which this question could be tested, so long as no one concerned was, or could be, in any manner prejudiced thereby. There was no concealment from any one of any material fact; there was no disputed fact; no material fact was involved over which there could be a dispute. There was simply prepared and presented to the

court a single, pure, unmixed question of law, upon the mere statement of which its prominence and significance would be at once appreciated by the court. As we view the record, the above finding of the district court was correct, and it is therefore adopted, in substance, as our own.

It is argued, however, that the proceeding was simply a moot suit. This argument is not persuasive. The transaction out of which it became necessary to institute a suit did not originate in sham or collusion. Surely the elder Sutphens had a right to know and have judicially determined what was the extent of their interest in the property in question by virtue of the will of Emily M. Sutphen. Likewise defendant Joslyn, after the execution of the contract of purchase, and he had become the equitable owner of the land, had a right to know the state of the title he was to receive, and to accomplish that purpose a construction of the will was required. That was virtually what the suit was, so far as the rights of the minors were concerned. Again, the Sutphens might have brought suit at any time against the minors to have a construction of that instrument. The minors themselves through a guardian *ad litem* or next friend might have instituted such a suit against the elder Sutphens for the same purpose. The actual facts as they existed were fully set forth to the court. The district court which pronounced the decree in question had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. It assumed to exercise it, and granted the relief requested. At most, the decree may have been erroneous, but it was not void.

It is suggested that making the minors parties to the suit for specific performance had the effect of depriving them of a trial by jury. This is not so, for under no circumstances could the rights of the minors ever have been a question for a jury. It was a pure, unmixed question of law at all times, and under all circumstances to be determined by the court. If it were made to appear that there was involved in the hearing of that case so much as a single disputed fact, a determination of which would

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affect, or even tend to affect, a proper decision of the question of law submitted to the court, there might be room for argument; but such is not the case. It is urged, however, that it was the duty of the guardian *ad litem* to have prosecuted an appeal from the decree in question. It is true that the guardian *ad litem* might have prosecuted such an appeal, and the district court could have directed him so to do; but it is evident from the undisputed facts contained in this record that at the time the decree was rendered the court and counsel for both parties were of the unanimous opinion that the law was correctly determined thereby; that under the will the children took nothing, and therefore to appeal would be a work of supererogation.

From the foregoing, we conclude that the findings of the district court upon the question of fraud are amply sustained by the evidence. Having reached that conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to determine any of the other points urged by counsel. Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

FAWCETT, J., not sitting.

HAMER, J., dissenting.

No extended effort will be made to criticise the opinions. The opinions are delivered in Nos. 16,634 (*ante*, p. 34) and 17,236 (p. 45, *post*). I am compelled to dissent in these cases because I believe the course pursued in the district court for Douglas county in the original case was in disregard of the rights of the heirs. The grandmother intended the property for her grandchildren. No attention was paid to her wishes in the matter. While there was no evil intent—no intent to deprive the grandchildren of their inheritance—the district judge and counsel sought an opportunity to apply the property otherwise than it was intended. If that sort of thing may be done in these cases, it may be done in any case. Hereafter, what-

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ever the disposition of the ancestor toward his grandchildren, he may feel no certainty that the property which he intends for them will ever reach the objects of his bounty. The case made was apparently a sham case. The guardian *ad litem* apparently made no effort to succeed, and there was no appeal. Those who were next to the children did not take care of them. There may have been no evil intent, but there was an utter disregard of the purpose of the grandmother. The district judge was used as a mere convenience, however honestly he may have intended to act.

GLADYS E. KIPLINGER, APPELLEE, V. GEORGE A. JOSLYN,
APPELLANT.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 16,827.

1. **Infants: DISABILITIES.** Under the statutes of this state, the disabilities of a female, as a minor, are ended when she becomes 18 years of age, and she may thereafter bring suits in her own name, and transact business generally. *Parker v. Starr*, 21 Neb. 680.
2. **Judgment: VACATION: INFANTS: LIMITATIONS.** To entitle a female to maintain an action, under the provisions of section 602 of the code, to vacate an order or decree, and for a new trial of an action in the district court, her suit must be commenced within two years after she becomes 18 years of age. If plaintiff relies on the provisions of section 442 of the code, the action must be commenced within one year after arriving at full age.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
ABRAHAM L. SUTTON, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

John C. Cowin and John J. Sullivan, for appellant.

Rich, O'Neill & Gilbert, contra.

BARNES, J.

The plaintiff in this action, after she became 21 years

of age, filed her petition in equity in the district court for Douglas county to set aside the decree of that court attacked by Clinton Joy Sutphen in *Sutphen v. Joslyn*, ante, p. 34. The grounds set forth in her petition were the same as those assigned in the action above mentioned. Upon the issues joined the district court found and decreed that the action was seasonably commenced in point of time, and the plaintiff as one of the heirs of Charles D. Sutphen had a good defense to the action of her father and grandfather against the defendant, George A. Joslyn, for specific performance of the contract which was decreed to be enforced in that action. The decree was set aside, and she was awarded a new trial. From that judgment defendant Joslyn has appealed.

The appellant contends that the district court erred in holding that the action was seasonably commenced, and awarding the plaintiff a new trial. This action was brought under section 602 of the code, which provides: "A district court shall have power to vacate or modify its own judgments or orders, after the term at which such judgment or order was made, * * * by granting a new trial. * * * Fourth. For fraud practiced by the successful party in obtaining the judgment or order. Fifth. For erroneous proceedings against an infant, or person of unsound mind, where the condition of such defendant does not appear in the record, nor the error in the proceedings." Section 609 of the code provides: "Proceedings to vacate or modify a judgment or order, for the causes mentioned in subdivisions 4, 5, and 7 of section 602, must be commenced within two years after the judgment was rendered or order made, unless the party entitled thereto be an infant, or person of unsound mind, and then within two years after removal of such disability." By section 5371, Ann. St. 1911, it is provided: "All male children under twenty-one and all females under eighteen years of age are declared to be minors; but, in case a female marries between the ages of sixteen and eighteen, her minority ends."

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In *Parker v. Starr*, 21 Neb. 680, it was held that a female 18 years of age may bring suit in her own name, and transact business generally. It follows that under our statutes the plaintiff's disability ended when she became 18 years of age. It must be observed that the plaintiff commenced this action more than three years after her disability ended. But counsel for the plaintiff contend that section 442 of the code, which provides that "it shall not be necessary to reserve, in a judgment or order, the right of an infant to show cause against it after his attaining full age; but in any case in which, but for this section, such reservation would have been proper, the infant, within one year after arriving at the age of twenty-one years, may show cause against such order or judgment," has the effect of granting the plaintiff a period of four years after she became 18 years of age in which to commence her action. Considering the several sections of our statutes bearing upon this question together, we are of opinion that section 442 does not have the effect for which the plaintiff contends. It seems clear that, in order to maintain her action, plaintiff must have commenced it within one year after she became 18 years of age.

In view of the rule announced in *Sutphen v. Joslyn*, *supra*, where it was held that there was neither actual nor constructive fraud in the action in which the decree of July 10, 1893, was rendered, and that the decree was binding upon the minors as well as the adult defendants therein, we are of opinion that the plaintiff could not maintain this action. The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and the plaintiff's action is dismissed.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

FAWCETT, J., not sitting.

WILLIAM H. INNESS, APPELLEE, V. JOHN H. MEYER,
APPELLANT.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 16,939.

1. **Parent and Child: ACTION FOR SERVICES OF INFANT.** As a general rule, the right of action for the services or earnings of an unemancipated minor is in the parent, and this is invariably true where the contract of employment was made by the parent.
2. **Appeal: TRIAL BY COURT: FINDINGS.** Where a question of fact in an action at law is submitted to the court, without a jury, upon competent evidence, the judgment of the court is entitled to the same weight and consideration as the verdict of a jury; and the finding and judgment will not be disturbed on appeal, although the evidence was conflicting, unless it can be said that the finding is clearly wrong.

APPEAL from the district court for Wheeler county:
JAMES N. PAUL, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

G. N. Anderson, for appellant.

J. R. Swain and T. D. Meese, contra.

BARNES, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court for Wheeler county. It appears that the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement by which plaintiff's son, a boy about 15 years of age, who was living with and being supported by his father, was to herd cattle for the defendant, and defendant agreed to pay plaintiff for the services of his son \$18 a month. The services were performed, as claimed by the plaintiff, for a period of four months and fourteen days. On defendant's refusal to pay for the services in question, plaintiff brought an action in justice court of Wheeler county, and recovered a judgment against the defendant for the sum of \$81.69. The defendant appealed to the district court, and on a trial, without the intervention of a jury, plaintiff again had judgment for \$80.33. To reverse that judgment the defendant has prosecuted this appeal.

Two grounds for a reversal are assigned, which stated as follows: First. The defendant was not party in interest, and had not the legal capacity to maintain this action. Second. The judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence.

In support of defendant's first assignment, it is claimed that plaintiff's minor son was the real party in interest, and the action could only be maintained by him or by his next friend. The testimony discloses that plaintiff had not emancipated his son, but, on the contrary, claimed his wages; that the contract with defendant was made by plaintiff, and not by the minor son, who made no claim for his services. In such a case, it can be said that the minor son of the plaintiff was not a party in interest. As a general rule, the right to sue for the services or earnings of an unemancipated minor is in the parent. This is invariably true where a contract of employment was made by the parent. 1631. As shown by the evidence in this case, plaintiff is the real party in interest, was the proper party to maintain this action, and defendant's contention cannot be sustained.

In support of the second assignment of error, it is argued that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment, for the reason that the plaintiff was entitled to receive compensation at the rate of \$18 a month, for 30 days as a month, instead of 26 days, as claimed by defendant. The plaintiff testified that it was the custom among cattlemen to pay for such services at the rate of 26 days, instead of 30 days, a month; that this was the understanding between plaintiff and defendant at the time the services in question were contracted for; that on a former occasion defendant had paid plaintiff for his services at the rate of 26 days a month, and this testimony was not denied by the plaintiff. The defendant insists, however, that he was entitled to receive the full value of the plaintiff's son for full 30 days for each month in which he was employed. That question, howe-

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submitted to the court upon competent evidence, and, even if it was somewhat conflicting, the finding of the trial court is entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury, and such finding and judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

DEWITT C. SUTPHEN ET AL., APPELLEES, V. GEORGE A. JOSLYN, APPELLANT; GLADYS E. KIPLINGER, APPELLEE.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 17,236.

Appeal: RELIEF. Where it appears that the district court has erroneously vacated a former judgment and granted a new trial of an action in that court, the former judgment should be reinstated and affirmed.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county: **ALEXANDER C. TROUP, JUDGE.** *Reversed, and judgment of district court reinstated.*

John C. Cowin and J. J. Sullivan, for appellant.

Rich, Gilbert & Nolan, contra.

BARNES, J.

Gladys E. Kiplinger, formerly Gladys E. Sutphen, by her petition in equity, obtained an order setting aside a decree for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of certain real estate, and for a new trial; she having been a minor when the decree was rendered against her. By that decree it was adjudged that her father and grandfather took the fee title to the land in question therein under the will of her grandmother, Emily M. Sutphen; that as such fee owners they could convey a good title thereto; and the defendant Joslyn was required to spe-

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cifically perform his contract of purchase thereof. After the new trial was granted she filed a demurrer to the answer and cross-petition of defendant Joslyn; the grounds of her demurrer being: First. That the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, or the subject matter of the action. Second. That several causes of action are improperly joined. Third. The cross-petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The district court sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the answer and cross-petition. From that judgment defendant Joslyn has appealed. This case, therefore, presents for our determination the identical question decided in *Sutphen v. Joslyn*, ante, p. 34, wherein it was held that by the decree of July 10, 1893, which is the one in question, the plaintiffs in that action took the fee to the land in question, and that their deed conveyed a good title to the defendant Joslyn.

For the reasons stated in our opinion in *Sutphen v. Joslyn*, ante, p. 34, we conclude that Joslyn's answer and cross-petition stated a good defense to the claims of the minor heirs of Charles D. Sutphen, of whom the appellee herein is one; that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer and vacating its former decree.

The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and the decree of July 10, 1893, is reinstated and affirmed.

JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.

FAWCETT, J., not sitting.

STATE, EX REL. COUNTY OF DOUGLAS, APPELLEE, V. FELIX
J. MCSHANE, JR., SHERIFF, APPELLANT.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 17,653.

Statutes: CONSTITUTIONALITY. So much of chapter 53, laws 1907,
as authorizes the county board of counties having more than

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100,000 inhabitants to contract with the lowest and best bidder for feeding prisoners in the county jail is violative of the provisions of section 11, art. III of the constitution.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
ALEXANDER C. TROUP, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

Arthur F. Mullen, for appellant.

James P. English, Albert S. Ritchie and Charles L. Fritscher, Jr., contra.

BARNES, J.

The relator brought this action in the district court for Douglas county for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, as sheriff of that county, to allow the relator and the firm of Garnipee & Flannigan admission to the jail of Douglas county in order to furnish meals to the prisoners confined therein for and during the year 1912 under a contract entered into for that purpose between the county commissioners and said firm under the provisions of section 5, ch. 28, Comp. St. 1905, as amended by chapter 53, laws 1907. The respondent filed an answer to the alternative writ. The district court held that the answer stated no defense, the writ of mandamus was allowed as prayed, and the respondent has appealed.

The appellant assigns error in overruling and disregarding his answer, and awarding a writ of mandamus as prayed, and contends that so much of the amendatory act of 1907 as provides that "it shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners to advertise on or before December 1, 1907, and annually thereafter, for proposals for furnishing meals to prisoners in the county jail according to specifications set forth in said advertisement, and on or before the first day of January in each year to contract with the lowest and best bidder for feeding prisoners in the county jail," is unconstitutional and void: First. Because the amendatory act is violative of the provisions of section 11, art. III of the constitution, which says: "No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the same

shall be clearly expressed in its title." Second. The amendatory act is broader than its title. Third. The act, both directly and by implication, amends several sections of the general laws of the state relating to the powers and duties of the county board and the powers and duties of the sheriff without expressly repealing such sections and reenacting them. Fourth. That the act is local and special legislation, and is violative of section 15, art. III of the constitution, which provides: "The legislature shall not pass local or special laws, * * * where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted."

On the first proposition it may be said that the act in question purports to amend section 5, ch. 28, Comp. St. 1905, entitled "Fees," and, in so far as it treats of that subject, it may be said to be germane to the section amended. It appears, however, that the act provides that for boarding prisoners the sheriff shall receive 50 cents per day, "provided that in counties having by the last preceding national or state census a population in excess of 100,000 the sheriff shall receive for boarding prisoners, including jail supplies, 39 cents per prisoner per day until January 1, 1908, and it shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners to advertise on or before December 1, 1907, and annually thereafter, for proposals for furnishing meals to prisoners in the county jail according to specifications set forth in said advertisement, and on or before the first day of January in each year to contract with the lowest and best bidder for feeding prisoners in the county jail; provided, further, that the sheriff shall, on the first Tuesday in January, April, July and October of each year, make a report to the board of county commissioners or supervisors under oath, showing the items of fees except mileage collected or earned, from whom, at what time and for what service, and the total amount of fees collected or earned by such officer since the last report, and also the amount collected or earned for the current year, and he shall then pay all fees earned to the county treasurer."

It must be said that section 5, ch. 28, Comp. St. 1905, dealt exclusively with the subject of sheriff's fees, and fixed the amount of fees he was to receive for official acts performed by him; that that part of the proposed amendment which is claimed to be unconstitutional does not deal with the subject of fees, but deals with matters entirely foreign to the subject matter of the original section, and refers specifically to the powers and duties of the county board. It attempts to take the control of feeding prisoners away from the sheriff and place it with the county board, which is a matter regulated by a distinct section of the statute. The subjects are not closely related, and are not germane to each other.

In *West Point W. P. & L. I. Co. v. State*, 49 Neb. 223, the court construed an amendatory act passed by the legislature of 1887 (laws 1887, ch. 107) by which it was attempted to include in the amendment a provision for the construction and maintenance of suitable fishways for the passage of fish over and around milldams. The title to the act amended was "an act to prohibit the catching of game fish in certain seasons," and the court held that so much of the act as related to the construction and maintenance of fishways was foreign to the subject of the title of the original and amendatory acts, and was therefore void. In *Trumble v. Trumble*, 37 Neb. 340, it was held that the attempted amendments of the legislature to the decedent law of Nebraska providing a new method for the disposition of homesteads, and containing, among other things, a provision whereby homesteads should be appraised upon proceedings instituted by the county judge, were invalid and unconstitutional. In the opinion in that case the authorities are collected and discussed, and among them are *Smails v. White*, 4 Neb. 353, *State v. Lancaster County*, 6 Neb. 474, *State v. Lancaster County*, 17 Neb. 85, *Touzalin v. City of Omaha*, 25 Neb. 817, *Stricklett v. State*, 31 Neb. 674, and many other cases, which clearly support the respondent's contention.

It is contended by the relator, however, that section 5,

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ch. 28, Comp. St. 1905, was a part of the Revised Statutes of 1866, and the limitations prescribed in section 11, art. III of the constitution of 1875, do not apply to any laws that were passed prior to its adoption. It was decided, however, in *Armstrong v. Mayer*, 60 Neb. 423, that the legislature, when amending a section of a statute, must comply with the provisions of our present constitution, regardless of the time when the statute was enacted. *Preston v. Stover*, 70 Neb. 632; *Knight v. Lancaster County*, 74 Neb. 82. It may be fairly said that the part of the section above quoted was not within the title to either the original or amendatory acts, and was not germane to the subject of either of those acts. We are therefore of opinion that so much of the amendatory act as refers to the powers and duties of the board of county commissioners is unconstitutional and void. Having reached this conclusion, the other points urged by respondent will not be considered.

A careful reading of the amendatory act satisfies us that, after eliminating the unconstitutional portion of it, the remainder of the act is complete in itself, and capable of enforcement. It has been repeatedly held that, if the unconstitutional and constitutional provisions of an act can be separated and leave the remainder of it capable of enforcement, the unconstitutional provisions will be stricken out, and the constitutional provisions will be preserved. *Scott v. Flowers*, 61 Neb. 620; *Trumble v. Trumble*, *supra*; *Stricklett v. State*, *supra*; *State v. Stuht*, 52 Neb. 209.

From the foregoing, it follows that the contract upon which the relator bases its right to the writ of mandamus was not authorized by law, and the district court erred in overruling and disregarding the respondent's answer and awarding the writ as prayed. The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and the action is dismissed.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

JOHN F. PIPER, APPELLEE, V. JOHN NEYLON, APPELLANT.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 17,803.

1. **Bills and Notes: TRIAL. DIRECTING VERDICT.** In a suit on an unpaid, past-due negotiable promissory note, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, where the uncontradicted evidence of witnesses whose credibility is not questioned shows that the plaintiff is a *bona fide* holder of the note; that he purchased it for value before maturity, without knowledge of any infirmity therein, or of any facts indicating bad faith in taking it. *Piper v. Neylon*, 88 Neb. 253.
2. **Appeal: LAW OF THE CASE.** Rulings of the supreme court on the admissibility of evidence become the law of the case, and will be adhered to on a subsequent appeal, unless such rulings are shown to have been clearly wrong.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
ALBERT J. CORNISH, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Shepherd & Ripley and J. B. Strode, for appellant.

Burkett, Wilson & Brown, contra.

BARNES, J.

This case is before the court on a third appeal. As was stated in *Piper v. Neylon*, 88 Neb. 253: "This is a suit on a promissory note for \$700 dated December 26, 1901, and due July 1, 1903. The petition contains a copy of the note, and in substance states: It was executed by John Neylon, defendant, and was delivered to Lee Parker, payee, from whom John F. Piper, plaintiff, purchased it before maturity for value in the regular course of business, without notice of any equities between the maker and the payee. It was indorsed 'Lee Parker, without recourse,' May 1, 1903, and delivered to plaintiff the same day. After maturity it was placed with the Farmers Bank of Lyons and the First National Bank of Lincoln for collection. Upon defendant's failure to make payment, the note was returned to plaintiff. Defendant in his an-

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swer admitted the execution of the note, but stated that it was given in payment of a worthless stallion, which defendant, by false and fraudulent representations of Parker, was induced to buy for breeding purposes alone. The answer further alleges: 'The plaintiff is not an innocent purchaser and *bona fide* holder of said note, having had at all times full notice and knowledge of the equities between the parties and of the terms of the said sale, and of the representations inducing the same, and that, as defendant is informed and believes, he is not, in fact, the owner of said note, but merely a cover and shield for the said Lee Parker in his attempt to collect the same.' The reply was a general denial. A judgment in favor of defendant was reversed here on a former appeal. *Piper v. Neylon*, 81 Neb. 481. The case was retried, and at the second trial defendant again prevailed." On appeal that judgment was reversed for the refusal of the trial court to direct the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. On the third trial the district court directed such a verdict, and from a judgment thereon the defendant has prosecuted this appeal.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence from the consideration of the jury. The competency and materiality of all of this evidence was considered upon the last appeal, and it was held that it should have been excluded. We adhere to what was said in that opinion, and defendant's contention on that point must fail.

It is also argued that the court erred in sustaining a motion to strike out the indorsement found on the back of the note in question. It is a sufficient answer to this argument that the indorsement was held by our former opinion to have been improperly received in evidence.

It is further contended that the plaintiff was not an innocent purchaser of the note: First, because he obtained it at a discount; second, it is claimed that he heard the representations as to the quality of the horse at the time of the sale; and, third, that there is testimony tend-

ing to show that he was once the owner of the horse. The evidence on the first two points above mentioned was before this court on the last appeal, where it was held that the trial court should have instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. Upon the first proposition it may be said, however, that the fact that plaintiff purchased the note in controversy for less than its face value would not prevent his recovery as a *bona fide* holder. *Cannon v. Canfield*, 11 Neb. 506; *Citizens Bank v. Ryman*, 12 Neb. 541. In *Sully v. Goldsmith*, 32 Ia. 397, it was shown that the plaintiff bought the note in question for two-thirds of its value. There was a verdict for the defendant, and the supreme court of Iowa reversed the judgment and set aside the verdict. It appears in the instant case that plaintiff received the note from Parker as part payment for a house, and there was nothing in the transaction tending to show a want of *bona fides* on his part.

Finally, it is conceded in appellant's brief that the only evidence in this record that was not before the court on the former appeal is a statement that plaintiff was once the owner of the horse in question. Neylon testified that Piper said to a stranger in Neylon's barn that he once owned the horse. This was denied by Piper. That fact, however, if true, is immaterial, and would not require the trial court to submit the question of the *bona fides* of plaintiff's purchase of the note to the jury. It must be observed that neither the time when plaintiff is alleged to have owned the horse, nor how long he owned him, if at all, was stated; and nothing was shown inconsistent with the fact that, if he owned the horse at all, it was when he was a mere colt and his qualities could not have been known. To entitle the defendant to a submission of his case to the jury, it was necessary for him to show to the court that the testimony in question would have a material bearing upon the question of the good faith of the plaintiff's purchase of the note.

As we view the record, it contains no additional evidence which would entitle the defendant to a submission

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of his case to the jury. It follows that the district court did not err in directing the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

FELIX J. MCSHANE, JR., SHERIFF, APPELLANT, v. STATE
OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 17,844.

Sheriffs: COMPENSATION. The question decided in this case is identical with the one determined in *State v. McShane, ante*, p. 46.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
P. JAMES COSGRAVE, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Arthur F. Mullen, for appellant.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, and *George W. Ayres*, contra.

BARNES, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court sustaining the action of the auditor of public accounts in disallowing a portion of a claim presented by plaintiff to the auditor of public accounts for allowance against the state.

It appears that plaintiff, as the sheriff of Douglas county, presented the claim in question to the auditor on or about the 1st day of September, 1912. There was contained in that claim the following item: "Board of prisoners from date of conviction, August 27, 1912, to August 30, 1912, 4 days, at 50c a day, \$2." All of the other items of the claim were allowed except the one specifically described, which was allowed at only 19 cents a day. From the allowance of the claim and the disallowance of a

part of the item above set forth, the plaintiff appealed to the district court for Lancaster county. Plaintiff filed a petition in the usual form. To this petition the state filed a general demurrer, which was sustained, and judgment was rendered against the plaintiff dismissing the action, and for costs. From that judgment the plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal.

The record contains a stipulation that the question presented for determination in this case is identical with the one recently decided by this court in *State v. McShane*, ante, p. 46, and the two cases have been consolidated and argued as one. In disposing of this question, it is sufficient to say that in that case it was held that the provision contained in chapter 53, laws 1907, by which the legislature attempted to authorize the county commissioners in counties having more than 100,000 inhabitants to let contracts for feeding prisoners in the county jail to the lowest and best bidder, is unconstitutional and void. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff was not bound by the terms of the contract between the county board of Douglas county and Garnipee & Flannigan, which was upheld by the district court; and, plaintiff having furnished the meals in question to a state's prisoner, which fact was admitted by the demurrer, he was clearly entitled to the compensation mentioned in that part of chapter 53 remaining in force, by which it is declared that the sheriff shall receive the sum of 50 cents a day for furnishing meals to such a prisoner.

We are therefore of opinion that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to plaintiff's petition, and in dismissing his action. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

Champion Iron Co. v. City of South Omaha.

CHAMPION IRON COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF SOUTH
OMAHA, APPELLEE.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 16,960.

1. **Municipal Corporations: PUBLIC BUILDINGS: ACCESSORIES.** The installation of cells in a "city hall," to be used in connection with a police court held in the building, is incidental to, and not inconsistent with, the general purpose for which such a building may be erected.
2. ———: ———: **AUTHORIZATION.** It is impossible to lay down an exact definition of the term "city hall." If separate buildings for different departments of city administration are erected upon the same site, so related to each other and to the main structure as to form practically a part of the same general plan, each of the buildings would be authorized by a vote-conferring power to issue bonds "to purchase a site and erect a city hall thereon."
3. ———: ———: ———. Under the facts recited in the opinion, *held* that the erection of cells in the police court building should be considered as forming a part of the general plan for a city hall, and that the cost thereof is properly payable out of the money appropriated by the vote upon the issuance of bonds for the purchase of a site and erection of a city hall thereon.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
HOWARD KENNEDY, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Lambert & Winters, for appellant.

John P. Breen and A. H. Murdock, contra.

LETTON, J.

This is an action to recover a balance due upon a written contract for installing cell work in a building erected by the city of South Omaha. The city defends upon the ground that it was without power or authority to make and enter into the contract sued upon, for the reason that no appropriation had previously been made by the city either to construct the building or to install the cell work as a part thereof, and that there were no funds available

for that purpose in the city treasury. At the close of plaintiff's testimony the court directed a verdict in favor of the city, and from a judgment dismissing the action the plaintiff has appealed.

The evidence shows that a petition was presented to the city council, asking it to call an election for the purpose of submitting to the voters of the city the question of issuing bonds to the amount of \$70,000 for the purpose of purchasing ground and erecting a city hall thereon for the use of the city. An ordinance was passed in conformity to the prayer of the petition, and a special election held under a call which submitted to the voters the question of issuing the bonds, the proceeds to be used "to purchase a site and erect a city hall thereon for the use of the city." The proposition for the issuance of the bonds carried at the election, and an ordinance was afterwards passed providing for the issuance of the bonds, and declaring that "the funds derived from the sale of said bonds shall be devoted exclusively to the purchase of a site and the erection thereon of a city hall for the use of the city." The evidence further shows that a site was purchased, a city hall erected, and another building erected upon a portion of the site purchased.

The section of the charter governing the issuance of bonds, so far as pertinent, is as follows (Ann. St. 1907, sec. 8410): "The mayor and council may purchase the necessary grounds and erect thereon a city hall and other buildings that may be necessary for the use of the city. For the purpose of paying the cost thereof, the mayor and council are authorized to issue bonds in any sum not exceeding \$100,000" This is followed by a provision regulating the issuance of bonds. Sections 8290, 8291, and 8292 provide, in substance, that the city council shall pass an ordinance to be termed "Annual Appropriation Bill," which shall specify the object and purpose for which appropriations are to be made; that an estimate shall be prepared before the appropriation is made each year; and that the mayor and council shall have no power to issue

or draw any order or warrants for the payment of money, unless the same shall have been appropriated or ordered by ordinance, or the claim has been allowed and the appropriation out of which such claim is payable has been made as provided in the annual appropriation bill. Section 8304, in substance, provides that no contract shall be made and no expense incurred, "unless an appropriation shall have been previously made concerning such expense, except as herein otherwise expressly provided."

The plaintiff contends that the provision of section 8410 giving power to erect a city hall and other buildings, and for issuing bonds for the purpose of paying for the same, is of itself an appropriation of the funds derived from the sale of the bonds to the purpose for which they are voted, and that the provision with reference to annual appropriation bills applies only to money derived from taxation and other sources. This seems to be conceded. Plaintiff also contends that, under the authorization to purchase a site and erect a city hall, the city and council were given power to make the contract sued upon. The stipulation of facts shows that after the sale of the bonds a site was purchased, 100 feet square, and an architect was employed to prepare plans and specifications for a city hall; that bids were called for for the construction of a city hall and jail building pursuant to the plans and specifications prepared by the architect; that bids were received and a contract let for the "construction and completion of the new city hall and jail for the sum of \$43,770, containing a separate bid upon a coping or boundary wall connecting the two buildings, in the sum of \$225;" that the contract for the two buildings included the installation of a heating plant (the same plant covering the heating of each building), and the contract included the electrical wiring and plumbing fixtures in each, and also the building of a coping wall between the buildings which extends from one building to the other. It is further stipulated that the plaintiff is claiming under an entirely separate and different contract from that of the builders; plaintiff's contract being "for

the installation of jail fixtures and cell work in the building devoted to the police court." At the time the contract was made there was sufficient money unexpended out of the \$70,000 from the issuance of bonds to pay the full amount of the contract with the plaintiff, and there were no other funds available or appropriated for that purpose. The plaintiff called a witness and offered to prove that the cell work in the city jail building was constructed in accordance with the plans and specifications, except as to the alterations directed by the city officials and the architect, and that it was completed and taken possession of by the city before the action was begun. This testimony was objected to for the reason that there was no appropriation made other than the money received by the sale of the city hall bonds, and that there being no legal contract, and the action being upon the contract, the offer was irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial. The objection was sustained. The offer to show the amount or balance remaining unpaid upon the original contract was also denied upon the same ground. Further offers of proof were refused for the same reason, and the jury directed as stated.

From this statement it will be seen that but one question is presented, which is, whether a contract to furnish cell work for a building used in connection with the city hall for the police court of the city may be legally made under a vote authorizing the city officials "to purchase a site and erect a city hall thereon for the use of the city." The question is not free from difficulty. It is clear that the city authorities have no power or authority to use the money derived from the sale of bonds under this statute for purposes foreign to that for which the money was voted, but it is equally clear that a reasonable discretion must be vested in such officers as to the manner in which the building shall be constructed in order to serve the purpose of its erection. The photographs in evidence show two buildings near each other. The larger seems to be the city hall building, and the adjacent building bearing the tablet "Police Court" seems to be occupied by offices

or courtrooms in the second story, and by the jail on the ground floor. The buildings are connected at the street end by a wall without an opening therein. Each building has upon the side facing the other a door opening at the ground level, and a walk extending from the door in the one to the door in the other. Both from the stipulation of facts and from these photographs it appears that the building in which the cells are placed is also occupied by the police court of the city.

It is the contention of the city that because the statutes authorize it to erect hospitals, workhouses, houses of correction, jails, station houses, market houses, and marketing places, and to provide for the erection of other usual and necessary buildings, the city had no power to divert a part of the funds voted by the people for the construction of a city hall to the erection of any of the other buildings named in the statute. We think, however, that this is too narrow an interpretation to be placed upon the law. There is no restriction upon the power of the city to use a building for more than one purpose. The uses of a city hall building may be manifold. If such a building could in conformity with and incidental to the proper carrying out of the main purpose of its construction be used for more than one related purpose, we see no reason why this should not be done. It is a matter of public knowledge of which we take judicial notice that in some cities the administration of the police, fire and water departments is carried on in offices in the city hall, while in other cities the police department and fire department are cared for in buildings entirely separate and distinct, and which from their situation could not in any view be considered as forming a part of the city hall. If the council chamber, the mayor's office, the revenue department, the police department, and the police court had all been housed in one building, and if the authorities of the city had considered it to be necessary and proper for the dispatch of the police business of the city that cells should be set up in the basement of the same building, could it with reason be said that it was beyond

the powers of the city to contract for such cells? The accommodation of a police court is one of the ordinary purposes to which a city hall is devoted, and we think that an equipment of cells to be used in connection with and for the purpose of the police court could with propriety be housed under the same roof and be considered as a part of a city hall and equipment. If the buildings had been under one roof, therefore, we think there could be no question as to the power of the city to contract. Does the fact that both buildings are not under the same roof, although both are erected upon the site purchased for city hall purposes, and neither is used exclusively for a jail, change the result? It is not infrequent in the construction of hospitals or prisons that a central administration building is erected, with separate buildings for different purposes connected with the general plan. We think it has never been contended that such separate buildings used in connection with the main building and incidental to the general plan and purpose required a special authorization for their erection. If in the construction of a penitentiary the authorities should believe that a separate building should be used for a workshop or for a prison kitchen and dining room, could this render such separate building any less a part of the prison? Or, if it were deemed proper that the city should operate a separate lighting plant for the lighting of its city hall, could it not properly be erected upon the same site and in a separate building, as a part of the general purpose? In perhaps a majority of instances large public buildings are heated from separate buildings on the same site. But the heating plant is usually considered a part of the general plan, and therefore authorized. We are of opinion that it is not an essential requisite to the validity of a contract under bonds voted for the erection of a city hall that the same roof cover every department of the city administration. If the architect should with the approval of the city authorities distribute the city departments, executive, judicial, and administrative, into separate buildings on the site which has been devoted to

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city hall purposes as a part of the same general plan, and in connection with and in relation to each other, we think there is nothing in the statute to forbid. It is impossible to lay down an exact definition of the term "city hall." It is sufficient to say that where the buildings and appurtenances provided for are upon the same site, and are so related to each other and to the main purpose of the erection as to form practically a part of the same general plan, they may each and all be included within that category.

Defendant argues that, when the governing board of a municipality is authorized by the vote of the people to incur a debt for a particular purpose, such purpose must be strictly followed, and the terms of the authority granted must be strictly and fully performed, citing *Tukey v. City of Omaha*, 54 Neb. 370. There is nothing inconsistent with this in the view taken here. In that case it was sought to erect a market house in a public park after bonds had been authorized to purchase a site therefor and to erect the building on the site. The taking of the park was not contemplated by the voter as a consequence of his ballot in favor of the bonds.

We are convinced that the city authorities had the power to enter into the contract in question, and that the money required to be paid by its terms was sufficiently appropriated by the proceedings leading up to the issuance and sale of the bonds.

For the reasons stated, the district court erred in holding that the contract was void. Its judgment is therefore

REVERSED.

ALBERT S. RITCHIE, APPELLEE, v. J. V. STEGER, APPELLANT.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 16,952.

1. **Appeal: INSTRUCTIONS.** In an instruction defining the issues, a statement that an undenied, immaterial allegation of the petition may be regarded as a fact is not a ground of reversal in a record which does not affirmatively show prejudice to appellant.
2. ———: **EXCESSIVE VERDICT: FAILURE TO OBJECT.** In a reviewing court, excessive recovery is not a ground for reversing the judgment, where the amount of the verdict is not challenged below by an available assignment of error.
3. ———: **INSTRUCTIONS: REVIEW.** On appeal, instructions correctly stating the law applicable to the issues raised by the pleadings cannot be successfully assailed by defendant on the ground that such instructions are inapplicable to evidence tending to support a defense not pleaded.
4. **Trial: VERDICT: IMPEACHMENT.** Matters inhering in the verdict of a jury cannot be assailed by affidavits of jurors.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
HOWARD KENNEDY, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

John L. Webster, for appellant.

Carl E. Herring and Albert S. Ritchie, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is an action to recover compensation in the sum of \$1,999.99 for professional services alleged to have been rendered during a period of years by plaintiff as attorney for defendant. From judgment on a verdict in favor of plaintiff for \$1,500, defendant has appealed.

In the first assignment of error the trial court's statement of the issues to the jury is assailed for directing, in substance, that plaintiff alleges "the defendant is the proprietor, with his sons, of the largest piano factories in the world, located at Steger, Illinois, said town receiving its name from the defendant on account of the large interests of defendant located there;" that defendant in his

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answer admits this allegation; that the court's summary of the issues is merely a summary of the claims of the respective parties, and is intended to assist in considering the evidence, but, except as to admissions, is not to be taken as a recital of facts. The issues by the answer were the employment of plaintiff as attorney, the performance of professional services for defendant, and the amount of compensation, if any. The criticisms of the instruction are that defendant's prominence as president of the largest piano factories in the world was immaterial to the issues; that in calling the jury's attention to the undenied allegation mentioned defendant was prejudiced; that the implied charge to consider the answer as a recital of fact was improper; and that the instruction should not have been directed to defendant's admissions. There is abundant reason why the judgment should be reversed for the giving of the instruction cited. Defendant in his answer did not deny the allegations regarding his factories. If it could not truthfully be denied, and was immaterial, and if defendant did not consider it considered by the court or the jury, or made the statement of comment, he had his remedy by motion to strike out of the petition. He did not see fit to pursue that remedy. In allowing the averment to remain in the record, the court acquiesced with plaintiff in putting it there; and it is to be assumed, under the circumstances, that he did not receive a benefit from the prominence it gave him, but that it was not a reflection upon him, and it does not appear that he was prejudiced by it. It was not from which the jury could infer that he had employed plaintiff or had been advised by him. If, however, the instruction be held prejudicial, it would only affect the amount of recovery, and of that no available complaint is made by assignments of error.

Other instructions are challenged as amounting to a declaration that plaintiff had a right to enter defendant's employ, though the evidence shows, so it is said, that he had previously entered into contracts which obliga

as an attorney, to assume on behalf of others an attitude hostile to defendant and inconsistent with professional relations with the latter, and that plaintiff received from others compensation for professional services antagonistic to the interests of defendant. This assignment of error cannot be sustained for the following reasons: As abstract propositions of law the instructions assailed are not open to serious criticism. In giving them the trial court charged the jury on the law applicable to the issues raised by the pleadings. Those issues were: Did defendant employ plaintiff as attorney? Did plaintiff perform services as attorney for defendant? If these questions are answered in the affirmative, what is the amount of plaintiff's compensation? In his brief defendant frankly states that these are the issues. That plaintiff's former retainers prevented him from serving defendant professionally was not pleaded as a defense. No effort was made to amend the answer either to include that issue or to conform the pleadings to the proof. If plaintiff accepted compensation from defendant's adversaries, the verdict is not properly assailed as excessive. On this particular feature of the case defendant did not request instructions containing his theory of the law. The record presented, therefore, does not in this respect contain an error available to defendant.

Misconduct of jurors is also a subject of complaint, but it is based on an attack made in violation of the rule that matters inhering in the verdict of a jury cannot be assailed by affidavits of jurors. *Iman v. Inkster*, 90 Neb. 704.

No reversible error has been found, and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

HAMER, J., dissents.

WILLIAM G. KORAB V. STATE OF NEBRASKA.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 17,615.

Information: SUFFICIENCY: ARREST OF JUDGMENT. An information for receiving stolen property does not state facts constituting an offense, where the property is described only as "the personal property of John Lightfoot of the value of \$48, then lately before stolen;" and, after a verdict of guilty on such an information, it is error to overrule a motion in arrest of judgment.

ERROR to the district court for Boyd county: R. R. DICKSON, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

W. T. Wills and M. F. Harrington, for plaintiff in error.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, and Frank E. Edgerton, contra.

ROSE, J.

In a prosecution by the state, William G. Korab, defendant, was convicted of receiving stolen property valued by the jury at \$38, and for that offense was sentenced to serve in the penitentiary a term of not less than one nor more than seven years. As plaintiff in error he now seeks a reversal of his conviction.

The information was made by the county attorney of Boyd county, Nebraska, and charged: "William G. Korab, late of the county aforesaid, on the 14th day of March, A. D. 1912, in the county of Boyd and the state of Nebraska, aforesaid, unlawfully and feloniously did receive the personal property of John Lightfoot of the value of \$48, then lately before stolen, taken and carried away, with the intent of him, the said William G. Korab, to defraud said John Lightfoot, he then and there well knowing the said personal property to have been stolen."

Defendant did not bring up a bill of exceptions. The only assignment of error available to him here is the overruling of a motion in arrest of judgment. "That the facts

stated in the indictment do not constitute an offense" is a statutory ground for sustaining such a motion. Criminal code, sec. 493. Were the facts stated sufficient to charge a felony? The inquiry is directed to the description of the property. It is described in the information as "the personal property of John Lightfoot of the value of \$48, then lately before stolen." The prosecutor intended to charge defendant with violating the following statutory provisions: "If any person shall receive or buy any goods or chattels of the value of thirty-five dollars or upwards, that shall be stolen or taken by robbers, with intent to defraud the owner, or shall harbor or conceal any robber or thief guilty of felony, knowing him or her to be such, every person so offending shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary no more than seven years, nor less than one year." Criminal code, sec. 116.

An information for larceny may contain also a count for receiving the stolen property. Criminal code, sec. 419. Since both offenses may be charged in the same information, the rules for determining the sufficiency of the description in charging larceny apply substantially in a prosecution for the single offense of receiving stolen property. In this state the law has been stated thus: "In an indictment or information for larceny the property alleged to have been stolen should be described with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine that such property is the subject of larceny; to advise the accused with reasonable certainty of the property meant, and enable him to make the needful preparations to meet such charge at the trial." *Barnes v. State*, 40 Neb. 545. This is the general rule. An eminent text-writer says: "As in larceny, so in receiving, the transaction is identified by the description of the stolen things, and their ownership; namely, the thing stolen must be described in the same manner as in larceny." 2 Bishop, *New Criminal Procedure* (4th ed.) sec. 982.

In the present case the description, "personal property of John Lightfoot of the value of \$48," did not enable the

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court to determine that the property was the subject of larceny, nor advise defendant with reasonable certainty of the property meant, so as to enable him to make the needful preparation to meet the charge at the trial. The information, according to the correct rule and the one supported by the weight of authority, was insufficient to charge defendant with the felony denounced by the statute. *Merwin v. People*, 26 Mich. 298; *State v. Kosky*, 191 Mo. 1; *Gabriel v. State*, 44 Fla. 57; *Brown v. State*, 116 Ga. 559; *Wells v. State*, 90 Miss. 516. The facts stated in the information being insufficient to charge an offense, the motion in arrest of judgment should have been sustained. It necessarily follows that the sentence must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

LETTON, J., not sitting.

NEBRASKA POWER COMPANY, APPELLEE, V. ARNOLD C.
KOENIG ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1918. No. 17,743.

1. **Trusts: CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS: ENFORCEMENT IN EQUITY.** A court of equity may acquire jurisdiction to decree that a trustee filed in his own name for the beneficiary an application to divert water from a river, though he asserts he acted for himself alone, and shows that, for the purpose of canceling prior, adverse applications of the beneficiary, he instituted a contest which is pending before the state board of irrigation.
2. **Corporations: DIRECTORS.** A director of a corporation is a fiduciary and is treated by courts of equity as a trustee.
3. **Trusts: CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.** The rules of equity which determine the consequences of acts performed by a fiduciary extend to all cases, where, on one hand, confidence is properly reposed, and, on the other, knowledge or authority or influence arises from the fiduciary relation.
4. ———: ———. A person gratuitously or officiously assuming as

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agent or trustee to control or manage the property or interests of another is as firmly bound by the implied terms of his confidential relation as one who is regularly employed and paid.

5. ———: ———: **ABANDONMENT OF RELATION.** A fiduciary by abandoning his trust and by assuming toward the beneficiary a hostile attitude cannot change the legal consequences of former relations and conduct.
6. ———: ———: **OBLIGATION OF TRUSTEE.** Means and knowledge acquired by a fiduciary in performing the duties of his trust cannot be used by him to gain a personal advantage at the expense of the beneficiary.
7. ———: ———: ———. Outside of proper compensation and expenses, any advantage gained by a trustee, either in performing his duty or in betraying his trust, inures to the benefit of the beneficiary.
8. ———: ———: **RESTORATION OF BENEFITS.** The benefit arising from an application to divert water from a stream for power is one which may be restored by a court of equity to the beneficiary, if acquired and held by a trustee in his own name in violation of his duties.
9. ———: ———: ———. A fiduciary, engaged as such in the work of establishing water rights, cannot acquire and hold for himself new, adverse rights, and justify his conduct by asserting that prior holdings of his principal were subject to forfeiture; and, if he attempts to do so, he will be held accountable as a trustee.
10. **Foreign Corporations: POWERS: ACTS OF DIRECTOR: ESTOPPEL.** Where a director of a nonresident corporation, which is authorized by its charter to acquire water rights for an electric power plant, asserts and exercises such rights on behalf of the corporation, he is estopped to deny it has that authority, when called to account as a fiduciary for making in his own name applications for adverse water rights.
11. ———: **FILING ARTICLES.** The prosecuting of a suit is not transacting business, within the meaning of the statutes requiring a corporation to file its articles of incorporation with the secretary of state, before transacting business in Nebraska.
12. ———: **HOLDING REAL ESTATE: DIRECTORS: ESTOPPEL.** To procure an advantage personal to himself, a director of a nonresident corporation cannot urge its statutory disability to hold real estate, where it is authorized to do so by its articles of incorporation.

APPEAL from the district court for Platte county: CONRAD HOLLENBECK and GEORGE H. THOMAS, JUDGES. *Affirmed.*

Field, Ricketts & Ricketts, C. C. Flansburg and E. J. Hainer, for appellants.

A. M. Post, Jesse L. Root, E. C. Strode and M. V. Beghtol, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is a suit for an injunction. The parties are rival claimants to rights growing out of an application to divert from the Loup river 3,200 cubic feet of water a second for the purpose of operating a hydro-electric power plant. The application was filed with the state board of irrigation by defendant Koenig. His codefendants are his transferees. Plaintiff is a corporation for which Koenig had been a director and an engineer. It pleads facts under which it asserts that it acquired prior rights to the use of waters of the same stream; that earlier applications had been transferred to it; that Koenig was its fiduciary or trustee, by reason of his directorate and his employment as engineer; that his filing inured to its benefit; that it is the beneficial owner of whatever rights arose from the filing of the application by Koenig, and that he wrongfully instituted before the state board of irrigation a contest of plaintiff's prior applications; that his contest is based on the false assertion that he is individually entitled to the benefits of his application for water rights instead of plaintiff. Koenig claims that he is not answerable as trustee; that in making his application he properly acted in his own behalf; and that he became the legal owner of accruing rights. The principal questions litigated may be stated thus: In equity, did Koenig file the application for plaintiff? Who is entitled to the benefit of Koenig's

preliminary step in filing his application to acquire water rights? The facts on which the parties rely are fully pleaded. A vast amount of testimony was adduced on both sides. The trial court found that Koenig and his codefendants held the application in trust for plaintiff, and enjoined them from using it to contest the earlier applications which had been transferred to plaintiff. Defendants have appealed.

The injunction is first challenged as an interference with the exclusive original jurisdiction of the state board of irrigation to allot and administer the waters of the state. The argument on this point is unsound for the following reasons: The issues presented to the trial court did not involve the allotting or the administering of any of the waters of the state. Neither the priority nor the validity of any application for water was adjudicated. No such application was sustained or disallowed. It was not decided that the filing made by Koenig was valid or invalid. All subjects over which the state board of irrigation had exclusive original jurisdiction were left open. On issues properly raised, it was found that Koenig made the application as a fiduciary, and that any interest arising therefrom belonged to plaintiff. This was a proper subject of judicial inquiry, and, in making it, the exclusive province of the administrative board was not invaded. The contest of earlier applications was based on the filing of Koenig. If he acted for plaintiff, and if inuring interests were plaintiff's, why should not a court of equity say so and restore the legal title to the beneficial owner? As between plaintiff and its fiduciary, why was not the former entitled to legal evidence of its ownership in the form of a decree in equity? If the rights growing out of the Koenig application belonged to plaintiff, why should Koenig, a trustee, be allowed to make use of the claim of plaintiff to contest its earlier applications? These are questions into which the court of equity below inquired, and, in doing so, it kept within its jurisdiction, and did not improperly interfere with that of the state board of

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irrigation. The issues and the decree will admit of no other interpretation.

- On the merits of the case, defendants concede the fundamental question to be: Was the Koenig application held in trust for plaintiff? Though the entire record, voluminous as it is, and all observations of counsel have been carefully considered, references to the facts must necessarily be brief. Beginning August 24, 1895, and ending July 30, 1906, H. E. Babcock, a resident of Ord, Nebraska, filed with the state board of irrigation a number of applications to divert water from the Loup river for irrigation and power. His filings were made for the benefit of the Central Irrigation Company, a Nebraska corporation, of which he was the president and a director. The interests, rights and property acquired by him were transferred to plaintiff, a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware. Babcock is plaintiff's president, and is also a member of its board of directors. In promoting the enterprises initiated in the manner stated, plaintiff and its predecessors have invested a large amount of capital. A number of surveys were made, and valuable engineering data were collected. Some canals were dug, and other work was started. During the years 1910 and 1911 plaintiff's officers sought capital to complete and carry on the work begun. To this end Babcock tried to interest Henry L. Doherty, a promoter of New York City, and furnished him information in regard to conditions and prospects. A like service on behalf of plaintiff was undertaken by Fritz Jaeggi, who appealed to G. Wegmann, a resident and capitalist of Zurich, Switzerland. Jaeggi was plaintiff's principal stockholder, and was also a director. He had been a resident of Switzerland, and had formed intimate business relations with Wegmann. The latter asked for technical information, including reports of engineers. Babcock and Jaeggi worked in harmony in the interests of plaintiff to unite Doherty and Wegmann in a plan to finance its power project. For services as an engineer, Koenig accepted capital stock issued by plaintiff, and be-

came a director in 1910. As such, he attended meetings of the board of directors, and otherwise participated actively in the affairs of the corporation. Under employment by president Babcock, he performed services as engineer in connection with the power enterprise in 1909. He had access to plaintiff's records. He used the engineering data collected by former engineers. He conferred with Doherty and sought employment from Wegmann. The latter asked him to make reports and to furnish technical information in regard to the matter with a view to investing a large amount of capital. In complying with Wegmann's wishes, Koenig not only used the work of the engineers who had formerly been in the service of plaintiff, but discussed in his correspondence his directorate and the validity of plaintiff's applications to use the water of the Loup River. After Koenig had been thus engaged, he made the application in controversy while he was one of plaintiff's directors. It was filed September 30, 1910. His point of diversion from the Loup River is a short distance above that upon which plaintiff chiefly relies. If Koenig procures and exercises the rights demanded in his application, plaintiff's power project will be injured, if not destroyed. Some of plaintiff's officers testified they understood from what Koenig had said in regard to his purposes that he made the filing for the benefit of plaintiff. In any event, he did not obtain from plaintiff permission to make the application in his own behalf. Claiming for himself all benefits arising from the application which he had filed in his own name, he resigned his directorate in March, 1912, and early in the following month instituted before the state board of irrigation a contest in which he prayed for the cancelation of all prior applications on which the success of plaintiff's power project depended.

The facts and conclusions thus briefly stated are proper deductions from the evidence, though defendants assert, and argue there is testimony to prove, that Koenig assumed no obligation to procure water rights for plaintiff; that he practiced no fraud or deception; that he violated

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no obligation or duty to plaintiff; that he informed plaintiff of his doings; that he advised plaintiff its old applications had lapsed for failure to comply with statutory requirements; that he entered the employ of Wegmann with the knowledge and consent of plaintiff; that, in addition to his work, he expended thousands of dollars in the course of his employment; that, after receiving the benefit of his services, Wegmann and plaintiff refused to make new filings to protect itself or him from the forfeiture of the other applications; that on account of the surveys he had made, the report and plans he had worked out, and the expenses he had incurred, he was obliged for his own protection to make the application in controversy; and that he was not a constructive trustee whose filing was made for plaintiff.

In equity, for whom did Koenig act when he filed the application to take from the Loup river above plaintiff's point of diversion 3,200 cubic feet of water a second? That amount of water will practically exhaust the supply during a considerable part of the year. If the filing was intended for the individual benefit of Koenig, it was an act of distinct hostility to plaintiff. It brought on a contest, which, if successful, would result in the cancelation of every right of plaintiff to take water from the Loup river for irrigation or power. In addition to being a director, Koenig had been employed as an engineer to perform special services for which his skill and training had prepared him. It does not appear, however, that it was any part of his duty to determine that the early applications had been forfeited. Counsel took a different view of the law, and so advised plaintiff. The value of the right to divert 3,200 cubic feet of water a second from the Loup river for power was learned, in part at least, through his special employment while he was performing his duties to plaintiff and examining engineering data collected by other specialists formerly engaged in the same project. Koenig's directorate alone made him plaintiff's fiduciary.

Judge Thompson in his work on Corporations says:

"The rule is thoroughly embedded in the general jurisprudence of both America and England that the status of directors is such that they occupy a fiduciary relation toward the corporation and its stockholders, and are treated by courts of equity as trustees. Courts hold the directors of a corporation to the strictest accountability. Conduct inconsistent with any duty is condemned. The fiduciary relation is so vital that directors are not only prohibited from making profit out of corporate contracts, and from dealing with the corporation except upon the most open and on the fairest terms, but the rule of accountability is so strict that they are not permitted to anticipate the corporation in the acquisition of property reasonably necessary for carrying out the corporate purposes or conducting the corporate business." 2 Thompson, Corporations (2d ed.) secs. 1215, 1246.

To the confidential relation created by the office of director, there is added in the present case the duties and obligations growing out of the fiduciary's employment as an engineer and the knowledge and influence acquired in that capacity. In *Wright v. Smith*, 23 N. J. Eq. 106, the chancellor said: "Every man has a trust to whom a business is committed by another. Every man is a trustee whose office is to advise or to operate, not for himself, but for others." The rules of equity which determine the consequences of acts performed by a fiduciary are not restricted to attorney and client, nor to similar conventional relations, but extend to all cases, where, on one hand, confidence is properly reposed, and, on the other, knowledge or authority or influence arises from any cause. *McCormick v. Malin*, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) *509.

A person gratuitously or officiously assuming as agent or trustee to control or manage the property or interests of another is as firmly bound by the implied terms of his confidential relation as one who is regularly employed and paid. *Wright v. Smith*, 23 N. J. Eq. 106. Koenig, by resigning his directorate in March, 1912, and by instituting his contest a few days later, did not change the legal con-

sequences of his former relations and conduct. A fiduciary who enters upon the performance of duties growing out of his confidential relations is not permitted to abandon his trust at pleasure to the injury of the principal or the beneficiary. *Tisdale v. Tisdale*, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 595, 64 Am. Dec. 775.

Among the principles enforced by courts of equity in dealing with conduct growing out of relations of trust and confidence are the following: Means and knowledge acquired by a trusted representative in performing the duties of his trust cannot be used by him to gain an individual advantage at the expense of his employer. *Cottom v. Holliday*, 59 Ill. 176. In matters relating to the subject of an agency or a trust, the fiduciary acts for his principal alone. *Porter v. Woodruff*, 36 N. J. Eq. 174. Outside of proper compensation and expenses, any advantage gained by a trustee, either by performing his duty or by betraying his trust, inures to the benefit of the beneficiary or principal. *Dodd v. Wakeman*, 26 N. J. Eq. 484; *Lafferty v. Jelley*, 22 Ind. 471; *Moinett v. Days*, 60 Tenn. 431. The purpose of the law in dealing with relations of trust and confidence is to raise the trustee above the temptation to violate his duties to his employer or to the beneficiary. *Porter v. Woodruff*, 36 N. J. Eq. 174.

It is firmly established, both by English and American courts, that a trustee is bound to perform faithfully the duties relating to his trust, and that in doing so he cannot allow his own interests to interfere. If he unites his personal and representative capacities, he confuses transactions which the law requires him to keep separate and distinct. If he attempts to acquire an individual interest in the subject matter of his trust or agency, he creates a temptation to serve himself at the expense of the beneficiary or principal, and enters a realm where his secret purposes with reference to trust property or interests may escape judicial scrutiny. To prevent evil consequences from growing out of the advantages which his position gives him, it will be presumed that what he does in rela-

tion to the interests or property involved in the trust or agency is done in a representative capacity. For the same reason, any advantage beyond proper expenses and compensation belongs to the *cestui que trust*. Adherence to these doctrines keeps personal and representative transactions free from entanglement, removes from the fiduciary the temptation to gain an undue advantage, and permits courts of equity to enforce the rights of the beneficiary. The philosophy on which these rules of law and equity rest came down through the centuries from the Chancellor of Galilee. The wisdom and necessity of such doctrines become more apparent as the forms in which property is held multiply under new conditions, and as earning capital in the custody and control of agents or trustees follows new enterprises over the world, where it is not under the watchful eye of the owner. Courts of equity do not set bounds to the principles which control the conduct and fix the accountability of trustees. The elasticity of these rules extends their applicability to all of the devices invented by unfaithful fiduciaries to evade their obligations or to defeat the imperative demands of business integrity and sound public policy.

Though Koenig in making the application in his own name, and in asserting individual rights arising therefrom, may not have been prompted by any evil design, and though he may justify his conduct according to his own standards of business rectitude, equity will nevertheless enforce upon his conscience his implied obligation to refrain from all acts inconsistent with his duties to plaintiff, will deprive him of the illicit reward by which he was tempted to assume an attitude hostile to the interests he had undertaken to promote, and will restore to plaintiff the title in dispute.

Another argument advanced to defeat the injunction is that the mere filing of an application to use water of the Loup river for power does not create property which can be made the subject of a trust. Whatever right arose from that act has been made the subject of acrimonious litiga-

tion and vehement advocacy in this case. The assignability of such a right has resulted in negotiations by all parties to the suit, if it has not in fact been asserted in their contracts. For the purposes of the present inquiry, the nature of the right is immaterial. It arises from the preliminary step in what may become property of great value. The enterprises which may be developed through the use of water power are encouraged by statute. The steps essential to the acquiring of water rights are statutory, and do not of themselves involve immoral conduct or violate the public policy of the state. As a director it was the duty of Koenig to take part in procuring the water rights essential to the operation of a power plant. His fiduciary relation prevented him from acquiring adverse rights to waters of the same stream. Such a relation is not limited to a person in control of real property, but extends to confidential relations affecting other rights and interests. *Murphey v. Sloan*, 24 Miss. 658. For reasons already stated, equity will operate upon the conscience of Koenig and restore to plaintiff the benefits of his hostile acts, without regard to the nature of the adverse interests he attempted to acquire. The principle which binds him is indicated by the following doctrine announced by the supreme court of the United States: "If an agent discover a defect in the title of his principal to land, he cannot misuse it, to acquire a title for himself; and, if he does, he will be held as a trustee holding for his principal." *Ringo v. Binns*, 10 Pet. (U. S.) *269; Story, Agency (9th ed.) sec. 211.

Defendants argue, further, that plaintiff is a foreign corporation, without any right to transact business in Nebraska, and that therefore it is not entitled to the relief granted. The prosecuting of this suit is not doing business, within the meaning of the statute requiring a non-resident corporation to become a domestic corporation, before transacting business in Nebraska. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 16, secs. 126, 215; *Alpena Portland Cement Co. v. Jenkins & Reynolds Co.*, 244 Ill. 354; *General Conference*

of *Free Baptists v. Berkey*, 156 Cal. 466. It follows that, in this respect, plaintiff, as a condition of obtaining relief, was not required to prove it had become a domestic corporation.

To show that the injunction was improperly granted, defendants contend that plaintiff, because it is a non-resident corporation, is forbidden by statute to acquire a water right in Nebraska, and that such a right, when perfected, is real estate, the title to which a nonresident corporation is without capacity to receive or hold. Koenig was one of plaintiff's stockholders. As an engineer he examined its engineering data and made independent investigations and surveys. He assumed to know its status and prospects. He advised capitalists to invest large amounts of money in its chief project. As a director he asserted its capacity to acquire and hold water rights. Acting jointly with other directors he assumed and exercised such capacity. Shall he now be permitted to deny that power in a court of equity, after having exercised it, and use his denial to establish a personal claim hostile to the very interests he had as a fiduciary solemnly undertaken to promote? The answer is that he will not. Estoppel prevents him from assuming that attitude here. *Macfarland v. West Side Improvement Ass'n*, 53 Neb. 417; *Centre & K. T. R. Co. v. M'Conaby*, 16 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 140; 3 Thompson, Corporations (2d ed.) sec. 2849; *Omnium Investment Co. v. North American Trust Co.*, 65 Kan. 50.

By statute the legislature has invited the investment of foreign capital in projects to utilize the waters of public streams. Corporations organized in other states may become domestic corporations. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 16, sec. 215. The charter of plaintiff authorizes the enterprises undertaken by it in this state, and permits it to hold title to realty. Statutory disability to take title does not make plaintiff an outlaw. Contracts under which it holds real estate essential to the purposes of its existence are at most voidable at the suit of the state, and cannot be

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challenged by the corporation's fiduciary to avoid the lawful consequences of his conduct in that capacity. 5 Thompson, Corporations (2d ed.) sec. 6688; *Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell*, 11 Neb. 192; *Carlow v. Aultman & Co.*, 28 Neb. 672; *Myers v. McGavock*, 39 Neb. 843; *Hanlon v. Union P. R. Co.*, 40 Neb. 52; *Kerfoot v. Farmers & Merchants Bank*, 218 U. S. 281; *Seymour v. Slide & Spur Gold Mines*, 153 U. S. 523; *National Bank v. Matthews*, 98 U. S. 621; *Fritts v. Palmer*, 132 U. S. 282. Koenig is estopped to raise this question, and his transferees are in no better situation.

There is no error in the decree, and it is

AFFIRMED.

IN RE ESTATE OF HIRAM C. NICHOLS.

EUPHEMIA C. CRANDELL, EXECUTRIX, APPELLEE, V. JAMES W. NICHOLS ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 16,945.

1. **Wills: CONSTRUCTION.** The will set out in the opinion construed, and held to vest in the widow of testator the use of the personal estate for life, with the right to consume the body of such estate, if reasonably necessary, in the protection and improvement of the real estate and for the support of herself and children.
2. **Executors and Administrators: ACCOUNTING.** The use of the body of the personal estate by the widow, as shown in the opinion, approved.

APPEAL from the district court for Dawson county:
BRUNO O. HOSTETLER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

W. A. Stewart, for appellants.

E. A. Cook, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

Hiram C. Nichols, a resident of Dawson county, died testate, leaving surviving him his widow, Euphemia C. Nichols (now Crandell), and a number of children, four of whom, James W., William E., Hiram C., and Roy, are appellants here. The inventory shows that the deceased left something over 700 acres of land, estimated to be worth \$7,205, and personal property consisting of horses, cattle, farm implements, and cash aggregating \$2,794.65. The will consists of two paragraphs as follows:

"First. I direct that all of my funeral charges and all of my debts be paid out of my personal property.

"Second. I give, devise and bequeath, to my dearly beloved wife, Euphemia C. Nichols, all of my property, both real and personal, wherever found, for and during her natural life, and at her death the remainder of the personal property, and all of the real estate shall vest in my children, share and share alike, and to them and their heirs and assigns forever. I also hereby appoint my wife, Euphemia C. Nichols, executrix of this my last will and testament, and request that no other bond be required of her as such executrix except her own personal obligations."

It is conceded by both sides that the only question involved here is the construction of the second paragraph of the will. The widow qualified as executrix and assumed the custody of the assets and control of the estate. It appears that several years after the death of Mr. Nichols the county court, evidently desiring to keep the records of his office in proper shape, called upon the executrix for a report. The report was furnished and is in the record. From this it appears that, after the death of Mr. Nichols, the executrix sold all of the personal property, and that her total receipts therefrom, including the cash on hand at the time of Mr. Nichols' death, amounted to \$4,008.70. As against this she reports expenditures for doctor's bills, funeral expenses, court costs, monument, and other

sundry items, amounting to \$855.60; for living expenses for herself and family during the first year after the death of Mr. Nichols, \$849; cash paid for a team given to the son Roy, \$235; harness for Roy, \$45; team and harness given to the son Clinton (evidently Hiram C.), \$275; team and harness given to the son William, \$225; a piano to a daughter Hazel, \$225; for lumber, making a well, and sundry items of repairs on the buildings, \$712.65; for taxes and insurance upon both the real and personal property, \$438.41; making a total amount expended by her of \$3,860.66, leaving a balance of cash on hand of \$148.04. The appellants appeared in the county court and objected to the report, basing their objection upon the second paragraph of the will, which they insist gave their mother a life estate only in both the real and personal property, and did not give her any right to consume the body of the personal estate or any part thereof. In other words, that if she converted any of the personal property into money she was bound by the terms of the will to preserve the whole of the fund intact. The county court construed the will otherwise, treated the report as a final report, approved it and discharged the executrix.

The district court, on appeal thereto, found that the will gave to appellee "all the personal property to be used by her as she should deem proper and necessary, and that she should not be required to account to the objectors (naming appellants) for the personal property or any part thereof, and that said objectors have no interest in any of said personal property left by the said Hiram C. Nichols, except such, if any, as may remain at the time of the death of the said petitioner Euphemia C. Crandell." The court further found that the report should be approved and the executrix discharged. A decree was entered in accordance with the above findings, and the objecting heirs appealed.

We think the construction given the will by the district court is sound. By the second paragraph the testator gives all of his property, both real and personal, to his

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wife "for and during her natural life, and at her death the remainder of the personal property, and all of the real estate," shall be vested in the children, share and share alike. It seems clear to us that the intention of the testator was that the real estate should be preserved intact, and at his death should "all" go to his children, but that, as to the personal property, only such portion thereof should go to the children as remained at the death of his wife, their mother. The word "remainder" has no application to what is left after a compliance with the first paragraph of the will, viz., the payment of the funeral charges and debts. It is clear that it applies to the time of the decease of the testator's wife. The words, "at her death the remainder of the personal property, and all of the real estate shall vest" in the children, are susceptible to no other construction than that put upon them by the district court.

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAM P. CONN ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 17,602.

1. **Trial: DIRECTING VERDICT.** "The trial court is not required to submit a case to the jury unless the evidence supporting it is of such a character that it would warrant the jury in basing a verdict upon it." *Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sporer*, 69 Neb. 8.
2. **Evidence examined and set out in the opinion.** *Held*, That a verdict for defendant should have been directed.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
WILLARD E. STEWART, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

Byron Clark, for appellant.

Burr, Greene & Greene, contra.

FAWDETT, J.

This case is before us a second time. Our opinion upon the former hearing will be found reported in 88 Neb. 732. Reference is made to that opinion for a full and accurate statement of the case. When the case was remanded, it was retried without change in the issues, and again resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.

The only question presented by this appeal, which we deem it necessary to consider, is one question of fact, viz.: Was the culvert, referred to in our former opinion, and to which the evidence as to the liability or nonliability on the part of the defendant was directed at the last trial, sufficient to drain plaintiff's land? This culvert was what is termed a box culvert, four feet wide by one and a half feet deep, and the question is: Was it set low enough to carry off such surface water as gathered upon plaintiff's land after hard or continued rains? There is no complaint as to the size of the culvert. After heavy rains the whole tract is flooded to the height of the embankments of both the county road and the railroad, the water at times running over both embankments. No complaint is made of that, however; the claim being that after each rain the water will all run off down to the level of the bottom of the culvert. The issue is well defined. Plaintiff's claim is that the culvert is higher than his land, and that after the water has all passed through to the level of the bottom of the culvert the rest of it remains upon his land until it passes away by absorption and evaporation. Defendant's claim is that the bottom of the culvert is six inches lower than the lowest point on plaintiff's land. If the evidence is sufficient to sustain plaintiff's claim, the judgment should be affirmed. If it is not, then the judgment should be reversed.

Plaintiff Conn testified: "Q. Do you know how this culvert compared in elevation with the flooded part of your field? A. Why, yes; I know. Q. Was it higher or

lower. than the flooded part of your field. A. It was higher. * * * I know that the bottom of the culvert across the public highway was higher than the low part of my ground. If it had been as low as the low part of my ground, the water would have run through it. After the water quit running out, it would be standing right up to it against it. The culvert was not in a ditch. It was in a road, the public highway. The railroad kept it up. * * * The ditch along the public highway to the culvert was lower than the culvert. The water would stand in my field clear up to this public highway; right up to the highway and the ditch standing full. The bottom of the culvert was just low enough to take the water off of the grade, to protect the public highway." It seems that there was a ditch along the west side of the public road. That is, the plaintiff called it a ditch. Some of the witnesses spoke of it as a borrow-pit, made when the public road was being constructed. We do not think any note should be taken of this so-called ditch. It was not a ditch at all in the sense that it was constructed for any such purpose, and, even if water stood in it at times, plaintiff would have no cause for complaint, as it is not claimed that the ditch was upon his land or that he sustained any damage by reason of its being filled with water. While being examined as to the rains in 1908, plaintiff testified: "I could not get out there to measure how deep the water was. It came from most all over the country. Some of it came from the south. It ran over the grade. The Nemaha Valley got up and flooded right up on top of the grade and off on to my ground. After it quit running, the water did not stand up to the bottom of the culvert all over my ground. It was over part up to the bottom of the culvert, and it was that area of ground that this damage occurred to. The water stood clear out to the public highway and on to it and filled up the ditch, and down at the corner it was up to the bottom of the culvert."

Anthony Bouwens, whose name appears as a coplaintiff

intiff Conn, the latter being referred to through-
rial as if he were *the* plaintiff, testified: That he
on owned the land, and that plaintiff Conn farmed
07 and 1908; that he saw the land in 1907, first
was planted, and again "a couple or three weeks
t was just about level under the water, which
ar from the north, from the hill and to the bottom
: other quarter, and then it went on close to the
d then it could not go any further and had to
re. I went to the railroad where the water went
and tried to get out, but it could not get out
account of the culvert was not big enough and

It was the only way to get it through that little
and that was too small to take the water off in
e when I saw it. I saw the corn after the water
en off, it was just cooked and baked." On being

he testified: "The water standing on this 19
uld just come up to the bottom of the culvert and
ere, it was the standing water that did the dam-

urged that the foregoing testimony by the two
: was sufficient to take the case to the jury and
n their verdict. The trouble with the contention
plaintiffs themselves disproved this testimony,
sted upon their ocular estimates of elevation, by
ing as a witness an experienced engineer whom
employed to make a survey of the land and take
ls necessary to determine the elevation of the
l of the culvert. Plaintiff Conn testified: "I
ok any levels to see whether the culvert was higher
low ground. I was present when some were
Mr. Scott, county surveyor of Lancaster county,
n. He was surveying for me, and I went with
old him what I wanted done, showed him where
l levels taken, told him what I wanted. Had him
als across from the east and west road to the
d south road across the right of way, and then
of this 19-acre field. I do not just remember

where the lowest place was—the lowest place was in the ditch right opposite this culvert. The lowest part of the ground lays right along the public highway just north. You will have to ask Mr. Scott how far from the railroad grade.” It will be seen that plaintiff Conn selected Mr. Scott as his expert engineer to make a survey and take the necessary levels to enable him to furnish accurate testimony with reference to the land, the embankments, and the culvert. He followed this up by introducing Mr. Scott as a witness, thereby vouching for his competency; and, judging from Mr. Scott’s testimony, we do not think plaintiff made any mistake in selecting him, as he appears to have understood the nature and extent of his commission and to have intelligently executed it. Mr. Scott testified: “The lowest elevation on the land north away from the railroad and river is 113.2. The highest on this piece of land was 116. * * * The lowest point on the 19 acres is 113.2, right at the end of the two parallel lines near the center of the 19 acres, and it would be an exact level of this bank. The culvert is 112.7. The lowest point on the 19 acres would be 6 inches above the bottom of the culvert; that is, the bottom of the culvert now is 6 inches lower than the lowest point on the 19 acres. From that point to the bottom of the culvert is about 450 or 500 feet. There would be a fall of water from the lowest point on this land to the culvert of 6 inches in about 500 feet. * * * The slope is plenty for the water to flow down there. Q. Then, if the water that did the damage to the land, that stood there, was below that point, what would obstruct it, or why wasn’t there sufficient room for the water to get away? A. Well, the bottom of that little ravine shows it to be 2 or 3 inches higher between the low point on the land and the culvert. Q. What little ravine? A. The little ravine shown by these parallel lines. Q. Where? A. That drains out to here (indicating). Q. About where is that low point of which you speak, in that ravine? A. I said the points in the ravine were 2 or 3 inches higher than the low points on

acres. Q. Oh, they are. Where is that? A. Here point 113.5. Q. Yes; that is up on the 19— A. About 100 feet higher than the 113.2. Q. But that point is on 19 acres, isn't it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And what is the elevation? A. The next one is 113. Q. That would be .2 feet lower? A. .2 lower than the high, or 6 inches than the high here (indicating). Q. That being true, the water at this low point would be held by reason of the elevation of the ground from the 19 acres itself, would it not? A. It would hold it 3 inches in depth up here. Q. Would the railroad grade add anything to that? A. It would add upon the depth of the water on the 19 acres. It would be deeper than that, then, of course, the railroad grade would help to hold it back." Continuing in narrative form, Mr. Scott testified: "Next to the railroad I took the surface of the ground at the fence. The lowest point to the railroad right of way was 114.5, which would show a line of ground there higher than this here the elevation in the 19 acres was taken. The water would be held back of this low point by reason of the natural surface of the ground next to the right of way at the fence. It did not reach the grade unless it was at least a foot or one and one-half feet lower there. Immediately south of this 19 acres the water could be 10 feet and a half on there, and yet not get next to the surface of the ground at the right of way. That would be clear down to the first elevation west to the public highway on the north side of the right of way where it was 114.5. The natural surface of the ground there along the highway would be that high, as I found it. Q. Now, then, when you get down then to the public highway, is it not true that the water is clear down to that point by reason of the working of this public highway and the throwing up of the right grade which stops the water in its course east? A. The water is carried down through this ditch. I presume that was made partially anyway to get dirt to fill the road. This fill would stop the water from going up as high as the road was, whatever that might be.

Q. So that this public highway is really the thing that deflects the water and flows it off along the public highway?

A. Yes; still you could not cross that. Q. And when it gets down to the point and reaches our culvert, then the bottom of our culvert is 6 inches lower than the lowest point on this land; that is true, is it not? A. Yes, sir.

Q. So that the water that stood on that 19 acres could get through our culvert, couldn't it, in point of time?

A. Yes; in point of time it could." No other testimony was offered by plaintiff with reference to the relative elevation of the land and the culvert. If, as Mr. Scott clearly shows, the bottom of the culvert was 6 inches lower than the lowest point on plaintiff's land, and "the slope is plenty for the water to flow down there," then it is a physical impossibility that plaintiff's damage was the result of any negligence on the part of defendant in the construction and maintenance of the culvert. The simple fact that plaintiffs Conn and Bouwens testified as shown above should not be permitted to weigh against the clear and positive testimony of a competent engineer, whom they introduced, and whose testimony is based upon actual levels and measurements. When plaintiff rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The motion was overruled.

"The trial court is not required to submit a case to the jury unless the evidence supporting it is of such a character that it would warrant the jury in basing a verdict upon it." *Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sporer*, 69 Neb. 8. The case at bar comes clearly within that rule. No jury would be warranted in basing a verdict for the plaintiff upon the evidence above outlined. It follows that the trial court erred in not sustaining defendant's motion. For this error, the judgment must be reversed. As plaintiff's case clearly appears to be without merit, it should not be permitted to longer vex the courts.

The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and the action dismissed, at plaintiff's costs.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

REESE, C. J., dissents.

In re Estate of Creighton.

IN RE ESTATE OF JOHN A. CREIGHTON.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. Nos. 16,775, 16,776.

Attorney's Fee: TRUST FUND. Attorneys who are duly authorized by parties interested in a fund in controversy to represent them and defend and preserve the fund are entitled to compensation out of the fund in controversy, at least for such services as resulted in the increase and preservation of the fund.

APPLICATION for allowance of attorneys' fees in case reported in 91 Neb. 654. *Application allowed.*

SEDGWICK, J.

After this case was determined in this court (91 Neb. 654), Messrs. Smyth, Smith & Schall, of Omaha, a firm of attorneys and members of the bar of this state, filed an application in this court for an allowance of attorneys' fees out of the funds involved in the litigation. The attorneys for the executors objected to the allowance, and the matter was presented upon briefs and oral argument.

It appears from the record that these applicants were consulted by parties interested in the charity whose right under the will was contested. The right of these parties to appear and be represented by counsel was challenged on the ground that they had no financial interest in the bequest, and perhaps for other reasons. The matter was then brought to the attention of the governor and attorney general of the state, and they considered that the charity in question was a public charity, and authorized these applicants to appear in the name of the attorney general of the state to procure a construction of the will favorable to the establishment of the charity. The county court of Douglas county had construed the will against the bequest for the charity; and, an appeal being in contemplation, a proposition of adjustment was submitted to the executors by the collateral heirs of the deceased not named in the will, by which the sum of \$75,000 would be devoted to the

establishment of the proposed charity. This proposition was by the executors submitted to the county court for instruction as to completing the proposed compromise. In the meantime an appeal had been taken to the district court from the decision of the county court. The applicants, in behalf of the charity and in the name of the attorney general, appeared in the district court, and upon trial in that court it was ordered that the executors devote the sum of \$75,000 to the proposed charity, and these applicants, believing that the bequest carried a much larger amount, appealed to this court.

Under the decision of this court, the amount secured for the charity was \$160,000 and interest thereon, so that on account of the services of these attorneys there had been secured for this fund, over and above the amount that could have been realized on the proposed settlement, the sum of \$85,000 and interest. It has already been determined in the opinion above cited that the bequest in question established a public charity and the state is interested; and the attorney general, on the advice of the governor, was authorized to represent the public interest in the controversy, and for that purpose to employ attorneys. The executors contend that, under such circumstances, the attorneys employed must look to the state or the attorney general for their compensation, and cannot be compensated out of the fund in litigation. It appears that these applicants were informed by the attorney general that the state would not compensate them for their services, and that if they received any compensation it must be from the fund in controversy. These attorneys then volunteered to accept the employment without other compensation than might be allowed them out of such amount, if any, as they might succeed in preserving for the proposed charity.

In *Stone v. Omaha Fire Ins. Co.*, 61 Neb. 834, it was held: "The expenses of procuring a receivership of an insolvent corporation, including services of an attorney in consultations, preparing papers and procuring the ap-

In re Estate of Creighton.

pointment of a receiver, are properly chargeable against the fund so brought into the court's control;" and in the opinion the same principle, which we think is everywhere recognized, is quoted from *Trustees v. Greenough*, 105 U. S. 527, 532: "Where one of many parties having a common interest in a trust fund, at his own expense, takes proper proceedings to save it from destruction and to restore it to the purposes of the trust, he is entitled to reimbursement." This principle seems to be applicable to this case. These attorneys were not themselves interested in the trust funds, but the state was, and, in his official capacity, was also the attorney general. These attorneys then represented parties interested in the trust fund, without any legal means of obtaining compensation except from that fund; and it seems clear that, so far as their services have increased the fund thus preserved, they should be compensated. It is alleged in the application, which is duly verified, that these attorneys rendered services in the matter in at least the value of 25 per cent. of the amount preserved to the fund as a result of those services. A history of the litigation and of the services rendered therein by these attorneys is set out quite in detail in the application, and it is alleged that these funds have been upon interest at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. from the 20th day of October, 1909. Counsel for the executors have filed objections to this allowance in the form of a brief giving the ground of their objection; but the allegations of fact in the application and of the value of the services are not denied. There being no issue of fact tendered by the executors, a reference to take evidence is not called for. The allegations of the applicants as to the extent and value of the services rendered will not justify the amount suggested by them. We think that under the circumstances of this case a fee of 10 per cent. of the amount preserved to the fund by those services is a reasonable fee. The interest on \$85,000 from the date and at the rate specified would amount to something over \$9,000. We think therefore that the reasonable value of

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the services rendered is \$9,400, and it is ordered that the executors pay to these applicants the said sum from that fund now in their hands.

APPLICATION ALLOWED.

FAWCETT, J., not sitting.

GEORGE B. DARR, APPELLANT, v. DAWSON COUNTY,
APPELLEE.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 16,780.

1. **Taxation: LEVY: INJUNCTION.** When a tax is not void as assessed without authority of law, sections 162 and 163 of the revenue law (Comp. St. 1911, ch. 77, art. I) apply, and collection thereof cannot be enjoined, unless the tax was levied "for an illegal or unauthorized purpose," and those sections provide a remedy in other cases in which injunctions were formerly allowed.
2. ———: **ILLEGAL ASSESSMENT: REMEDY.** The remedy provided for the taxpayer by the first subdivision of section 162 is available only when the property was wrongfully assessed, either because exempt from taxation or because the tax levied had already been assessed thereon and paid:
3. ———: ———: ———. The remedy given by the first subdivision is not available to correct overvaluation, or mistake in estimating the amount of the money of the taxpayer on hand liable to assessment or the value thereof.
4. ———: ———: ———. Under the second subdivision of section 162, the tax must be paid "in all respects as though the same was legal and valid." Protest is not necessary, nor allowed. The taxpayer must, within 30 days after paying the tax, "demand the same in writing from the treasurer of the state, of the county, city, village, township, district, or other subdivision, for the benefit, or under the authority, or by the request of which the same was levied." The treasurer of such political subdivision, when such demand is made, must transmit a copy thereof "to the authorities authorized by law to audit and pay accounts against" the political subdivision which has received the illegal tax, and, if payment is refused, the taxpayer may sue such county, city, or other corporation.
5. ———: **ASSESSMENT: REMEDY.** Questions of valuation and of

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amount and value of money or other personal property to be assessed are not provided for by sections 162 and 163 of the revenue law, and must be presented to the proper board of equalization.

6. ———: RULES GOVERNING. The assessment and levy and collection of taxes are not equitable proceedings. They must necessarily be governed by rules which in many respects may be considered arbitrary. The taxing powers and the taxpayers must comply with these rules.
7. ———: ASSESSMENT: RELIEF. The taxpayer is entitled to a copy of the assessment when completed by the assessor. He may waive this and ascertain the amount of his assessment from the records before the meeting of the board of equalization, and, if dissatisfied with his assessment, he may appeal to that board and have it corrected. If he fails to do so, he cannot for that reason avail himself of the special remedies provided by sections 162 and 163 of the revenue law.

APPEAL from the district court for Dawson county:
BRUNO O. HOSTETLER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Warrington & Stewart, for appellant.

E. A. Cook, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

Plaintiff seeks to recover from Dawson county \$402 paid by him under protest for taxes. He filed his claim with the county board, and, from an order disallowing it, appealed to the district court. In his petition in the district court, he alleged that in the month of April, 1908, his personal property was assessed for taxation by the deputy assessor of Lexington precinct, Dawson county, Nebraska; that he entered all his personal property that was liable to be assessed to him for that year on the schedule furnished him by the said deputy assessor for that purpose; "that plaintiff verified and signed said schedule as required by law, and returned said schedule to said deputy assessor; that (on) said schedule of assessment plaintiff entered his cash on hand at \$465, the same being all the cash plaintiff had on the 1st day of April, 1908, and the said item ap-

peared on said schedule when it was returned to said deputy assessor by plaintiff as aforesaid; that, after said schedule had been so made and returned to the assessor, some person, unknown to the plaintiff, and without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, and without notice to him, wrongfully changed the said item of cash, \$465, so that it read \$30,465, and thereafter plaintiff was taxed on said item upon the basis of \$30,465, instead of on the basis of \$465, as returned by plaintiff aforesaid, whereby plaintiff was wrongfully assessed on one-fifth of said \$30,000 in the sum of \$402; that the plaintiff was absent from the state of Nebraska from about the 15th day of April, 1908, until about the 1st day of November, 1908, and had no notice or knowledge of said wrongful change in his assessment or schedule until after his return to the state as aforesaid; that on the 15th day of April, 1909, plaintiff, being absent from Dawson county, caused said taxes to be paid under protest, for the reasons aforesaid, as to the taxes so wrongfully levied on the one-fifth of the said \$30,000, and thereafter filed his application with the board of county commissioners of said county, asking that said taxes so wrongfully assessed against him be refunded, which application was by the said board of commissioners rejected." The trial court sustained a demurrer to the foregoing petition, and from a dismissal of the proceeding plaintiff has appealed to this court.

It is not contended that the tax was levied for an illegal or unauthorized purpose. The allegation is that, after the plaintiff had made out his schedule of personal property, and had stated thereon an item of \$465, some person, unknown to plaintiff, had changed the item to \$30,465, without the knowledge of the plaintiff. The question is whether plaintiff is entitled to relief under sections 162 and 163 of the revenue law. The sections are as follows:

Section 162. "No injunction shall be granted by any court or judge in this state to restrain the collection of any tax, or any part thereof hereafter levied, nor to restrain the sale of any property for the nonpayment of any

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such tax, except such tax or the part thereof enjoined, be levied or assessed for an illegal or unauthorized purpose; nor shall any person be permitted to recover by replevin, or other process, any property taken or restrained by the county treasurer for the nonpayment of any tax except such tax be levied or assessed for illegal or unauthorized purpose; but in every case the person or persons claiming any tax, or any part thereof, to be for any reason invalid, who shall pay the same to the county treasurer, may proceed in the following manner, viz.: First. If such person claim a tax, or any part thereof, to be invalid for the reason that the property upon which it was levied was not liable to taxation, or that said property has been twice assessed in the same year and taxes paid thereon, he may pay such taxes under protest to the county treasurer, or other proper authority, and it shall be the duty of the treasurer, or other proper authority receiving such tax, to give a receipt therefor, stating thereon that they were paid under protest, and the grounds of such protest, whether or not taxable or twice assessed, and taxes paid thereon. If such taxes are paid to the proper authority, other than the county treasurer, such persons so receiving them shall, within ten days thereafter, deliver such taxes, or such part thereof as are paid under protest to the county treasurer, together with a copy of the receipt given for the same, and the county treasurer shall retain the money so paid under the protest until otherwise directed by order of the county board. Within thirty days after paying such taxes the person paying them shall file a statement in writing, duly verified, with the county board, setting forth the amount of tax paid under protest, the grounds of such protest, and shall attach thereto the receipt taken for said taxes. Whereupon at the first meeting of the county board thereafter, they shall inquire into the matter and if they shall find either that the property upon which taxes were levied was not liable for taxation, or that it had been twice assessed in the same year, and taxes paid thereon, they shall issue an order to the county

treasurer to refund said taxes, stating therein what sum shall be refunded, and if they shall find that the grounds of such protest are not true, they shall issue an order to the county treasurer to dispose of said money in the same manner, as though it had not been paid under protest. Appeals may be taken from such decisions in the same manner and within the times as appeals are now taken from the action of the county board in allowance or disallowance of claims against the county; and if such an appeal be taken the county treasurer shall retain such taxes until the case is finally determined. Provided, that he shall in all cases retain said money until the time for an appeal shall have elapsed. If an appeal from the decision of the county board be taken, and upon the final determination thereof their decision be affirmed, the treasurer shall at once carry the order of said board into effect; but if their decision be reversed, they shall issue a new order to the treasurer conforming to the decree of the court finally determining the case. In all cases where the treasurer shall refund such taxes he shall write opposite such taxes in the tax list the words, 'Erroneously taxed—refunded.' Second. If such person claim the tax or any part thereof to be invalid for the reason that it was levied or assessed for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, or for any other reason except as hereinbefore set forth, when he shall have paid the same to the treasurer, or other proper authority, in all respects as though the same was legal and valid, he may, at any time, within thirty days after such payment, demand the same in writing from the treasurer of the state, of the county, city, village, township, district, or other subdivision, for the benefit, or under the authority, or by the request of which the same was levied, and if the same shall not be refunded within ninety days thereafter, may sue such county, city, village, township, district, or other subdivision, for the amount so demanded; and if upon the trial it shall be determined that such tax, or any part thereof, was levied or assessed for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, or was for any

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reason invalid, judgment shall be rendered therefor, with interest, and the same shall be collected as in other cases."

Section 163. "When any demand to refund taxes paid is made upon any treasurer, as provided in the second method of procedure indicated in the preceding section, such treasurer shall transmit a copy of the same to the authorities authorized by law to audit and pay accounts against the state, county, city, township, village, or district, as the case may be, who shall pass upon the same as upon any other claim, but no claim for refunding such taxes shall be paid unless it appears to the satisfaction of such authorities that the sum was levied for an illegal or unauthorized purpose." Comp. St. 1911, ch. 77, art. I, secs. 162, 163.

If it is claimed that a tax is invalid because the property upon which it was levied was not liable to taxation or because the said property has been twice assessed in the same year and the tax paid thereon, the alleged invalid tax may be paid under protest, under the first subdivision of section 162.

Section 144 of the revenue act of 1879 (laws 1879, p. 334) provided that no injunction may be brought to restrain the collection of taxes on any other ground than that the tax was levied for an illegal or unauthorized purpose. It attempted to provide a statutory remedy for other cases in which taxes had been enjoined in the absence of such a statute. The remedy provided in the first act was that, when a person claimed that a tax was for any reason invalid and should pay the tax "in all respects as though the same was legal and valid," he might demand the same in writing from the treasurer of the state or political subdivision "for the benefit, or under the authority, or by the request of which the same was levied;" and if the tax was not repaid to him he might sue the county or other subdivision, as the case might be, and recover the same, if it appeared that the tax was levied for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, "*or was for any reason invalid.*" The next section of that act (section 145) pro-

vided: "When any demand to refund taxes paid is made upon any treasurer, as provided in the preceding section, such treasurer shall transmit a copy of the same to the authorities authorized by law to audit and pay accounts against the state, county, city, township, district, or village, as the case may be, who shall pass upon the same as upon any other claim, but no claim for refunding such taxes shall be paid, unless it appears to the satisfaction of such authorities that the same was levied for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, or that the same property has been twice assessed in the same year, and taxes paid thereon, or that such property was not liable to taxation." One section provided that the taxpayer might recover in such case if the tax was "for any reason invalid," and the other section provided that the authorities should not refund the tax unless it was levied for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, or that the same property had been twice assessed the same year, and taxes paid thereon, or that such property was not liable to taxation, limiting the right to repay the contested tax to these three grounds.

In 1887 these two sections were amended. Laws 1887, ch. 69. The words "that the same property has been twice assessed in the same year, and taxes paid thereon, or that such property was not liable to taxation" were omitted from section 145 and placed in the first subdivision of the preceding section. The only change in section 144 of the first act was to insert the right to pay under protest and recover from the county when the property taxed was not liable to taxation, or was assessed twice and the first assessment paid. This provision appears now as the first subdivision in section 162, and the second subdivision of that section remains substantially the same as first enacted in 1879. In determining the application of the remedy provided by those sections, we should consider that they were enacted in view of the law as it was formerly administered, and construe them in that light. We must consider the conditions that existed, the evil that it was proposed to remedy, and the remedy provided. In the ab-

sence of such a statute, Judge Cooley says that injunctions were allowed: (a) Where taxes were levied on exempt property; or (b) where property was doubly assessed; or (c) where levied without authority of law by persons having no power to make the levy; or (d) where there was a clear case of fraud in making the valuation. 2 Cooley, Taxation (3d ed.) 1441, 1442. It would seem that these are the only cases in which it ought to be held that taxes may be paid and recovered back under section 162. In the absence of a statute of this kind, taxes were not enjoined by courts of equity on the ground that they were illegal or erroneous. 2 Cooley, Taxation (3d ed.) 1440. The statutory remedies were considered to be sufficient for such purposes.

The legislature, having these grounds for injunction in mind, substituted the remedy supposed to be more simple, more just to the taxpayers, and more certain in its operation in the collection of the public revenues. If the property was exempt from taxation, or if it had already been assessed for that year and the tax paid, those questions were simple and could be easily determined. They are therefore referred to the county board for determination.

The plaintiff did not attempt to proceed under the second subdivision of section 162. He paid the tax under protest, and appealed to the county board for a return of the money so paid. The second subdivision does not provide for or contemplate payment under protest. It is only applicable when the taxpayer has paid the tax "in all respects as though the same was legal and valid." When so paid the tax cannot be recovered from the county, unless the tax was levied "for the benefit, or under the authority, or by the request" of the county. If any other political district or subdivision procures for its benefit a tax to be levied for an illegal or unauthorized purpose under this second subdivision, it can only be collected from such "city, village, township, district, or other subdivision," as the case may be, for which it was levied; and, under this subdivision of section 162, the taxpayer must, within 30

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days after he paid the tax, "demand the same in writing" from the treasurer of the particular subdivision benefited by the tax. As none of these things were done, the plaintiff cannot claim under this second part of section 162.

It seems equally clear that his claim is not within the first remedy provided by that section. Our statute exempts certain specified property from taxation. If a tax is assessed upon property exempt and "not liable to taxation," or assessed a second time after the tax has already been paid upon the property, it may be paid under protest; and, if the proper steps are taken by the taxpayer, the money so paid is not distributed to the various political subdivisions for whose benefit taxes in general are levied and collected; it is held until the county board can ascertain whether the property taxed is exempt from taxation under the statute, if that is the ground of protest, or whether the tax upon the property had already been paid before the protested tax was collected. A second assessment after the tax has been paid is practically the same thing as an assessment on property which the statute exempts, and a tax so collected is summarily returned by the county treasurer upon order of the county board. The matter so presented for determination is entirely different in character from questions of valuation, and disputes as to the amount or value of money that the taxpayer has at the time of assessment, whether he has and should be assessed on \$400, or some other amount, is not a question of exemption from taxation, nor of second assessment on the same property.

The plaintiff says that he had only \$465 in money at the time this assessment was made. The assessor found that he had a much larger amount. This question could have been determined readily by the board of equalization, and it appears to be the policy of the law that all such questions should in the first instance be presented to that board. The assessment and levy and collection of taxes are not equitable proceedings. They necessarily have to be governed by rules which in many cases must be con-

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sidered to be arbitrary. There is no way to avoid it, and the taxing power and the taxpayers must comply with these rules. There is no other way to do. Plain rules of law that will be readily understood by the assessing authorities and by the taxpayer are very desirable. To say that Mr. Darr has been wronged by this assessment is to say, not only that he actually had no more than the \$465 in money, but also that the statute did not provide him any method of summarily disposing of the question. Whether he had \$465 or \$30,465 was a question of fact that was in the first instance submitted to the assessor, and if wrongly determined might be submitted to the board of equalization. The board of equalization has no power to add other property to the list returned by the individual taxpayer or increase the valuation without notice to the taxpayer. If it attempts to do so, or otherwise violates substantial provisions of the statute intended to protect the taxpayer, the tax is "levied without authority of law." They are without authority to make such levy, and the tax may be enjoined. *South Platte Land Co. v. Buffalo County*, 7 Neb. 253; *Suydam v. County of Merrick*, 19 Neb. 155; *State v. Edwards*, 26 Neb. 701. The plaintiff alleges that he does not know who added to the list as he returned it to the assessor. If the board of equalization did, it was without authority of law, because no notice was given the taxpayer, as the statute requires. In such case the tax would be void, and might be enjoined, but it could not be paid under protest and recovered again. A voluntary payment of taxes cannot be recovered, in the absence of a statute authorizing such payment and recovery. There is no statute authorizing the payment and recovery of a tax, except the first subdivision of section 162 of the revenue act, which applies only when the property is exempt from taxation, or has once been assessed for the same year and the tax paid.

If the property was added by the assessor, the plaintiff has also taken the wrong remedy. He might have required the assessor to furnish him with a copy of the assessment,

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as he proposed to return it to the county authorities. This Mr. Darr neglected to do, and the assessor valued his property, and no complaint was made to the board of equalization. It is not the duty of a taxpayer to assess his own property; he lists his personal property upon the schedule, and submits to the assessor to determine the value thereof for assessment; and when the assessor has done so, if the taxpayer demands it, he must furnish to the taxpayer a copy of such valuation as he puts upon the property. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 77, art. I, sec. 110. If the taxpayer does not exercise this right and so obtain a copy of the valuation, as made by the assessor, he is allowed ample time to examine the assessor's valuation before the sitting of the board of equalization; and, if dissatisfied with his assessment, he may appeal to that board and have it corrected. This affords a simple and inexpensive method of adjusting all questions of valuation, and in most cases is found to be ample without an appeal to the courts, and without the delay in collecting the revenue involved in such appeals. There is no evidence of fraud, and no allegation in the pleadings from which fraud can be inferred. It is as reasonable to presume that Mr. Darr attempted fraud upon the public as it is to assume that the assessor perpetrated fraud upon Mr. Darr. If we imagine that Mr. Darr has been wronged, we still must avoid breaking down the revenue law in the attempt to right that wrong. We certainly cannot disregard the statute in an attempt to do what we imagine to be equity.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., dissenting.

It is my belief that the whole discussion by the majority is on entirely too technical grounds. It was evidently the purpose of the legislature to give a remedy in all cases of unjust taxation. To prevent the expensive and long drawn out remedy by injunction, by which the revenues of the state could be tied up, it provided that where a tax, or any

part thereof, was claimed to be illegal, the person against whom the levy was made could pay under protest, the treasurer holding the part claimed to be illegal until within the short time named in the statute; the one paying the same to have the benefit of a speedy and effective remedy at law for testing the question involved, and to recover back his money held by the treasurer, if any should be found to have been illegally demanded. It was never the intention of the legislature to set a trap by which the citizen could be robbed, yielding him no remedy, or, if one is given, to hedge it about with technicalities of procedure to such an extent as to render the protection of his rights uncertain and insecure. The holding calls to mind the ancient rule of pleading which required the plaintiff to name his case. If he gave it a wrong name, no matter what his facts nor how meritorious his demand, he was forever undone, so far as that case was concerned. I do not believe the legislature ever intended to limit the remedies of a person against whom an illegal tax was charged in any such way as is held in the majority opinion. Plaintiff's "cause of action," if he has one, consists of being wrongfully compelled to pay a tax upon property which the demurrer admits he did not have nor own, and which he did not return for taxation. If the petition is true, he is entitled to relief. The construction given to the statute is, I think, too technical and narrow, and does not give effect to the intention of the legislature. To my mind a more liberal construction should be adopted.

FAWOETT, J., concurs in the above dissent.

HAMER, J., dissenting.

I regret being unable to agree with the majority opinion. As I understand this case, there was a petition filed in the district court for Dawson county seeking to recover from the county of Dawson the amount paid by the plaintiff because an additional \$30,000 had been added to his list of taxable property without his knowledge or consent, presumably by the assessor or the board of equalization,

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but which it is not certain. From the brief of the appellant it appears that he made out his assessment schedule of personal property, and, after swearing to the same, delivered it to the deputy assessor for Lexington precinct, in Dawson county, in April, 1908; that in said schedule he entered as cash on hand \$465, the same being all the cash he had on the 1st day of April, 1908; between the time the said schedule was delivered to the assessor and the time it was entered upon the tax list, some one, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, and without notice to the plaintiff, changed the item of \$465 to \$30,465; that the appellant was thereupon taxed for said year upon the basis of one-fifth of the said item of \$30,465, instead of upon the basis of one-fifth of the said sum of \$465, as returned by the appellant in his schedule; that the appellant was absent from the state of Nebraska from the time he delivered said schedule to said deputy assessor until in October of that year, and had no knowledge or notice of the change made in said schedule until after his return to the state of Nebraska; that on the 15th day of April, 1909, appellant caused his personal taxes to be paid, and that part of them which was levied against the one-fifth of said \$30,000, so added to his tax list, to be paid under protest, for the reasons aforesaid, the same being \$402, and then, within the time required by law, filed an application with the county commissioners asking to have said \$402 refunded to him; that said application was rejected by the board of county commissioners, and the appellant appealed from said order of the board to the district court for Dawson county; that he filed in the said district court his petition setting up the facts in the case as before set forth, and that the appellee filed a general demurrer thereto; that the district court sustained said demurrer, and the appellant elected to stand on his petition, the court dismissed the petition, and the appellant has appealed from said order of dismissal to this court. The demurrer filed by Dawson county admitted the truth of the petition; that is, it admitted that, without the knowledge of the owner, and

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after the schedule had been made and had been delivered to the deputy assessor, \$30,000 additional had been added to the cash set forth in the schedule. Whether this addition was by the assessor, by the board of equalization, or by some interloper, does not appear. No one may know how or why this was done.

Sections 120-124, ch. 77, art. I, Comp. St. 1911, provide for the county board of equalization, and seem to give it authority to hear cases on appeal as in equity, and without a jury to determine the questions raised before it which relate to the liability of property to assessment, or the amount thereof. The sections before referred to seem to contemplate that the board of equalization may raise the value of the property assessed or lower it, and they can add other property to that contained in the schedule; but they must do these things upon notice to the person interested, or his agent. They are also authorized by subdivision 5 of section 121 to add to the assessment roll any taxable property not included therein and these things are all to be done *upon notice to the property owner*. Subdivision 5 reads: "Also add to the assessment rolls any taxable property not included therein, assessing the same in the name of the owner thereof as the assessors should have done, but no personal property shall be so added unless the owner thereof is previously notified, if he be found in the county."

According to the statement contained in the plaintiff's petition, he was entirely without notice, and the thing must have been done by the assessor, by some unauthorized person, or by the board of equalization. The thing done was unlawfully done. On the statement as made, an additional \$30,000 was added to the plaintiff's taxable property, without his knowledge or consent, and without any notice of any kind, and by some unknown person. The value of the property already there was not increased. There were \$465 specified in the schedule as the money on hand; \$30,000 were added to that money, just as a thousand cows might be put in a tax list; the only differ-

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ence being between the use of the word "dollars" and the use of the word "cows." For anything that appears in the petition, the change may have been made after the schedule reached the board of equalization, and without notice. There should be certainty. The legislature did not contemplate that there would be any fraudulent legerdemain of any kind against the interest of the property owner. In effect, the case is like this: I own a farm. On that farm I have horses and hogs. I have no cattle. After I have made out my schedule and have presented it to the assessor, and he has looked over it and there are no cattle listed upon it, somebody adds a *thousand cows* to my schedule. I am not told by whom the addition is made. No one serves any notice upon me. I do not know whether the deputy assessor did it, whether the assessor did it, whether some unauthorized clerk did it, or whether the county board did it; but somebody does it. Does the law contemplate that I should be held to pay the tax on a thousand cows that I do not own, that are not on my farm, and never have been?

The legislature made a provision for the protection of the property of the owner. That provision requires that he shall have notice from the board before there is an increase in the amount of his property or in its value. It would seem that the judgment of the district court ought to be reversed and the case sent back to be tried. When the evidence is taken it might disclose why \$30,000 was added, and by whom. In any event, if the testimony should be taken, there would probably be an opportunity to make an intelligent disposition of the case, so that everybody might know what happened, and when, and how, and why. The ingenuity of the majority opinion serves to strengthen the conviction that it is wrong.

JANNIE CALLFAS, APPELLANT, v. WORLD PUBLISHING COMPANY, APPELLEE.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 16,785.

1. **Libel: PLEADING.** In an action for libel, if the publication complained of makes general charges against the plaintiff, an answer in general terms that the charges are true is insufficient. The facts must be stated showing that the charge made is true. If the facts are specifically stated in the charge as published, a general allegation that they are true is sufficient.
2. ———: ———. In such action if the published words are obviously defamatory, that is, libelous *per se*, it is not necessary by innuendo to allege or explain the meaning of the words published, nor to allege special damages.
3. ———: ———. If the published words are ambiguous, or are meaningless unless explained, or *prima facie* innocent, but capable of defamatory meaning, the plaintiff must specially allege and prove the defamatory meaning of the words used, and must allege and prove special damages. In such case, if no special damages are alleged and proved, there can be no recovery.
4. ———: ———. **SPECIAL DAMAGES.** The publication in this case not being obviously defamatory, and there being no allegation and proof of the facts from which it can be found that the plaintiff has suffered special damages for which the defendant is liable, the judgment for the defendant was the only judgment possible.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
GEORGE A. DAY, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

A. S. Churchill, for appellant.

Stout & Rose, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

The plaintiff alleged in her petition that the defendant is a corporation with its principal place of business in Omaha, Nebraska, "engaged in publishing a newspaper generally known as the World-Herald, which has a large circulation in the cities of Omaha, South Omaha, state of Nebraska, and in various other cities and states," and

the defendant published two articles of and concerning the plaintiff, one on or about the 12th day of May, 1908, and the other on or about the 24th day of May, 1908. She alleged that these articles were libelous, and asked for damages in the sum of \$25,000. Upon issue being joined and tried to the jury, there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.

The record is very large, and the plaintiff has filed a voluminous brief assigning and discussing very many alleged errors. The amended petition, with the exhibits attached, consists of more than 40 sheets of closely typewritten matter, and the evidence as contained in the bill of exceptions covers more than 1,000 sheets. It will be impracticable here to make even a synopsis of the pleadings and evidence. We will have to be content with such reference to the record as we think will illustrate some of the principal questions presented. The petition alleges that the plaintiff is a resident of the city of Omaha, and has been since the 1st day of June, 1907, and that before coming to the city of Omaha she resided in the city of St. Louis for a number of years, and that in the year 1900 she entered the Barnes University Medical Department of St. Louis, Missouri, and took the regular medical course prescribed, which continued for the full course of four school years, and that she graduated from the institution on the 3d day of May, 1904, and received a diploma which conferred upon her the degree of doctor of medicine, with all its rights, benefits, immunities, and privileges. The petition then sets out some of the provisions of the statute of Missouri regulating the practice of medicine, surgery and midwifery, which prescribe the conditions and manner of obtaining a license to practice medicine in the state, and alleges that she complied with those conditions and received a license from the state board of health of the state of Missouri, and that she was then appointed to the position of "hostess of the Temple of Fraternity, at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition held in the city of St. Louis, Missouri, during the year 1904," and was about

the same time "appointed lady physician of the same," and "employed as lady physician of a concession at said exposition known as the 'Boer War';" that "during said time the plaintiff had under treatment as such physician a very large number of patients who were afflicted with a great variety of diseases and ailments, and derived therefrom a large experience in her profession;" that at the close of the exposition she "entered upon the general practice of her profession in the city of St. Louis, and state of Missouri," and that "on or about the 15th of May, 1907, she was duly elected by the Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle, at its regular biennial session, to the position of supreme physician of the Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle, and entered upon the discharge of her duties as such supreme physician on or about the 1st day of June, 1907, and continued to perform the same until on or about the 1st day of June, 1908." She then alleges that on the 12th day of May, 1908, the defendant "published of and concerning the plaintiff a false, wanton, sensational and libelous article," as follows:

"DR. CALLFAS IS SILENT ON CASE.

"Will not Talk about the Poisoned Candy and Alludes to Charge Against Her.

"Shows the Effects of Strain and Refuses to Discuss any Details.

"Dr. Callfas, whose mysterious poisoning through a box of bonbons left on her porch May 1 has been a ten days sensation, was at her desk as usual while the meeting of the board of managers of the Woodmen Circle was in progress in the same building. She denied herself to all callers until Tuesday morning, when she talked to the World-Herald. She sat at her heavy oak desk in her beautifully appointed office, gowned in an expensive and heavy black silk.

" 'When the time comes, I will make a statement,' she said, a trifle sharply. Her eyes and face showed the effects of the two weeks' strain upon her. When asked whether she would talk of the finding of the candy, she

frowned deeply and called to a stenographer in the outer room, 'Anna.' The stenographer came into the room and aimlessly leaned against the desk, pretending to open a bundle of mail. The doctor's palpable subterfuge and reluctance to talk without a witness was openly apparent.

" 'The newspapers have treated me very unkindly,' she said. 'When Mrs. Manchester says repeatedly that there is no trouble, why cannot they let the matter drop. If you want to write a sensational story, go write it and print the charges the other side make against me. When the time comes, I will talk and talk plenty. There is much to be said on my side, and I will say it when I get ready. I have retained attorneys, but I refuse to tell who they are, because it is my business and no one's else.'

" 'Will you attend the annual meeting today?' she was asked. Her eyes snapped and she straightened herself in her chair, gripping the sides with a jerk. 'Of course I will,' she said. 'Why not? This is merely an annual meeting and nothing but reports will be heard. If this matter of the poisoned candy is to be brought up, I have not heard of it. And if the newspapers don't look out, they may get themselves into trouble by what they print.' The determined glance with which she turned to her desk and rustled her heavy silken garments showed that, in any contest of will with her sister officials, Dr. Callfas would not depend entirely upon tact or policy in the management of her affairs.

"Dr. Callfas, the husband, is in the employ of a prominent ear specialist in this city, and is studying this line of his profession with a view of specializing. He says that his wife has never practiced medicine, and he appears to be much worried about the outcome of the matter. Both husband and wife are Canadians and middle-aged people. He is getting but a moderate salary while he studies, while his wife draws \$300 a month as supreme physician of the Woodmen Circle.

"The matter had not come before the council meeting at noon, although members of the board had been in close

council with the chief of police this morning regarding the outcome of the poison case."

The petition then contains allegations showing that the Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle is a fraternal beneficiary corporation organized under the laws of Nebraska, and that its constitution provides for the election of a supreme physician of the order whose term of office shall be four years, and alleges that an executive council of the order held one of its sessions in Omaha on the day that the defendant published the said article. The defendant moved to strike out certain parts of the amended petition. The motion was overruled, and the defendant answered. The answer admitted the publication of the two articles alleged, and denied that the articles had "import and meaning as charged in said amended petition," and denied that they were published with the intention or for the purpose as claimed, and alleged that the readers of said articles did not understand them as alleged in the amended petition. It denies that it published any matters which were not true, or with malice or with the intent to in any way injure the said plaintiff or to damage her either in her social standing or relations or her profession, or in any other matters, and denies that the plaintiff suffered any damage by reason of the articles. The answer then alleges that "every matter published of and concerning said plaintiff in its said paper was and is true, and that this defendant at the time the said publication was made believed it to be true, and published the said matter of and concerning said defendant simply as a matter of common news in its said newspaper, and with good motive and for justifiable ends." The plaintiff then filed a motion which at great length asked the court to strike out many specified matters from the defendant's answer, including the general allegation that the matters published by the defendant were true. The motion also asked the court to require the defendant to make its answer more definite, and "that the defendant be required to make its fourth defense pleaded in the amended answer

more definite and certain, by setting forth the ultimate facts upon which it relies to establish the truth of the publications sued upon and admitted in the amended answer to have been published by the defendant, instead of merely its conclusions," and to make its answer more definite in many other similar respects. Upon this motion the court ordered the allegation that the defendant believed the publication to be true stricken out, and overruled the motion in all other respects. Plaintiff then filed a reply denying "each and every affirmative allegation set forth in said amended answer." The briefs discuss some of these questions presented upon the pleadings.

1. Should the court have stricken out the general allegation that the matters contained in the publication were true? "Where the charge is specific, it is sufficient to state that the alleged defamatory words set forth in the petition are true. Where the charge is general, the answer must state facts which show that the defamatory words are true. And, generally, if the answer gives the plaintiff sufficient notice of what defendant will attempt to prove, it is sufficient." *Sheibley v. Fales*, 81 Neb. 795. In an action for libel, if the petition alleges a publication in which specific charges are made against the plaintiff, it is a sufficient answer to allege that the charges against the plaintiff so specified are true; but if the publication, as alleged in the petition, makes the charge against the plaintiff in general terms, without specific allegations constituting the matter charged, it is not a sufficient answer to allege that the charge made in the publication is true. The plaintiff is entitled to know from the pleadings the specific matter that he will be called upon to meet in the trial. If the charges are specifically alleged in the publication complained of, and the answer contained allegations that the charge as published is true, the plaintiff is sufficiently informed as to what he will be called upon to meet. If the publication contained the charge that the plaintiff is a thief, and the answer merely alleges that the charge as made was true, the plaintiff could not

know what facts might be offered in evidence as tending to prove the truth of the charge. If, however, the publication stated fully the facts constituting the charge made, it would be sufficient in the answer to allege that the facts so stated in the publication were true of and concerning the plaintiff. Applying these principles to this case, the result is that, in so far as the publication in question made specific charges of and concerning the plaintiff, the answer that such charges were true is a sufficient defense; but if there is any general charge of and concerning the plaintiff in the publication, and the facts constituting that charge are not specifically stated, the answer alleging the truth thereof in general terms is insufficient.

2. The petition discusses *seriatim* the several matters contained in the published article complained of. In regard to the incident of the poisoned candy, it is alleged that "on or about the 24th day of April, 1908, she found a box of candy which had been placed upon the front porch of her residence, near her front door, and addressed to her; that the plaintiff, upon seeing said box, and not suspecting any harm therefrom, picked the same up, and after entering the house ate some of the said candy, which proved to have contained poison, which made the plaintiff sick, and by reason thereof she was detained at her home until Monday preceding the meeting of the said supreme executive council of the Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle, at which time she went to her office and resumed her duties, in the meantime having passed upon applications, as supreme physician, at her home; that the plaintiff did not know, had no means of knowing, and does not now know who it was that placed the said candy on the front porch of her home; that the statement contained in said article, wherein it is stated, 'Dr. Callfas is Silent on Case, Will not Talk about the Poisoned Candy,' relates to the incident mentioned above; and by the expression, 'and Alludes to Charge Against Her,' was intended to and does convey and mean that charges had been made

against the plaintiff arising out of her having been poisoned by eating some of the said candy which had been left on her porch as aforesaid; and by the statement, 'Shows the Effects of Strain and Refuses to Discuss any Details,' the defendant intended to and did convey the meaning that the plaintiff showed the effects of the strain arising from the eating of said poisoned candy, and that she refused to say anything in regard to the details thereof, and thereby carrying the implication that plaintiff had attempted to poison herself." The petition then continues with similar quotations from the published article and similar allegations in regard thereto.

If the published words are obviously defamatory, that is, libelous *per se*, it is not necessary in the petition to explain the meaning of the words nor to allege any special damages; the law implies damages. If the published words are ambiguous, or are meaningless unless explained, or *prima facie* innocent, but capable of defamatory meaning, it is necessary to specially allege and prove the defamatory meaning of the words used, and to allege and prove special damages. The plaintiff will not be allowed to prove upon the trial a different meaning than that which she has alleged. If the words, with the meaning alleged by the plaintiff, are not libelous, or if no special damages are alleged, the petition fails to state a cause of action. The petition and the publications complained of must be considered in the light of these well-established legal principles.

3. It is stated in the publication that plaintiff's husband had said that plaintiff had not had any practice as a physician. The defendant contends that publications of this character are not actionable because she was not engaged in the practice of her profession at the time the publications were made. Of course, if she had no professional character or standing at the time, there could be no damage in that respect. If she had abandoned her profession and no longer relied upon it as an occupation and means of support, she could not be damaged profes

sionally; but this does not appear to have been the situation. She had taken the prescribed studies, and had been admitted to practice, and had actually engaged in the practice, and had accepted an official position which none but a practicing physician could hold. This was not a permanent position, but was for a definite specified term. Her official position required her to continue to practice her profession while she held it. Under these circumstances, no doubt, a successful attack upon her professional standing would be a distinct injury. The statement published was that her husband had said that she had never practiced medicine. There are, however, no facts pleaded upon which any damages can be computed or based.

4. We have tried to state enough of the allegations of the petition to show generally the nature of the plaintiff's case. It was necessary that there should be allegations that the words used had a defamatory meaning, stating in direct language what the meaning was, and allegations of special damages sustained thereby. The meaning attributed by the pleading to the words used, where such allegation is attempted, is in no case obviously defamatory. Many of the facts charged are substantially admitted by the petition to be true. The published articles do not charge plaintiff with the commission of a crime, nor with any immoral act. There is no statement that, without addition or explanation, is libelous *per se*, that is, obviously defamatory; nor any statement of fact that would necessarily, without further explanation than is contained in the petition, cause plaintiff damages, that is, that could constitute a cause of action without a plea of special damages. There is no allegation in the petition of facts showing any special damages sustained. The most specific allegation of damages is at the end of the first count of the petition, as follows: "That by reason of the publication by the defendant of the foregoing false and libelous article, the plaintiff has been greatly injured and damaged in her social standing and relations, not only

with members of the order, but with others with whom she has been brought in contact, made the subject of sensational talk and comment and ridicule, as well as having been greatly injured and damaged in her professional standing in the order and in the community in which she lives, all to her great damage and injury in the sum of \$10,000."

As early as 1877 this court was committed to the rule that, when the published words are not obviously defamatory, that is, not libelous *per se*, there can be no recovery, unless special damages are pleaded and proved. The rule was stated as follows: "But it is not every false charge against an individual which is sufficient to sustain an action for damages. In order to authorize a recovery the plaintiff must aver in his petition, and prove on the trial, that he has sustained some special damages from the publication of the alleged libel, unless the nature of the charge is such that the words are actionable *per se*. And where the words are not actionable *per se* it is not sufficient to simply allege that the party has sustained damages, but a party must state in his petition *wherein* he has sustained damages. * * * The petition entirely fails to show *how* the plaintiff was injured by the alleged libel, and the mere statement that she has sustained damages by the loss of friends, etc., where there is no statement of facts from which it is apparent that the defendant is liable for damages, will not sustain the action." *Geisler v. Brown*, 6 Neb. 254.

There being no allegation or proof of special damages in the case, no other judgment than the one entered was possible. It is therefore

AFFIRMED.

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IN RE WILLIAM E. CONNOR.

STATE, EX REL. LUCY M. REBMAN, APPELLANT, V. ARLESS
L. MACY ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. No. 16,932.

1. **Guardian and Ward: GUARDIAN OF MINOR: JURISDICTION TO APPOINT.**
The probate court in each county in this state has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian to a minor who is an inhabitant or resident in the same county, or who has property in the county and resides in another state. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 34, sec. 2.
2. ———: ———: ———. The courts of Kansas have no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a minor whose domicile and property are in this state. *Connell v. Moore*, 70 Kan. 88.
3. **Adoption: APPEAL: FINDINGS.** Upon appeal from the county court in the matter of an application to adopt a minor child, the findings of fact of the district court upon examination of witnesses in open court are presumed to be correct, and will not be reversed upon appeal to this court, unless upon consideration of the whole case it appears that they are clearly wrong.

APPEAL from the district court for Red Willow county:
ROBERT C. ORR, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

A. C. T. Geiger and Lambe & Butler, for appellant.

W. S. Morlan, W. R. Starr, and C. E. Eldred, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

In April, 1908, John F. Connor killed his wife, Minnie Connor. They were residing at the time, with their two infant children, upon a farm in Red Willow county, a few miles from the Kansas state line. Immediately after the murder Mr. Connor took the two infant children, a little boy and girl, to the home of his sister, Mrs. Hattie Macy, who, with her husband, was residing on an adjoining farm in Red Willow county, and requested his sister to take care of the children. He was soon after arrested, and pleaded guilty to a charge of murder in the second

degree and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. On the following day he was taken to the penitentiary, where he has since remained. In the following year Mr. and Mrs. Macy applied to the probate court of Red Willow county to adopt the boy, William E. Connor, and the appellant, Mrs. Rebman, appeared and opposed the adoption. Mr. Connor filed with the court a relinquishment of the boy and requested the court to allow Mr. and Mrs. Macy to adopt him. Upon the decision of the probate judge and an appeal to the district court for Red Willow county, Mr. and Mrs. Macy filed a petition setting up, somewhat at length, allegations of the facts and asking to be allowed to adopt the boy. Mrs. Rebman filed an answer alleging many matters in opposition thereto, and a reply was filed, in substance a general denial of the answer. A trial was had, and the court entered an order allowing the adoption, and Mrs. Rebman appealed to this court.

The answer objecting to the adoption alleges, in substance, that John F. Connor, having been convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life, had no power or authority over the children, and his relinquishment and request for the adoption by the appellees was of no force, and that the appellant is the mother of Minnie Connor and the grandmother of William E. Connor; that Mrs. Macy and her husband have seven children of their own, and have no affection for the child, William E. Connor, and are unfit to have his custody; that the other child was a little girl, a few months old, and that the Macys abused and neglected both of the children, in consequence whereof the little girl died about six months after they took her; that the Macys are not in a condition to take care of the boy; that Mr. Macy is a man of bad habits, accustomed to use bad language and the excessive use of intoxicating liquors, and with bad associations and accustomed to gambling; that both of the Macys used improper parental care of the child, and are boisterous and profane in dealing with them; that one of the children of

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the Macys died of tuberculosis, and that the boy is exposed to danger of contagion and his health endangered thereby. Appellant also alleges that she is situated so as to take good care of the child, and that in July, 1909, the boy came to her house and expressed a desire to live with her, and that on that day she made application to a court of competent jurisdiction in Decatur county, Kansas, and was "regularly and legally appointed guardian over the person and property of the William E. Connor aforesaid," and so became the only person having a right to the care and custody of the boy, and that Mr. Macy took the boy away from her by force and violence, against her will. She asked for a writ of habeas corpus giving her the custody and control of the boy.

1. The first question presented is as to the validity of the appointment of the guardian of the boy. It appears from the evidence that the appellant requested that the boy be allowed to go to her house upon her representation that she wanted to have his picture taken, and that the appellees, pursuant to that request, sent the boy there, and she immediately took the boy to Oberlin, in Decatur county, the appellant then being a resident of that county, and procured her appointment as guardian. The domicile of the boy was in Red Willow county, this state, where he was born and had always resided. Under such circumstances it seems clear that the courts of Kansas had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian, and, so far as this record shows, it also appears that the court which made the appointment was imposed upon, and did so on the supposition that the boy's domicile was in Decatur county, Kansas. The trial court did right in disregarding the alleged guardianship. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 34, sec. 2; *Connell v. Moore*, 70 Kan. 88.

2. The trial court appears to have thoroughly investigated the questions of fact presented in the pleadings as to the condition and surroundings of the respective parties, as to the character and habits of the appellees and their manner of living, and as to their treatment and care

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of the boy, and his interest and welfare in their custody and control. There is nothing in the evidence that in any way reflects on the character and conduct of Mrs. Macy. There is some little evidence, mostly as it appears from interested parties, tending to reflect upon Mr. Macy's reputation; but by the clear weight of the evidence in the case these accusations are without foundation. The findings of fact by the trial court in a case like this are entitled to great consideration, and will not be reversed, unless upon the whole evidence it appears that they are clearly wrong. We do not therefore find it necessary to quote or attempt to analyze the testimony of the various witnesses.

The judgment of the trial court being abundantly supported by the evidence, it is

AFFIRMED.

FAWCETT, J., not sitting.

**JONES NATIONAL BANK, APPELLEE, v. CHARLES E. YATES
ET AL., APPELLANTS.**

**BANK OF STAPLEHURST, APPELLEE, v. CHARLES E. YATES
ET AL., APPELLANTS.**

**UTICA BANK, APPELLEE, v. CHARLES E. YATES ET AL.,
APPELLANTS.**

**THOMAS BAILEY, APPELLEE, v. CHARLES E. YATES ET AL.,
APPELLANTS.**

FILED JANUARY 31, 1913. Nos. 17,276, 17,277, 17,278, 17,279.

1. Banks: NATIONAL BANKS: LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS. The national bank act, as provided in section 5239 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, affords the exclusive rule by which to measure the right to recover damages from directors based upon a loss resulting solely from their violation of a duty expressly imposed upon them by a provision of the act, and that liability cannot

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be measured by a higher standard than that which is imposed by the act.

2. ———: ———: ———: EVIDENCE. Where by the federal statute concerning national banks a responsibility is made to arise against the directors from its violation knowingly, proof of something more than negligence is required, and it must be shown that the violation was intentional.
3. ———: ———: ———. Where the directors of a failed national bank claim immunity under section 5239 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as to the rule of liability to be applied to them, the state courts may not create another rule than that provided by the national bank act, nor are they at liberty to disregard the rule provided by the act.
4. Courts: CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL STATUTES. If there is a penalty or liability enforced because of the violation or disregard of the United States statute, then the penalty is that provided by such statute, and the interpretation of the statute made by the United States supreme court must be adopted by the state courts.
5. Banks: NATIONAL BANKS: LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS: STATUTORY PROVISIONS. The civil liability of national bank directors in respect to the making and publishing of the official reports of the condition of the bank is based upon the duty enjoined by the national bank act, and the rule expressed by the statute is the exclusive rule, because of the elementary principle that, where a statute creates a duty and prescribes a penalty for its nonperformance, "the rule prescribed in the statute is the exclusive test of liability." *Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank*, 206 U. S. 158. *Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. Dearing*, 91 U. S. 29.
6. ———: ———: ———: FRAUD: PLEADING AND PROOF. To render a director of a national bank personally liable to a depositor for fraud and deceit practiced by its officers, as at common law, it must be alleged and proved that the director had knowledge of, or approved of, or participated in, the fraudulent acts of which complaint is made.

APPEAL from the district court for Seward county:
BENJAMIN F. GOOD, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

John F. Stout, Halleck F. Rose, F. M. Hall and Frank E. Bishop, for appellants.

J. J. Thomas, R. S. Norval and L. C. Burr, contra.

HAMER, J.

The cases designated by the foregoing titles and numbers are before this court a second time. By our former decisions (74 Neb. 734) we affirmed the judgments of the district court for Seward county, in which the plaintiffs were successful. The cases were taken on error to the supreme court of the United States, where our judgments were reversed (*Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank*, 206 U. S. 158; *Yates v. Utica Bank*, *Yates v. Bailey*, and *Yates v. Bank of Staplehurst*, 206 U. S. 181), where it was held that plaintiffs' petitions were insufficient to charge the defendants with a common law liability for fraud and deceit. When the mandates were received by this court, the causes were remanded to the district court for Seward county for further proceedings. Thereafter plaintiffs amended their petitions by interlineations, and thereby sought to change their causes of action so as to avoid the federal question. Upon a second trial the plaintiffs again had the judgments, and from these judgments the defendants have appealed.

Defendants contend, among other things, that the amendments above mentioned were wholly insufficient to change the plaintiffs' causes of action; that they still charge a violation of the national bank act; and that question will be first considered.

An examination of the record discloses that the interlineations by which it was sought to amend the petitions consisted of some slight amplifications of the statements contained in the original petitions as theretofore amended. The amendments contain no material additional statement of facts, and the petitions still charge the defendants with making false statements to the comptroller of the currency as to the condition of the Capital National Bank, and this is the main foundation or basis for recovery. By the amendments plaintiffs attempt to charge that the defendants knowingly and fraudulently, and with the intent to deceive the plaintiffs, made such statements, and

that thereby they induced the plaintiffs to become depositors in the Capital National Bank. To the petitions thus amended, each of the defendants demurred. The demurrers were overruled, and the defendants excepted. It is probable that the demurrers should have been sustained; but defendants answered over and admitted that the Capital National Bank was organized under the national banking act, but denied that they signed the statements or reports made to the comptroller as stated in the petition; alleged that they had no knowledge of the falsity or untruth of any of them, or of the true condition of the Capital National Bank at the times mentioned in the amended petition; denied that they caused the reports to be published in the newspapers; denied that they caused them to be sent out to the public or to the plaintiffs; denied that they had any knowledge that they were so sent by any of the officers or agents of the bank; they also pleaded a former adjudication, and averred that the only acts performed by them were done in compliance with the provisions of the national banking act, and that their liability, if any, was measured by the terms of that act, and not otherwise. Plaintiffs' replies were a general denial of the facts stated in the defendants' answers. Trials were had to the court without the intervention of a jury. There was a general finding for the plaintiffs, together with certain special findings as to each of the defendants, some of which are inconsistent with the general finding; and upon such findings the judgments appealed from were rendered. Defendants have renewed their objections to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' amended petitions, and also contend that the testimony is insufficient to sustain the general finding upon which the judgments in question are predicated.

It is impracticable, considering the length of the petitions and the manner in which they were amended by interlineations, to set them forth in this opinion, and it is sufficient to say that we are of opinion that the amendments in no way changed the nature of the plaintiffs'

causes of action; and, unless the supreme court of the United States shall recede from its decision of these cases, the petitions will be held insufficient by that court to state a common law liability for fraud and deceit as against the defendants, who were simply directors of the Capital National Bank.

Coming now to the consideration of the additional evidence introduced upon the second trial of these cases, we are of opinion that it is insufficient to charge the defendants with a personal liability for fraud and deceit. The testimony is clear, and practically without dispute, that when defendants Yates and Hamer signed the reports of December 9, 1892, and December 28, 1886, which are the ones upon which this action is in fact predicated, neither of them had any personal knowledge of their falsity, but signed them in good faith, believing that they exhibited the true condition of the Capital National Bank. It is not shown that either Yates or Hamer ever had any communication or conversation with the plaintiffs, or any of them, in regard to the condition of the Capital National Bank. It is not shown that they, or either of them, had any knowledge that any published statements or cards containing any information as to the condition of the bank were ever sent to the plaintiffs, or any of them, by any officer or agent of the bank.

It follows, therefore, that the evidence is insufficient to charge them, or either of them, with ever having knowingly made any false statement in regard to the condition of the bank, or participated in sending any advertising matter, published statements, or any of the things mentioned in the plaintiffs' petition to them, or any of them; and, having taken no part in said transactions, it cannot be said that they knowingly participated in any of them. There being nothing in the record sufficient to bring defendants Yates and Hamer within the rule of liability announced by the supreme court of the United States in these cases and others, we are of opinion that the judgment as to them must be reversed.

As to the defendant David E. Thompson, it appears from the record that he did not sign either of the statements in question. Some evidence was introduced which tends to show that before the last report was signed Thompson had notice of a letter from the comptroller of the currency questioning the correctness of the former reports made to him by the directors, and requiring the bank officers to charge off certain worthless notes or obligations held by that institution; that thereafter Thompson refused to sign any statements to the comptroller of the currency, and took no part in the management of the bank; that he disposed of some of his stock; that he was not informed in any way of the fact that published statements of the condition of the bank were sent by any agent or officer of the bank to the plaintiffs, if any such were sent. While it may be said that for a considerable length of time before the bank was closed by the comptroller he had some knowledge that its financial condition was questioned, still, so far as the record shows, defendant Thompson did not personally participate in any of the acts of which the plaintiffs complain, and they do not claim that he ever had any conversation with, or made any statement whatever to, the plaintiffs, or any of them.

As we view the opinion of the supreme court of the United States in *Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank, supra*, there was required in this case of the directors of the bank only that standard of conduct expressly imposed by section 5239 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and no higher duty may be rightfully established and demanded. A bank director is guaranteed immunity from liability under the very law that permits him to become a director. As an inducement to him to act in that capacity, the law assures him that he is not to be liable except for that which he knowingly does. A knowledge must be brought home to the director that he is deceiving the individual wronged and may thereby occasion a loss to him. The director is not liable for his own mistakes or blunders, or for the mistakes or blunders of his brother directors;

neither is he liable for the frauds and wrongs of the officers of the bank, unless he has personal knowledge thereof or participates in such fraudulent acts. If it were not so, there would be great difficulty in securing men to assume the position of national bank directors. The rule for which plaintiffs contend, if carried to its ultimate conclusion, would make the director of the national bank, who has himself been imposed upon and deceived by its officers, and who has thereby suffered loss, liable to the depositors for the fraudulent acts of such officers. Such has not been the views expressed by the supreme court of the United States in any cases. The opinion of Justice White in *Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank*, *supra*, is based on a single proposition; that is: "Where a statute creates a duty and prescribes a penalty for nonperformance, the rule prescribed in the statute is the exclusive test of liability." In the argument on behalf of the appellees it is said: "We sought to avoid the application of this rule for the reason that, while the national banking act expressly commanded the publication of the official report, it did not require the publication of a *true* report, and that therefore the publication of a *false* report did not violate any express mandate of the statute." *Cochran v. United States*, 157 U. S. 286. The argument was that the making of a *false* report was not a violation of the United States bank act, and that the remedy provided by section 5239 for violations of the statute did not reach the case, and therefore the contention was that there was no statutory remedy for making a false report, and that the plaintiffs in the court below could resort to their remedy at common law. This is a sort of legal refinement, and the only objection to it is that it does not seem to be along ordinary logical lines. The trouble with this contention is that it would eliminate the federal courts from a construction of the United States statutes and their enforcement. This would make a failure of bank directors to closely observe the terms of the national banking act, though acting under it, an excuse for releasing them

from all penalties to be inflicted under the act and by its provisions, and the substitution of a different liability from that imposed by the statute.

In *Briggs v. Spaulding*, 141 U. S. 132, the bill was framed upon the theory of a breach by the defendants, as directors, of their common law duty as trustees of a financial corporation, and of breaches of special restrictions and obligations of the national banking act. There plaintiffs commenced their action under the United States banking act, and claimed a liability because of a violation of the same. It was there said that plaintiffs cannot, in an action to recover because of a violation of the banking act, be allowed to recover upon some *other* theory. The plaintiff may not jumble his causes of action together and then say to the defendant: If you are not liable upon that which I have charged you with, then here is another construction that can be placed upon what I have said, and you are liable under that. It may be said, with much plausibility and reason, that it should be the duty of the directors to look into the condition of the bank of which they are directors; but that matter seems to have been determined by the supreme court of the United States in the case of *Briggs v. Spaulding, supra*, where it was said: "Persons who are elected into a board of directors of a national bank, about which there is no reason to suppose anything wrong, but which becomes bankrupt in 90 days after their election, are not to be held personally responsible to the bank because they did not compel an investigation, or personally conduct an examination." That decision holds that, if the bank directors fail to look into the condition of the bank, they are not guilty of an ordinary want of care, so far as the statute is concerned; section 5239 states in terms the nonliability of bank directors who fail to investigate the conditions of the bank. It may be that, when one deposits money in a bank or takes stock in a bank, thus putting his property in immediate control of other persons, he has a right to expect that the directors, who are supposed to manage the bank, will ex-

ercise at least ordinary care and prudence in the management of the bank's affairs; but the degree of care required rests of course with congress, which has control of the legislation.

In *Briggs v. Spaulding*, 141 U. S. 132, Chief Justice Fuller, in delivering the opinion of the court, among other things, said: "(1) Our attention has not been called, however, to any duty specifically imposed upon the directors as individuals by the terms of the act. (2) If any director participated in, or assented to, any violation of the law by the *board* he would be individually liable. * * * (3) It does not follow that the executive officers should have been left to control the business of the bank absolutely and without supervision, or that the statute furnishes a justification for the pursuit of that course. Its language does enable individual directors to say that they were guilty of no violation of a duty directly devolved upon them." (4) He cites 1 Morawetz, *Private Corporations* (2d ed.) sec. 556, to the effect that: "The liability of directors for damages caused by acts expressly prohibited by the company's charter or act of incorporation is not created by force of the statutory prohibition. (5) The performance of acts which are illegal or prohibited by law may subject the corporation to a forfeiture of its franchises, and the directors to criminal liability; *but this would not render them civilly liable for damages.* (6) The liability of directors to the corporation for damages caused by unauthorized acts rests upon the common law rule which renders every agent liable who violates *his authority to the damage of his principal.* * * * (7) The degree of care required depends upon the subject to which it is to be applied, and each case has to be determined in view of all the circumstances. (8) They (bank directors) are not insurers of the fidelity of the agents whom they have appointed, who are not their agents, but the agents of the corporation; and they cannot be held responsible for losses resulting from the wrongful acts or omissions of other directors or agents, unless the

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loss is a consequence of their own neglect of duty, either for failure to supervise the business with attention or in neglecting to use proper care in the appointment of agents. 1 Morawetz, Private Corporations (2d ed.) sec. 551 *et seq.*, and cases. * * * (9) The relation between the corporation and them (bank directors) is rather that of principal and agent, certainly so far as creditors are concerned, between whom and the corporation the relation is that of *contract* and not of *trust*. * * * (10) There are many things which, in their management, require the utmost diligence, and most scrupulous attention, and where the agent who undertakes their direction renders himself responsible for the slightest neglect. There are others where the duties imposed are presumed to call for nothing more than ordinary care and attention, and where the exercise of that degree of care suffices. The directors of banks from the nature of their undertaking fall within the class last mentioned, while in the discharge of their ordinary duties."

The plaintiffs having failed to allege and prove that the defendants personally knew of, or personally participated in, the acts of the officers of the bank of which they now complain, it seems clear that, if we follow the decision of the supreme court of the United States in these cases, they are not entitled to recover, and the judgments of the district court should be reversed as to all of the defendants. It also is apparent that plaintiffs cannot produce any other or additional evidence which will render the defendants liable in these cases, and therefore the judgments are reversed and the actions are dismissed.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

REESE, C. J., not sitting.

SEDGWICK and FAWCETT, JJ., dissenting.

LETTON, J., concurring in part.

I concur in the view that the amendments made after

the remand do not change the issues, and only set out more fully a cause of action for deceit at common law. The issues, then, are the same as when the case was presented to the supreme court of the United States. A careful reading of the history of this case, set out in the opinions of this court and in those of several inferior federal courts before which the question was presented, shows that it was their opinion that the petitions charge only a liability at common law for deceit, and not one under the national banking acts. The judgment of this court which was reversed by the supreme court of the United States was based upon the theory that the pleadings contained no federal question and stated merely a common law liability. The supreme court of the United States held that a federal question was presented, and that "the measure of responsibility, concerning the violation by directors of express commands of the national bank act, is, in the nature of things, exclusively governed by the specific provisions on the subject contained in that act." *Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank*, 206 U. S. 158, 178.

I agree with the former judgment of this court and that of the several inferior federal tribunals before which the question was presented that the petitions state a cause of action at common law for deceit, but think this court is bound by the opinion of the supreme court of the United States. I am also inclined to the view that the evidence would support a judgment upon such a theory of the case. The findings of the district court are to that effect. I am not satisfied they are unsustained by the evidence. The presumption is that they are so sustained; but I have not examined the evidence so critically as would be necessary to determine this, for the reason that, under the holding of the supreme court of the United States as to the measure of duty and of liability of directors under the banking laws of the United States, I think a case has not been made. For that reason alone, I concur in the conclusion.

SEDGWICK, J., dissenting.

It seems to me that the opinion and the concurring opinion are both predicated upon the capital error of assuming that it has been decided by the supreme court of the United States that the action is one for deceit at common law, and for that reason cannot be maintained. The opinion says that it was held (by the supreme court of the United States) that plaintiffs' petitions were insufficient to charge the defendants with a "common law liability for fraud and deceit," whereas that court held that the action was essentially for a violation of the federal statute, and expressly holds that such actions can be maintained in the state courts, and then reverses the judgment of this court, not because of any defect in the petition, that question not being discussed or even mentioned, but because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to liability under the federal statute. The opinion discusses the proposition somewhat at length, and concludes that "unless the supreme court of the United States shall recede from its decision of these cases, the petitions will be held insufficient by that court to state a common law liability for fraud and deceit as against the defendants, who were simply directors of the Capital National Bank." It seems to me wonderful that any members of this court should so completely misunderstand the opinion of that court. The concurring opinion falls into the same remarkable error, as the first sentence shows: "I concur in the view that the amendments made after the remand do not change the issues, and only set out more fully a cause of action for deceit at common law." This is exactly the reverse of what the supreme court in fact decided: "Directors of a national bank who merely negligently participated in or assented to the false representations as to the bank's financial condition contained in the official report to the comptroller of the currency * * * cannot be held civilly liable to any one deceived," etc. *Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank*, 27 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 638 (206 U. S. 158). This is the decision of the merits of the case as stated in the third paragraph of the syllabus. In the opinion the court say that the basis of the assignments of error is found in the *instructions given by the trial court, and in refusals to give instructions*. These instructions and refusals are quoted by the court and they all relate to this one point. Is proof of negligence only sufficient? Must the violation of the federal statute be in effect intentional? These instructions and refusals furnish the sole ground for reversal. All other points are resolved in favor of defendant in error. The court said that it was suggested by the plaintiffs in error that the action to enforce a liability created by the federal statute was "so inherently federal" that "the state court was wholly devoid of jurisdiction, * * * and that such action could only be brought in the courts of the United States." It was thought sufficient in the opinion to say that such contentions were without merit; but the character of the action and the right to bring it in the state courts is plainly stated in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus: "State courts may enforce, against directors of a national bank who have made false representations as to the bank's financial condition in the official report to the comptroller of the currency, the civil liability prescribed by U. S. Rev. St., sec. 5239, which * * * makes every director who participated in or assented to the same civilly liable to persons who have suffered damage in consequence thereof." How is it possible that any one should suppose that the court held that the pleadings were defective or that the judgment was reversed because the action was the common law action for fraud and deceit?

It is said in the opinion which has been promulgated as the opinion of this court: "As we view the opinion of the supreme court of the United States in *Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank, supra*, there was required in this case of the directors of the bank only that standard of conduct expressly imposed by section 5239 of the Revised Statutes

of the United States (U. S. Comp. St. no higher duty may be rightfully mandated." And this is discussed at length. This statement is entirely outside. There is no attempt to establish or duty of these directors than is enforced by the federal statute. No action against the directors of a national bank for fraud and deceit at common law can be maintained. This was decided when this case was formerly before the supreme court of the United States, and has been since emphatically decided by that court, and no such claim can be made in this case. The question is whether these directors are liable under the federal statute, and this action is prosecuted under that statute to enforce such liability. No action could be presented in any other way. No one who will take the pains to read the opinion need make such mistakes. If the instructions of the trial court had correctly stated the law as to liability under the federal statute the judgments would have been affirmed.

When the case was in this court the first time, this court followed the law announced in the earlier case of *Gerner v. Mosher*, 58 Neb. 135, 154, and held that, in signing the reports to the comptroller of the currency, the directors "by such act vouched for, or certified to, the absolute truthfulness of the statements therein contained, and not that the report was correct so far as the directors knew or had been advised by the proper performance of their duties as directors." This court thereupon held that the instructions given by the trial court were not erroneous. *Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank*, 74 Neb. 734. The supreme court of the United States reversed the case upon this point only, and held that, "where by law a responsibility is made to arise from the violation of a statute knowingly, proof of something more than negligence is required; that is, that the violation must in effect be intentional." To determine the meaning of this language of that court in this case is now the question of law for this court upon

this appeal. If there ever was any doubt of the holding of that court upon this point, that doubt has emphatically been set at rest by a later decision, where the language used by that court in this case is quoted and its meaning fully stated and made plain. *Thomas v. Taylor*, 224 U. S. 73. That case originated in a *nisi prius* court of the state of New York. It was afterwards taken to the appellate division, and to the court of appeals of that state. The court of appeals adopted the opinion of the appellate division, and the supreme court of the United States affirmed the decision of that court. It appears that the action was begun as a common law action for fraud and deceit and was substantially so prosecuted in the trial court, and when it reached the appellate division it was insisted that it could not then be considered as an action to enforce the liability imposed by the federal statute. The state court held that a common law action for fraud and deceit could not be sustained against the directors of a national bank, but that "a judgment in an action against such directors, tried and determined in accordance with common law principles for publishing a false report which induced the plaintiff to purchase stock in the bank, will not be reversed when the case, both as to pleading and proof, meets the statutory requirements, especially when defendants do not claim to have been prejudiced by the theory upon which the action was tried. A right decision will not be reversed merely because a wrong reason has been assigned therefor." 124 App. Div. (N. Y.) 53. The supreme court of the United States approved this holding, and again decided that no common law action for fraud and deceit could be maintained, and yet this court states as a reason for reversing this judgment that, "unless the supreme court of the United States shall recede from its decision of these cases, the petitions will be held insufficient by that court to state a common law liability for fraud and deceit as against the defendants, who were simply directors of the Capital National Bank." That court, in this very case, had decided that no possible

allegation can be sufficient to state such common law liability; that is, that no common law action could be sustained.

The case of *Thomas v. Taylor*, 224 U. S. 73, will leave no possible room for doubt as to the measure of liability of the directors in making these reports to the comptroller. In that case, as in the case at bar, the assets of the bank had become depleted and the reports to the comptroller misrepresented the condition of the bank. The plaintiff had not seen the reports to the comptroller, but had been informed of their contents, and purchased some of the stock of the bank relying upon the statements in those reports. On account of the false reports he was compelled to pay an assessment upon the stock which he bought, and brought his action to recover damages so sustained. In the syllabus the court stated the law as follows: "Although the common law action of deceit does not lie against directors of a national bank for making a false statement, and the measure of their responsibility is laid down in the national banking act (*Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank*, 206 U. S. 158), an action may be maintained in the state court regardless of the form of pleading if the pleading itself satisfied the rule of responsibility declared by that act. There is, in effect, an intentional violation of a statute when one deliberately refuses to examine that which it is his duty to examine." The opinion is devoted largely to an explanation of the holding in the case at bar when it was before that court. The court said: "The contention goes beyond what was said in *Yates v. Jones Nat. Bank*. The language there is 'that, where by law a responsibility is made to arise from the violation of a statute knowingly, proof of something more than negligence is required; that is, that the violation must in effect be intentional.' Not, therefore, that as a condition of liability there should be proof of something more than recklessness; not that there should be an intentional violation, but a violation 'in effect' intentional. There is 'in effect' an intentional violation of a statute when one

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deliberately refuses to examine that which it is his duty to examine." And, again, the court said: "There was an issue of knowledge tendered by the pleadings, and to sustain their side of the issue plaintiffs in error offered testimony of the correctness of the books and to show that the report was a true copy of them, as it was alleged in their answer to be."

The case at bar is quite similar. There is evidence that the comptroller became dissatisfied with the conditions of the bank, and wrote to the officers of the bank to call the attention of the directors to its condition and to send a statement of what they found to the comptroller. This was done, and these defendants signed the statement to the comptroller. It is therefore conclusive that these defendants knew the condition of the bank. After this the reports were published as before, and the plaintiffs were deceived and damaged thereby. There is a large mass of evidence in the case, but it is useless to discuss it, in view of the total inadequacy of the opinion and concurring opinion to discuss, or even to state, the questions of law upon which this decision depends.

FAWCETT, J., concurs in this dissent.

PARRY MANUFACTURING COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. ROBERT O. FINK, CITY TREASURER, ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,000.

1. **Taxation: LEVY: SALE.** The assessment of property for taxation in the city of Omaha for the year 1905 was made in the latter part of the year 1904. M. S. & D. was a corporation engaged in the sale of implements and vehicles, and at the time of the assessment had no property of plaintiff in its possession for sale or otherwise. In December, 1905, and after the expiration of the assessment, plaintiff shipped to the corporation for M., a member thereof, under a personal contract of agency with him, five sample buggies for exhibition, and which M. stored in the place of business of M. S. & D., but which did not form any part of the

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stock of goods of M. S. & D. The personal for the year 1905 not having been paid, the upon and sold the property of plaintiff to *Held*, That the levy and sale were wrongful ity, and that the treasurer was liable for the erty.

2. ———: ———: ———. The return to the a property belonging to M. S. & D. for taxat was made by that corporation May 29, 19 time, nor at any time thereafter, did said c property in its possession belonging to pla held by M. under a personal contract of agei in the place of business of M. S. & D., but d body of the stock of said corporation. *Held* and sale of plaintiff's property to pay the t & D. for the year 1906, with knowledge that M. S. & D., were without authority, and th liable for the value thereof.

APPEAL from the district court for
WILLIS G. SEARS, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

De Bord, Fradenburg & Van Orsdel, f

*B. S. Baker, W. O. Lambert, John A
Poel, H. C. Brome and Crofoot & Scott,*

REESE, C. J.

This is an action by plaintiff against Fink, as city treasurer of the city of Omaha, and indemnity companies, his sureties, for the property levied upon and sold to satisfy taxes assessed against said corporation, for the years 1905 and 1906 as the property of plaintiff, known as Margaret, Stephens & Davis, to satisfy the taxes assessed against said corporation, erty, it is alleged, was not the property of plaintiff, but that of plaintiff. It is alleged that the property consisting of five buggies, of various kinds, of value of \$500. The defendants answered the petition, denying the levy and sale as alleged, denying the assessments of the petition, and alleging that the property assessed as the property of Margaret, S

by the county assessor on the 27th of May, 1905, and on the 29th of May, 1906, and that the said corporation held itself out as the owner of the property to the knowledge of plaintiff, that plaintiff had at no time scheduled any property for taxation in the county or city, and is estopped to deny the ownership (of Magaret, Stephens & Davis) of the property in controversy. The answers of the indemnity companies present substantially the same issues. To each answer plaintiff replied, denying in substance the averments thereof. The cause was tried to the court without the intervention of a jury, and, the findings and judgment being in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals.

From an inspection of the evidence, we are satisfied that there can be but one conclusion as to the ownership of the property when levied upon and sold by defendant. In fact there is no material dispute upon that question. It is practically conceded that the title and ownership were in plaintiff. In December, 1905, the property was consigned to Magaret, Stephens & Davis under a personal contract with Magaret by which he was to act as agent for plaintiff in selling its manufacture of wheeled vehicles. Prior to that time Magaret, Stephens & Davis had had none of plaintiff's property in their possession, except under a contract by which, when plaintiff had taken orders through its salesmen, the goods were to be shipped to that corporation in car-load lots and by it immediately forwarded to the purchasers. The shipment by car-load lots of the goods sold by plaintiff was for the purpose of taking advantage of the reduced freight rates on such shipments. The goods were transferred to the purchasers in so short a time after receipt as to render it practically a continuous transit. Plaintiff's factory is at Indianapolis, Indiana. In the years 1902 and 1904 plaintiff's goods were sold to Magaret, Stephens & Davis, as jobbers, and plaintiff had no interest in them. That relation ceased in 1904, and there were no further dealings between the parties, except the transfer contract of re-

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shipment of the goods sold to customers by plaintiff upon orders taken by it. The tax for which the property was sold was that due from Magaret, Stephens & Davis for the years 1905 and 1906, and it clearly appears that at the time of the assessment for the year 1905 plaintiff had no property in the city of Omaha, nor in Douglas county, and, in fact, it had no property there subject to taxation until the property involved in this case was shipped there about the middle of December, 1905, as sample goods. The only excuse we can discover for the levy and sale was that the property was in the warehouse of Magaret, Stephens & Davis from that time until about the time of the levy, and it was then seized to pay the taxes of that corporation. Under the laws as existed at the time of the assessment for the 1905 taxes, the assessment was made between the 15th day of September and the 15th day of November, 1904, the return to be made to the tax commissioner by the 1st day of December. In the February following, the mayor and council levied the taxes. Ann. St. 1903, sec. 7606. The tax commissioner delivered the tax list to the city treasurer by the 1st of May. Section 7611. As plaintiff had no property in Douglas county at that time, it is clear that it did not add anything to the volume of the property in the possession of Magaret, Stephens & Davis for that assessment and levy for 1905, and therefore there could be no estoppel, and the property levied upon could not have been liable for the taxes assessed to Magaret, Stephens & Davis for that year, and the levy and sale were wrongful.

The law governing the levy for 1906 was by the provisions of the act of 1905. Comp. St. 1905, ch. 12a. By section 160 of that act the city council was required to annually certify to the county clerk the amount of general tax required for the ensuing year. The county board then fixed the rate of tax to be levied to raise the amount so certified as assessed by the county officers, and the state board of equalization as returned by that board to the county clerk, and the taxes were entered as a part of

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the consolidated tax of the county. The return for assessment for 1906 taxes by Magaret, Stephens & Davis was made May 29, 1906, and at that time that corporation had no property of plaintiff in its possession. It is true that Magaret, under his personal contract with plaintiff of September 23, 1905, may and probably did store the property in dispute in the warehouse of Magaret, Stephens & Davis, but it did not enter into nor form a part of the property of that corporation, and therefore was not taxable with nor chargeable to it, and the levy upon and sale thereof to satisfy the taxes due from Magaret, Stephens & Davis were without authority, and therefore wrongful. It is shown that, before the levy made by the deputy treasurer, he was informed that the property did not belong to the local corporation, and it was with the knowledge of that fact the levy and sale were made by him. We are unable to see how it can be said that the property was liable for the taxes due from Magaret, Stephens & Davis.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

ROSE, J., not sitting.

ELEAZER D. PEDEN, APPELLEE, V. PLATTE VALLEY FARM
& CATTLE COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 16,900.

1. **Waters: IRRIGATION: WATER CONTRACTS: BREACH: LIABILITY.** If a corporation engaged in the business of supplying individuals with water for the irrigation of arid or semiarid lands unlawfully and arbitrarily prevents the holder of one of its water contracts from using water for the irrigation of his growing crops, it is liable to the individual in damages.
2. ———: ———: ———: ———: **MEASURE OF DAMAGES.** In such a case the measure of damages is the value to plaintiff of the

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use of said right during the time he is deprived thereof, and it is not error to instruct the jury that the measure of plaintiff's recovery is the value of the crop at the time the water was shut out of said canal, with the right to irrigate it from that time to the end of the irrigation season, less the value of the crop without the right to irrigate it from that time until the end of the season. *Clague v. Tri-State Land Co.*, 84 Neb. 499.

3. **Trial: VERDICT: INSTRUCTIONS.** Where it appears from a consideration of all of the evidence that the jury could have properly rendered the verdict of which complaint is made by following the instructions, an assignment of error "that the jury disregarded the instructions of the trial court" is not available as a cause for reversing the judgment rendered on the verdict.
4. **Evidence examined, and found sufficient to sustain the judgment.**

APPEAL from the district court for Dawson county:
BRUNO O. HOSTETLER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

H. D. Rhea and E. A. Cook, for appellant.

H. M. Sinclair, W. D. Oldham and W. A. Stewart,
contra.

BARNES, J.

Action for damages against an irrigation company by the owner of certain water rights for failure to furnish water during the irrigation season of 1907 and 1908. The petition contained nine counts or causes of action. The jury found for the plaintiff on three counts for damages to his crops in the year 1907, and for the defendant as to all of the other causes of action set forth in plaintiff's petition. From a judgment rendered upon the verdict, the defendant has appealed.

The three causes of action involved in this appeal are: First, for damages to 40 acres of oats, corn and alfalfa; second, for damages to 80 acres of corn; third, for damages to 10 acres of corn and 30 acres of alfalfa.

Appellant contends that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, and argues that, to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict on the causes of action on which he recovered, it was incumbent upon him, not only to show a demand

for water after the payment of the annual maintenance fee according to the contract, but also to show that there was water in the Platte river which the defendant could get into its ditch in sufficient quantity to carry to the land of the plaintiff in 1907, and that his crops were damaged by reason of the failure of defendant to furnish him his share of the water flowing in the ditch. The water-right deeds in question provide that the irrigation company sells, assigns, transfers and conveys "the right to receive and use water from the canal of the said party of the first part, in an amount not exceeding one cubic foot of water per second of time for each 80 acres of the land hereinafter described; * * * provided, and so long as the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns shall pay to the party of the first part, its successors or assigns, annually in advance, on or before the first day of October in each year, the sum of \$40, in addition to the consideration above expressed, for the use of said water." The deed further contains the provision that if the grantee fails to remit the annual payments at the time they become due and payable, and such default continues for two years, the conveyance shall become null and void, and the rights of the grantee shall cease and determine. It is further provided that "the said party of the first part shall have the right, upon the failure of the party of the second part to pay the rent hereby reserved, or to comply with any of the stipulations herein contained, to immediately, or at any time during such default, refuse and cease to supply any water under this agreement."

It appears that the court instructed the jury that the provision of the contract for payment on October 1, annually, in advance, means "at the beginning of the year October 1, and before the water season begins." The jury were further instructed that, under the statutes, the water season continues from April 15 to November 1. The proof shows that the plaintiff paid the annual maintenance charge on July 26, 1907, and that defendant made no complaint as to that matter, and at no time refused to

furnish plaintiff water for the reason that payment was not made at an earlier date. The thirteenth instruction reads as follows: "You are instructed that under no circumstances under the contracts in this case can you allow plaintiff damages, if any, to his crops for failure of defendant, if any, to furnish water prior to the time plaintiff paid his water rental for the current year and demanded water." Defendant contends that the jury disregarded and failed to follow this instruction, and while appellant must necessarily concede that the instruction, if erroneous, was prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff and not those of the defendant, still it is insisted that the refusal or failure of the jury to follow this instruction entitles the appellant to a reversal of the judgment. It is argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to demand or receive water from the defendant until July 26, 1907, for the reason that up to that time he had not paid his water rental for that year; that plaintiff's crop of oats was either ripe and ready for harvest at that time, or had in fact been harvested, and therefore the jury could allow him no damages to that crop, and therefore the jury must have disregarded the instruction above mentioned.

It appears, however, that the plaintiff had planted and cultivated 40 acres of corn upon one tract of his land, as well as 40 acres of oats; that he claimed damages to those crops to the amount of \$2,000. The testimony shows conclusively that plaintiff's corn, if irrigated, would have produced from 40 to 60 bushels an acre. While, in fact, for that year he was only able to produce 15 bushels an acre, thus making a difference of 25 bushels an acre in the production for that year, or a total difference of corn production of 1,000 bushels. The testimony discloses that corn in that year was worth 40 cents a bushel, making a loss of corn upon that tract of land of \$400. Upon that cause of action the jury awarded him only \$316.80. In view of this situation, it seems clear that the jury allowed the defendant no damages whatever for his oat crop. It further appears that plaintiff had also planted 80 acres of

corn upon another tract of land, for which he claimed damages to the amount of \$1,600. The testimony as to that 80 acres is practically the same as to the amount of corn produced per acre, and the amount which plaintiff could have produced if his corn had been irrigated. On this cause of action the jury assessed his damages at the sum of \$408.

The fifth cause of action was for damages to 10 acres of corn and 30 acres of alfalfa, amounting to \$500. The jury assessed plaintiff's damages upon that cause of action at the sum of \$135.60.

In view of this situation, we are unable to say that the jury disregarded the instruction in question. On the other hand, they might have followed it literally, and still have found, upon a consideration of all of the evidence, that his damages, to the full amount allowed plaintiff, were in fact sustained by him after he paid the annual maintenance tax and demanded water, as shown by the testimony. We are therefore of opinion that the defendant's contention that, where the jury disregards the court's instructions, a reversal of the judgment is required, has no application to the facts of this case, for it may reasonably be said that the jury followed the instruction, and at the same time arrived at a correct and just verdict.

It appears that the court further instructed the jury, in substance, that they should allow the plaintiff damages in the sum that water, according to the contract, would add to the crop of the plaintiff between the time of the payment of the fee and demand for water to the end of the irrigating season. The appellant contends that this instruction was unnecessary, and does not present a true rule, and has no application to the evidence. We think what we have already said on this question disposes of this contention.

Coming now to the evidence: It seems to establish clearly that the plaintiff was not furnished the amount of water which his contract called for, and had from time to time asked defendant for water. The plaintiff so testified,

and his evidence was not directly disputed. The court also instructed the jury that if the plaintiff established the facts that he planted the crops as alleged, had kept his laterals in proper condition, had demanded water during the irrigating season, had paid the annual rental at the time he made demand, and that thereafter the defendant negligently refused to furnish water, as provided in the contract, and that because of such failure plaintiff sustained injury and damage to his crops, he would be entitled to damages accordingly after demand and a payment of rental; that the statutes provide that the water season for irrigating shall continue from April 15 to November 1; that under no circumstances, under the contracts in this case, could plaintiff be allowed damages for a failure to furnish water prior to the time he paid his water rental for the current year and demanded water; that the contracts provide for the payment of the rentals in advance on the 1st day of October of each year; that the term "in advance" means at the beginning of the year, October 1, and before the water season begins; that after the time the rentals are paid the defendant had no right to refuse water; that, under the contract, if there was a deficiency of water in the canal, for some cause beyond the control of defendant, or a deficiency in the source of supply, and if the water was distributed *pro rata*, then the defendant would not be liable; that if they found for the plaintiff they should allow him the net value of the crop at the time he failed to get water according to his contract, if he did so fail to get water, with the right to irrigate it from that time to the end of the season, less the net value of the crops, without the right to irrigate, according to his contract, from that time to the end of the season.

Appellant contends that these instructions relating to the measure of damages are prejudicially erroneous, and do not state the true measure of damages. It is apparent from the record that the trial court endeavored to, and did substantially, follow the rule announced in *Clague v. Tri-State Land Co.*, 84 Neb. 499. In that case it was said:

"If a corporation engaged in the business of supplying individuals with water for the irrigation of arid or semiarid lands unlawfully and arbitrarily prevents the holder of one of its water contracts from using water for the irrigation of a field of growing potatoes, it is liable to the individual in damages. In such a case the measure of damages is the value to plaintiff of the use of said right during the time he is deprived thereof, and it is not error to instruct the jury that the measure of plaintiff's recovery 'is the value of the crop at the time the water was shut out of said canal, with the right to irrigate it from that time on to the end of the season, less the value of the crop without the right to irrigate it from that time until the end of the season.' " As we view the instructions, they substantially follow this rule, and none of the rights of the defendant were prejudiced thereby.

Mention is made of *Wade v. Belmont Irrigating Canal & Water Power Co.*, 87 Neb. 732. It appears that there are two substantial reasons why the rule announced in that case has no application to the case at bar. In that case there were no crops, and no damages were claimed for the loss of crops, while in the case at bar the testimony discloses that plaintiff had planted the crops, as alleged by him, and that they were in a proper state of cultivation and in good condition up to the time when he was refused water under his contracts. From what we have said, appellant's contention that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence must fail.

As we view the record, defendant has failed to show any error prejudicial to its rights; and, while it may be conceded that in some respects the instructions were erroneous, still, upon a consideration of the entire record, we are satisfied that the case is one for the application of section 145 of the code, which provides: "The court in every stage of an action, must disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings, which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judg-

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ment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect."

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

GEORGE L. SMITH, APPELLEE, v. SHERMAN R. SEVERN,
APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 16,971.

1. **Vendor and Purchaser: CONTRACT OF SALE: DELIVERY.** A contract for the sale of real estate is not binding upon the vendor until it is signed and delivered to the vendee.
2. ———: ———: **UNAUTHORIZED DELIVERY.** A real estate agent or broker cannot bind the vendor by an unauthorized delivery of a contract for the sale of real estate.
3. ———: ———: **PERFORMANCE.** The delivery by the purchaser of a check or draft to the agent or broker of the vendor, payable to the order of the broker, where the contract provides for payment of money, is not a compliance with the terms of the contract.
4. ———: ———: ———. In such a case the vendor may refuse to accept the check instead of cash, and, until cash is tendered to him as payment, may decline to proceed with the proposed sale.

APPEAL from the district court for Butler county: BENJAMIN F. GOOD, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

E. C. Strode, Skiles & Harris and M. V. Beghtol, for appellant.

Arthur J. Evans, L. S. Hastings and E. A. Coufal, contra.

BARNES, J.

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Butler county to cancel a contract for the sale of the east half of section 21, and the north half of the northwest

quarter of section 22, all in township 14, range 1 west of the sixth P. M., situated in said county. The defendant filed an answer and cross-petition, by which he prayed judgment for a specific performance of the contract. The plaintiff thereupon dismissed his petition, and by an answer and cross-bill to the defendant's cross-petition resisted specific performance, and prayed for a cancelation of the contract. The defendant filed a reply to plaintiff's cross-petition, and upon the issues thus joined a trial was had which resulted in a decree for plaintiff, and the defendant has appealed.

It appears that plaintiff listed his farm, which is the land in question, with one Earle, a real estate broker; that defendant had some negotiations with Earle in November, 1909, looking to the purchase of the land in question. The negotiations failed because of some ill feeling existing between plaintiff and defendant, and thereafter one Crumbliss, another real estate broker, obtained permission from the plaintiff to sell the land in question for \$47,000. Crumbliss negotiated with the defendant for the sale of the land, and induced him to make an offer therefor of \$46,000. Crumbliss then informed the plaintiff that he had such an offer, but declined to give the name of the purchaser. Plaintiff finally agreed to take \$46,000, and thereupon Crumbliss and plaintiff made duplicate copies of a proposed contract, but Crumbliss at that time declined to state the purchaser's name or insert it in the contract. Crumbliss then took the duplicates to the defendant, who revised them in some respects, among which was the place of payment, and signed them as thus revised. By the terms of the contract defendant agreed to pay plaintiff \$6,000 when the duplicate contracts were signed, and the balance of the consideration, amounting to \$40,000, was to be paid at a bank in Ulysses on the 1st day of March, 1910, and it was agreed that upon such final payment the plaintiff was to convey the premises to the purchaser by good and sufficient warranty deed. Crumbliss then took the revised contracts to the plaintiff at his

bank in Ulysses on the morning of the 10th day of December, 1909. Plaintiff approved of the alterations made therein, and signed the contracts. At that point in the negotiations a question arose between plaintiff and Crumbliss in regard to the commission. Plaintiff said he had not seen any money on the contract, and Crumbliss replied that he had a check in his pocket for \$6,000. Plaintiff thereupon told Crumbliss that he would not take Severn's check for 15 cents, and demanded cash in place of a check. It appears that plaintiff was at that time about to leave for Omaha by a train which was coming into the station, and told Crumbliss to let the matter rest until his return. He left the duplicate contracts on his desk in the bank, and started for the train. After plaintiff had left the bank, Crumbliss, without authority, took the duplicate contracts into his possession, followed plaintiff and overtook him on his way to the train. Plaintiff then told Crumbliss to return the contracts to the bank, and leave them there, and let the matter rest until he returned from Omaha. Crumbliss disobeyed plaintiff's instructions, and went to Surprise, where he saw Severn, and after consultation with him took the train to David City, and after consulting an attorney placed one of the duplicate contracts on record, in accordance with his instructions from Severn. Some days later he returned the other duplicate to plaintiff's bank, where it was placed by one Patrick in a drawer, but that fact was not brought to plaintiff's attention. The matter remained in that condition for some time, and until the plaintiff contracted with another party to sell the land, when Severn wrote to plaintiff, asking him if he had sold the land, and whether or not he was going to comply with his contract. To this communication the plaintiff made no reply. On the 2d day of April, 1910, plaintiff commenced this action, and thereafter the issues were made up by the pleadings above mentioned. The cause was tried to the court, without the intervention of a jury, and resulted in the judgment from which this appeal was taken.

Appellant's brief contains no specific assignments of error, but from his argument we infer that his contention is that the decree of which he complains is not sustained by the evidence. There is but little conflict in the testimony as contained in the record. Plaintiff and his witnesses testified that the signed contracts were left by him on his desk in his bank, with instructions to Crumbliss to let the matter rest until he returned from Omaha; that later, on his way to the train, he told Crumbliss, who had taken possession of the contracts without his consent, to return them to the bank, and let the matter await his return. This was in part denied by Crumbliss. But the great weight of the evidence sustains plaintiff's contention on this point. It therefore follows that defendant failed to prove a legal delivery of the contract.

Again, the contract provides, in express terms, that defendant was to pay plaintiff the sum of \$7,000 (agreed orally to be \$6,000 in cash) when the contracts were signed, and it appears, without dispute, that this money was never paid or tendered to the plaintiff. Instead of such payment or tender, defendant gave Crumbliss a check or draft payable to his order for \$6,000, which plaintiff refused to accept, and demanded payment in money or cash, as stated by the witnesses. Instead of complying with that demand, Crumbliss later on cashed the check or draft, and according to his own testimony left \$5,600 with a rival bank to plaintiff's credit, which all agree plaintiff refused to claim or accept. So it must be said that defendant himself failed to comply with the terms of the contract which he sought to enforce.

It is claimed, however, that Crumbliss, as plaintiff's agent, had authority to accept defendant's check payable to himself as the first payment upon the contract, and also to take possession of the contracts and deliver one of them to the defendant. It appears, however, that Crumbliss was simply authorized to find a purchaser for the farm at a price and on terms of payment satisfactory to plaintiff; and the evidence entirely fails to support defendant's con-

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tention on this point. It is strenuously insisted, however, that Crumbliss had apparent authority to perform the acts by which he sought to bind the plaintiff. It is a sufficient answer to this contention to say that, when defendant was informed that plaintiff refused to accept anything but cash for the \$6,000 payment, he was sufficiently notified that Crumbliss was without any such authority as he now contends he possessed. It is therefore apparent that the district court, in refusing to compel plaintiff to specifically perform the contract in question, acted with the sound discretion vested in courts of equity to refuse a decree of specific performance unless, acting upon broad equitable grounds, he deems himself required to render such a decree.

As we view the record, the judgment of the district court is amply sustained by the evidence, and is therefore

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., not sitting.

IN RE PHILLIPS.

U. S. ROHRER, APPELLANT, V. L. PHILLIPS, APPELLEE.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,756.

1. **Intoxicating Liquors: APPLICATION FOR LICENSE: REMONSTRANCE: BURDEN OF PROOF.** In order to defeat an application for a saloon license on the ground that the applicant has violated the provisions of chapter 50, Comp. St. 1911, entitled "Liquors," by selling intoxicating liquor to a minor, the burden of proof is on the remonstrator to establish that fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
2. ———: ———: ———: **EVIDENCE.** The evidence contained in the bill of exceptions examined, and found sufficient to sustain the order of the licensing board, and judgment of the district court affirming such order.

APPEAL from the district court for Adams county:
ERNEST B. PERRY, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Benjamin F. Johnson, for appellant.

W. P. McCreary, contra.

BARNES, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court for Adams county, affirming an order of the mayor and council of the city of Hastings granting a license to one L. Phillips to sell malt, spirituous and vinous liquors in that city for the license year, commencing May 1, 1912.

The only question presented by the record is one of fact. The remonstrance contained an allegation that Phillips, a licensed saloon-keeper, had violated the provisions of chapter 50, Comp. St. 1911, entitled "Liquors," within the preceding year by selling liquor to a minor. That issue was tried before the mayor and council, and was decided against the remonstrator. An appeal was taken to the district court, where that question was again tried upon the transcript of the evidence taken before the mayor and city council. The district court found that the remonstrator had failed to establish the charge set forth in his remonstrance, and affirmed the order of the licensing board. From that judgment the remonstrator has prosecuted this appeal.

An examination of the record discloses that one Otto Parry, a young man about 19 years of age, testified that he had bought liquor in appellee's saloon in August, October and November of the year 1911; that he was waited upon by Phillips' bartenders. He did not claim to be able to definitely fix the date of his purchases, except on one occasion, when appellee cashed a check for him for \$13. He testified that at that time he bought a glass of beer, and received the balance of the check in money. On the other hand, the three persons who tended bar for Phillips testified positively that they did not know Parry, and that they never had sold him any liquor at any time. The appellee testified that he might have cashed a check for \$13 at Parry's request; that he knew him; that if he cashed the

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check he paid him the full amount in cash; that he sold him no liquor, and did not on any occasion of that kind wait on a customer at the bar of his saloon.

The foregoing is the substance of the evidence contained in the bill of exceptions. As we view the record, the evidence fails to sustain the charge contained in the remonstrance. The finding of the district court is sustained, and its judgment is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., not sitting.

**LAURITZ NELSON, APPELLANT, v. OMAHA & COUNCIL BLUFFS
STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLEE.**

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 16,980.

Dismissal. "The district court may, in the just exercise of its discretionary power, permit plaintiff to dismiss his case after it has been finally submitted to the court or jury." *Bee Building Co. v. Dalton*, 68 Neb. 38.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
WILLIS G. SEARS, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

John O. Yeiser, for appellant.

Rich, Nolan & Woodland, contra.

LETTON, J.

This is an action to recover from a master for personal injuries. In the view we take of the record, it is unnecessary to state the facts.

After the evidence of both parties had been produced, a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant was filed on account of the insufficiency of the petition and the evidence. The journal recites: "The defendant moves that

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the jury be instructed to return a verdict for the defendant, and said motion is argued and submitted. Whereupon the plaintiff asks leave to withdraw a juror; and, after due consideration, said leave is by the court granted." A juror was withdrawn and the jury discharged and the cause set for trial anew; to each of which orders the defendant excepted. Afterwards, during the same term, the defendant moved the court "to vacate and set aside its order allowing the plaintiff to withdraw a juror and setting the case for trial anew, for the reason that the motion of defendant to instruct the jury to render a verdict in favor of defendant had been duly argued by counsel and submitted to the court, as more fully appears from the record of the court, and the court was thereby without power to entertain any other motion until the said motion to instruct the jury had been either granted or denied, or to take any action whatsoever except to rule upon the said motion," and defendant further moved that the court dismiss the action with prejudice, at plaintiff's costs. This motion was argued and submitted and taken under advisement. The record shows that at the next term the motion was sustained, "for the reason that the court was about to sustain said motion to take the case from the jury when the application was made to withdraw a juror and continue the case, and the court now considers that the court was without discretion in the premises." It was then ordered that the case be dismissed according to defendant's motion at the close of the testimony.

The plaintiff contends that it was error to set aside the order granting a new trial and to dismiss the case, for the reason that the former order was within the discretion of the court, and that the evidence was sufficient to warrant its submission to the jury.

Defendant takes the position that, there being no motion for a new trial filed, this court cannot examine the evidence, and that, the case having been submitted to the court by the motion to instruct, the court had no power to allow the withdrawal of a juror, and to grant a new trial.

Both sides rely on the case of *Bee Building Co. v. Dalton*, 68 Neb. 38. In that case, after the evidence had been submitted, a motion was made by the defendant to instruct in its favor. The motion was sustained by the court. Before the court gave the required instruction, the plaintiff attempted to dismiss his cause of action without prejudice. The defendant objected to the dismissal at that time, after a motion to instruct a verdict in favor of the defendant had been sustained. The court allowed plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice. In discussing the question presented, SULLIVAN, C. J., says: "Before plaintiff moved to dismiss the action without prejudice, his case had been not only submitted to the court upon a vital issue of law, but that issue had been decided against him, and nothing remained open for contention. * * * The *record does not show* that the the court *undertook to exercise a discretionary power*, or that the situation called for the exercise of such power. The application was evidently made and *granted as a demandable right*. * * * The discretionary power of the district court to set aside a submission and receive further evidence, or to postpone the trial, or even to permit a dismissal of the case, is not doubted; but there is nothing in the present record to indicate that there was any just ground for the exercise of such power, or that there was any attempt to bring it into action. The court was evidently of the opinion that, the peremptory instruction not having been yet read to the jury, the right of plaintiff to dismiss was absolute. This was an erroneous conception, and it led to a wrong result."

Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the syllabus are as follows:

"6. The district court may, in the just exercise of its discretionary power, permit plaintiff to dismiss his case after it has been finally submitted to the court or jury.

"7. But where the discretionary power of the court is not invoked, and the application to dismiss after final submission is made and allowed as a demandable right, the order of dismissal will not be upheld, unless a denial of the application would amount to an abuse of discretion."

It will be seen that there is a marked distinction in the recorded facts between that case and this. While the motion to instruct was pending, and before it had been sustained, the plaintiff in this case asked leave to withdraw a juror. He did not attempt, as in the Dalton case, to dismiss without prejudice as a matter of right. It was within the discretion of the court at that stage of the trial to allow this to be done. The argument in defendant's motion, based upon the alleged want of power to act until the motion to instruct had either been granted or denied, is fallacious, for the reason that the rules of parliamentary procedure, whereby the chair has no right to entertain any but privileged motions while a motion is pending, do not apply to proceedings in courts of justice. We are of the opinion that the court had power, in the exercise of its discretion, to grant leave to withdraw a juror, and that, in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, its action should be sustained.

The defendant insists that we are without power to examine the evidence to ascertain whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by the judgment of dismissal, for the reason that no motion for a new trial was filed. This was unnecessary.

The plaintiff is not here complaining that the order granting the new trial was erroneous, but merely that the later order setting aside the same on the ground of want of power was erroneous. This question is presented by the record, and does not require a consideration of the evidence, since it will be presumed that the former order was justified until it is made affirmatively to appear otherwise. We are of opinion that, since the court at plaintiff's request exercised its discretionary power in permitting a new trial of the case, and since no abuse of this discretion has been affirmatively shown, its later judgment setting aside this order and dismissing the case for the reasons stated in the order was erroneous.

The later judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded.

REVERSED.

MARY MORAN ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. WILLIAM CATLETT
ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,017.

1. **Dower: EQUITABLE INTERESTS.** Under the statutes in force in 1891, a widow was not entitled to dower in an equitable interest in lands held by executory contract by her deceased husband.
2. **Process: CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE: AFFIDAVIT.** An affidavit for constructive service upon unknown heirs, under section 83 of the code, must be made by the plaintiff himself, if an individual, and not by his attorney, and must be verified positively.
3. **Taxation: FORECLOSURE OF LIEN: PARTIES.** An action for the foreclosure of a tax lien was brought against specific individuals; the petition being in the ordinary form. The land was not made a party to the suit. The court afterwards, apparently upon its own motion, ordered the land to be made a party defendant, but no amendment was made to the petition or the title of the case, and the land was not described as a party in the published notice, which was in the usual form in a suit against individuals. *Held*, That the land was not brought in, and that the action was not *in rem* against the land itself.

APPEAL from the district court for Perkins county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Reversed*.

Wilcox & Halligan, for appellants.

E. J. Hainer and C. P. Craft, contra.

LETTON, J.

This is an action to set aside certain conveyances founded upon tax foreclosure proceedings. A demurrer to the petition was sustained and the action dismissed. Plaintiffs appeal.

The material allegations of the petition are substantially as follows: That Patrick Fitzgerald, who died intestate in July, 1891, was at that time the husband of the plaintiff Mary Moran, and was the father of the plaintiff Patrick Thomas Fitzgerald; that during his lifetime Patrick Fitz-

gerald purchased the land in controversy from the Union Pacific Railroad Company under an executory contract of sale and upon ten annual payments; that after his death the plaintiffs completed the payments, and on January 24, 1894, the railroad company conveyed the land to "the heirs at law of Patrick Fitzgerald, deceased;" that the plaintiff Patrick Thomas Fitzgerald is a minor, born August 17, 1891; that the estate of his father was probated in Cook county, Illinois, and that all the debts and expenses of administration have been paid; that the plaintiffs are the owners of the land, and have at all times since the death of Patrick Fitzgerald resided in the city of Chicago, and their residences and addresses have at all times been published in the directory of said city. It is further alleged that in 1896 John W. Welpton purchased the land at tax sale, and that on September 19, 1890, he filed his petition in the district court for Perkins county seeking to foreclose his tax lien; that a decree of foreclosure was entered, the land sold under the decree to Mr. Welpton, and a sheriff's deed made. A copy of the pleadings and of the record in the foreclosure case is attached to the petition and made a part thereof. The title of the foreclosure case, as shown by the petition, is: "John W. Welpton, Plaintiff, vs. Mrs. Patrick Fitzgerald, full name to plaintiff unknown, the heirs of Patrick Fitzgerald, further and full names to plaintiff unknown, Defendants." The petition is verified in the ordinary form by plaintiff's attorney. On the same day an affidavit was made by the attorney, reciting: "The said premises were conveyed to said heirs by the Union Pacific Railroad Company; that affiant has written said company and been informed by it that said heirs were in Chicago, Illinois; that affiant has been unable to learn the names or addresses of any of the said heirs, and plaintiff has been unable to do so, and their names and addresses are to the plaintiff wholly unknown, and he is unable to ascertain the same. Wherefore affiant and plaintiff prays that service may be made upon said heirs as unknown and without naming them." There was

iled an affidavit for constructive service in the ordinary form, reciting that "the defendants, Mrs. Fitzgerald, v of Patrick Fitzgerald, deceased, and the unknown heirs of Patrick Fitzgerald, deceased, are nonresidents of the State of Nebraska, that service of summons cannot be made upon the said defendants or any of them within this State." On November 12 the following paper was filed: "I, John W. Welpton, now the plaintiff, and alleges that he is the holder of a tax sale certificate set forth in plaintiff's petition; that the property involved in this case appears from the records to be owned by the heirs of Patrick Fitzgerald, having been deeded to said heirs by the Union Pacific Railroad Company; that plaintiff has made all possible inquiry to discover the addresses of said heirs, and has been unable to find the same; that plaintiff is informed by the Union Pacific Railroad Company that deed was recorded to said heirs at Chicago, Illinois; but plaintiff has been unable to discover the names of said heirs, or their addresses. Wherefore plaintiff prays that said heirs may be served by publication as the unknown heirs of Patrick Fitzgerald, deceased. John W. Welpton, Plaintiff, By B. F. Hastings, His Attorney." This was verified by the attorney, "as he verily believes." On the same day the following order was made: "It is ordered by the court that the said premises involved in this action, to wit, the southeast quarter of section 13, Twp. 10 north of range 39 west, be made a party defendant herein, also that the unknown heirs of Patrick Fitzgerald be made defendants herein." The notice of publication thereafter made was addressed as follows: "Mrs. Fitzgerald, widow of Patrick Fitzgerald, other and full name to plaintiff unknown, heirs of Patrick Fitzgerald, deceased, will take notice," etc. Proof of publication was made, and on March 19 the court found that due and legal service of summons and notice of the pendency of the action had been given upon all the defendants, and entered the decree of foreclosure by default.

The petition in the case at bar further alleges that no service of summons in the foreclosure case was had upon

the plaintiffs, and that the alleged notice was null and void, and failed to give the court jurisdiction; that the defendants claim title under the void proceedings by conveyance from Welpton. It is further alleged that Mary Moran has a life estate in an undivided one-third interest in the land.

Appellants' brief states: "There is but one question presented for determination in this case; that is, whether the affidavit by which it was sought to make the unknown heirs of Patrick Fitzgerald, deceased, defendants was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the plaintiff, Patrick Thomas Fitzgerald, so that the decree in the tax foreclosure suit would bar his rights to this land as the heir of Patrick Fitzgerald? Making unknown heirs a party and obtaining service upon is authorized by section 83 of the code of civil procedure, under the following conditions: 'It shall appear by the affidavit of the plaintiff annexed to his petition, that the names of such heirs or devisees, or any of them, and their residence are unknown to plaintiff.' * * * It will be seen that the affidavit filed in this case is deficient in at least two respects: First, the affidavit does not state that the residence of the unknown heirs is unknown, but affirmatively shows that their residence is Chicago, Illinois, and in lieu of the statement that the residence is unknown says that their address is unknown; second, the affidavit was not made by the plaintiff, as required by law, but by his attorney."

It may be well to clear up the question as to who are the heirs of Patrick Fitzgerald before considering the questions above propounded. At the time of his death he held the land under an executory contract of purchase. Under the statute then in force, and under the settled rule in this court, a widow was not an heir of her deceased husband, and had no dower rights in the lands held under a partially executed executory contract, hence no title is shown in Mrs. Moran. *Crawl v. Harrington*, 33 Neb. 107; *Hall v. Crabb*, 56 Neb. 392; *Grandjean v. Beyl*, 78 Neb. 349, 354; *Nortnass v. Pioneer Townsite Co.*, 82 Neb. 382.

Returning now to the question of the sufficiency of the affidavits for constructive service to confer jurisdiction. It was after the filing of the paper of November 12, verified by the attorney on his belief, that it was ordered that the land and the unknown heirs be made parties defendant, and that service be made by publication. The statute requires that an affidavit for service upon unknown heirs be made by the plaintiff in order to warrant service by publication. It cannot, therefore, be made by his attorney. There is reason for this. The plaintiff might know the facts as to residence and heirship, and yet his attorney be ignorant as to these very matters, and he might thus secure an undue advantage over the defendant. The rule in this state is that, in order to sustain service by publication, the provisions of the statute must be strictly followed. *Stull v. Masionka*, 74 Neb. 309. The affidavit was, therefore, insufficient to warrant such service upon the "unknown heirs." This is the rule in other states. *Davis v. John Mouat Lumber Co.*, 2 Colo. App. 381; *Sylph Mining & Milling Co. v. Williams*, 4 Colo. App. 345; *Sayre-Newton Lumber Co. v. Park*, 4 Colo. App. 482; *Everett v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.*, 4 Colo. App. 509; *Taylor's Heirs v. Watkins*, 43 Ky. 561.

The defendants, however, argue that the land itself was made a party to the suit, and that the action was one *in rem* in which notice to the parties is unnecessary. If the land itself had been made a party by proper pleadings, and had been brought in by proper service of notice of that fact, the doctrine of these cases would be applicable, and the conclusion urged irresistible. In this case, however, the land was not made a party to the suit. It is true that on November 12 the court ordered that the land and the unknown heirs be made parties defendant, but this order was made, so far as the record shows, upon the court's own motion, without any request or suggestion on the part of the plaintiff, and it was never complied with. The petition was not amended in conformity with the order to make the land a party, and the notice for constructive

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service was addressed merely to Mrs. Fitzgerald and to the unknown heirs of Patrick Fitzgerald, and not to the land itself. The pleadings remained and the proceedings were had thereafter in all respects as if no such order had been made. We think, therefore, that the proceedings never became actually *in rem* against the land as a party defendant.

Defendants argue that, under the rule announced in *Stratton v. McDermott*, 89 Neb. 622, and *Lear v. Fickweiler*, 92 Neb. 621, the plaintiffs are estopped to insist that the name under which they took title, namely, "the heirs at law of Patrick Fitzgerald, deceased," is not their true name, and that service upon them by such name is sufficient. Upon the father's death the son immediately became vested by inheritance with the interest in the property which the father held. *Cutler v. Meeker*, 71 Neb. 732; *Nortnass v. Pioneer Townsite Co.*, 82 Neb. 382. He acquired such interest by inheritance in his true name, and the doctrine of estoppel as announced in the cases mentioned is not applicable to the facts. We are of opinion that the affidavit for constructive service upon the unknown heirs was insufficient, and that the petition states a cause of action.

The judgment of the district court, therefore, is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

WILLIAM REED V. STATE OF NEBRASKA.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,850.

Criminal Law: TRIAL: SEVERANCE. Under section 465 of the criminal code, one jointly indicted with others for a felony is entitled to a separate trial as a matter of right, if the request for a separate trial is made in due season. *Metz v. State*, 46 Neb. 547, distinguished.

ERROR to the district court for Nemaha county:
LEANDER M. PEMBERTON, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Lambert & McCarty, for plaintiff in error.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, and *Frank E. Edgerton*, contra.

LEITON, J.

The plaintiff in error was jointly indicted with three other persons upon the charge of having committed a felonious assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury upon one Goings. Each of the defendants filed a separate motion asking for a separate trial. These motions were overruled and exceptions taken. Trial was had, and the jury returned a verdict finding the plaintiff in error guilty of assault and battery, and finding the other defendants guilty of felonious assault as charged. No bill of exceptions has been preserved. The only assignment of error we can consider, as the record stands, is that the court erred in overruling the motion for a separate trial.

At common law a defendant could not as a matter of right demand to be tried separately, and a severance at the request of either party was a matter of discretion. 1 Bishop, Criminal Procedure (3d ed.) sec. 1018. Section 465 of the criminal code provides: "When two or more persons are indicted for a felony, each person so indicted shall, on application to the court for that purpose, be separately tried." Plaintiff in error insists that the provisions of this statute are mandatory. The state contends that the motion in this case, being made immediately before the trial, was made too late, and, further, that the error, if any, was not prejudicial, since the accused was only convicted of a misdemeanor; that one guilty of a misdemeanor is not entitled to a separate trial as a matter of law, and that he was really tried for a misdemeanor.

The objection that plaintiff in error did not apply for a separate trial in time we think is not justified by the

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record. The information was filed in the district court on May 27, 1912. On May 29 the case was set for trial on the morning of the 31st, and on that day the motion was made and overruled before the selection of a jury was begun.

The accused was charged with a felony, and when so charged the statute clearly preserves to him the right to be tried separately. *Johnson v. State*, 14 Ind. 574; *Trisler v. State*, 39 Ind. 473; *Cain v. State*, 44 Ind. 435; *Greer v. State*, 54 Miss. 378. In the case of *Metz v. State*, 46 Neb. 547, the defendant complained of a severance, but did not do so until after a jury had been selected and sworn. It was held that this was too late, which was undoubtedly a correct decision. NORVAL, C. J., however, added the statement (probably true as to the state, but, as we are of opinion, incorrect as to the defendant) that the severance is "in the discretion of the court." This question was not in the case, and must be considered as mere dictum. We hold, therefore, that, when the demand is made by the accused in time, the court has no discretion. This right he may waive by failure to make the request in proper season. In Alabama the code fixes the time at or before which the request must be made. In Washington, where there is no statutory provision as to time, the court say: "The right to a separate trial is a valuable one, and this section of the penal code confers it upon a defendant. It does not specify when the demand shall be deemed waived. We think this right to a separate trial belongs to the defendant, and he may avail himself of the right at the time the cause is assigned for trial. A severance of trial afterwards is in the discretion of the court, until the jury is sworn to try the cause, subsequently to which time a several trial cannot be granted." *State v. Mason*, 19 Wash. 94. There was a dissent on this proposition. No other court taking this view has been called to our attention. There being no statute or rule of court setting a limit of time before the trial for the defendant to elect whether he will be tried separately, we

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think the court ought not to hold that the right was waived by failing to exercise it until the day of trial.

Was the error without prejudice? The evidence not being before us, it is impossible to tell whether the defendant's conviction was not influenced by his association with the three defendants who were each found guilty of a felony.

The motion for a separate trial should have been sustained, and the judgment of the district court is therefore

REVERSED.

IN RE ESTATE OF JOHN BROEHL.*

CHARLES BROEHL, ADMINISTRATOR, APPELLEE, V. SOPHIA BROEHL, APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,954.

Appeal: FINAL ORDER. An order granting or refusing a license to sell real estate to pay the debts of a deceased person is a final order reviewable on appeal. *Miller v. Hanna*, 89 Neb. 224, distinguished.

APPEAL from the district court for York county: GEORGE F. CORCORAN, JUDGE. *Motion to dismiss overruled.*

France & France and Morning & Ledwith, for appellant.

Power & Meeker, contra.

LETTON, J.

A motion to dismiss the appeal has been made by the administrator, based upon the contention that the order refusing to set apart to the widow a part of the premises as the family homestead and granting a license to him to

* April 7, 1913. Appeal dismissed on motion of appellant.

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sell real estate to pay debts of the deceased is not a final order, and that it is not reviewable until after confirmation of a sale based upon such order has been made. In this state orders granting or refusing such licenses have always been considered as final orders, reviewable by proceedings in error until the change in appellate practice, and by appeal since that time. *Waldow v. Beemer*, 45 Neb. 626; *Poessnecker v. Entenmann*, 64 Neb. 409; *Martin v. Bond's Estate*, 64 Neb. 868; *Bixby v. Jewell*, 72 Neb. 755. This is the general rule in other states. 2 Woerner, American Law of Administration (2d ed.) sec. 473, p. *1049.

Section 581 of the code provides, among other things, that "an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding * * * is a final order which may be vacated, modified, or reversed, as provided in this title." Section 582 provides for a review in the supreme court of judgments and final orders. We have frequently held that this is a "special proceeding." The judgment in this case denied the prayer of the widow to set apart a part of the real estate of her deceased husband as the family homestead, and refused to order the sale of the premises in parcels as she prayed. There can be no doubt that the right of the widow and children to have the extent of the homestead determined and to have it set apart before the sale, or to have the land sold in parcels or in such a manner as best to preserve the homestead interest, or to show that the amount of money needed to pay debts is less than alleged are substantial rights. An adverse decision and order based thereon is a final order reviewable upon appeal.

The administrator bases his contention upon the authority of *Miller v. Hanna*, 89 Neb. 224. In that case a husband who was administrator of the estate of his deceased wife procured a license to sell a portion of the real estate, "subject to the life estate of the surviving husband." The heir of the wife, who had no notice of the proceedings until after the order was made, filed objections to the

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confirmation, which were overruled, and from the order confirming the sale he appealed. The court held that the estate which the husband took at the death of the wife was liable for her debts, and that "it follows that the judge of the district court *had no power to make the order* complained of, because the effect of that order was to deprive the remainderman of all interest in the estate and declare that the life estate of the husband was not subject to the payment of the debts of his deceased wife." It was also held that, in line with former holdings, an application for a license to sell real estate to pay debts of a deceased person is "a special proceeding." In that case it will be seen that the judge of the district court had no power under the statute to authorize a sale of that which he ordered sold. This lack of power extended throughout the proceedings, and, like any other lack of jurisdiction, the question might be raised at any time. *Miller v. Hanna*, therefore, is not in conflict with previous decisions to the effect that an order granting or refusing a license is reviewable. The motion to dismiss is overruled. *Poessnecker v. Entenmann, supra.*

MOTION TO DISMISS OVERRULED.

JENNIE E. COUNSELMAN ET AL., APPELLEES, V. JOHN B. SAMUELS ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 16,981.

1. **Taxation: TAX SALE: TIME FOR REDEMPTION.** Where the last day of the two-year statutory period to redeem land sold by a county treasurer for delinquent taxes falls on Sunday, the owner's right of redemption exists during all of the next day.
2. ———: ———: **SUIT TO REDEEM: PETITION.** In a petition to redeem land sold by a county treasurer at an administrative tax sale, an allegation that plaintiff is the owner of the land is, in that respect, sufficient to resist a demurrer.

APPEAL from the district court for Lincoln county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Hoagland & Hoagland, for appellants.

Wilcox & Halligan, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is a suit to cancel a treasurer's tax deed to a quarter-section of land in Lincoln county and to permit plaintiffs as owners to redeem the land from the tax lien. Defendants claim title by virtue of the tax deed. The trial court granted the prayer of plaintiffs' petition, and defendants have appealed.

Plaintiffs plead, and here assert, among other grounds for relief, that the tax deed is void, because, under the administrative proceedings, they were not given the full time allowed by law to redeem their land. The point is that, the last day of the usual two-year period having been Sunday, plaintiffs were entitled to, but were not given, all of the following Monday to exercise their right of redemption. On this question the facts and law seem to be with plaintiffs. The county treasurer sold the land at private sale August 19, 1904. He so certified, and in his certificate stated that the time for redemption would expire August 20, 1906. The purchaser in his published notice gave the same dates, and stated that he would apply for a deed August 20, 1906, if the premises were not redeemed in the meantime. The treasurer's tax deed was in fact issued August 20, 1906. August 19, 1906, was Sunday.

Were plaintiffs legally entitled to all of the next day, Monday, August 20, to redeem? If they were, the treasurer's deed was void, because, in that event, it was issued pursuant to an insufficient notice before the expiration of the time for redemption. Const., art. IX, sec. 3; Comp. St. 1911, ch. 77, art. I, sec. 212. Where a purchaser's notice to redeem from a treasurer's administrative tax sale fixes a specific date within the statutory period for redemption, the treasurer's deed, if executed on the date

so named, is void. *Hollenback v. Ess*, 31 Kan. 87; *Gage v. Bailey*, 100 Ill. 530; *Benefield v. Albert*, 132 Ill. 665; *Wisner v. Chamberlin*, 117 Ill. 568. A text-writer on taxation says: "When the last day of the statutory period of redemption falls on Sunday, then, either by customary law, or under a statute directing that that day shall be excluded from the computation, the owner will have the whole of the following day in which to redeem. If, therefore, the day named in the notice, as the date when the right of redemption will expire, should prove to be Sunday, though it is correctly calculated to the end of the statutory period in ordinary cases, the notice does not give the owner the full time for redemption to which he is legally entitled, and for that reason it is insufficient." Black, Tax Titles (2d ed.) sec. 334. This seems to be the correct rule. *Brophy v. Harding*, 137 Ill. 621; *Gage v. Davis*, 129 Ill. 236. Section 895 of the code provides: "The time within which an act is to be done as herein provided, shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if the last day be Sunday, it shall be excluded." It has recently been held that this statutory provision for computing time is applicable alike to the construction of statutes and to matters of procedure and is controlling, whether the time to be taken into account be days, months or years. *Johnston v. New Omaha T.-H. E. L. Co.*, 86 Neb. 165. According to this interpretation of the code, plaintiffs had all day Monday, August 20, 1906, to redeem their land from the tax lien. The notice having fixed a time before the end of that day, and the deed having been issued before the statutory period expired, plaintiffs' right to redeem was not cut off.

The sufficiency of the petition is challenged because plaintiffs' ownership of the land is pleaded in general terms only. The argument on this point is answered by a former decision. *Hill v. Chamberlain*, 91 Neb. 610.

The manner of proving plaintiffs' title is questioned, but the opinion is unanimous that in this respect sufficient proof was properly admitted. Other questions need not

be considered, since the right of plaintiffs to redeem was conclusively established.

AFFIRMED.

RESE, C. J., not sitting.

NEMAHA COUNTY, APPELLEE, v. RICHARDSON COUNTY;
ARTHUR ALLEN, EXECUTOR, APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 16,996.

1. **Taxation: PLACE OF ASSESSMENT: POWER OF STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION.** By section 10941, Ann. St. 1909, the legislature has conferred upon the state board of equalization and assessment, in any case where the statute is silent or uncertain as to the proper place to list personal property for taxation, the same power to fix the proper place as is possessed by the legislature itself.
2. ———: ———: ———. And, it being within the power of the legislature to provide, where the residence and personal property of one under guardianship are both in one county and the residence of the guardian in another, in which of the two counties the property should be listed, where it fails to so provide, the state board of equalization and assessment has full power to act; and when it does so act its determination of the question has all the force and effect of a statute.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
LINCOLN FROST, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

Quackenbush & Neal and Amos E. Gantt, for appellant.

Lambert & McCarty, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

On October 17, 1908, Charles Mason, a resident of the village of Stella, in Richardson county, was adjudged an incompetent person, and his son-in-law, Arthur Allen, a resident of Auburn, in Nemaha county, was appointed his guardian. Allen qualified as such, and filed an inventory

and appraisement of the property of his Richardson county, which consisted of ing-house valued at \$2,000, and personal ing of moneys and promissory notes, all deposit for safe-keeping in the State Ba were of the appraised value of \$9,544.5 of the real estate was later filed by M that his ward was the owner of 872 acr maha county, valued at \$84,000. It is was no personal property in Nemaha . year 1908 the personal property of Mr. by himself with the deputy assessor of in Richardson county. The village of l Mason had his domicile, was in Muddy guardian has never removed any of the j from the State Bank of Stella, but has mitted the same to remain there. The g personal property for taxation for 1909 assessor of Muddy township, the same done when acting for himself. The cc Nemaha county claims the right to as property in that county, and made a c guardian to so list the same. Thereup filed in the county court of Richardson c praying for instruction and guidance as the matter. The county court set a da, which due notice was given to the chair of commissioners and to the county ass county. Nemaha county entered a sp challenging the jurisdiction of the court of said parties and the subject matter of special appearance was overruled, and structured that it was his duty to list the j of his ward in Muddy township, Ric Thereupon the county assessor of Nemah application with the state board of equ sessment requesting a decision of that proper place for the listing and assessmer

property involved, and gave due notice to the guardian and to the county assessor of Richardson county of such application. On August 9, 1909, there appeared before the state board of equalization and assessment "J. H. Lambert, county attorney, C. E. Blessing, county assessor, and others representing the county of Nemaha, Nebraska, and A. E. Gantt, county attorney, and N. B. Judd, county assessor, and others representing the county of Richardson, Nebraska, in the matter of the assessment of the property of Charles Mason." There was present the full board. A copy of the findings of the county court of Richardson county, touching the request of Arthur Allen, guardian, for instructions, in relation to the listing of the personal property of his ward for taxation, was filed with the board, and it was agreed by the parties interested that such findings correctly stated the facts in the case. The substance of the findings has already been given above. On the next day, August 10, 1909, the state board met in regular session, all of the members being present, and upon further consideration of the matter the board decided that the property should be assessed in Richardson county. From this action of the state board the county of Nemaha and C. E. Blessing, its county assessor, prosecuted error proceedings to the district court for Lancaster county. Upon hearing in that court, the court found there was error in the order of the state board of equalization and assessment, "in this: that the personal property of the said Charles Mason should have been ordered assessed at the home of his guardian, in Auburn, Nemaha county, and not at the place of the ward's domicile, at Stella, in Richardson county." The order of the state board of equalization and assessment was reversed, and the personal property ordered to be assessed in accordance with the above finding. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and defendant Allen, executor, appealed to this court. (Prior to the filing of the petition in error in the district court, Mr. Mason had departed this life, and Mr. Allen had been appointed executor of his estate.)

We think it must be conceded that the legislature may fix the situs of personal property for purposes of taxation. Section 10941, Ann. St. 1909, provides: "In all questions that may arise under this chapter as to the proper place to list personal property, or when the same cannot be listed as stated in this chapter, if between several places in the same county, the place for listing and assessing shall be determined and fixed by the county board; and when between different counties, by the state board of equalization and assessment; and when fixed in either case, shall be as binding as if fixed in this chapter."

It was evidently with this statute in mind that the county assessor of Nemaha county filed with the state board of equalization and assessment his request for it to determine this question. The state board, upon due notice to all parties interested, and after a full hearing of the matter, with all parties represented by counsel, decided the question. In doing so it acted within the powers conferred upon it by the section of the statute above quoted. The words, "and when fixed in either case, shall be as binding as if fixed in this chapter," have a clear and distinct reference to the first two clauses in the section. The power thus conferred upon the state board is plenary in any case where the statute is silent or uncertain as to the proper place to list personal property for taxation. The board is given the same power to "fix" the proper place as is possessed by the legislature itself. It cannot be doubted that the legislature might have provided, where the residence and personal property of one under guardianship are both in one county and the residence of the guardian in another, in which of the two counties the property should be listed. Where it fails to so provide, the state board has full power to act; and when it does so act its determination of the question has all the force and effect of a statute. *Diemer & Guilfoil v. Grant County*, 76 Neb. 78, so far as it goes, is in harmony herewith.

Without deciding the question of the jurisdiction of the

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courts to review, by error or appeal, a decision by the state board of equalization and assessment, when acting under the statute in question, we hold that the district court erred in reversing the action of the board in this case. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the error proceedings from the state board of equalization and assessment dismissed at costs of plaintiff in error therein.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

EUGENE DELATOUR, APPELLEE, v. HUGO H. WENDT,
APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,014.

1. **Taxation: FORECLOSURE OF LIEN: PROCESS: NAMES.** Defendant brought suit to foreclose a tax sale certificate upon lands standing of record in the true name of the owner, John E. Toumey. Service was attempted by publication. The petition named as defendant John E. "Townry," and the affidavit and published notice designated the defendant as John E. "Towrny." *Held*, That the notice was insufficient, and that the deed issued in such suit was void as against the owner, Toumey, and his grantees.
2. **Adverse Possession: ENTRY: INTENT: EVIDENCE.** Where one, claiming title to real estate by adverse possession, entered originally without color of title or claim of right, and the acts relied upon to show entry and occupation were consistent with a mere intention to trespass from time to time until interfered with by the true owner, his testimony that he intended to take possession and hold and occupy as owner, uncorroborated by acts necessarily indicating such intention, is not sufficient to require a finding in his favor. *Knight v. Denman*, 64 Neb. 814.

APPEAL from the district court for Deuel county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Affirmed*.

Morning & Ledwith, for appellant.

Hoagland & Hoagland and *L. O. Pfeiffer*, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

From a decree of the district court quieting title in plaintiff to the southeast quarter and lots 3 and 4 in said county, defendant appeals.

The pleadings and the evidence establish the following facts: One John E. Townry as a homestead, and under date of 1889, granted a patent therefor. The records in the office of the county clerk shows that John E. Townry, by the same name set out in the Davidson Investment Company mortgage to the Davidson Investment Company, July 10, 1889, he, by the same name set out in the Davidson Investment Company mortgage to one J. W. McMenemy, introduced evidence to show that the mortgage to McMenemy was executed under the name of John E. Townry. The copy of the mortgage to McMenemy of the mortgagor as John E. Townry, as set out in the numerical index, is not disputed. Townry, after obtaining the patent, Townry, or some one for him, paid the taxes upon the land down to a certain time after executing the mortgages, the time not being shown, Townry removed from Nebraska to the state of Michigan, and the lands by quitclaim deed to plaintiff. Townry claims for a reversal of the judgment on the following grounds: (1) that he obtained the sheriff's deed in a suit instituted by plaintiff to close a tax lien under a tax sale conducted by plaintiff on March 7, 1901; and (2) advice of counsel.

In the tax foreclosure suit, relief was granted to the defendants named were J. W. Townry, Mrs. John E. Townry, and the Davidson Investment Company. The service was by affidavit for such service the defend-

John E. Townry, Mrs. John E. Townry, J. W. McNenanny and the Davidson Investment Company. The published notice gave the names as stated in the affidavit. The decree of foreclosure is entitled Hugo H. Wendt, Plaintiff, vs. J. W. McNenny et al., Defendants. It nowhere refers to any of the other defendants by name. The order of sale issued to the sheriff follows the same course, naming personally but one defendant, and naming him as J. W. McNenanny. The appraisal names only the defendant "McNenanny" and concludes with the recital: "The interest of.....defendant, we value at one hundred sixty dollars." The notice of sheriff's sale names only "McNenamny." The return of the order of sale makes no reference to any of the defendants by name except in the title of the case in the indorsement upon the return, which refers only to defendant "McNenamny." The order of confirmation refers only to defendant "McNenamny." Upon this record the district court properly found: "That in said tax foreclosure proceedings no service of summons of notice of the pendency of said action was had upon the owner of the record title thereof, to wit, John E. Toumey, and by reason of said fact said tax foreclosure proceedings were void, and conveyed no title to Wendt." It requires too great a stretch of the rule of *idem sonans* to hold that either "Townry" or "Townry" is the same as Toumey.

Upon the second point, viz., the statute of limitations, the evidence shows that in the spring of 1893 defendant wrote to John E. Toumey in Michigan with a view to renting the land in controversy. Counsel for defendant in his brief states: "Receiving no reply, and learning that the land was mortgaged for all or more than it was worth, and that the taxes were unpaid, he concluded that Toumey had abandoned the land. Wendt thereupon, and on or about March 1, 1893, concluded to enter upon this land and take and retain adverse possession until he thereby acquired title, and possession was at that time taken by him for that purpose." It appears that before Toumey

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left Nebraska he had broken up about ten acres of the land. In the summer of 1893 defendant raised a crop of wheat upon this ten acres, and in 1894 a crop of millet. No further attempt was made to cultivate the ten acres until about ten years later, nor did defendant offer to pay any of the taxes upon the land, which he says he learned in 1893 were unpaid, until March 7, 1901, when he called at the county treasurer's office and learned that the taxes for the years 1896 to 1899, inclusive, were delinquent, that the land had been offered at public tax sale, but not sold for want of bidders, and that it was then subject to private tax sale. He thereupon paid to the treasurer the delinquent taxes due, and the treasurer sold him the land at private tax sale, and executed to him a certificate of purchase therefor. He paid the subsequent taxes, and on June 16, 1903, commenced the suit to foreclose his tax lien, hereinbefore referred to. Defendant's contention now is that he had ten years of continuous and adverse possession at the time he brought his suit to foreclose his tax lien, and that his purpose in foreclosing the lien was to obtain a marketable title. It is not claimed that at the time he purchased the tax sale certificate he had had ten years' possession. If his purpose in foreclosing his tax lien after, as claimed, he had become the owner, by reason of ten years' adverse possession, was simply to secure a marketable title, it is hard to understand why, when he appears to have been compelled to pay \$275 at the sheriff's sale, which was \$90.48 in excess of the total amount due for taxes and costs of sale, he paid the amount of the surplus into court, and has never made any attempt to recover the same. If he was then the owner of the land, he was himself entitled to any surplus. The fact that he was the bidder at the sale is immaterial. If he were the owner of the property, and John Smith had purchased the land at the sheriff's sale, he, defendant, as the owner of the land, would have been entitled to the surplus, for, if he were the owner of the land, there could be no superior right in any one else. The fact, therefore, that he paid

the surplus into court, and has permitted it to there remain, indicates quite strongly that at that time he was not relying upon his title by adverse possession, but upon his title by purchase at that sale, and when he paid the surplus into court it must have been done in recognition of a superior title in Toumey.

But, be that as it may, the district court was right in finding against defendant generally, for the reason that the evidence does not sustain his claim of adverse possession. The record shows that at the time he claims to have entered upon the land he was an unmarried man living with his father upon an adjoining tract; that he had some cattle which were running with his father's stock; that in 1894 he entered a homestead about five miles distant which he occupied during the full period of five years to entitle him to a patent therefor; that during all of that time his stock continued to run with his father's, he going down occasionally to look after it. No attempt was made to fence the land until after he had obtained title, as he thought, under his tax foreclosure proceeding; so that during all of the ten years, when he claims he was holding the land adversely, it was open, grazing land, upon which there were neither buildings nor fences. He contends that during those ten years he sometimes cut hay upon the land; but the evidence shows that it was the custom of the residents of that section of the country to cut hay upon any of the wild and vacant land in that vicinity. He also claims that during those ten years he kept every one else from grazing cattle upon the land in controversy. Upon this point the evidence shows that there was a good deal of land in that neighborhood, some of which was owned by the railroad company and some by nonresidents, lying open; that by a sort of gentlemen's agreement among the residents these open lands were parceled out and each resident was expected to herd his cattle upon the land within his allotment. We think the evidence fairly shows that in telling others to keep their cattle off of this land defendant was doing so by virtue of this

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neighborhood agreement, and not under any claim of ownership. Without pursuing the matter further, we think it clearly appears that defendant never took or held possession of this land during any time within the ten years referred to in any such manner as would start the statute of limitations running adversely to the owner thereof.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

**GUSTAV DRINGMAN ET AL., APPELLEES, V. JOHN KEITH,
APPELLANT.**

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,016.

1. **Former Decision Followed.** Our former opinion in this case, reported in 86 Neb. 476, as to the questions of law involved, adhered to.
2. **Adverse Possession: EVIDENCE.** Evidence examined, and held clearly sufficient to sustain the judgment of the district court.
3. ———: **CHARACTER OF POSSESSION.** The possession of defendant set out in the opinion held not adverse.

APPEAL from the district court for Cheyenne county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. Affirmed.

Wilcox & Halligan, for appellant.

Hoagland & Hoagland, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

This is a second appeal. A very complete statement of the case will be found in our former opinion, reported in 86 Neb. 476. The case was again tried in the district court, and from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs defendant appeals.

The questions of law involved are settled by our former

opinion. Some of the members of this court, at the former hearing, thought that judgment should then be directed in favor of plaintiffs, but a majority thought, as stated by LERTON, J., in the opinion, that possibly all of the evidence available by the parties had not been introduced; and, while we all thought there was a slight preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs, the preponderance was so slight as to cause the court to hesitate to set aside the deed upon which defendant relies. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings upon the ground, as stated: "It may be possible for the defendant to furnish additional evidence with respect to the conversations had by the deputy marshal with Mrs. Dringman when she testifies that she was unduly influenced and coerced. For this reason, the case will be reversed and remanded for further proceedings, instead of rendering a decree upon the facts in evidence." When the case was retried, the deposition of the deputy marshal was taken, and is in the record before us. This deposition removes all doubt from our minds, and leaves us all agreed that upon the evidence now before us the execution of the deed in controversy by Mrs. Dringman was obtained under duress.

It is urged by defendant that on the retrial of the case he introduced the testimony of himself and two witnesses to show that he was in possession of the land from the time the deed was given in 1899, and that, although the plaintiffs were both in court and testified on the trial, the testimony of defendant and his two witnesses was not controverted by them. In other words, the contention is that defendant, under the deed in controversy, took possession of all of the land except a few acres upon which the house and a small corral were located, "not to exceed an acre or two," and that, such being the fact, the four years' statute of limitations had run against the plaintiffs. An examination of the testimony of defendant and his two witnesses shows, very clearly we think, that defendant never took possession of any portion of the land under the deed. The evidence shows that for many years prior to 1899 the

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land, of which defendant now claims he took possession under the deed, was inclosed in a large pasture of some 700 or 800 acres, belonging to defendant, and that the possession he has had and the use he has made of the land in controversy since is not different from but precisely the same as for a number of years prior to the execution of the deed. That the former possession was not adverse to, but by permission of, the plaintiffs is not disputed; and, if the possession and use continued the same after as before the execution of the deed, we think it should be held that, so long as the plaintiffs continued to occupy the dwelling-house and corral, the use of the grazing land, which constituted a part of their homestead, was still by their permission, and not adverse.

AFFIRMED.

L. A. WILSON, APPELLEE, v. ANNA J. WILSON, APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,794.

The evidence examined, but not set out in the opinion for the reasons therein stated, *held* sufficient to sustain the findings and decree of the district court.

APPEAL from the district court for Gosper county:
ERNEST B. PERRY, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

R. D. Stearns, for appellant.

Ritchie & Wolff, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

There was submitted with the case a motion by defendant to strike from the files the "rejoinder briefs" filed by plaintiff without leave of court. The motion was well taken, and is sustained.

This is a second appeal. Our former opinion is reported

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in 89 Neb. 749. For a full statement of the controversy between these unhappy parties, reference is made to that opinion. A decree in favor of plaintiff was reversed at that time, for the reason that the trial court had evidently acted upon the theory that extreme cruelty is not a defense to a charge of adultery, and therefore excluded evidence offered by defendant to sustain a charge of extreme cruelty, set out in her cross-petition. Upon a retrial, and before another district judge, the decree was again in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant, both upon the charge set out in plaintiff's petition and the countercharge set out in defendant's cross-petition, and defendant is again asking relief at our hands.

It would serve no good purpose to the public, and assuredly would not be of any benefit to the parties, to even briefly recount the facts as disclosed by the present record. We deem it sufficient to say that defendant upon the second hearing was given a full opportunity to introduce all of the evidence offered by her at the former trial and any additional evidence she desired. After carefully weighing the evidence, we do not see how we can interfere. The findings and decree of the district court are fully sustained upon every point.

The controversy between the parties as to the property rights of defendant, and as to the liability of plaintiff as guardian of defendant during the time she was his ward, are now being litigated, and will be fully determined in that litigation. There is, therefore, no necessity of a reference to that controversy here.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

Lashmett v. Prall.

WILLIAM D. LASHMETT, APPELLEE, V. JOHN PRALL; WILLIAM J. PRALL, INTERVENER, ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,013.

1. **Action, Character of: PRACTICE.** Under our code practice this court must look to the substance of the issue presented and tried in the lower court to determine the character of the action as to whether it is legal or equitable in its nature. Wholesome rules of practice which guard the essential rights of the parties must be enforced, but technicalities which tend to defeat justice will not be regarded.
2. ———: **ISSUES.** When no issue is taken on the essential facts answered by a garnishee, and a petition in intervention is filed by leave of court and without objection, in which the legal title of the fund in the hands of the garnishee is shown to be in the intervener, and the plaintiff relies upon an equitable right to the fund, the issue so presented and tried is equitable in its nature and upon appeal will be so regarded.
3. **Pleading and Proof.** When one party alleges that a note in controversy has not been paid, and no objection is made to the form of the allegation and description of the note, and no plea of payment, and proof is admitted without objection showing the ownership of the note and that it is unpaid, those facts so far as relevant must be considered as established in determining the issues presented.
4. **Fraudulent Conveyances: ACTION: SET-OFF.** *Held*, That under the law, as stated in *Lashmett v. Prall*, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 284, the judgment in the case at bar cannot be sustained for the reasons there given.

APPEAL from the district court for Garfield county:
JAMES N. PAUL, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

Cannon, Ferris, Swan & Lally, W. H. Thompson and Guy Laverty, for appellants.

E. P. Clements, O. I. Bragg and H. A. Robbins, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

In October, 1896, this plaintiff, William D. Lashmett,

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recovered a judgment in the district court for Valley county against John Prall in an action for damages in the sum of \$1,600 and costs. Afterwards a transcript of the judgment was filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court for Loup county, and in January, 1897, the plaintiff began an action in the district court for the last named county to set aside a certain deed of land in that county made by the said John Prall and wife to his son, William J. Prall, this plaintiff, and another son. In that action the defendant John Prall answered, denying that he was the owner of the lands in controversy, and alleging that the deed to his sons was in good faith, and alleging as a second defense that the plaintiff in that action was indebted to him upon a promissory note in a sum larger than the amount of the plaintiff's judgment, and asking that an account be taken and the amount due him upon the note offset against the judgment which the plaintiff was asking to enforce. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and entered a judgment setting aside the conveyance of the tract of land to this intervener, William J. Prall, and subjecting the same to the lien of the judgment, and also found that there was nothing due on the said note and that John Prall was not the holder thereof in good faith. Upon appeal to this court the judgment was reversed and the cause dismissed. 2 Neb. (Unof.) 284. Afterwards the land involved in that litigation was sold and the purchase price paid into the Farmers State Bank of Burwell, Nebraska. The said judgment having been revived and execution issued and returned thereon unsatisfied, the plaintiff caused the bank to be summoned as a garnishee. The garnishee by its president appeared and answered, and by leave of court its answer was reduced to writing and filed in the case. The answer disclosed the fact of the sale of the land and that the purchase price was in the bank, and alleged that the garnishee had been informed that the land and the proceeds thereof belonged to this intervener, William J. Prall. The answer also alleged the former proceedings above stated and the

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action of this court thereon, and suggested to the court that the garnishee had been advised by counsel that those proceedings constituted a complete bar to the plaintiff's lien. William J. Prall, by leave of court, filed his petition in intervention, in which he alleged the deed from John Prall and wife to him, conveying the land in question, and other matters by reason of which he alleged that he was entitled to the money in the hands of the garnishee. The plaintiff filed a general denial to this pleading in intervention. The district court found the issue in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the garnishee to pay the money into court to be applied on plaintiff's judgment, and the intervener and garnishee have appealed.

The first question to be determined is as to the nature of the action that we are called upon to review. Under the code practice, the court must look to the substance of the issue presented and tried to determine the character of the action as to whether it is legal or equitable in its nature. The court must enforce wholesome rules of practice which guard the essential rights of the parties, but technicalities that tend to defeat justice are not so much regarded as formerly. If the answer of a garnishee is unsatisfactory to the plaintiff he may take issue thereon, and the statute amply provides for making up and filing such issue. In this case the answer of the garnishee so far as it alleged the facts upon which the liability depends is not controverted. The intervener, William J. Prall, alleged that he was the owner of the land and therefore entitled to the fund in controversy. The plaintiff denied his allegation and admitted that the title to the land was in the intervener, but still claimed that the intervener was not in equity the owner of the land and therefore not entitled to the fund. The issue then was entirely between the plaintiff and the intervener and was in its nature an equitable issue. The action now must be regarded as an action in equity.

The intervener in his petition alleged that the note held by John Prall against the plaintiff had not been paid, nor

any part of it. The allegation was incomplete and was subject to motion. No objection, however, was made to the petition in that regard. The plaintiff in his reply did not allege payment of the note, and witness for the intervenor was allowed to testify without objection that the note was still owned by John Prall and was wholly unpaid. It would seem that the same issues were presented that were discussed in *Lashmett v. Prall*, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 284. In that case, referring to this same note, it was held: "The indorsee of negotiable paper before due and without notice of defenses, as collateral security for an antecedent debt, is a *bona fide* holder thereof for value within the meaning of the law merchant." The ownership of the note and liability of the plaintiff thereon were discussed quite at large in the opinion, and it was concluded that John Prall was the owner of the note, and that the plaintiff was liable thereon in an amount larger than the amount of the judgment. However, in referring to the contention that there was no liability on the note, it was said in the opinion that the trial court did not "determine especially or otherwise which of these two versions of the interview is the more accurate." From the transcript in this record of the judgment then entered by the trial court this statement in the opinion seems to have been a mistake. The principal question then presented was as to the correctness of the judgment setting aside the conveyances of the land, and the findings of the trial court as to liability on the note were reversed as well as the judgment complained of. If for these and other reasons it might be thought that the judgment of this court then entered should not be regarded as an adjudication of the liability upon the note, it still must be held upon the evidence and pleadings in the case at bar, as above stated, that the note is unpaid and is a valid claim in favor of John Prall and against this plaintiff. There was no plea of the statute of limitations, and, if there were, it would not seem equitable to allow the plaintiff to delay enforcement of his judgment until the five years' limita-

tion had elapsed and then plaintiff paid the note, when it had been held that the judgment in an equitable proceeding was against the note. Equity follows the law that "when cross-demands have been made, the demands must be deemed compensated against each other." Code, sec. 106. In the holding in that case this judgment was affirmed. The law was there stated thus: "When a judgment creditor to set aside a judgment has been made in fraud of the judgment creditor, and the plaintiff is indebted, upon the judgment debtor in an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim. It was held that, while the plaintiff's claim is larger than the amount of the debt, the plaintiff cannot maintain an action in equity to set aside the judgment. The reasons are stated in the opinion referred to and it is not necessary to repeat them here."

The judgment of the district court in this case dismissed.

EMMA PULVER, APPELLEE, V. K

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1

1. **Mortgages: LIFE ESTATE IN HOMES.** A mortgage given by a living spouse in the homestead exemption act, and the mortgagee, upon foreclosure of the mortgage, is entitled to the property.
2. **———: AFTER-ACQUIRED ESTATE.** A mortgage given by a person who conveys the whole property, and after the mortgage is given, the mortgagee will accrue to the title of the mortgagee, and includes an interest in real estate acquired by the mortgagee upon the death of her son. No action can be maintained to set aside such title in the mother. The mortgage is valid upon the death of the son.
3. **———: CONSIDERATION.** An indebtedness is sufficient consideration for a mortgage.

APPEAL from the district court for Lincoln county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Hoagland & Hoagland, for appellant.

Wilcox & Halligan, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

The defendant, Kate Connelly, is the widow of James Connelly, deceased, and the other defendants are their children. Prior to the death of James Connelly the land in question was the homestead of the family upon which they resided. After his death the defendant Kate Connelly executed and delivered to the plaintiff the real estate mortgage upon said land, which mortgage this action was brought to foreclose. The trial court entered a decree of foreclosure, and the defendant has appealed.

The title to the land was held in the name of James Connelly, and at the time of his death there were eight children. After his death and after the execution of the mortgage one of the children died. The trial court held that the one-eighth interest of the deceased child descended to his mother, and that the mother had a life estate in the real estate, and ordered that the life estate and the one-eighth interest be sold to pay the mortgage. The decree was right. The homestead life estate can be mortgaged and the purchaser under the decree will acquire the life estate. *Nebraska Loan & Trust Co. v. Smassall*, 38 Neb. 516.

The mother inherited the right of the deceased child. This interest descended to her by operation of law. There was no necessity of any decree of the court for that purpose. The probate court would have no jurisdiction of such matter, and the constitution forbids that court to try title to real estate. When a deed purports to convey the whole title, an after-acquired interest of the grantor "shall accrue to the benefit of the grantee." Comp. St. 1911, ch. 73, sec. 51.

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The real estate mortgage was given in consideration of a prior chattel mortgage between the same parties. This prior indebtedness and the surrender of the deed was sufficient consideration for the mortgage. The suggestion that the chattel mortgage was not released of record is immaterial in this case. The statute provides a method of compelling such release and a penalty for refusing to release a chattel mortgage of record upon demand duly made. There is no allegation of demand nor evidence of refusal to release in this case.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., not sitting.

MARY E. MCNAMARA, APPELLEE, v. WILLIAM C. MCNAMARA, APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1913. No. 17,667.

1. **Divorce: CONDONATION.** Condonation of acts of cruelty by the husband against the wife is conditional upon subsequent good conduct, and cannot constitute a defense in an action for divorce if the husband is guilty of cruelty after the alleged condonation.
2. ———: **EXTREME CRUELTY.** A false and malicious accusation of adultery by a husband against his wife is cruelty, and if, knowing it to be wholly unfounded, the husband wilfully makes such accusation, and is guilty of other acts of cruelty while her action for divorce is pending, such conduct on his part will be considered as aggravating former acts of cruelty relied upon for a divorce.
3. **Appeal: EQUITY: TRIAL DE NOVO.** In an action in equity this court, upon appeal, must try the case *de novo* upon the evidence in the record. A decree of divorce will be affirmed if a cause of action alleged in the petition is supported by the evidence, although the trial court based the decree upon another alleged cause of action not established by the evidence.
4. **Evidence found to support the decree of divorce.**
5. **Divorce: MODIFICATION OF DECREE.** Decree for alimony and custody and support of children modified for reasons stated in the opinion.

APPEAL from the district court for Dakota county:
ANSON A. WELCH, JUDGE. *Affirmed as modified.*

Alfred Pizey and J. A. Douglas, for appellant.

*R. E. Evans, M. F. Harrington and D. H. Sullivan,
contra.*

SEDGWICK, J.

The plaintiff and defendant were married in the year 1900. The plaintiff began this action in the district court for Dakota county in the year 1907 to obtain a divorce and alimony. The ground alleged in her petition was extreme cruelty. The defendant denied all allegations of cruelty. Upon motion and notice the trial court ordered the defendant to pay certain sums as suit money and temporary alimony, and, the defendant having neglected to make such payments, a further order was made that, unless the defendant comply with the orders of the court in that regard, his answer should be stricken out and he should not be allowed to defend the action. Pursuant to this order the answer was stricken out and a decree entered in favor of the plaintiff, which, upon appeal to this court, was reversed upon the ground that the defendant could not be deprived of his right to defend in an action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony. 86 Neb. 631. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, and the plaintiff amended her petition, alleging acts of cruelty while the action was pending, and afterwards, upon leave of court, filed a supplemental petition, in which she alleged a cause of action against the defendant upon the ground of adultery. The defendant answered, and upon trial the court entered a decree of divorce in favor of the plaintiff and a judgment for alimony, and gave the care and custody of the children to the plaintiff, and made a further allowance against the defendant for the support of the children. The defendant has appealed.

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The defendant insists that the decree of divorce in favor of the plaintiff is not supported by sufficient evidence; that the judgment for alimony is excessive; and that the order of the court in regard to the care and custody of the children is not warranted by the evidence. The trial court found that the defendant was guilty of extreme cruelty as alleged in the original petition and in the amended petition, with special findings of fact constituting the cruelty. The court further found that all of those acts of cruelty had been condoned by the plaintiff before the commencement of the action. The court also found that at a time after this action was begun the defendant was guilty of extreme cruelty in making unjustifiable charges against the plaintiff, and that the defendant was also guilty of extreme cruelty in that he failed, refused and neglected to maintain or support the plaintiff after this action was begun. The court also found that the defendant during the year before the action was begun was guilty of adultery as charged in the supplemental petition.

The record is very large. Some 15 witnesses were examined on the part of the plaintiff, and more than 30 on the part of the defendant. Under the statute we are required to examine this evidence independently of the finding of the trial court and determine anew the issues presented by the parties. In the condition of this record we find this duty to be a very difficult one. It is impossible to feel that confidence in the result of our investigation of the evidence which is desirable in all judicial proceedings. A large part of the defendant's brief is devoted to a discussion of the evidence tending to establish the guilt of the defendant of the crime of adultery charged against him, and it is most earnestly insisted that the evidence fails to support the finding of the trial court upon that issue. There is no direct evidence of the act charged against the defendant, except the testimony of the woman with whom it is alleged the act was committed. She testifies that she was then about 17 years of age, and that

about the same time she also had intercourse with a young man whom she afterwards married, and who she thinks is the father of her child begotten at that time. It would seem that since her marriage she has led a correct life, and her acquaintances vouch for her statement that she has become a respectable woman. There is also the evidence of three other young girls, who testify to improper conduct on the part of the defendant. The evidence of one of these impresses us as being candid and truthful, but she could not positively identify the defendant as the one whom she charges with the improper conduct, and the act which she charges against him was not of such a serious character. The defendant is a man past 50 years of age, and all the evidence in the record that tends in any way to impeach his character relates to a very short period of his life, not exceeding a year and a half or two years. He denies positively, and apparently with frankness, the evidence of these witnesses against him. Very many of his acquaintances, who have known him for many years, testify to his correct conduct and mode of life. It seems improbable that a man who has led a correct and honorable life until past 50 years of age should for a short period abandon all sense of virtue and decency and afterwards again for several years lead an irreproachable life. However this may be, we must still consider the charge of extreme cruelty as a ground for divorce in this case.

The trial court we think was in error in finding that former acts of cruelty had been condoned by the plaintiff so that they should not be considered in determining the weight of the evidence as tending to establish the charge of cruelty. It appears that the finding of the trial court that after the action was begun the defendant was guilty of an act of cruelty against the plaintiff is established by the evidence. All the evidence shows that the plaintiff is a virtuous woman, and that she has during the whole period of their married life endeavored to perform her duty as a wife. The defendant, without any ground therefor, as he and his counsel now substantially admit, wrote

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a long letter, ostensibly to his lawyer, reciting in detail accusations against his wife, reciting some of the alleged proof which he could produce showing her to have been guilty of adultery, and threatening, if the action for divorce were persisted in, to bring forward his charge against his wife as a matter of defense. This letter, though ostensibly written to his lawyer, was inclosed in an envelope addressed to his wife, and it was received by her. He says that at the same time he wrote this letter to his lawyer he also wrote one to his wife, and that they must have been exchanged by mistake; but his lawyer received no letter from him, and the court was justifiable in finding that he intentionally forwarded these accusations to his wife. This, under the circumstances, was cruelty. The trial court also found that defendant was guilty of other acts of cruelty about the time and soon after this action was begun. Under these circumstances, the defendant is not permitted to allege the condonation by his wife of a former course of cruel conduct towards her, such as is alleged in her petition. *Heist v. Heist*, 48 Neb. 794. It is urged that conduct after the action was begun cannot furnish a ground for divorce, but it has been held by courts of high authority that to falsely and maliciously charge a virtuous woman with crimes of this character, even if those charges are contained in the pleading and alleged as matter of defense, if wholly unsupported by the evidence, would be regarded by the court as cruelty, and as aggravating other charges of cruelty relied upon as ground for divorce.

In considering, therefore, the evidence in this case as establishing extreme cruelty on the part of the defendant as a ground for divorce, we should take into consideration the whole course of conduct of the defendant during their married life. We cannot attempt in the limits of an opinion of reasonable length to analyze this mass of testimony, much less to recite the testimony of the various witnesses. As we have already stated, the plaintiff at the time of the marriage was about 18 years of age, and the defendant

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was 49 years of age. He had been divorced from a former wife, and was the owner and was operating a large ranch in Iowa, which he afterwards sold and purchased a ranch of about 1,000 acres in Brown county in this state. He had met with some financial difficulties on account of his former divorce and the judgment entered therein, and perhaps from other causes, and was very much occupied in his business affairs, and much of the time away from home, and apparently failed to realize the situation and necessities of his young wife, who during the seven years of their married life had borne him four children, and was deprived of the society of her former friends and acquaintances and left to her own resources for diversion, and in the care of her children. It is not necessary to find from the evidence that he used personal violence against her, or purposely or maliciously rendered her life intolerable. Carelessness and neglect, coupled with rude and boisterous behavior, and at times unkind words, with some conduct towards other women that would naturally offend a sensitive wife, if practiced through a period of years, would constitute such extreme cruelty as the law characterizes as ground for divorce. The evidence in some important particulars is conflicting and in many respects unsatisfactory. It may be that we have failed to find the truth of the matter, but upon the whole record we find that the charge of extreme cruelty against the defendant is sufficiently sustained to support the decree.

The defendant seriously complains of the amount of the judgment for alimony. The evidence is particularly conflicting and unsatisfactory as to the amount and value of the defendant's property. He still owns the ranch in Brown county of about 1,000 acres, covered by several mortgages, all of which are said by the plaintiff's counsel to be fictitious and fraudulent, except one mortgage for \$10,000, which is admitted to be valid and a first lien. When this litigation was begun the plaintiff also had personal property which is valued by the witnesses as from \$10,000 to \$20,000. Upon this conflicting evidence the

trial court found that the value of the defendant's property, real and personal, over and above valid liens thereon, is \$20,000, and after considering this evidence we would not feel that we can do better than to adopt that as a correct finding. The trial court allowed the plaintiff \$5,000 permanent alimony and \$1,000 for attorney's fees and expenses. The custody of the children was given to the plaintiff, and the court decreed that the defendant should pay for the support of the children the sum of \$600 per year until the further order of the court. \$600 per year is 6 per cent. interest on \$10,000. This, if the defendant's property was available as cash, would leave the defendant \$4,000 unincumbered. We think that the decree of the trial court in allowing these amounts is excessive. While the evidence is conflicting as to the value of the defendant's ranch, it is substantially agreed that it is not at present salable, or at least for the amount that the court has found it to be worth. The defendant has already incurred considerable expense in this litigation, and the evidence will not justify the conclusion with any certainty that the defendant will be able to meet these further payments required of him, even if he should use all of his property for that purpose. The allowance for the support of the children is not final. It can be enlarged or decreased by the trial court at any time, upon proper showing. We think, under the circumstances, that the amount given plaintiff is so large that there is, to say the least, no certainty that the defendant will be able to obtain in cash from his available property any considerable sum in addition to such amount. The sum allowed should, therefore, be considered in full of all demands against him. It is not clearly shown that the defendant could at the present time realize more than \$14,000 on his entire property; and we think, therefore, that an allowance of \$1,000 for attorney's fees and expenses and \$3,000 as permanent alimony for the use of the plaintiff and \$400 per annum for the children is all that this evidence will justify.

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The trial court entered the following order as to the custody of the children: "That the custody of the children be and it is awarded plaintiff until further order of the court, they not to be removed from its jurisdiction; and defendant is enjoined from interfering with plaintiff in the control of the children, but shall be entitled to visit them at reasonable hours not oftener than once in two months, visits not to last more than two hours each, and to be in the presence of the sheriff in said county, or his deputy." This order can, of course, be modified at any time that necessity demands. If the defendant should improperly interfere with the children or with the plaintiff in the care of the children, the court can make such orders as are necessary for their protection. There is nothing in the evidence that we have found requiring such restrictions placed upon the defendant in regard to visiting his children.

The judgment of the district court is therefore modified. The decree for divorce is affirmed on the ground of extreme cruelty, and the defendant is required to pay to the clerk of the district court of Dakota county, within 60 days from the filing of this opinion, the sum of \$1,000 for the plaintiff for her attorney's fees, suit money and expenses, and the further sum of \$1,000 as permanent alimony, and the further sum of \$2,000 as permanent alimony, payable as follows: \$1,000 on the first of August, 1913, \$1,000 on the first of February, 1914, and \$400 per annum for the support of the children, payable quarterly on the 1st day of April, July, October and January of each year, first payment to be April 1, 1913, with interest on all overdue payments at 7 per cent. per annum; the said sums to be in full satisfaction of all permanent alimony, maintenance and expenses. The plaintiff's receipt may be filed with the clerk in satisfaction of this decree. The order of the district court in regard to the custody of the children is modified so as to allow the defendant to visit the children at all reasonable times, in the presence of their mother. In all other respects the order of the

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district court is affirmed. The costs of this litigation are to be taxed against the defendant.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

DE ETTE RAKOW, ADMINISTRATRIX, APPELLEE, V. ROBERT
J. TATE ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 16,911.

1. **Quieting Title: VENUE: PROCESS.** An action, the purpose of which is to quiet the title to real estate, must be brought in the county in which the real estate is situated. Where the suit is instituted in the district court of such county, the summons may be served on the defendant in any county of the state where he may reside or be found. In such case, the court where the action is pending will have jurisdiction over both the defendant and the subject matter of the action, and summons may be issued and served upon any other necessary or proper defendant, if served anywhere within this state. It is not essential in such case that a summons be served upon any one within the county where the suit is pending.
2. **Appearance.** Where a summons is served upon a person other than the principal defendant, but who is made a party to the suit, and such person appears and by a cross-petition demands affirmative relief, the question of jurisdiction over him will not arise.
3. **Quieting Title: DISCLAIMER.** In such case the filing of a disclaimer of any interest in the real estate by the principal defendant will not defeat the jurisdiction of the court, the disclaimer not having been made in any form prior thereto.
4. ———: **CLOUD ON TITLE.** A written contract by which the plaintiff agrees to sell his real estate to the defendant for a fixed price, and which the defendant purchaser causes to be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the land is situated, casts a cloud on plaintiff's title to the land where the contract is abandoned and the record of the contract is not canceled by the person named as purchaser, and an action in equity may be maintained by the person named as vendor for the purpose of removing the cloud and quieting the title.
5. ———: ———. In such case the fact that a part of the land described in the written agreement constitutes the exempt home-

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stead of the person named as vendor, and which agreement was not signed by his wife, will not defeat the right of the owner of the real estate to have the cloud removed and his title quieted.

6. **Abatement.** Where an action upon the same contract is filed in another county in this state by the defendant in the instant case as plaintiff, but in which the court acquired no jurisdiction over the person of defendant, plaintiff in this case, such action will not abate this one.
7. **Equity: RELIEF.** Where an action in equity is properly brought and the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and all the parties to the suit, it is the duty of the court to adjudicate all questions and rights presented by the pleadings in order to do full justice to all parties before it.
8. **Quieting Title: EVIDENCE.** The evidence is examined, and it is found that the findings and decree of the district court are sustained thereby.

APPEAL from the district court for Antelope county:
ANSON A. WELCH, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

J. J. Sullivan, E. C. Strode and M. V. Beghtol, for appellants.

Charles H. Kelsey and J. W. Rice, contra.

REESE, C. J.

This is an action by plaintiff, August G. Rakow, against defendants Robert J. Tate and the First National Bank of Fremont, Nebraska, the object and purpose of which is to quiet the title to the southwest quarter of section 14 and the southeast quarter of section 15, all in township 26, range 5, in Antelope county. It is alleged in the amended petition that on the 14th day of September, 1907, plaintiff, as party of the first part, and Robert J. Tate, as party of the second part, entered into a certain written agreement, in two parts, by which plaintiff agreed to sell defendant the land above described upon condition that defendant should approve the purchase and sale, and, if so approved, the deed was to be made to him October 14 of the same year and left in escrow with the First

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National Bank of Fremont; that defendant was to pay to plaintiff the sum of \$14,400 by a warranty deed to the east half of section 26 and the east half of section 35, all in township number 15, range 47, in Cheyenne county, the consideration of which was \$16,000, plaintiff paying the difference of \$1,600, evidenced by his promissory note executed to defendant due March 1, 1908; that, in case the said party of the "second" part (*sic*) should refuse or neglect to pay the purchase money as agreed, said party should thereby forfeit any rights he may have to said land and also should forfeit any money paid in part performance of the contract, but that the first party might, at his election, waive a forfeiture of the contract and proceed to collect the purchase money, and in such event default in payment of interest or principal should cause the whole amount to become due and payable at the election of the first party; that upon a compliance with the terms of the contract by the second party he should be entitled to the possession of the land, but upon a failure by him to comply therewith his right to possession should terminate, and he should surrender the possession of the land and improvements thereon to the party of the first part.

The other part of said agreement was embodied in a somewhat similar writing binding defendant to convey to plaintiff the east half of section 26 and the east half of section 35, all in township 15, range 47, in Cheyenne county, the deed or deeds to be made and deposited in the First National Bank of Fremont on the same date that required the deposit by plaintiff—October 14, 1907—together with an abstract of defendant's title thereto, showing perfect title. If, upon examination of plaintiff's land by defendant, he approved the sale or exchange, the \$1,600 note executed by plaintiff to defendant was to be retained by defendant, and the deeds delivered, otherwise the note was to be returned to plaintiff; but, in case plaintiff failed to comply with the agreement, the \$1,600 should be forfeited to defendant. These two writings were evidently intended to embody one agreement and should be so

treated. They are both set out at length in the petition, but it is believed that the foregoing fairly sets out the material parts thereof.

It is alleged that it was expressly agreed and understood between the parties that the promissory note signed by plaintiff should not become effective and binding until plaintiff's real estate had been inspected by defendant, and the contract approved by him, after his examination, and the contract and note signed by the wife of plaintiff; that neither the written contract nor note was ever in fact delivered; that they were never assented to and signed by plaintiff's wife, nor was the agreement ratified by defendant, and the transaction was rescinded and revoked by plaintiff; that plaintiff is a married man, the head of a family, and that his exempt homestead is included in the land owned by him and described in said agreement; that in violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement defendant had unlawfully, wrongfully and fraudulently caused the written agreement to be filed and recorded in the records of the register of deeds of Antelope county on the 18th day of October, 1907, and entered on the numerical index of said county, by which a cloud had been cast upon plaintiff's title, and had as wrongfully and fraudulently sold and transferred the \$1,600 note to the Farmers State Bank of Plainview, Nebraska, which claimed to be an innocent purchaser thereof, and that the First National Bank of Fremont claimed to have some interest in said note, but it is alleged that such banks had knowledge of the invalidity of the note before they obtained it; that on the 14th day of October the defendant was not the owner of the land which he had contracted to convey to plaintiff, and did not leave in escrow with the First National Bank of Fremont a warranty deed conveying the land to plaintiff, nor did he furnish an abstract of the title thereto, or to any part thereof. The prayer of the petition is for the cancellation of the written agreement and promissory note; that defendant be adjudged to have no interest in plaintiff's real estate; that plaintiff's title thereto be quieted;

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that the cloud thereon caused by the record of said agreement be removed; and that the note be ordered surrendered to plaintiff, or, in the event that it be found said banks or either of them holds said note in good faith, that plaintiff may have judgment against defendant Tate for the amount thereof, and for general equitable relief. Summonses were issued and served upon defendants. The Plainview bank showed that it had held the note, but it had been surrendered to defendant before the institution of the suit.

Defendant Tate answered, objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. He also disclaimed any interest, lien or claim upon the land either at the time of answering or the commencement of the suit. He presented as a plea in abatement the pendency of a suit instituted in Cheyenne county by him against plaintiff, which, he alleged, involved the same subject matter, but which, upon a special appearance by plaintiff herein, who was defendant in said action, was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and from which judgment defendant had appealed to the supreme court, where the action was still pending. Defendant further answered, without waiving the objection to jurisdiction or plea in abatement, admitting the execution of the agreement and note, alleging their unconditional delivery, denying that any of the papers were to be signed by the wife of plaintiff, alleging that the contract was approved by him, and denying that the agreement was revoked by plaintiff. The averments that plaintiff is a married man, and that a portion of his land, described in the contract, was his homestead, are admitted, as also the recording of the agreement for the sale of the land, that the \$1,600 note was sold to the Farmers State Bank of Plainview, and that the defendant the First National Bank of Fremont owns said note. It is alleged that on the 14th day of October, 1907, defendant was the actual owner of the land in Cheyenne county described in the contract, and that a deed thereto was executed by defendant and wife and deposited in the First National Bank of Fremont.

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The chain of title is set out, but which need not be here recited. It is shown that the title to a part thereof and the possession of all was in Charley Olson, a portion thereof being held by him under a contract with the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the final payment thereon having been made September 30, 1907, and the deed executed by the railroad company November 21, 1907; that, before the execution of the agreement with plaintiff, W. T. Tate, an agent of defendant, had held a contract with Olson and wife for the purchase of the land, and which W. T. Tate had assigned to defendant so that defendant could obtain a deed at any time and comply with his contract with plaintiff, and on October 23, 1907, Olson and wife conveyed the land to defendant, and the deed was recorded April 3, 1908; that the delay in obtaining the deed and presenting the abstract of title was because of plaintiff's refusal to perform his part of the agreement. The prayer of the answer is that the prayer of the petition, "except as to the quieting of the title to said real estate, be denied; that this defendant's objection to the jurisdiction of the court over his person and over the subject matter with reference to said note be sustained, and said matter be dismissed for want of jurisdiction; and that, if said objection to the jurisdiction is overruled, this defendant's plea in abatement be sustained, and said cause be dismissed, and for costs." Other averments of the petition are denied. A transcript of the proceedings of the district court for Cheyenne county in the case of *Tate v. Rakow* is attached to the answer.

The First National Bank of Fremont filed its answer and cross-petition, which, in part, is practically a repetition of the contents of the answer of defendant Tate, which is followed by what we may term an action on the \$1,600 note held by the bank, which is alleged to have been purchased in good faith, for value before maturity, and without notice or knowledge that any defense thereto was claimed by plaintiff; and the prayer is for judgment against plaintiff for the amount thereof, including interest.

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Plaintiff replied specifically, denying the essential affirmative averments of the answer of defendant Tate, and averring that defendant Tate refused to approve the agreement; that plaintiff thereupon revoked and rescinded the contract, and notified defendant that the offer was withdrawn. The cause was tried to the court, submitted, and taken under advisement September 9, 1909. On the 7th day of October, 1909, plaintiff, August G. Rakow, died, and on the 15th day of December, of the same year, the cause was conditionally revived in the name of De Ette Rakow, the administratrix of his estate. On the 8th day of January, 1910, the order of revivor was made absolute.

On the 3d day of May, 1910, the findings and decree were entered in favor of plaintiff De Ette Rakow, as administratrix, in which the facts as found by the court were set out, including the homestead character of plaintiff's land; that no part of the agreement was signed by the wife, nor was any part thereof acknowledged by either husband or wife; that on September 20, 1909, defendant examined plaintiff's land, when he declared that unless plaintiff reduced the price of his land \$2.50 an acre there was no deal, whereupon plaintiff informed defendant that he "would call the deal off," and requested the return of his note; that defendant Tate did not on said day approve of the land, nor agree to take the land upon the terms prescribed in the agreement; that on that day, without the knowledge or consent of Rakow, defendant sold and indorsed the note for value to the Farmers State Bank of Plainview, which purchased the same in the ordinary course of business and without notice of any defense thereto; that on October 14, 1907, Tate and wife executed a deed to Rakow of the Cheyenne county land, and deposited it in the First National Bank of Fremont, but that at that time he was not the owner in fee of said land, and no conveyance thereof was made to him until October 23, 1907, which was delivered to Tate and recorded in the deed records of Cheyenne county April 3, 1908; that on November 21, 1907, the Union Pacific Railroad Company executed

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a deed conveying the east half of section 35 to Olson, and which was recorded in the proper county records the 29th day of the same month; that defendant never furnished nor offered to furnish to Rakow an abstract of title to the Cheyenne county land, and Rakow never executed nor offered to execute a deed to the land in Antelope county to Tate, and from and after September 20, 1907, refused so to do; that on January 21, 1908, Tate brought an action against Rakow in the district court for Cheyenne county, alleging the sale and purchase of the Antelope county land, which was approved by him, the failure of Rakow to perform the agreement, that Tate elected to forfeit all interest which Rakow had in the Cheyenne county land and the money paid thereon, and declared a forfeiture of the \$1,600 note, and that said cause was afterward dismissed by the court for want of jurisdiction over Rakow; that on November 25, 1907, the Iowa State National Bank of Sioux City, Iowa, purchased the \$1,600 note from the Farmers State Bank in due course of business and for value, and the same was subsequently and in a similar way purchased by the Fremont bank, all of which was before the maturity of said note.

The conclusions of law are quite elaborate, and will not be here set out. They are, in substance and effect, that the completion of the agreement of September 14, 1907, was made to depend upon the examination of the Antelope county land and approval of the deal by Tate before October 14, 1907, and if he refused to accept the proposition the note referred to was to be void; that on September 20, 1907, Tate examined the land and rejected the proposition contained in the agreement; that at that time Rakow declared the contract at an end and demanded the return of the note which he had signed; that by the action of the parties the contract was then annulled and terminated, and could not be enforced by either party, and Tate had no power or right to forfeit the \$1,600 note; that the written agreement, so far as it affected the homestead of Rakow—the southwest quarter of section 14—was null

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and void; that the failure of Tate to have title to the Cheyenne county land at the time he made his deed, and his failure to furnish an abstract of title thereto, as stipulated in the agreement, constituted a default on his part which prevented him from enforcing a forfeiture of the note; that the banks were innocent purchasers of said note, and the Fremont bank, being the owner and holder thereof, was entitled to recover the amount thereof from Rakow's estate, the same being found to be the sum of \$1,947.55, and plaintiff was entitled to recover from Tate the same amount. Decree and judgment were rendered accordingly. Defendant Tate appeals.

The defenses pleaded will be noticed in the order in which they are presented. The contention that the court was without jurisdiction contains no merit. The contract on the part of Rakow was recorded by Tate in Antelope county and constituted a cloud upon the title to Rakow's land, and no cautious purchaser would have bought it with that record against it uncanceled. Had Tate caused the cancelation of the record thereof at any time before the beginning of this suit, there would be reason for the contention of no jurisdiction, but he failed to do this. The public records are for the purpose of giving notice of the interests in or ownership of the land to be affected thereby. This recorded contract gave notice to the world of defendant's claimed interest in the land, and to that extent apparently affected Rakow's title, and he was entitled to have it canceled, either by Tate, or by his authority, or by a court of equity.

The contention that the agreement was of no force does not apply, as the proof of the invalidity of the record would have to be made *dehors* the record, and, until attacked by an equitable proceeding and canceled by a decree, it implied just what it said. *Corey v. Schuster, Hingston & Co.*, 44 Neb. 269; *Smith v. Neufeld*, 57 Neb. 660; *Sanxay v. Hunger*, 42 Ind. 44.

The action to quiet title must be brought in the county where the land to be affected is situated. Code, sec. 51.

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Johnson v. Samuelson, 82 Neb. 201. It follows that the action was rightly commenced in Antelope county, and that the service of summons was properly made on Tate without the county. There is no appeal from the judgment in favor of the First National Bank of Fremont, and that part of the case will not be considered.

It is insisted, however, that the court erred in rendering judgment against Tate for the amount of the note, which he had sold, and for which the judgment in favor of the Fremont National Bank was rendered against Rakow's estate. The giving of the note, whether delivered or not, inhered in and was a part of the main transaction. By the action of Tate in terminating the contract on the 20th of September the note became the property of Rakow, and he was entitled to its surrender. Instead of so doing, the defendant sold it, and thereby created a liability against Rakow where none would have existed had not the note been transferred to innocent purchasers. It is a well-settled rule that, where a court of equity obtains jurisdiction of a cause, it will retain it until all questions involved in the case are adjudicated, doing complete justice between the parties. This rule applied fully justified the settlement of all controversies growing out of the main case between the parties, and there was no error in this action of the court. By the sale and transfer of the note to innocent purchasers, thereby creating a liability against Rakow, where none existed before, defendant created a liability against himself in favor of Rakow, and it was entirely proper to adjudicate all questions growing out of the contract.

A plea in abatement was presented and overruled, and of which ruling complaint is made. This subject will be briefly noticed. The final decision of the case mentioned in the plea was rendered by this court on the 21st of May, 1909 (*Tate v. Rakow*, 84 Neb. 459), where it was held that the district court for Cheyenne county never obtained jurisdiction over Rakow, and affirming the judgment of that court. Aside from the question of the

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identity of the cause of action pleaded in the two cases, it is very clear that the district court never had jurisdiction to render any judgment or decree against Rakow, and therefore the case was not pending in the sense that would bar the jurisdiction of the district court for Antelope county, where Rakow's land was situated. The district court for Cheyenne county could neither have enforced the contract nor quieted the title of the Antelope county land. The plea was properly overruled.

It is claimed that the findings and decree are not sustained by the evidence and contrary thereto. We do not so view it. The evidence is conflicting on the material parts in the case. The written agreement provides that, if defendant did not approve the purchase of the Rakow land after inspecting it, the note was to be returned to Rakow, and the contract abandoned. He inspected the land September 20, 1907—one week after signing the agreement. The evidence is clear that, upon the examination, he sought to have the agreed price reduced. Rakow testified that defendant insisted upon it, and declined to proceed with the trade unless upon the reduction, and declined to perfect the deal, and that after defendant's declination Rakow notified defendant of his refusal to consider it further, and demanded the possession of the note. He also testified that the note was never delivered to defendant, but that it was agreed he might hold it, as custodian, until it was finally decided as to whether they would carry out the agreement or not, and if that were done defendant should retain the note; if not, it was to be returned to Rakow. True, defendant and another testified to the contrary; but viewing all the circumstances, as shown, we incline to the conclusion adopted by the district court. The note was sold to the Plainview bank on the same day that the defendant inspected the land, and, as alleged and testified to by Rakow, refused to proceed with the contract unless Rakow would reduce the contract price \$2.50 an acre. Defendant failed to furnish an abstract of the title to the Cheyenne county

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land. He testified that the reason why he did not do so was because Rakow had refused to complete the agreement. The fact, however, remains that at the time he deposited his deed in the bank he could not have done so and shown a perfect title, for the reason that Olson, his grantor, had no deed either of record or otherwise to a part of the real estate, and a perfect title could not have been shown by an abstract of the record.

We have examined the transcript and bill of exceptions with care, and can see no sufficient reason why the decision of the district court should be reversed. It is therefore

AFFIRMED.

RICHARD C. PATTERSON, APPELLANT, V. JOHN STEELE,
APPELLEE.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 16,839.

1. Pleading: AMENDMENT. Where a demurrer to a petition in an action founded upon a *quantum meruit* was sustained and the action dismissed, and an amended petition basing a right of recovery upon the same facts, but setting up an express contract, was also held vulnerable to a demurrer, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to permit the latter petition to be amended so as to set up a cause of action upon *quantum meruit*.
2. ———: ———: REVIEW. Permission or the refusal to permit plaintiff to amend an amended petition, after the commencement of the trial, is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and his order in that behalf will be sustained, unless it appears that there has been an abuse of such discretion.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
WILLIAM A. REDICK, JUDGE. *Affirmed*.

E. C. Wolcott and Hugh A. Myers, for appellant.

Weaver & Giller, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action to recover a sum of money alleged to be due from defendant to plaintiff as a part of an agent's commission on a life insurance policy. From an order refusing plaintiff's application to amend his amended petition and dismissing the action plaintiff has appealed.

The record discloses that the plaintiff filed his original petition in the district court for Douglas county on the 17th day of August, 1904, alleging, in substance, that on or about June, 1899, he was a life insurance agent, writing life insurance for the Hartford Life and other companies; that on said date plaintiff had a customer for a \$10,000 life insurance policy, but could not satisfy him in any of the companies which he represented; that plaintiff knew defendant at that time; that defendant was on friendly terms with him, and he knew that defendant represented the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company; that plaintiff went to defendant and talked to him about the matter; that thereupon, by mutual consent, plaintiff introduced defendant to said customer that he might have an opportunity to solicit an application from said customer for a policy of insurance in said defendant's company.

Plaintiff further alleged that he made no further effort to write a policy of insurance on the life of his customer; that the customer saw defendant and talked with him several times thereafter in reference to writing a policy of insurance on his life, and that finally, on September 24, 1900, defendant did write a \$10,000 policy on the life of plaintiff's customer in the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, and did thereafter collect from said customer the first annual premium on said policy, which was and is the sum of \$830; that by reason of the services so rendered by plaintiff to defendant in procuring said customer and introducing defendant to him on account of which defendant was able to write said policy of insurance, and did so write the same, plaintiff's services

in that behalf were reasonably worth the sum of \$332, "and plaintiff is entitled to receive from defendant said sum, which is just and reasonable; that plaintiff has demanded of defendant the said sum of \$332, but defendant has neglected and refused to pay the same and still refuses to pay, and no part of said sum has been paid by defendant to plaintiff, and there is now due plaintiff from defendant for and on account of the services rendered by him to defendant as above set forth the sum of \$332, and interest from September 24, 1900," for which sum, with interest, plaintiff prayed judgment.

To this petition defendant filed a general demurrer. On the 14th day of January, 1905, the demurrer was sustained. No leave was given plaintiff to amend, but it appears that on the 7th day of February, 1905, plaintiff filed an amended petition, by which he changed his action from *quantum meruit* to one based on an alleged contract between plaintiff and defendant, by which defendant agreed to pay plaintiff for the same services set forth in the original petition 40 per cent. of the first annual premium on such policy of life insurance as the defendant should be able to write on the life of plaintiff's customer, and 5 per cent. on each annual premium paid thereafter at the time when the same should be paid. By the amended petition plaintiff prayed judgment for \$539.50, with interest and costs. Thereafter, and on the 6th day of May, 1905, defendant filed a motion to strike the amended petition from the files, for the reason that it stated a new and different cause of action from the one set forth in the original petition, and that the said cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. On the 20th day of May, 1905, the district court overruled the motion, and thereafter the defendant filed an answer which contained a plea of former adjudication; and further alleged that some time in June, 1899, the plaintiff came to defendant and stated that he had a customer for a \$10,000 single premium policy to be paid in one payment; that an oral agreement was entered into at that time between plaintiff

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and defendant that when plaintiff's customer should take the said \$10,000 single premium policy, the premium to be paid in one payment, defendant would allow plaintiff, as a broker's commission, 40 per cent. of such part of the premium as would equal a twenty-payment life policy, at the same age, and nothing on the excess; that plaintiff's alleged customer refused to take such policy, and stated emphatically that he desired no insurance whatever, and that he had not at any time contemplated taking an insurance policy; that thereupon defendant stated to plaintiff that the deal was off, and that the insurance could not be written, and there was no further conversation between plaintiff and defendant regarding the matter.

It was further alleged that in September, 1900, one Shukert, who plaintiff claimed was his customer, did take from defendant a ten-payment, twenty-year endowment policy for \$10,000; that said policy was not written through any representation of the plaintiff, or by reason of any effort on his part. Further answering, defendant denied that said Shukert, at the time said policy was written, or at any other time, was a customer of the plaintiff, and it was alleged that the plaintiff could not have written the said Shukert for any kind of policy in June, 1899, or at any time since that date. The answer also denied all of the allegations of the petition not specifically admitted.

The plaintiff thereupon filed a reply, by which he denied that the agreement mentioned in the petition was for the writing of a single premium policy; denied that he was to get 40 per cent. of such part of such premium as would equal a twenty-payment life policy at the same age; denied that the parties ever talked to Shukert about such single premium policy; denied that defendant told plaintiff that the deal was off; and denied that plaintiff ever agreed to procure a customer for a single premium policy of any amount. The reply contained no other denials, and failed to controvert the allegations of the answer that defendant was unable to write a policy on

Shukert's life until more than a year had elapsed, and until Shukert had ceased to be plaintiff's customer.

Upon the issues thus joined, the cause came on for trial on the 24th day of March, 1910. The jury was impaneled and sworn, and plaintiff proceeded to offer evidence, at which time defendant objected to the reception of any evidence on the ground that the amended petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiff asked leave to amend his amended petition, and after argument, and upon due consideration thereof, the court refused leave to amend, discharged the jury, and dismissed the action. A motion for a new trial was filed and overruled, and defendant prosecuted this appeal.

It thus appears that the questions presented for our determination are: First, was defendant's objection to plaintiff's evidence properly sustained? Second, did the court abuse its discretion in refusing plaintiff's request to amend his amended petition, and in dismissing the action?

As we view the record, it is apparent that the defendant was entitled to a judgment on the pleadings as they stood when the trial was commenced, and defendant's objection to the introduction of plaintiff's evidence was properly sustained.

Finally, it further appearing from the record that plaintiff failed to seasonably assert his alleged claim against the defendant, that he delayed the commencement of his action until almost four years had elapsed after the transaction set forth in his petition occurred, that he first sought to recover upon a *quantum meruit*, and long afterwards amended his petition and based his action upon an express contract, that, when met by an objection to the sufficiency of his amended petition, he again sought to amend by asserting his right to recover upon a *quantum meruit*, we are of opinion that the trial court was justified in concluding that the plaintiff's action was without merit, and that he was attempting to continue

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its prosecution for the purpose and causing him trouble and not be said that the court's r amend his amended petition w

It follows that the judgment is right, and is

FAWCETT, J., not sitting.

GEORGE W. FRANCE, APPELLANT.
APPELLANT

FILED FEBRUARY 26, '10

1. Limitation of Actions: Acknowledgment to a promissory note, although validity and implying no disposition, and which contains no acknowledgment to it, is not such an acknowledgment section 22 of the code.
2. ———: ———. To toll the statute of limitations, an admission, unqualified and direct admission, which the party is liable. Nelson

APPEAL from the district court of
ROBERT C. ORR, JUDGE. *Affirmed*

Lambe & Butler and France

J. F. Fults, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action on a promissory note against defendant to one Harvey on the 23d day of August, 1909, and payable five days after date in the usual form, with the acknowledgment of the owner of the note, defendant as follows: "Beaver City, 8-

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Sir: In regard to that note it is impossible to do anything about it. I have nothing to pay with. This is the third year in succession for crops to burn up here, so you see we are in no position to do anything. Respt., R. W. Ruby." No payment either of the principal or interest is alleged in the petition, and the foregoing letter was pleaded and relied on to toll the statute of limitations. A demurrer to the petition was sustained. Plaintiff refused to further plead, and his action was dismissed. From that judgment plaintiff has appealed.

The sole question presented for our determination is: Does defendant's letter amount to an unqualified acknowledgment of an existing liability for the payment of the note in question? A like question was before this court in *Nelson v. Becker*, 32 Neb. 99. In that case certain letters written by the defendant were relied on to toll the statute, and it was held that they were not an acknowledgment of an existing liability. Section 22 of the code provides: "In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt, or claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made in writing, an action may be brought in such case within the period prescribed for the same, after such payment, acknowledgment, or promise." In construing that statute it was said: "To remove the bar of the statute, the debtor must unqualifiedly acknowledge an existing liability." In *Hanson v. Towle*, 19 Kan. 273, it was said: "A mere reference to the indebtedness, although consistent with its existing validity, and implying no disposition to question its binding obligation, or a suggestion of some action in reference to it, is not such an 'acknowledgment' as is contemplated by the statute. This must be an unqualified and direct admission of a present, subsisting debt on which the party is liable."

As we view the record, this case should be ruled by *Nelson v. Becker*, *supra*, and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

STATE OF NEBRASKA V. PAXTON & GALLAGHER COMPANY.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 17,536.

Food: STATUTORY REGULATIONS. Where syrup is put up by a wholesaler and sold under a label stating that each half-gallon can contains a brand composed of cane syrup and maple syrup, the pure food law requires also a statement showing the proportion of each. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 33, secs. 8, 22.

ERROR to the district court for Lincoln county: **HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE.** *Exception sustained.*

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, George W. Ayres, Frank E. Edgerton and George E. French, for plaintiff in error.

Isaac E. Congdon and Wilcox & Halligan, contra.

BARNES, J.

In the district court for Lincoln county, the state instituted a prosecution against defendant for violating the pure food law by selling to Ernest T. Tramp, October 5, 1911, six half-gallon cans of improperly labeled or misbranded syrup. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the information and dismissed the prosecution. For the purpose of settling the question of law raised by the demurrer, an exception by the county attorney to the decision below is presented here under section 515 of the criminal code.

The information charged: "That Paxton & Gallagher Company, a corporation, on or about the 5th day of October, 1911, in the county of Lincoln then and there being did then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell to one Ernest T. Tramp, six cans of syrup, each of which said cans did contain a food product, composed of more than one ingredient, to wit, commercially pure cane syrup, and commercially pure maple syrup, and which said product was composed of 75 per cent. of said cane syrup and 25

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per cent. of said maple syrup, and as thus prepared was offered for sale in said cans containing said mixture, and was composed solely as aforesaid, each of which said cans was then and there labeled and branded:

“ ‘1/2 Gallon,
“ ‘YELLOWSTONE
“ ‘Brand
“ ‘Pure
“ ‘SUGAR CANE SYRUP
“ ‘and
“ ‘CANADIAN MAPLE SYRUP
“ ‘Guaranteed equal to any blended syrup
“ ‘on the market. Packed for
“ ‘PAXTON & GALLAGHER CO.
“ ‘Omaha, Neb.’

“And there was not printed on the outside on the main label of said cans, or anywhere else on the outside of any of said cans, a correct statement of the percentage of cane syrup and the percentage of maple syrup of the contents of said cans, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Nebraska.”

The pure food law makes the sale of a misbranded article of food unlawful. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 33, sec. 22. It further provides that an article shall be deemed misbranded in the case of food: “If sold for use in Nebraska and in package form, other than canned corn; if every such package, as branded and named below, does not have a correct statement clearly printed, on the outside of the main label, of the contents * * * viz., all dairy products, lard, cottolene, or any other article used for a substitute for lard, wheat products, oat products and corn products, and mixtures, prepared or unprepared, sugar, syrup and molasses, tea, coffee, and dried fruit: * * * Provided, that an article of food which does not contain any added poisonous or deleterious ingredients shall not be deemed to be adulterated or misbranded in the follow-

ing cases: First. In the case of mixtures or compounds which may be now, or from time to time hereafter, known as articles of food, under their own distinctive names, and not an imitation of, or offered for sale, under the distinctive name of another article, if the name be accompanied on the same label or brand with a statement of the place where said article has been manufactured or produced, * * * and in case of syrups the per cent. of each ingredient composing said food." Comp. St. 1911, ch. 33, sec. 8.

Did the pure food law require defendant to state on its label or brand the percentage of each kind of syrup in its cans? It is agreed by both parties that this is the question presented. It is clear that the statute required defendant to place on each can a correct statement of the contents. Defendant contends that the label or brand copied in the information was such a statement. The state insists that any lawful statement includes the percentage of each syrup. In determining this question the purposes of the legislation, the evils against which it is directed, and the remedies provided must be considered. In *Gran v. Houston*, 45 Neb. 813, 825, this court said: "In giving a construction to a statute the court will consider its policy and the mischief to be remedied, and give it such an interpretation as appears best calculated to advance its object by effectuating the design of the legislature."

It is well understood, and often stated by the courts, that the promotion of honesty and fair dealing in the sale of foods is one of the purposes of pure food laws. Imposition and fraud arising from the custom of inclosing food in packages for the purposes of sale and delivery, without being opened, are among the evils which called for, and resulted in, the legislation on this subject. The legislative remedies require dealers in some form to make certain packages of food show what they contain, and how much, and to submit to punishment for failure to comply with such requirements. As applied to the cans of syrup sold by defendant, what, in the light of the purposes,

evils and remedies considered in the pure food law, is meant by the term "correct statement of the contents"? Each half-gallon can contained two distinct kinds of syrup. The maple syrup has a distinct character and quality of its own. It is known to be more expensive than cane syrup. If the label used did not indicate that the quantity of cane syrup in a can was the same as the maple, there was nothing on the outside of the package to show the proportion of each. The demurrer admits that 25 per cent. only was maple syrup. The quantity thereof was not stated on the label. As applied to the contents of a can containing two distinct kinds of syrup of different quality and value, the quantity of each kind is as clearly within the purposes, evils and remedies affected by the pure food law as the names of the syrups. A "correct statement of the contents," therefore, included the quantity or proportion of the different syrups, as well as the name of each. In this view of the law, the demurrer should have been overruled. It follows that exception of the county attorney is sustained.

EXCEPTION SUSTAINED.

REESE, C. J., not sitting.

SEDGWICK, J., dissenting.

Section 251 of the criminal code provides, among other things: "No person shall be punished for an offense which is not made penal by the plain import of the words, upon pretense that he has offended against its spirit."

This is a question of the meaning of a statute. A somewhat lengthy and complicated section of the statute containing different distinct subdivisions is sometimes at first sight difficult of construction. What was the intention of the legislature? We are not allowed to legislate by adding to or taking from what the legislature intended. The purpose of the whole statute is to prevent two things, adulteration and misbranding. The chapter, after providing for a board and their method of proceeding,

etc., comes to section 7, which enacts what she considered adulteration, and then comes section begins with a general statement of misbranding supposed to cover most cases that will arise. . is misbranded if the label "shall bear any design or device regarding the ingredients or stances contained therein, which statemen or device shall be false or misleading in ticular." This general statement is followed l detailed definitions of what shall be consic what shall not be considered misbranding. . general definition of misbranding the statute to state six distinct specific definitions wl govern in determining when an article of foo considered misbranded, and then three distin definitions for determining what articles shall r sidered misbranded. This action is brought third specific statement of what shall be regard branding. The language of the complaint bring this third specification plainly, and excludes It is not alleged in the complaint that the a was known and sold under its "own distincti the prosecution therefore is not for a violatic provision which relates only to articles so k sold. Moreover, that subdivision, which is the quoted in the majority opinion, provides that t specified therein, under the conditions there shall not be deemed misbranded. A man can judged a criminal because the legislature has ically enacted that the thing which he has dor deemed innocent. There must first be a law d act as a crime and affirmatively forbidding it. prosecution could be sustained under that sub it had been attempted by the prosecution, sinc division does not forbid anything, but only sp tain things that are not forbidden. The q What is meant by "a correct statement"? In subdivisions of the statute, in dealing with oth

and different conditions, it is enacted that the proportion or percentage of the ingredients must be stated on the label. The legislature must have had a reason for omitting this requirement from the subdivision under which this action is brought. There could be no other reason than that, as to the articles and conditions covered by this subdivision, it was intended that if the ingredients were correctly stated on the label the percentage or proportion of those ingredients should not be required to be stated.

After all of the provisions of the section defining what is misbranding, there is a proviso, which of course relates to all of the section that has gone before, as follows: "Provided, that an article of food which does not contain any added poisonous or deleterious ingredients shall not be deemed to be adulterated or misbranded in the following cases: * * * Second. In case of articles labeled, branded, or tagged so as to plainly indicate that they are compounds, imitation or blends, and the word, 'compound,' 'imitation' or 'blend,' as the case may be, is plainly stated on the package in which it is offered for sale, and the ingredients composing said articles." The label in question is copied in the majority opinion. The article sold was labeled "so as to plainly indicate" that it is a blend, and it stated "the ingredients composing said article." The word "blend" is not on the label, but the word "blended" is. If the word "blend" had been "plainly stated on the package in which it is offered for sale" it would have been a literal compliance with the statute, which declares that in such case it "shall not be deemed to be * * * misbranded." The decision, then, would have been different; the defendant would be "not guilty." The statute does not declare that, unless the word "blend" appears upon the label, it shall be deemed misbranded. The same subdivision provides that, in case the ingredients are made from different kinds of wheat, the word "blended" may be used. Thus the court convicts the legislature of juggling with trifles. A responsible business

firm of our state is adjudged criminal, although the substance and purpose of the statute has been fully complied with. No one can read the label without knowing that two kinds of sugar syrup have been blended to form the article, and that they constitute the only ingredients thereof.

The provision of the statute which I have quoted, declaring that this article shall not be deemed misbranded, is conclusive of this case for another reason. Even if it could be held that the word "blend" is indispensable to afford the protection which this provision is intended to give, still it declares the policy and intention of the legislature and shows beyond question what the legislature regarded as a "correct statement" of the contents. If public policy required that when two kinds of sugar syrup are blended the proportion and percentage should be stated on the label, as well as a "correct statement" of the ingredients of the blend, surely the legislature would not allow this public policy to be thwarted by so simple an expedient as placing the word "blend" upon the label.

Clearly the legislature did not consider that public policy required the proportion or percentage of the ingredients to be stated in such case. While the courts are not authorized to establish a public policy for the state, and are only required to ascertain and enforce the intention and meaning of the legislature in that regard, yet I may be allowed to suggest that there appears to be good reason for the action of the lawmakers in providing that an article which is a blend of two simple, harmless substances of the same nature and use shall not be deemed misbranded if the label plainly states all of those facts with a correct statement of the ingredients. The evidence in this case shows that cane sugar and maple sugar are essentially the same substance, differing only in flavor; that the flavor of the maple syrup is the sole advantage which it possesses over cane syrup; that maple sugar varies greatly, not in its character or quality, but in the strength of its flavor; that the object is to maintain a

uniform flavor, which requires a varying proportion of maple sugar in the blend, depending upon the strength of flavor in the particular maple sugar used. If, then, the flavor of the article sold is uniform and can be relied upon, there is no benefit to the purchaser in knowing the proportions, except to gratify a curiosity, which cannot be very imperative. There is no necessity or reason for requiring a statement of the percentage or proportion of cane and maple sugar that would not apply with equal or greater force to the various breakfast foods and other similar articles, none of which are required to make such statement on the label. It seems, then, that there is no reason, in the nature of the case, which would lead us to think that the legislature must have intended to declare such a public policy. The language of the subdivision of the section under which this prosecution is brought, taken literally, does not require that the percentage or proportion shall be stated upon the label, in addition to a correct statement of the ingredients of the simple blend. The fact that, when the legislature intended that the proportion or percentage of the ingredients should be stated, it said so in plain words, and in the subdivision under which this prosecution is brought only required that the label should contain a correct statement of the ingredients, is conclusive of the intention; and the legislature has expressly provided that an article of this kind, branded as this was, shall not be deemed misbranded.

In a matter of so great importance to all of the people of the state as is our pure food law, it is indeed unfortunate if we have failed to understand it and correctly interpret and apply it.

LETTON, J., concurs in this dissent.

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SARAH L. DISHER, ADMINISTRATRIX, APPELLANT, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLEE.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 16,924.

1. **Negligence: POWERS OF COURTS: EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.** The enactment of the employers' liability act (Comp. St. 1911, ch. 21) does not affect the judicial power of a court to determine the legal sufficiency of evidence offered to establish the fact of negligence or of contributory negligence.
2. ———: **COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE: DIRECTING VERDICT.** In a case arising under the employers' liability act, where the existence of negligence or contributory negligence is the matter at issue, a court is entitled to direct a verdict where the lack of evidence of negligence, or the undisputed evidence as to more than slight contributory negligence in comparison with that of defendant, is so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ as to its legal effect; but in all other such cases the issues must be left to the jury.
3. ———: ———: ———. Where the facts in evidence tend to show both negligence and contributory negligence, the duty to make the comparison required by the statute rests with the jury, unless the evidence as to negligence is legally insufficient, or contributory negligence is so clearly shown that it would be the duty of the trial court to set aside a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Ordinarily, wherever there is room for difference of opinion upon these questions, they must be submitted to the jury.
4. ———: ———: **QUESTION FOR JURY.** The facts in the case examined, and it is *held* that in this an action under the employers' liability act the comparison of the degrees of negligence of the plaintiff and defendant should have been left to the jury.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
ALBERT J. CORNISH, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Wilmer B. Comstock, for appellant.

M. A. Low, P. E. Walker, E. P. Holmes and G. L. De Lacy, contra.

LETTON, J.

Action by the administratrix of the estate of David L.

Disher against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company for negligently causing the death of plaintiff's intestate. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the district court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.

Many acts of negligence on defendant's part are alleged in plaintiff's petition, which, on account of its great length, is not set forth in this opinion. Defendant, by its answer, denied all the plaintiff's allegations of negligence, and by suitable averments alleged that plaintiff's intestate assumed the risks incident to his employment by the defendant, and that his death was caused solely by his own gross negligence, and not otherwise. The reply was a general denial.

The bill of exceptions discloses that on the 19th day of December, 1908, plaintiff's intestate was employed by the defendant as foreman in charge of a gang of Greek section men who worked under his directions; that on the day above named deceased was directed to take his men to work in repairing a spur track of defendant's railroad which ran from a point on its main line, north of the city of Lincoln, to University Place, a distance of two or three miles northeast of the city; that deceased was furnished with a hand-car on which to transport his tools and men to and from the place where the repairs were being made; that the spur track on which the deceased was at work joined the defendant's main line a short distance northeast of a cut constructed upon a sharp curve which is within the city limits, and over which the viaduct on Holdrege street is constructed; that about the noon hour, and while deceased and his section men were returning from their work on the hand-car, and while coming through the cut above mentioned at a point within the yard limits of the defendant, they were met by one of the defendant's passenger trains, which was about two hours late, and which was running at a rate of speed of about 25 or 30 miles an hour; that the deceased first discovered the approaching train when it was only five or

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six rail lengths away; that he warned his men of its approach, and all of them jumped off from the hand-car, and attempted to remove it from the track; that when they had three wheels of the car from the track deceased called to his men to look out. They sprang out of the way of the approaching train, and none of them were struck or injured thereby but the deceased, who remained on the track, in the endeavor to remove the hand-car, an instant too long, was struck by the pilot beam of the engine as he stepped away, and was instantly killed.

The negligence charged in the petition is the excessive speed of the train within the city limits through the cut and around the curve, the failure to sound the whistle when approaching the cut, the failure to stop the train after discovering the hand-car, and the failure to keep a proper lookout to discover the hand-car.

The plaintiff contends that, having established a state of facts from which negligence of the railway company in the operation of its train was reasonably inferable, it was the duty of the trial court to submit the case to the jury; that under the employers' liability statute questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury; and that it was an usurpation of the functions of the jury for the trial court to determine these questions. The ordinances of the city of Lincoln provide that no train or engine shall be run or operated upon any railroad within the city limits at a speed in excess of four miles an hour. The plaintiff's evidence shows that the usual and ordinary rate of speed of trains going out through this cut was from 15 to 20 miles an hour. The rules of the railway company require that two long and two short blasts of the whistle shall be sounded at obscure places. The evidence is to the effect that no whistle was sounded or bell rung. It also shows that from the place of the accident, looking down the railroad track in the direction from which the train came, a person standing in the center of the track could be seen a distance of 16 rail lengths away, or about 480 feet. There is also testimony from the men upon the

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hand-car that they first saw the engine five or six rail lengths away. The proof also shows that such a train as the one which struck the deceased, under similar conditions and equipped with proper appliances, could be stopped within 100 feet, if running at a speed of 15 miles an hour, and within 150 feet, if running at the rate of 20 miles an hour. The train did not actually stop until it had proceeded about its length beyond the point of the accident, or about five car lengths. Considering the evidence as to the violation of the city ordinance, that the place of the accident was within the yard limits of the defendant and within the city limits, the fact that the usual rate of speed in running through this cut was only 15 to 20 miles an hour, while on this day the train was running at the rate of 25 to 30 miles an hour, and that no signals were given before the cut was entered, we think there was sufficient evidence tending to establish negligence in the operation of the train to take the case to the jury; in other words, a trial court would not be justified, as a matter of law, in declaring that the defendant was not negligent in the operation of its train at that place and time.

Was this negligence the proximate cause of the death of the deceased, or was he so clearly guilty of such contributory negligence that the court could say, as a matter of law, that the accident resulted from his own default?

Disher at the time of the accident was in charge of a gang of Greek section men. By the rules of the company a track foreman "must not run his hand-car without at least one man facing in each direction, nor without full protection by signals when necessary." The evidence shows that he was advised of the fact that trains were liable to be operated at other than the regularly scheduled hours, and that it was his duty to look out for the same at all times and places upon the track. It is also shown that he had been directed by his immediate superior to take precautions in passing through this cut, and that it had been his custom, during the time he had

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been at work upon the switch at University Place, to send a man ahead each day before passing through upon his return to Lincoln with the hand-car. Taking all this evidence into consideration, it would seem that the deceased was guilty of negligence in attempting to pass through this cut without taking the precaution of sending a man ahead to look out for trains before entering the cut with the hand-car.

This fact alone, however, does not determine the question presented. After the hand-car was in the cut and the train was seen approaching, the car was stopped by the deceased, apparently in ample time to have removed it from the track if the train had been running either at the rate of speed prescribed by the ordinance, or at the higher rate of 15 to 20 miles an hour, which was the customary rate when passing eastward through the cut. The Greek laborers were unhurt, and the deceased was struck by the projecting pilot beam just as he was moving away. In his endeavor to save the lives of the passengers on the train and prevent the destruction of the property of the company he lingered an instant too long. It seems clear that if the train had been running at the usual and ordinary rate of speed the deceased would have reached a place of safety and that his death could not have occurred. It is a reasonable deduction from the testimony that the hand-car could have been seen by the engineer as far as a person standing upon the track could see another, or about 480 feet, and that the train might have been stopped in time or its speed reduced sufficiently to prevent the accident if a proper lookout had been kept.

Since we must conclude there was negligence on the part of the deceased in entering the cut, the judgment of the district court would be entitled to affirmance, if the law stood as it did before the enactment of the employers' liability act.

Section 4, ch. 21, Comp. St. 1911, commonly termed "Employers' Liability Act," provides: "That in all actions hereafter brought against any railway company to recover

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damages for personal injuries to an employee, or when such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when his contributory negligence was slight and that of the employer was gross in comparison, but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee—all questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury."

The appellant contends that the clause, "all questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury," makes it the duty of the court, regardless of what the proof may show, to submit the question of the existence of negligence or contributory negligence to the jury, in order to compare the negligence of the workman and the negligence of the employer, and that the trial court has no power to compare the negligence of the parties and determine, as a matter of law, that that of the employee was so gross that he is not entitled to a recovery. While this clause is declaratory of the existing rule, we think that at the time of its enactment in positive form the legislature had in mind the tendency of some courts to remove such questions in close cases from the jury, and that it was intended to extend rather than to limit the duty of the trial court to submit the same. We are not able, however, to adopt the construction for which the appellant contends, and hold that in every case the evidence must go to the jury, regardless of its legal effect.

The doctrine of comparative negligence adopted by this statute has long been in force in some other states, though it has not been approved by legal philosophers or by the courts generally. 1 Thompson, Law of Negligence, sec. 259; 1 White, Personal Injuries on Railroads, sec. 443. In the state of Illinois, where this doctrine has long existed, the question of whether negligence is a question of fact for the jury in all cases has been frequently decided, and it is held that the question is not always for the jury. In *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dewey*, 26 Ill. 255, a verdict

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for \$5,000 was set aside, for the reason that the court found that the deceased was, as a matter of law, guilty of gross negligence in attempting to pass between cars of a train standing at a station and on the point of moving, although the court also believed that the railroad company was guilty "of such negligence as would have rendered them liable for injury to a child, or a person of less than ordinary mind." The same rule was followed in *Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Hutchinson*, 120 Ill. 587; *Werk v. Illinois Steel Co.*, 154 Ill. 427; *Beidler v. Branshaw*, 200 Ill. 425; *Hewes v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co.*, 217 Ill. 500. See, also, Illinois cases in note to section 451, 1 White, Personal Injuries on Railroads.

The rule adopted seems to be that the courts may decide the question if the plaintiff has clearly been guilty of gross and culpable negligence; but, if his negligence is slight as compared with that of the defendant whose negligence is gross, he may recover, and the comparison must be made by the jury. *Parker v. Lake S. & M. S. R. Co.*, 20 Ill. App. 280.

In Wisconsin, also, it has been declared that this provision of the act does not affect the judicial power of the court to determine the legal sufficiency of the evidence tending to prove the fact of negligence or contributory negligence. *Haring v. Great Northern R. Co.*, 137 Wis. 367.

In *Kiley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co.*, 138 Wis. 215, it was said: "Did the legislature intend by the provisions of subdivision 5 of sec. 1816, as amended, to confer judicial power, vested in the court, on the jury? It declares: 'In all cases under this act the question of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury.' In their general sense the words are but a declaration of the law as it exists, namely, that when the court has found that there is legal evidence tending to show negligence or contributory negligence, it is for the jury to determine from the evidence adduced whether negligence or contributory negligence exists."

Kansas at first adopted the rule of comparative negligence, and afterwards repudiated it. While it was in effect that court held: "It is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether there has been negligence, and its nature and degree; but it is a question of law for the court to determine what degree of care and diligence on the one side and of negligence on the other will entitle the plaintiff to recover." *Caulkins v. Mathews*, 5 Kan. 191.

We are satisfied that in a proper case, where the evidence or lack of evidence is so clear that reasonable minds could not differ, the power is with the court to direct a verdict; but in all other cases under this statute the issues must be left to the jury.

Where the facts in evidence tend to show both negligence and contributory negligence, the duty to make the comparison rests with the jury, unless more than slight contributory negligence of the plaintiff, in comparison with that of defendant, is so clearly shown that it would be the duty of the trial court to set aside a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Ordinarily, wherever there is room for a difference of opinion upon these questions, they must be submitted to the jury. In line with this idea, in Georgia it is held that where the plaintiff's negligence is shown to have been the sole cause of the injury he cannot recover, and that where his negligence is shown to be a part of the cause of the injury his recovery will be divided in part. The court say: "For the apportionment of damages according to the relative fault of the parties, there seems to be no standard more definite than the enlightened opinion of the jury. * * * But it should not be overlooked that the defendant is not to be deemed in fault at all, unless there was a failure to exercise ordinary or reasonable diligence." *Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Neely*, 56 Ga. 540; *Atlanta & R. A. L. R. Co. v. Ayers*, 53 Ga. 12.

The question, then, remains whether the evidence in this case so conclusively establishes contributory negli-

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gence, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff is not entitled to have the facts as to his negligence and that of the defendant submitted to the jury for comparison. We are unable to say that the negligence of the deceased in attempting to remove the hand-car from the rails, after he had ample time to have saved himself, in view of the fact that he was entitled to presume that the approaching train was coming at the usual and ordinary rate of speed, was so great as to require us to say that, as a matter of law, there can be no recovery. If the jury should consider, after hearing evidence in behalf of the defendant, that the negligence of both parties was equal, or that the negligence of the deceased was more than slight in comparison with that of defendant, then there can be no recovery, under all the authorities we have examined. 1 Thompson, Law of Negligence, ch. 10; 1 White, Personal Injuries on Railroads, ch. 17.

The cases cited by defendant with respect to the duties of section foremen in keeping a lookout for trains, and the particular cases in which the facts were that section foremen in charge of hand-cars were caught by moving trains in cuts on the main line at a distance from a station, and at a point where trains might be expected to be running at their full rate of speed, are not applicable to this case, where the accident occurred within the yard limits, and where both custom and law required a slow movement of the train and proper signals. Furthermore, the cases referred to were decided at a time when, as the law stood, contributory negligence of any degree was a complete bar to a recovery, and they are not applicable to the enlarged liability under the statute.

It is our view that it was the duty of the court, under the facts in evidence, to instruct the jury upon the law of negligence, and for that body to say whether negligence existed on the part of either deceased or defendant; to determine whether that of the deceased, if any, was slight, and that of the defendant, if any, gross in comparison, and either to refuse a recovery, if they find that the negligence

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of the deceased was equal to or more than slight as compared with that of defendant, or to diminish the amount of recovery in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the deceased, in case they find his negligence was slight in comparison.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

BARNES, J., dissenting.

I am unable to concur in the majority opinion. The plaintiff's undisputed evidence in this case shows that Disher was the foreman of the section men upon the hand-car at the time the accident occurred; that for six or seven months he had worked on the section where he was killed; that he had passed around the curve and through the cut in question an innumerable number of times; that it was the well-known rule and custom, and Disher had been instructed, to never run his hand-car around the curve and through the cut without sending a man ahead to flag the cut and see that no train was approaching. He also knew the rule that foremen and trackmen were required to keep out of the way of regular trains, late trains, special or wild trains running at all rates of speed, and that he could expect to meet such trains at any and all times. Notwithstanding this, and his knowledge of the existing physical conditions, and knowing that it was his duty to keep out of the way of all such trains, so as to allow them to proceed at full speed, he went into the cut with a heavily laden hand-car, without stopping to look or listen, and without sending a man ahead to flag the cut. He knew of the rule, for the testimony shows that before the day of the accident he had always flagged this curve; but on that day, while hurrying to his dinner, he neither stopped his car nor took any precaution whatever to protect himself, and utterly failed to consider the lives of the section men under his charge until he saw the approaching train. ' Then it was

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too late to remove the car from the track before the train struck him. The plaintiff's own evidence, therefore, makes out a case of utter recklessness on the part of the deceased. He was clearly guilty of gross contributory negligence in running his hand-car into the cut where he was struck, without having sent a man ahead to watch for and warn the passenger train, which he might have expected was approaching; and but for his own negligence in that respect he would not have been killed. I am unable to understand how reasonable minds can reach different conclusions upon the undisputed testimony found in this record. *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Healy*, 5 Neb. (Unof.) 225; *Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Holland*, 117 Tenn. 257, 96 S. W. 758.

In *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Healy*, *supra*, the deceased was a section foreman on the defendant's road, and on the morning of the accident he, with five others of the section crew under his charge, started over the track upon a hand-car, going to their work. At a certain point on his section the defendant's track makes a sharp curve through a cut. The deceased and his crew went into this curve, just as Disher did in the case at bar, without stopping to send a man ahead to flag the curve. While proceeding through the cut an extra train appeared, running 30 or 40 miles an hour. As soon as the deceased saw the train he exclaimed: "Here she is; get her off, boys!" The hand-car was stopped, and all hands undertook to remove it from the track. Before it could be removed the train struck it, and the deceased was instantly killed. On those facts it was held that there was no negligence shown on the part of the company, and that the cause of the injury was the reckless negligence of the deceased in going into the cut without flagging it.

Therefore I am of opinion that, even if the defendant was guilty of negligence, its negligence was slight in comparison to that of the plaintiff's decedent, which, as we have seen, amounted to gross contributory negligence. To such a case the provisions of section 4, ch. 21, Comp. St. 1911,

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have no application. That section provides that in all actions hereafter brought against any railway company to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or when such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, when his contributory negligence was slight, and that of the employer was gross in comparison, but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee. All questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury.

As I view the provisions of this section, they have no application to a case where the negligence of the employee was gross, and where a fair consideration of plaintiff's own evidence establishes, beyond question, gross contributory negligence on the part of the employee. In such a case the provisions of the statute leave no question for the consideration of the jury. It was not intended that in such a case there would or could be a comparison of negligence as between the employee and the employer. Notwithstanding the clear provisions of this statute, the majority insist that, according to the facts established in this case, the right of recovery should have been submitted to the jury. Upon this proposition I am utterly unable to concur with my associates.

As I view the case, the trial court properly instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, and its judgment should be affirmed.

OTOE COUNTY, APPELLANT, v. MRS. J. C. BROWN, APPELLEE.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 17,037.

Witnesses: FEES: PROCEEDINGS BEFORE COMMISSIONERS OF INSANITY.

Under section 50, ch. 40, Comp. St. 1911, witnesses before the board of commissioners of insanity are entitled to the same fees as witnesses in the district court, and are entitled to have the same allowed and paid out of the county treasury in the usual manner.

APPEAL from the district court for Otoe county: JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

D. W. Livingston, for appellant.

W. H. Pitzer and Paul Jessen, contra.

LETTON, J.

This is an appeal by the county of Otoe from a judgment of the district court reversing an order of the board of county commissioners disallowing a claim for the fees of a witness who testified before the board of commissioners of insanity. At the request of the person informed against as being insane, a subpoena was issued for the appellee to appear before the board of insanity commissioners at the hearing. She appeared at the time and place specified, was sworn and testified; and after the hearing the clerk of the board certified the costs of the hearing, including her witness fees, to the board of county commissioners.

The county contends that there is no authority given the board of commissioners of insanity to tax the costs of any proceedings had before them; that witness fees are costs, and that, in the absence of a statute, no costs can be taxed and none recovered. Section 50, ch. 40, Comp. St. 1911, prescribes the compensation of the commissioners of insanity, the clerk, the examining physician, and the sheriff, and provides further: "Witnesses shall be entitled to the same fees as witnesses in the district court. The compensation and expenses provided for above *shall be allowed and paid out of the county treasury in the usual manner.*" Section 20 of the act relating to the powers of the commissioners provides: "For the purpose of discharging the duties required of them, they shall have power to issue subpoena and compel obedience thereto, to administer oaths, and do any act of a court necessary and proper in the premises." Under these provisions it seems clear that the county authorities have the same power and the same

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duty with reference to the payment of witnesses before the commissioners of insanity as with reference to the payment of other costs charged against the county in legal proceedings.

The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

ALLEN H. PRUYN V. STATE OF NEBRASKA.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 17,547.

1. **Criminal Law: INSTRUCTIONS: REVIEW.** One cannot predicate error upon an instruction when he has requested the court to instruct the jury substantially to the same effect.
2. ———: **EVIDENCE: REVIEW.** Where the evidence in a criminal case is conflicting, but the testimony on behalf of the state, if believed by the jury, is amply sufficient to sustain a conviction, this court will not interfere.
3. **Homicide: SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.** Evidence examined, and held to sustain the verdict.

ERROR to the district court for Dodge county: CONRAD HOLLENBECK, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

F. Dolezal and A. S. Ritchie, for plaintiff in error.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, Frank E. Edgerton and George L. Loomis, contra.

LETTON, J.

The plaintiff in error, who will hereafter be denominated defendant, was charged with the crime of murder in the first degree. He pleaded not guilty, and was found by the jury guilty of the crime of manslaughter. From a judgment on this verdict he prosecutes error.

The errors complained of all relate to the giving or refusal of instructions, except that it is claimed that the evi-

dence fails to show that the defendant used excessive force in repelling an assault.

Patrick Gorey is a saloon-keeper in the town of North Bend. The deceased, Michael Gorey, was his brother. While Michael had no pecuniary interest in it, the evidence shows that he was often in the saloon, and sometimes assisted his brother in the business. The defendant is about 34 years of age, and was employed by his father, who was in the hay business, as foreman of a gang of men engaged in baling hay. On Christmas day, 1911, the day of the tragedy, the defendant went into the Gorey saloon for the purpose apparently of settling with his father for his own work and the work of some of the men. The father deducted some money from his wages and that of the men for some time which he claimed had been lost, and some loud, boisterous and profane language was used between them in this dispute. The father and son then walked toward the back end of the saloon near the stove, still disputing and using profane and vulgar language towards each other. Michael Gorey, the deceased, was standing behind the bar. At this time Patrick Gorey stepped over towards the defendant, and said: "Al., look here, we don't want you in here. We don't sell you at all, and please go out." This he refused to do. Michael Gorey then came from the west end of the bar, holding an automatic pistol in his hand. The testimony in behalf of the state tends to prove that the pistol was unloaded, rusty in the barrel, and that it had not been loaded for two years, and that Michael held the pistol at arms length, pointing to the floor as he walked towards the accused and his father, while there is evidence on the part of the defense tending to show that the pistol was partly raised and pointing towards the accused at that time. In the quarrel with his father, the accused made an uncomplimentary reference to the Goreys, which was heard by Patrick, but it does not appear that it was heard by the deceased. According to the witnesses for the state, Michael said to the accused, as he approached him, "No gun plays here today, you go out," and that the accused

then quickly passed around the stove, pulled out a revolver, and fired twice at the deceased, who was about 12 feet away. A fight then ensued between him and Patrick, in which the accused was knocked down and severely bruised by blows from the pistol which Patrick had taken away from him. The deceased lingered for two days, and then died from the result of his wounds. The evidence on the part of the accused is to the effect that as the deceased approached the accused he carried the pistol partly raised towards the accused, that he said to the accused: "Shoot now, I have got the gun." And it is argued that this language and the conduct of the deceased justified in the accused the belief that he was about to be assaulted with a deadly weapon, and that his action in shooting the deceased under the circumstances as they appeared to him was justified on the ground of self-defense. There is a dispute in the testimony as to the number of shots heard or that were fired. There is positive testimony on the part of the state that only three shots were fired, and that they were all from the accused's revolver, two of which penetrated the body of deceased, and one fired by Patrick Gorey into the wall after he obtained possession of the revolver. Several witnesses for the defendant who were in and about the saloon testify to hearing more than three shots, and the father of the accused testifies that he saw shots being fired from Michael Gorey's revolver.

In the endeavor to establish a higher grade of homicide, the state introduced evidence showing that the defendant while under the influence of liquor had quarreled with his father in the saloon about a year previously, and had been put out by the deceased, and at that time he had threatened "to go and get a gun and get all of them;" that in July or August, 1911, while in a state of intoxication, he made threatening remarks about the Goreys; that in November, 1911, when refused a drink in the saloon, he threatened to get even with the Goreys, and that about the same time he drew a pistol on Michael Gorey, using language of a nature to provoke an assault. It seems to be established that

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there had not been the best of feeling between the defendant and the Goreys before the day of the homicide.

It is contended that the evidence is not sufficient to justify a conviction of manslaughter. This is true if the evidence on behalf of the accused is alone considered, but it is equally true that if the jury believed the testimony produced on behalf of the state a verdict of even a higher degree than manslaughter might have been sustained. In such a condition of the evidence, it is for the jury alone to determine the weight of the testimony, and the court is bound by their conclusion.

It is next contended that there is prejudicial error in the instructions given, and in the refusal of the court to give a number requested by defendant. Instructions 17 to 20, inclusive, it is said by counsel for the accused are taken almost verbatim from the case of *Carleton v. State*, 43 Neb. 373, and it is argued that there is such a wide difference between the cases that the instructions given are inapplicable. The principles of the law of self-defense as stated in these instructions are substantially sound. The defendant complains of the use of the expression in instruction 17, that, if defendant was assaulted in such a way as to induce in him "a reasonable and well-grounded belief" that he was in actual danger. In the same instruction the jury were told: "Actual or positive danger is not indispensable to justify self-defense. The law considers that, when men are threatened with danger, they are obliged to judge from appearances and determine therefrom as to the actual state of things surrounding them, and in such cases, if persons act from honest convictions induced by reasonable evidence, they will not be held responsible criminally for a mistake as to the extent of the actual danger." The defendant himself requested the court to instruct the jury that "if at the time he shot Mike Gorey he had reasonable cause to apprehend on the part of said Gorey a design to do him great personal injury, and there was reasonable cause for him to apprehend immediate danger," and that "at the time he did so he had

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reasonable cause to believe it necessary for him to shoot the deceased." In another he requested the court to instruct that the important question was: "Were the circumstances such as to afford him (defendant) just and reasonable ground for believing himself to be in such danger." The distinction between the instruction requested conditioning the action of accused upon "just and reasonable ground for believing" and that given by the court making the condition "reasonable and well-grounded belief" is too fine for us to perceive, and the defendant cannot predicate error on a statement of law which in substance he requests the court to charge. The numerous instructions upon the ground of self-defense requested by the defendant, while perhaps not erroneous, were for the most part unnecessary, since the propositions therein contained applicable to the facts were for the most part given by the court to the jury upon its own motion. We are further of the opinion that the refusal to give the cautionary instruction No. 8 with reference to verbal declarations did not prejudice defendant. The testimony as to declarations on the day of the tragedy was given by witnesses both for the state and for the defendant, and it was for the jury to say by a comparison of all the evidence which of the witnesses were to be believed. As to declarations or threats made prior to the day of the tragedy, the verdict shows that the jury were not influenced thereby, or the verdict would have been for a graver crime.

Considering the whole charge of the court, as well as the instructions refused, we are unable to see that any error prejudicial to defendant was committed. On the other hand, the court would certainly have not been justified in giving the instructions requested by the defendant in addition to the 28 which were actually read to the jury. As a general proposition, no good purpose is served by attempting to make hairsplitting distinctions in a multitude of instructions qualifying each other to the confusion of the ordinary mind. The better practice is to make the charge clear and simple, and yet at the same time to cover

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the law upon the essential points involved was done in this case.

We are unable to find from the record that the defendant did not have a fair trial. The judgment of the court is therefore

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FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1918. 1

Criminal Law: FORMER JEOPARDY. If during a trial before a magistrate it appears to him that the defendant be put upon his trial for a felony, an indictment or new complaint to be filed, and proceed under the criminal code, to sit as an examining magistrate, cause, and binds the accused over to trial for the felony, the fact that the accused was tried before a court having jurisdiction of the offense does not constitute a good plea in bar to the indictment in the district court. *Thompson v. State*, 10 Neb. 207.

ERROR to the district court for Merrick county, Nebraska. *H. THOMAS, JUDGE. Affirmed as to the judgment, reversed as to costs.*

Martin & Bockes, for plaintiff in error.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, for defendant. *Edgerton*, contra.

LEITON, J.

The defendant was arrested upon a charge of larceny and battery. He was taken before the district court of Merrick county, arraigned upon the charge, and pleaded not guilty. A jury was waived. Judgment was rendered by the state and by defendant, and before any decision was moved the court to stop all further proceedings.

put him upon a hearing for an offense not cognizable before a magistrate, and to proceed as in other criminal cases exclusively cognizable before the district court. The court sustained the motion, to which the defendant excepted. A new complaint was filed, charging an assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury, which is a felony. A warrant was issued and the defendant arrested on this charge. He objected to any hearing upon the latter complaint, for the reason that he had already been placed in jeopardy. This was overruled, and after a hearing the court found there was probable cause and bound him over to the district court.

In the district court an information was filed upon the same charge. The defendant interposed a plea in bar, setting forth specifically all the proceedings before the county judge, and pleading that he had already been placed in jeopardy, and by operation of law had been discharged and acquitted upon the charge of assault. A demurrer to this plea was filed by the state, which was sustained. The plea in bar was overruled, and a trial was had over his objections. The jury found that the defendant was not guilty of assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury, and found that he was guilty of assault. A motion to set aside that portion of the verdict finding the defendant guilty of assault and a motion in arrest of judgment were filed and overruled, and a fine and costs adjudged against the defendant.

After sentence, defendant also filed a motion to retax the costs, for the reason that the costs in the district court were made in the effort to convict him of the alleged crime of assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury, while the jury found that the defendant is not guilty upon that charge. This was also overruled.

The defendant assigns error of the district court in sustaining the demurrer to the plea in bar and in overruling the same, and further complains that the court erred in overruling the motion to retax the costs in the district court.

Section 327 of the criminal code provides: "If in the progress of any trial before a magistrate, under the provisions of this chapter, it shall appear that the defendant ought to be put upon his trial for an offense not cognizable before a magistrate, the magistrate shall immediately stop all further proceedings before him, and proceed as in other criminal cases, exclusively cognizable before the district court." The defendant insists that this provision is unconstitutional as in violation of section 12, art. I of the constitution, providing that no person shall be "twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." The constitutionality of this section we think is really not involved whichever view is taken as to the question of former jeopardy, because the first complaint might be for a misdemeanor not identical with the offense for which the defendant is bound over, and no such question could then arise. The real question presented is not whether this section is constitutional, but whether, when a defendant has been put upon trial for a misdemeanor before a magistrate and the trial has proceeded to such an extent that jeopardy is attached, this will be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for a like offense accompanied by such circumstances of enormity or aggravation as to bring it within a class made felonies by the statute.

A like question to that presented in this case was decided at an early day in the history of this state in the case of *Thompson v. State*, 6 Neb. 102. In that case a person was accused and tried upon the charge of petty larceny. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and fixed the value of the property stolen at \$35. Upon this verdict no judgment was rendered, but the magistrate required the accused to appear before the district court, where he was convicted of grand larceny. A plea of *autrefois convict* was interposed, which upon demurrer was adjudged insufficient. Upon review this court sustained the district court, for the reason that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to determine the question of guilt of a felony, saying: "It should be borne in mind that it is an indispensable requisite to a

plea of *former conviction* that the court whose record is relied upon to sustain it had jurisdiction of the alleged offense." The same rule would, of course, apply to a plea of *autrefois acquit* or former jeopardy. While, as defendant contends, many authorities and a number of text-writers take a different view with respect to cases where the only difference in the two crimes charged is one of degree, a number of other courts take the same view as was taken by this court. *State v. Reiff*, 14 Wash. 664; *State v. Campbell*, 40 Wash. 480, 82 Pac. 752; *State v. Hattabough*, 66 Ind. 223; *Commonwealth v. Harris*, 74 Mass. 470; *Commonwealth v. Bubser*, 80 Mass. 83; *Cunningham v. State*, 80 Ga. 4; *Ex parte Burke*, 58 Miss. 50. See, also, a discussion of the subject in *Warren v. State*, 79 Neb. 526, as applicable to a prosecution for robbery and one for murder based upon the same facts. An interesting discussion of the whole question is found in a monographic note to *People v. McDaniels*, 92 Am. St. Rep. 81 (137 Cal. 192). However, as was said in *State v. Campbell*, *supra*: "But it will not do to lay down a rule to the effect that in a case where, through inadvertence or misinformation of a prosecuting officer, a defendant has been charged with a misdemeanor—for instance, an assault and battery—and it afterwards eventuates that the actual crime committed was that of an assault with intent to commit murder, or even murder, the law must be content with punishing the defendant for the crime of assault and battery or allow him to escape punishment altogether, by reason of the inability of the state to dismiss the action for assault and battery and indict for the greater offense. Such a determination by a court would surely be the clogging, instead of the lubricating, of the wheels of justice." Moreover, the crime of assault with intent to do great bodily injury is not necessarily involved in the crime of assault and battery, and *vice versa*. The assault in the one case may be made by threatening another with a deadly weapon, and without the element of battery. A great bodily injury is injury to the person of a more grave and serious character

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than an ordinary battery. *State v. Gillett*, 56 Ia. 459. The prosecution is based upon a different section of the statute and the crime has other constituent elements. We think no error was made, therefore, by the district court in its ruling upon the demurrer and upon the motions other than to retax costs. As to the latter, it seems clear that the proceedings in the district court were unnecessary. We think the defendant is not justly chargeable with the increased costs, and that the motion to retax should have been sustained. *Biester v. State*, 65 Neb. 276.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed as to the judgment of conviction, but is reversed as to the motion to retax costs, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.

REESE, C. J. dissents.

THEOPHILUS HOELLWORTH, APPELLEE, v. MARY J. MCCARTHY, APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 16,927.

Mortgages: CONTRACT OF MARRIED WOMAN: DURESS. A married woman who involuntarily mortgages her separate estate or homestead to secure an individual indebtedness of her husband may have the lien canceled in a suit to foreclose the mortgage, where she was induced to execute it by mortgagee's threats to imprison her husband for feloniously disposing of mortgaged chattels.

APPEAL from the district court for Greeley county: JAMES N. PAUL, JUDGE. *Affirmed as modified.*

J. P. Boler, T. J. Doyle and J. R. Swain, for appellant.

T. P. Lanigan, W. F. Critchfield and Lambert, Shotwell & Shotwell, contra.

ROSE, J.

Plaintiff brought this suit to foreclose a mortgage for \$9,230.88 on 720 acres of land in Greeley county. By cross-bill Byers Brothers & Company, defendant, a corporation engaged in the live stock commission business in South Omaha, pleaded a subsequent mortgage on the same property for \$12,423.93, and prayed for a foreclosure thereof. In both transactions defendants Patrick H. McCarthy and Mary J. McCarthy, his wife, are mortgagors. From a decree foreclosing both mortgages defendant Mary J. McCarthy has appealed, and will be designated "appellant." Other mortgages aggregating \$8,915.80 were pleaded, and foreclosure thereof was properly decreed, but to prevent confusion further reference thereto will be avoided.

A quarter-section of land to which appellant held the fee, and, in addition, an 80-acre tract occupied by her with her husband and ten children as a homestead, were included in the mortgages. Appellant concedes that the other incumbered lands are subject to foreclosure. The question to be determined is whether appellant voluntarily mortgaged her 80-acre homestead and her separate estate of 160 acres. That she signed the mortgages and the notes thereby secured is not disputed. No defect in complying with the forms of the law in regard to acknowledgments appears on the face of the mortgages themselves. Directly stated, the material defenses interposed by appellant are that she was mentally incompetent to incumber her property, and that she was coerced into doing so by threats of mortgagees that her husband would be imprisoned if she failed to execute the mortgages.

The first of the defenses is not established. Appellant understood the transactions, and knew that her acts might deprive her and her offspring of their home. She discussed these matters intelligently with her husband's creditors. She first refused to sign the instruments, and for a time persisted in her refusal without the advice of any one. In

absence of her husband, she left her home after she had been visited there by his creditors and went to the county seat to confer with them. The evidence does not show that she was mentally incompetent when the notes and the mortgages were signed.

It is argued that duress is not properly pleaded in the answer of appellant, and that therefore she is not entitled to relief on that ground. Appellant replies that her answer is sufficient, but, to conform her pleading to her proofs, she tenders here an amendment containing a better plea of duress. It is unnecessary either to discuss the sufficiency of the answer or to determine the right of appellant to amend it in this court, for the following reasons: This is a suit in equity wherein there is no issue to be defined for the guidance of a jury. All parties interested understood that duress was pleaded as a defense, and a large part of more than 600 pages of testimony was directed thereto. To refute testimony tending to show threats, mortgagees cross-examined appellant's witnesses, and in contradicting them produced and interrogated other witnesses. There was no objection that testimony offered by appellant to prove duress was not within the issues or that it was for that reason incompetent. No one was misled or injured by any informality or imperfection in the answer, and it will now be given the same interpretation as that adopted by the pleader, by her adversaries and by the trial court. For the purpose of preventing the review of a defense which was perfectly understood and fully tried, undue importance will not be attached to mere technical objections to an answer in equity. An objection to the authentication of the bill of exceptions is likewise without merit.

Did Ryers Brothers & Company procure the signature and acknowledgment of appellant by duress? In considering this question, her physical and mental condition, the surrounding circumstances and the attitude of the parties in conducting the negotiations and in dealing with each other are proper subjects of inquiry. During her married life appellant was frail and excitable. She had 10 chil-

dren, the oldest being 23 and the youngest 3. Occasionally for many years prostration followed nervous attacks. Two physicians testified to the opinion that her nervous disorder was hysteria, that it was permanent, and that it seriously affected her conduct and impaired her will-power. She lived with her family on their 80-acre homestead about five miles from Greeley Center. Her husband, after having been a prosperous ranchman, engaged extensively in the live stock business. He made his sales at South Omaha stock-yards through Byers Brothers & Company, mortgagee. The latter advanced him money to make purchases. Late in the afternoon of May 24, 1907, B. F. Hertzler, a representative of mortgagee, and Mr. Shotwell, its attorney, appeared unannounced at the home of appellant in absence of her husband, and interviewed her in her own house in presence of her son Edward, who was about 21 years old. She was distinctly told that an indebtedness of her husband, which they were seeking to secure by mortgage on her real estate, was about \$12,000, and that his commission merchant, Byers Brothers & Company, had a chattel mortgage on about 200 head of cattle. It is undisputed that this information surprised her. She did not owe any part of the indebtedness, nor know of its existence. She told them her husband did not have the live stock mentioned. Hertzler exclaimed: "That's strange." They repeatedly asked her to consent to the giving of a real estate mortgage to secure her husband's debt, but throughout the entire interview she steadfastly refused to do so, and they left her in the evening with the parting admonition to "think it over during the night," and to come to Greeley Center the next morning, stating that their train left for Omaha about 8:30 A. M. These facts and conclusions as to what occurred at their interview are proper deductions from their own testimony and cannot be successfully controverted. Thus far there is nothing to show a direct threat of imprisonment, but enough was said to create in the mind of appellant the fear that her husband might not escape punishment for felonious conduct in con-

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nection with his chattel mortgages. This was not the first time the nature of the duties and obligations imposed by her husband's chattel mortgages had engaged her attention. The evidence relating to direct threats of imprisonment is conflicting. Edward, a son of appellant, said repeatedly on the witness stand that he plainly heard Hertzler say to his mother that, "if she didn't sign, he [husband] would have to go to jail, and they would eventually take the property anyhow." Appellant testified directly and positively that Hertzler made threats of like import. Shotwell said he heard no such threats. Hertzler denied having made them, but admitted on cross-examination: "I told her we didn't want to frighten her or scare her. I told her I was sorry I had to come in and bother her, and I thought she ought not to be frightened." Here is an inference from his own testimony that in presence of her son he had already done something to frighten her. If she felt free to resist their demand for a mortgage on the family homestead and on her separate estate to secure a debt she did not owe, why was she frightened?

Edward testified that, after they left, his mother walked the floor crying and saying she would have no home for her children, and that if she had to sign a mortgage her husband wouldn't have to go to jail; that his mother had not retired at 1 o'clock; that he saw her at 4; that she was nervous and agitated; that she left with him for Greeley Center at 7, and that they made the trip in the rain during a thunderstorm. The evidence shows that when she reached town she went to a store kept by a brother of her husband; that she was excited; that her eyes were inflamed from weeping; that she there met her husband and his attorney, J. R. Swain; that her husband pleaded with her to sign the mortgage, but that she refused; that no one advised her to protect the family homestead and her separate estate; that she told Swain she would not execute the security, but that, if she had to, she preferred to give a deed rather than a mortgage. After a short conference, she and her husband and Swain went to the latter's office,

where they met Hertzler and Shotwell. It was understood by all present that her business interests and her intentions were in direct conflict with the wishes of her husband. On the witness stand Swain said he thought appellant had asked him at the store if her husband's conduct had been criminal, and he admitted that he might have advised her, if the facts stated by her were correct, that her husband was in no position to stand a lawsuit. In any event, Swain gave her no encouragement in her oft repeated purpose not to sign a mortgage. He did, however, advise her, when she was suffering from the ordeals described, when she was confronted in his office by three men who were impatiently insisting on her signature, when she was struggling with a mother's impulse to protect the home of herself and her children, and when she was seized with a fear that to do so would result in the imprisonment of her husband, that it would be better to give a mortgage than a deed. This identical advice had been given by Hertzler the evening before. After Hertzler and Shotwell had started to the station, she hastily signed the mortgage. They returned, left it in the hands of Swain for acknowledgment, and rushed to the train. Appellant then went to the residence of a friend in town, said she had been compelled to mortgage her property, and that she would lose her home. She spent the greater part of the day there in hysterics and in bemoaning her fate. She testified, without objection, that she was induced by threats to sign the mortgage, and the evidence and circumstances, when considered as a whole, sustain her in that view. She successfully resisted the importunities of the creditor of her husband. She did not yield to his pleading, nor to the advice of his counsel, but she signed the mortgage when the agent who had threatened her husband with imprisonment started to the station in disappointment. She was not a free agent in the sense that she voluntarily executed the mortgage. She did not act on her own judgment. The advice of her husband and of his attorney, under the circumstances of this case, does not avoid

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the consequences of duress. She was moved by fear which overpowered her will. The duress applies with equal force to appellant's offer to execute a deed. In equity, therefore, the family homestead of 80 acres and her separate estate of 160 acres are not incumbered by the mortgage which she was unduly induced to execute, and as to that property the foreclosure is erroneous. *Nebraska Central Building & Loan Ass'n v. McCandless*, 83 Neb. 536. Only a brief reference to the controlling facts and conditions has been made, but all of the evidence has been carefully read and weighed.

Was plaintiff's mortgage on the same land procured by duress? It was executed at an earlier date—November 15, 1906. If the procuring of this mortgage and the one already discussed had been planned by the same person, the methods adopted would scarcely have been more similar. Plaintiff's mortgage is a renewal of older obligations of Patrick H. McCarthy, appellant's husband. His mortgage indebtedness to plaintiff consisted of a number of items aggregating with interest \$8,801.03, June 2, 1906. About that time the entire debt was due the First National Bank of Greeley, except \$1,000 owing to one of its officers. The first of the original items was a loan of \$3,000, April 15, 1905, and a later one was a note for \$3,567 given by McCarthy, January 16, 1906, for the purchase price of cattle, and discounted by the bank. The latter note was secured by a chattel mortgage on cattle. Some time during the winter or spring of 1906, McCarthy disposed of the cattle without satisfying the lien of the chattel mortgage. The loans were excessive and could not properly be carried by the bank. Three of its officers undertook to relieve it of the load created by McCarthy's paper and to obtain security in the form of a mortgage on the 720 acres of land owned by McCarthy and wife. The bank officers were Theophilus Hoellworth, plaintiff, of Greeley Center, Cornelius Bradley, of Wolbach, A. P. Cully, of Loup City. There was no attempt to disguise their anxiety to relieve the bank and to procure real estate

security. Who should carry the loan? The business sagacity of these bank officers cannot be doubted. McCarthy was willing to give security in the form demanded. Appellant alone objected. The amount due the bank and its officer was included in a mortgage executed by McCarthy and wife to Bradley, June 2, 1906. For the same debt with accrued interest plaintiff, as Bradley's transferee, procured on November 15, 1906, another mortgage which is the subject of foreclosure herein. Should the separate estate of appellant and the family homestead be sold to satisfy plaintiff's mortgage? Her answer is that her signature and acknowledgment were in both instances procured by threats that her husband would be imprisoned if she failed to execute the mortgages. The question presented requires an examination of the circumstances relating to both transactions. Many of the facts are not in dispute, but the bank officers deny every imputation implying duress. No part of the indebtedness was appellant's, nor did she receive any of the consideration for her husband's notes. Her first business interview with the bank or with any of its officers, according to her own story, occurred late in May, 1906, when plaintiff came to her house one afternoon, in absence of her husband, and told her the latter had borrowed a large amount of money, and asked her to sign a mortgage on her real estate, and was told by her that she was not aware that her husband owed him or his bank anything. A few days earlier she had been in Montana at the death-bed of a brother, and her account of her trip indicates that she had recently been in hysterics from which she had not recovered. She said that she was ill and weak during her interview with plaintiff; that he told her he had given the money to her husband who furnished chattel security; that he did not find the security there; that her husband had left himself in a bad place; that something had to be done; that she was frightened; that she refused to sign the mortgage; that after her husband had been informed of the interview he went to Greeley Center, saw the bankers, and told her

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to come to town; that she went to the bank, June 2, 1906, and first refused to sign the mortgage, but finally did so through fear inspired by plaintiff's threat that her husband would be punished criminally if she did not yield. McCarthy testified that plaintiff reminded him of the chattel mortgage, and told him he would be sent to the penitentiary if he did not give them a lien on the land; that he communicated this threat to his wife who went into hysterics. While plaintiff denies that he had made any threat, he admits that he had the interview in absence of appellant's husband; that he went to her house to procure a real estate mortgage; that he visited with her on the subject; that possibly he said to her, "This new loan was to take up the loan secured by the chattel mortgage;" that she told him her husband "would have to mend his ways." To arouse a sense of fear, it was not necessary to advise her that the mortgaged chattels were missing. She would know without being told that they were not in the feed-yards, though she had known nothing of her husband's banking transactions. A covert threat may fairly be inferred from plaintiff's own testimony, and it was as effective for the purpose of inspiring fear as a direct statement. Its very refinement may have made it appear more ominous to a hysterical woman. In any event, it is proper to hold from all the evidence that appellant, when the family homestead and her separate estate were at stake, was able to resist every inducement, but the fear produced by threats to imprison her husband. There was no attempt to foreclose the Bradley mortgage, but it was used five months later to obtain for the very person who had procured it by duress another mortgage on the same property to secure the same debt. Appellant persistently refused to execute the mortgage pleaded in plaintiff's petition, but finally yielded through the same fear that controlled her judgment when she signed and acknowledged the Bradley mortgage.

Plaintiff has a lien on McCarthy's land, but his mortgage should be canceled in so far as it purports to incum-

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ber appellant's separate estate of 160 acres and the family homestead of 80 acres. The same relief is granted as to the mortgage of Byers Brothers & Company. In other respects the decree below is affirmed, the costs in this court to be taxed in equal proportion to plaintiff and Byers Brothers & Company.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

LETTON, J., not sitting.

RICHARD A. UPSTILL, APPELLANT, v. STEPHEN H. KYNER,
APPELLEE.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 17,069.

1. **Judgment: RES JUDICATA.** The rule is well settled that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction upon questions directly involved in one suit is conclusive as to those questions in a subsequent action between the same parties.
2. **Waters: INJUNCTION: EVIDENCE.** Record examined, and no competent evidence found to sustain any of the allegations in plaintiff's petition not covered by a former adjudication between the parties.

APPEAL from the district court for Brown county:
WILLIAM H. WESTOVER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

J. B. Smith, for appellant.

J. A. Douglas, contra.

FAWOETT, J.

From a judgment of the district court for Brown county, dismissing his suit for an injunction, plaintiff appeals.

The pleadings in the case are unnecessarily voluminous. So much so that no attempt will be made to set them out in detail. Plaintiff and defendant are the owners of ad-

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joining mill properties on Long Pine creek in Brown county. The stream runs from south to north, and the mill of plaintiff is north of that of defendant. Plaintiff commenced the construction of his dam in 1883, and completed the same and erected his mill shortly thereafter. Defendant's grantor constructed the dam and erected the mill now owned by defendant in 1885. Defendant became the owner of the property within a year or two thereafter. The parties have had more or less trouble and litigation ever since that time. The purpose of the present suit may be gathered from the prayer of the petition, which is: "That the defendant be permanently enjoined from continuing the use of any obstructions or placing any obstructions on his said dam or race, and from continuing or raising his dam or race any higher than it was in the year 1887 when defendant's grantor owned and operated said dam and race, and that the defendant may be permanently enjoined from obstructing in any manner the free flow of water in Long Pine creek as it flowed when the defendant's grantor owned and operated said dam and race in the year 1887; and that defendant may be permanently enjoined from impeding in any manner the flow of said water and then releasing it and causing it to flow in large and unusual volumes into the plaintiff's race and dam, and from making any repairs to defendant's dam or race by means of manure or other offensive substances, and for such other and further relief as justice and equity may require."

The contention of defendant is that all of the matters for which plaintiff prays relief in the above prayer were adjudicated between the parties by a decree of the district court for Brown county, entered in a suit between the same parties, April 24, 1905. In that case defendant here was plaintiff, and plaintiff here was defendant. Each was seeking an injunction against the other and each obtained relief in the decree. The pleadings filed and the decree entered in that case were introduced in evidence in this. We have carefully examined them and find that the de-

defendant's plea of *res judicata* is fully established and should be sustained. The prayer of plaintiff's petition in this case is identical with the prayer for affirmative relief in his answer in that case, with the single exception of that portion of the prayer in this case which asks the court to enjoin the defendant from making any repairs to his dam or race by means of manure or other offensive substances. Upon that point the evidence is uncontradicted that in 1909 defendant removed his old dam, which was constructed of wood, earth and various other kinds of material, and built in place thereof a solid and substantial dam of concrete, reinforced with steel cables; and that none of the offensive substances complained of are now used in and about any part of his dam or race. The decree of April 24, 1905, adjudicated all of the matters embraced in plaintiff's prayer in this suit. No appeal was taken from that decree by either party, and, if defendant is violating any of its terms, plaintiff can obtain prompt and full relief in the district court.

We might properly end this opinion here, as we have now disposed of everything specifically contained in the prayer of plaintiff's petition; but, under the prayer for general equitable relief, we will consider the allegations in plaintiff's petition that defendant, by raising his dam from time to time, has created such a pressure of water that for a number of years there has been a flow of water underground, through the sandy formation of the valley, which has extended to plaintiff's dwelling-house and rendered the stone basement thereof damp and unhealthy to such an extent that it has seriously impaired the health of Mrs. Upstill. The evidence shows that plaintiff's residence is 280 feet down stream from defendant's dam. Plaintiff testifies that the ground has a natural and even slope. The stream, after leaving defendant's mill and land, runs in a northwesterly direction for some little distance and then turns and flows almost directly east and passes within from 20 to 30 feet of plaintiff's house. At the point where it passes plaintiff's house it is directly north of the

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eastern portion of defendant's dam. Bearing in mind the fact that the general course of this stream is north, if we were to draw a straight line from the eastern part of defendant's dam, down grade, due north for 280 feet, we would come to plaintiff's house, and 20 to 30 feet beyond that, and still down grade, we would come to the bed of the stream. The county surveyor was employed by both plaintiff and defendant to make a survey and take certain levels. A plat of this survey with the elevations noted thereon is in evidence and shows that the surface of the stream just below the house is $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet lower than the basement floor in the house. There is no competent evidence in the record that there is any underflow of water between defendant's dam and plaintiff's house. There is nothing but mere conjecture on the part of plaintiff that the dampness in the basement of his house is caused by such underflow. In addition to the lack of evidence of underflow, it seems incredible, if there is any such underflow, that it could affect plaintiff's basement. Water naturally seeks its level. This is true whether it is flowing above or below the surface of the ground. Applying this natural rule or law of gravitation, water leaving defendant's dam and flowing underground down an even slope for 280 feet would not at that point have an elevation of $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet above a clear and unobstructed outlet into a flowing stream 20 to 30 feet below.

Viewed from any standpoint, we think the judgment of the district court is right, and it is

AFFIRMED.

GRACE ARMSTRONG, ADMINISTRATRIX, APPELLEE, V. UNION
STOCK YARDS COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 17,039.

1. **Negligence: EVIDENCE.** Under the evidence in this case, stated in the opinion, the finding of the jury that the defendant was negligent is not so clearly wrong as to require a reversal upon that ground.

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2. ———: CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: PRESUMPTIONS: EVIDENCE.

There is a presumption that one in his right mind and in possession of his faculties will take ordinary precaution to avoid danger and injury. The evidence of contributory negligence in this case, stated in the opinion, is not so conclusive as to require this court, as a matter of law, to hold that such presumption was overcome and contributory negligence established, contrary to the verdict of the jury.

3. Damages: PRESUMPTIONS: REVIEW. There is no conclusive presumption of law that the present earnings of an able-bodied, active and intelligent young man, under 25 years of age, will not be increased in the future. The court will not reverse as excessive a judgment for damages resulting from his death, solely upon the ground that such present earnings are so small.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
HOWARD KENNEDY, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Frank T. Ransom, and Greene, Breckenridge, Gurley & Woodrough, for appellant.

George E. Bertrand, McGilton, Gaines & Smith and Guy R. C. Read, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

Thomas Armstrong was struck and killed by a car that was being switched by the defendant company. His mother, Grace Armstrong, as administratrix of his estate, brought this action in the district court for Douglas county, alleging that the death of the deceased was caused by the negligence of this defendant. Upon the trial there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant has appealed.

The defendant denied the allegations of negligence on its part, and alleged contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, and also contended that the verdict is excessive.

1. The first contention of the defendant is that the deceased, under the circumstances in this case, must be considered to have been a trespasser, or at least a mere licensee, upon the tracks of the defendant, and that there-

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fore the defendant was not under the "obligation that might arise toward one injured at a recognized crossing or pathway, and there was no reason why appellant's switching crew should have anticipated that one of Cudahy's men would place himself in such a dangerous position on the track that he could not extricate himself, nor that Cudahy's men would not protect themselves against the movement of the cars on these tracks, for they used this track as a convenience to themselves in passing to and from the repair shop, and were required to exercise a high degree of care." This contention is clearly not justified by the evidence. The deceased was in the employ of the Cudahy Packing Company. That company had a covered inclosure in or near the switching yards of the defendant. Within this inclosure there was a shed with a narrow platform on each side thereof, used for the purpose of cleaning and icing the refrigerator cars of the packing company. Forty or fifty men were employed by the packing company in this service. This shed was a long narrow structure, used by the men in handling the ice and for similar purposes, and the platforms extending along each side were very narrow, and were high, to correspond with the height of the platform of the cars to be cleaned and iced. On each side of this shed there was a switching track, upon which the refrigerator cars were placed for cleaning and icing, and were located so near the platforms that the men could pass readily from the platforms to the cars. At the east end of the platform there was a step and "handhold" which the men used in passing to and from the shed and platform. The employees of the defendant company were engaged in switching coal cars; and, to use the expression of the witnesses, they "kicked" two cars along one of these tracks into the inclosure of the packing company; that is, the switching engine was pushing a train of several cars towards this switching track, and detached two of the forward cars and allowed them to run by their own momentum along this track into the said inclosure. The cars were running at a speed of three or four

miles an hour when they entered the inclosure. Several witnesses testified that neither coal cars nor any others, except refrigerator cars of the packing company, were expected or allowed upon the switch track within the packing company's inclosure, except upon rare occasions when a car was pushed there at the request of the packing company for the purpose of removing the accumulations from the cleaning of the refrigerator cars. Other witnesses testified that the defendant company was at liberty to use these tracks at its own convenience, and that it frequently did so. This evidence being somewhat conflicting upon this point, there is no doubt that the jury might find that the former proposition was established by the evidence.

It is very manifest from these conditions that the employees of the packing company were not trespassers in going to and from their cars over these tracks in this inclosure, nor were they licensees. They were acting in the regular course of their employment, and were entitled to that protection which should be accorded to men who were where it was not only their right, but their duty, to be. This is virtually conceded by the defendant in its answer in the admission that the deceased "received certain injuries on the premises of the Cudahy Packing Company at South Omaha, Nebraska, from which he died." Several witnesses testified, and the plaintiff contends, that the universal practice had been to push these refrigerator cars along the switch track with an engine that could be heard by the workmen, which enabled them to avoid danger; that these cars on this occasion moved without noise, and there was no lookout stationed to warn the workmen of danger; and that the defendant was negligent in this respect, and also in driving these unusual cars onto these tracks without notice or warning to the employees of the packing company. The jury must have found that the defendant was negligent in these respects; and, while the evidence at some points is somewhat conflicting, we cannot say that this finding is so clearly wrong as to require a reversal.

2. The defendant insists that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence which was the proximate cause of his death. The deceased and another employee of the packing company, who was a witness at the trial, were on the platform referred to and near the end where the step and "handhold" were. This witness testified that the deceased had some of his tools with him, and was about to go from the shed, where he had been at work, to the tool house, a few rods distant. Some trivial conversation passed between the deceased and the witness, and immediately the witness heard a scream, and, turning, saw the deceased between the platform and the moving car, which was so close to the platform that the deceased was immediately killed. The theory of the defense is that the deceased, while engaged in this conversation with the witness, was careless of his own safety, and must have stepped from the platform without turning his face toward the direction from which the cars were coming, and without any precaution to avoid the accident which followed. In such case there is always the presumption that a man in his right mind and with the use of his faculties will take the ordinary precautions for his own safety. If the jury believed from the evidence that the manner of throwing this car into the inclosure was an unusual one, and not to be expected by the employees, that it moved with little, if any, noise, and that the car was so different in its construction from the refrigerator cars ordinarily placed upon those tracks, and so much lower, not being much above the high platform on which the deceased stood, that the deceased, if he had looked for the refrigerator car, might not have seen the car in question, they might reasonably have found that the presumption of ordinary care was not overcome by this evidence. It follows that the verdict was not so wholly unsupported by the evidence that we can say, as a matter of law, that it is clearly wrong.

3. The jury assessed the plaintiff's damages at \$7,000. The defendant contends that this is grossly excessive and is not supported by the evidence. The deceased was a

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young man not over 25 years of age. The interest on \$7,000 at 6 per cent. would nearly, if not quite, equal the salary that he was receiving, so that, if those dependent on him for support were receiving his whole salary, \$7,000 would be much more than the present worth of such benefits during the expectation of life of the beneficiaries, as shown by this evidence. We think, however, that this is not the true measure of the value of the life of the deceased to those beneficiaries. There is no certainty, and perhaps not even a probability, that the present earnings of an active young man of that age are the limit of his full capacity. What were the reasonable probabilities of his future earnings, and the future necessities of the beneficiaries? It is always difficult in such cases to determine the exact measure of the pecuniary loss, and this duty devolves upon the jury. They must take into consideration the condition of the parties and all of the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, and determine what sum will make full compensation for the loss sustained. We cannot say from this evidence that the finding of the jury in this respect is so clearly wrong as to require the court, as a matter of law, to overrule it.

The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

STATE, EX REL. CITY OF LINCOLN, APPELLEE, V. CHICAGO,
ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, APPEL-
LANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 17,678.

1. **Municipal Corporations: STREETS: VACATION.** Under the statute in force in 1892 and 1893, the mayor and council of the city of Lincoln had authority to vacate streets and alleys in said city, and the vacated portions reverted to the owners of the adjacent lots. Comp. St. 1893, ch. 13a, art. I, sec. 67, subd. IV.
2. ———: ———: ———. The ordinance of 1892 held to vacate that

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portion of P street taken and occupied by the defendant company as its station and switching grounds, and, the company then being the owner of the adjacent lots, the vacated portion became the property of the company.

3. ———: RAILROADS: VIADUCTS. The city of Lincoln cannot compel a railroad company to construct a viaduct over its property occupied by its station and switching tracks where there is no public way or street.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
P. JAMES COSGRAVE, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

M. A. Low, P. E. Walker, E. P. Holmes and G. L. De Lacy, for appellant.

Foster & McClenahan and Burr, Greene & Greene,
contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

In March, 1907, the mayor and council of the city of Lincoln duly enacted and approved an ordinance decreeing the necessity of a viaduct and approaches thereto "over and across the tracks of certain railway companies in and over P street of the city of Lincoln," and requiring the defendant company to construct a viaduct over and across its railway tracks at P street. At the general city election of that year the plan was approved and the mayor and council empowered to require its construction. In August of the following year the mayor and council duly passed and approved an ordinance for that purpose. The company having neglected to construct the viaduct, this action was brought in the district court for Lancaster county to obtain a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel it to do so. Upon trial in that court the issues were found in favor of the city, a peremptory writ ordered as prayed, and the defendant company has appealed.

There is no question raised as to the regularity of the preliminary proceedings, but it is contended by the defendant that there is no public street over its right of way at the place in question, and that therefore the city of

Lincoln is without authority to compel the construction of the viaduct. This question depends upon the construction and meaning of the ordinance known as ordinance No. 218, also known as No. 1641, enacted in July, 1892, entitled: "An ordinance providing for the passage of the railway of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company across and through the streets and alleys of the city of Lincoln, in the county of Lancaster, and state of Nebraska, and vacating portions of certain streets and alleys in said city for the purpose of giving right of way and other privileges in said city to said railway company." The seventh section of this ordinance is as follows: "That all of that part of P street in said city lying south of lots 9, 10, 11 and 12, in block 13, Kinney's O Street addition to said city, be, and the same is hereby, vacated." That part of P street described in this section was about 200 feet in length, and at that time the defendant company owned the lots abutting thereon on each side of the street. Under the statute then in force, if a street of the city was vacated, the territory so vacated reverted to the owners of the adjacent lots.

It is contended by the city that the mayor and council were without authority to vacate the streets of the city, and that the proper construction of the ordinance is that it grants a right of way to the company over the streets of the city, and does not vacate the streets for any other purpose. Upon the first contention it is sufficient to say that the statute then in force expressly authorized the mayor and council "to open, widen, or otherwise improve, vacate, care for, control, name, and rename any street, avenue, alley, or lane, parks, and squares, within the limits of the city." Comp. St. 1893, ch. 13a, art. I, sec. 67, subd. IV. Some authorities are cited by the relator holding that the city, under such a statute, cannot vacate a public street solely for the purpose of donating it to some individual or corporation, but those authorities are not applicable for two reasons: First, because in those cases the streets when vacated remained the property of the

city, and, of course, could not be disposed of as a pure gift or donation; second, because in this case the ordinance was somewhat in the nature of a contract, and was enacted for the public benefit to procure the defendant company to construct its line through the city for the convenience of the citizens and traveling public generally, as well as for the accommodation of the company.

The twelfth section of the ordinance provided that the company and its successors and assigns are "given and granted the right and privilege of occupying so much of said streets and alleys, vacated by this ordinance, as said railway company, its successors and assigns, may at any time desire for its railroad, switches, side-tracks, depots and other railroad purposes." It is contended that this shows that the intention was merely to create a right of way over the streets vacated, and not to vacate the streets named for other purposes. It will be noticed that the title of the act specifies that it is the purpose to grant a right of way through the streets and alleys of the city and to vacate portions of said streets and alleys, not only for the purpose of giving a right of way, but also to give "other privileges" in said city. The first section of the ordinance granted a right of way "over, through, along and across (naming 12 streets), together with the right of way upon, along and across all alleys crossed or intersected by said located line." This section does not mention the vacating of any streets, and was sufficient for the purpose of granting a right of way, if that was all that was intended. O street was then, as it is now, the main thoroughfare of the city, and section 1 also provided that no more than two tracks, including the main line, should be constructed over O street. The ordinance also provided that the company shall not construct more than three tracks, including the main line, across L, M, N and Monroe avenue, which lie immediately south of P street, and not to exceed four tracks, including its main line, across Q and R streets, which lie immediately north, and there is no limitation of the number of tracks to be placed

across P street. It was provided that the company shall maintain an arc light of 2,000 candle power on M, N and O, three streets immediately south of P street, and on Q, R and Vine, three streets immediately north, but made no provision for maintaining a light at P street. The ordinance also required the company to pave and keep in repair as a street a strip of ground immediately west of its depot, 25 feet wide, "so as to connect with O street and with P street in said city," thus enabling the traffic on P street to pass over on O street, as it was prevented from crossing on P street. This provision the company has fully complied with. In due time after the enactment of this ordinance the company took possession of that part of P street that was vacated by the seventh section of the ordinance, and constructed its switch tracks and other improvements thereon, erected its station building immediately adjoining it, and, in fact, extending slightly upon the vacated portion of the street. The evidence shows that some foot-passengers have crossed over this vacated strip, and that teams and conveyances have been known to cross it, but the tracks "have a 4½-inch drop on its rail," and they are not planked or otherwise prepared for crossing. There has been no crossing there by people or conveyances in any different manner than they might cross or drive over the railroad right of way at any and all places. The property has been in the exclusive possession and control of the railway company as much as any property devoted to a public use could be, and this has been continued now for much more than 10 years.

Other sections of the ordinance vacate that part of Twentieth street lying between P and O streets which the company was required to pave, as above stated, and also a small portion of two alleys through which the right of way extended; and it is contended that the provision, that the company should have the right and privilege of occupying these vacated parts, indicates that the intention was to make a qualified vacation for right of way only. The railway company did not own the property abutting

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on the vacated portions of these two alleys, and it may have been thought necessary, in order to secure the right of way then as against the owners of the abutting property, to make special provision therefor in the ordinance. Whether the mayor and council had power to prevent the vacated portions of these alleys reverting to the owners of the abutting property is not now material in this inquiry. The company has occupied them under this claim of right for much more than 10 years, and it is too late now to question the right of the company in its depot and switching grounds because of any doubt as to the original right to occupy the vacated alleys as against the owners of the abutting property. Under these conditions, it is impossible to conclude that the vacation of the part of P street in question by the seventh section of the ordinance was intended merely as a grant of right of way. This vacated portion of P street became the property of the defendant company as the owner of the abutting lots. This ownership and full control of the property has been continually recognized by the city authorities and the company has held and exclusively occupied this territory for much more than 10 years. The power given to the city by the statute to compel the construction of a viaduct requires that it must be over a railway track on or across a "public way," and must be a "viaduct on or along such street, under or over such track." Ann. St. 1911, sec. 8031. As there was no public way or street crossed by the railway tracks at the proposed place, the city was without authority to compel the construction of a viaduct.

We do not at this time determine the right and power of the city to now open the street over these station grounds by condemnation proceedings, as that question is not presented by the record.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the action dismissed.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

HAMER, J., not sitting

FAWOETT, J., dissenting.

I am unable to concur in the construction by my associates of ordinance No. 218, published in the Revised Ordinances of the City of Lincoln in 1895 as No. 1641. At the time that ordinance was passed and the streets entered upon by the respondent, I do not think either the city or the railway company regarded the ordinance as an absolute and unlimited vacation, for its full width, of any part of P street. To my mind, the intent and purpose of the ordinance was simply to give the company a right of way across the streets and alleys of the city, named in the ordinance, together with the right to construct certain side-tracks across but not along P street. That it was not the intention of the city to give the company the right to erect its depot building upon P street, or any other street, is shown by section 4 of the ordinance, which provides: "That said railway company shall, within one year, construct a substantial passenger depot building of brick or stone, or brick and stone, at or near the northwest corner of the intersection of O and Twentieth streets and north of O street." In order to comply with this provision of the ordinance, the company would be compelled to build its depot upon its own ground lying north of O, west of Twentieth and south of P streets. This construction is corroborated by the fact that the company did, within one year thereafter, construct its depot building as I have indicated. No part of the foundation or walls of the depot extends north of block 28, or upon P street. The only encroachment upon P street by the depot is by a projection of the cornice, upon the north end of the baggage room, a few inches over the south line of P street. That the ordinance was intended merely as a grant of a right of way and not as an absolute vacation of P street is shown by the ordinance itself. The title of the ordinance reads: "An ordinance providing for the passage of the railway of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company across and through the streets and alleys of the

city of Lincoln, in the county of Lancaster, and state of Nebraska, and vacating portions of certain streets and alleys in said city for the purpose of giving right of way and other privileges in said city to said railway company." The whole reference in this title to the question of vacation is in the last clause, "and vacating portions of certain streets and alleys in said city for the purpose of giving right of way and other privileges in said city to said railway company." It will be observed that in this clause of the title there is not even a comma separating the words, "and vacating portions of certain streets and alleys in said city," from the words, "for the purpose of giving right of way and other privileges in said city to said railway company." It seems to me that words could not be used to indicate more plainly that the vacating of certain streets and alleys was to be "for the purpose," and for the purpose only, "of giving right of way," etc. The language of the ordinance itself is in harmony with the title, and its interpretation is as unmistakable.

Section 7 provides: "That all that part of P street in said city lying south of lots 9, 10, 11 and 12, in block 13, in Kinney's O street addition to said city, be and the same is hereby vacated." If the construction placed upon the ordinance by the majority opinion is correct, then that portion of P street, lying south of those four lots in block 13, and north of lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 in block 28, became the absolute property of the company, by reason of the fact that it was then the owner of the four lots in block 13 and the four in block 28, above enumerated, and P street, from the west line of lot 9 in block 13, and lot 4 in block 28, east to Twentieth street, no longer existed. If the city council considered that it was so vacating that portion of P street, wiping it off the map of the city, so to speak, and giving it to the railway company, what did either the city or company expect that the city and the public generally would gain by the provision in section 8 of the ordinance, which provided that the company "shall dedicate, pave and keep in repair, as a street, a strip of

ground west of its said depot 25 feet wide, and through said block 28, in Kinney's O street addition to Lincoln, Nebraska, so as to connect with O street and with P street in said city?" The strip of ground specified, lying west of the company's depot, would run from O street northerly, and would strike the point where P street had formerly been some distance east of the west line of lot 9, in block 13, and lot 4, in block 28, so that, while it would connect with O street on the south, it would not connect with P street on the north, because, if the majority opinion be right, there was then no P street at the point where this 25-foot strip would intersect what formerly had been P street. In other words, the northern termini of this 25-foot strip would be upon the railway company's private land, which it received under the ordinance. When the right of a city to the control of its streets is sought to be taken from it by construction, such construction should rest upon more reasonable ground than this.

Again, it was admitted by the respondent at the trial "that, before the construction of the railroad, the city built a water main on P street at the place in controversy in this lawsuit, and has since said time maintained it;" yet the ordinance nowhere reserves to the city the right to go upon this part of P street for the purpose of making repairs that may at any time be needed upon its water main. If the city desired to go upon that ground for the purpose of renewing or repairing this water main, it would have to first obtain the consent of the railway company, or proceed as a trespasser. I do not think either the city or company then considered, or that the company should now be permitted to contend for any such construction of this ordinance.

Again, section 12 of the ordinance provides: "That said Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, its successors and assigns, be and the said railway company, its successors and assigns, are hereby given and granted the right and privilege of occupying so much of said streets and alleys, vacated by this ordinance, as said railway

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company, its successors and assigns, may at any time desire for its railroad, switches, side-tracks, depots, and other railroad purposes." What was intended by this section? Is it to be construed as a mere jumble of words, without purpose or meaning of any kind? Certainly not. The company is "given and granted the right and privilege of occupying"—what? The other streets and alleys over which it might cross? No. It was given and granted the right and privilege of occupying "so much of said streets and alleys, vacated by this ordinance." If the ordinance absolutely vacated those streets and alleys, the land became the property of the company, and it did not need any grant from the city of the right and privilege of using it for any purpose it saw fit. This provision was inserted in the ordinance for the reason that the city and the company both knew that it was not the intention to absolutely vacate these streets and alleys, but to simply give a right of way over and across them; and the grant given by this section was to permit the company to not only cross the streets and alleys, designated as vacated, but at any time, when desired for its railroad switches, side-tracks, depots and other railroad purposes, to occupy so much of said streets and alleys as would be necessary for those purposes. This is undoubtedly what is meant by the words "and other privileges" found in the title of the ordinance, following the words, "for the purpose of giving right of way." A point is attempted, in the majority opinion, to be based upon these words; but I do not think it requires argument to support the statement that they cannot, by construction, be made to grant any greater rights than those given by the specific words of grant with which they are connected. The words "other privileges" cannot be construed to mean more than "similar" privileges. Privileges of like character. The meaning of the language is as if the clause had been written, "and vacating portions of certain streets and alleys in said city for the purpose of giving right of way and similar privileges in said city to said railway company."

To my mind, section 13 of the ordinance is also significant. It reads: "By the acceptance of the rights and privileges hereby granted, the said railway company shall be taken to agree, and does hereby agree, to save and keep said city of Lincoln harmless from the payment of any damages, growing out of the rights hereby conferred, in favor of any person whomsoever." The only references in this section are to rights and privileges granted, and not to lands donated, by vacation or otherwise. It is another circumstance in the chain of circumstances, tending to show that both the city and the company considered and fully understood that all the company was obtaining was certain rights and privileges over and across the streets and alleys of the city.

It is contended by the city that, to hold that the ordinance absolutely vacated that portion of P street in controversy, and thereby, by reason of the fact that the company owned the lots on either side abutting thereon, transferred to the company the title and absolute ownership of that portion of the street so vacated, is contrary to, prohibited by, and in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, in that it constituted the taking of property without compensation; that the ordinance was passed without a vote of the people, or an opportunity on the part of any one to be heard in any tribunal as to compensation. It is stipulated that O and P streets and the various lettered streets running east and west from corporation line to corporation line "were duly laid out and dedicated for public use as streets, and the fee title thereto conveyed to the city of Lincoln." Relator contends that, such being the case, if the street was vacated as claimed, the title to the ground did not pass to the abutting lot-owners, but remained the property of the city, and became a part of its real estate, which it could not donate to the company, nor even sell without a vote of the electors of the city, in accordance with section 9, article II, chapter 13a, Compiled Statutes 1891, which provides that the mayor and

council "shall not have power to sell any real estate of the city unless authorized so to do by a vote of the majority of the electors of such city at a special election therefor." This question is squarely decided adversely to the city in the second paragraph of the syllabus and in that part of the majority opinion upon which the syllabus is predicated.

P street is one of the main public streets of the city of Lincoln, extending from the city limits on the west to the city limits on the east. It is well built up on both sides of the street for over a mile west of the point in controversy. The post office, the Lincoln Hotel, the Savoy Hotel, the Commercial Club, the Elks Club, the Young Men's Christian Association, and many large business buildings front upon it. It is also built up on both sides with valuable residences, solidly for many blocks, and partially so for many more blocks east of the point in controversy. By a vote of the electors it has been decided that a viaduct should be built across the tracks of the railway company where they cross that street. The necessity for such a viaduct is not questioned. O street (the next street south) is frequently quite congested. Numerous street car lines run on O street. It is the main street leading to the city cemetery. The travel over it by automobiles, carriages and wagons is more or less continuous, and the crossing at its intersection with respondent's track is necessarily more or less attended with danger, notwithstanding the precautionary steps taken by the company to prevent accidents. With a viaduct across the tracks on P street the congestion on O street would be relieved. Automobiles and other vehicles could pass over the tracks without danger or delay. The people living on P street, east of the tracks, would have the use of the street to and from the post office and business center of the city, and the thousands of citizens living west of Twentieth street would have a safe and never-obstructed route to the city cemetery. The proposed viaduct would not prevent or in the least obstruct the company in the free use of the

street for any of the purposes specified in the ordinance. On the contrary, it would give the company such use freed from the dangers incident to the use now being made of it by the public on foot and at times in vehicles of various kinds. In the closing lines of the opinion there is the suggestion of a possible right on the part of the city to regain control of P street by condemnation proceedings. I am unable to see the justice in requiring the city to resort to condemnation proceedings, and to pay to the company, in such proceedings, a large sum of money, to regain that for which the company paid nothing, and which it is exceedingly doubtful if it ever obtained. There being, to say the least, grave doubt upon that point, such doubt should, under the circumstances shown in this case, be resolved in favor of the city. It is idle to say that the city received any consideration for the conveyance of its fee title to or the surrender of its control over a solid section of one of its principal streets. The right given the company to run its main-line track through the center of the capital city of the state, and to use streets and alleys in the heart of the city for side-tracks and switches, was and is worth to the company many times as much as any benefit it thereby conferred upon the city. The only way it will suffer from building the viaduct will be in the cost thereof. Equity, and its contract with the city, both require it to bear that cost. The district court so found, and I think it should require a much clearer case than the one before us to warrant us in reversing that judgment.

Tonkawa Milling Co. v. Town of Tonkawa, 15 Okla. 672, is as like the case at bar as "two peas in a pod." The title to the ordinance in that case is: "An ordinance granting a right of way to the Blackwell and Southern Railway Company through the town of Tonkawa, Kay county, Oklahoma territory, and, for the purpose of such right of way, vacating certain streets, avenues and alleys in said town of Tonkawa." The only difference in that title and the one under consideration here is the words of vacation and of the purpose therefor are transposed. In

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the consideration of that case, on page 678, the court say: "By the express terms and provisions of the ordinance it is clear that nothing more was intended or attempted by the town than to grant to the railway company a right of way over and across the streets and alleys named, and the right to the railway company to use and occupy the same for the purposes mentioned." I fully concur in that construction of the ordinance. I do not see how any other construction can reasonably be placed upon the language used. No case has been cited, either in the majority opinion or in the brief of counsel, which would sustain any other construction.

REESE, C. J., concurs in this dissent.

AMERICAN CASE & REGISTER COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. D.
J. CATCHPOLE, APPELLEE.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 17,051.

1. **Pleading: ANSWER: SUFFICIENCY.** If there is no motion in the trial court to require a more complete and certain statement of facts in an answer alleging fraud in procuring a signature to a promissory note, the answer will be liberally construed in that regard to support the judgment.
2. **Appeal: CONFLICTING EVIDENCE.** A law case tried by the district court without a jury upon conflicting evidence will not be reversed upon appeal, unless from the whole record it appears that the judgment is clearly wrong.

APPEAL from the district court for Johnson county:
LEANDER M. PEMBERTON, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

L. O. Chapman, for appellant.

Burr, Greene & Greene and *E. Ross Hitchcock*, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

The plaintiff brought this action in the district court

for Johnson county upon a note which it was alleged in his petition was given for an "account register." The allegations of the answer substantially admit the signing of the note by the defendant, but allege that it was obtained by the fraud of the plaintiff's agent. The defendant alleged that he signed the order for the machine, and "that his name was obtained without the knowledge or intention of the defendant to the note as well as to the said order, which was done by the use of carbon paper, and the defendant was thus deceived, and his signature was obtained to the note sued on, without the knowledge or intention of the defendant, by the use of carbon paper in this fraudulent manner."

This, perhaps, is not a very artistic manner of pleading the facts constituting the fraud, but no motion was made for a more definite statement, and the defendant's evidence of fraud was received without objection on the ground of any supposed insufficiency of the answer. The defendant testified positively to the signing of the order, and that he only signed his name once, and did not know at the time that he had signed any such note, or that it was intended that he should.

The case was tried to the court without a jury, and the court found for the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff's action. The evidence is perhaps conflicting, but we cannot reverse the judgment of the trial court under such circumstances, if there is a substantial conflict, and it does not affirmatively appear that the finding is clearly wrong.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

**MARY HENZE, APPELLANT, v
APPELL**

FILED FEBRUARY 25,

1. **Taxation: REDEMPTION: RIGHT OF** act authorizing the existence of the husband's lands, she had a should be allowed to protect by imprudence or neglect of her husband protect such right as well before wards, and, where the husband from a sale for taxes, the wife is to redeem from such tax sale.
2. ———: ———: ———. Where, or to be allowed to redeem from mitted by the owner of the tax deemed from that the land on to the plaintiff's husband at the closure and sale, and that the wife it follows that she is at liberty premises by the maintenance of
3. **Process: VALIDITY.** The alleged case examined, and held to be v
4. **Taxation: REDEMPTION: RIGHT OF** foreclose a tax lien, no sufficient who was admitted by the answer interest in the lands of her husband redeem from a tax sale as though

APPEAL from the district of
WILLIAM H. WESTOVER, JUDGE

*Allen G. Fisher, William J
Morrissey, for appellant.*

Cornelius Patterson and Al

HAMER, J.

This action was brought by
against John Mitchell and Geo

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alleged homestead from alleged tax liens. The petition was filed in the instant case December 15, 1908. It alleged a sheriff's sale of the premises in controversy to the defendant John Mitchell under a decree of foreclosure describing certain tax liens, and that the decree was void as to the plaintiff for the lack of service upon her. The prayer was, to be allowed to redeem from the tax liens and to quiet title in the plaintiff. January 16, 1909, there was service upon the defendant Mitchell. March 29, 1909, there was a decree in favor of the plaintiff upon the evidence taken and according to the prayer of the petition. It was rendered on a default. April 8, 1909, the defendant Mitchell filed an answer to the plaintiff's petition; but there is no showing that this was done by leave of the court. March 4, 1910, the plaintiff filed a reply to this answer, in which she insists upon her decree of March 29, 1909, and denies the allegations of new matter contained in the answer. February 21, 1910, there was a hearing, according to the bill of exceptions, upon the application to vacate the decree of March 29, 1909. This proceeding is not shown by the transcript to have been journalized. The first bill of exceptions appears to have been signed by the judge April 29, 1910, and refers to the affidavits given in evidence upon the application to vacate the decree, and on which the hearing seems, by the said bill of exceptions, to have been had. March 4, 1910, there was a hearing and an order dismissing the plaintiff's petition. Also, the plaintiff's motion to set aside said order was denied. The second bill of exceptions is signed by the trial judge April 19, 1910, and recites the giving of certain evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, which is therein specified, and also on behalf of the defendant recites "his motion for a judgment of dismissal, which motion was sustained." The petition in the instant case alleged, among other things, that on and prior to February 23, 1900, the plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the immediate possession of the N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$ of section 18, township 31 north of range 46 west, in Sheridan county; that

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the title of record to said real estate was in the defendant George H. Henze, the husband of the plaintiff, "and as a family plaintiff and said defendant George H. Henze * * * were residing upon the said real estate as their homestead at the dates mentioned;" that the decree in favor of the plaintiff found that on January 16, 1909, in said county of Sheridan, the defendant John Mitchell was duly served with a summons requiring him to answer the petition on or before February 8, 1909, and that the defendant George H. Henze had entered his general appearance in the case, and had waived the service of the summons; that each defendant was in default of a pleading; that the facts stated in the petition were true; that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief prayed in said petition; that the plaintiff was entitled to redeem from the purported sale and decree and sheriff's deed upon tax sale foreclosure, upon payment into court, for the benefit of the defendant John Mitchell, of the sum of \$281.10, being the amount paid at the sale, with 12 per cent. per annum from date of the said sale until date of the decree, and the taxes since that date paid by Mitchell upon said tract, allowing therefrom as mesne profits a sum equal to the annual taxes paid. It was decreed that the title should be quieted in the plaintiff, "and as her homestead, free and clear from any lien, claim or demand of any person or corporation," and free from any tax lien, claim or mortgage of any person, upon the payment into court of said sum of \$281.10 for the benefit of the defendant Mitchell. The decree in favor of Mary Henze was fully supported by the allegations of the petition; the trial court took the evidence; and it is not shown that the evidence failed to support the decree rendered.

The facts upon which the foreclosure is alleged to have been void as to the plaintiff are recited in the petition in the instant case: That on February 23, 1900, a petition was filed in the district court for Sheridan county, entitled "The County of Sheridan, Plaintiff, v. George H. Henze, and *Mrs. Henze, his wife, Christian name unknown,*

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E. S. Ormsby, Trustee, and the American Investment Company, and John Mitchell, Defendants;" that the purpose of that case was to foreclose an alleged tax lien against the land in controversy; that there was never any sale of said real estate for taxes by the county treasurer; that the land had not been assessed, and that the taxes had not been extended against it; that the petition falsely stated in the verification that the Christian name of Mary Henze was unknown to the county attorney in that case, and to the said John Mitchell, when the same was known; that this was done to prevent Mary Henze from having a knowledge of the pendency of the action; that a purported cross-petition was filed in the said case of the County of Sheridan v. George H. Henze et al. by the defendant John Mitchell, in which he claimed to own a tax lien upon the premises sought to be foreclosed; that the said cross-petition failed to state a cause of action; and that no proof of publication of the delinquent tax list was ever filed in said county.

The plaintiff in the instant case stated in her petition that no summons was served upon her or delivered to her, and that she had not waived the same; that she did not have any knowledge of the facts until about August, 1907; that a purported sheriff's deed was made to the said John Mitchell, who became the purchaser at said sale; that the said defendant John Mitchell had promised the defendant George H. Henze that, if he, the said George H. Henze, would not bid at the sheriff's sale, then that he, the said John Mitchell, would convey the said tract by deed to the said defendant George H. Henze, but that said Mitchell failed to so convey said premises, and refused to permit a redemption thereof from said sale; that said defendant John Mitchell filed an answer in the instant case, which admits that the plaintiff, Mary Henze, had an inchoate dower interest in the land in controversy as the wife of the defendant George H. Henze, and denied that he had ever entered into any agreement with the said George H. Henze to purchase said land at sheriff's sale and convey

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the same by deed, or otherwise, to the said George H. Henze, and denied that he had ever permitted the redemption of the said premises; that said Sheridan county got its decree against said George H. Henze and the plaintiff for \$7.41 taxes and interest, which was represented by the said tax sale certificate claimed to be held by said John Mitchell; that on the 22d of November, 1899, said Sheridan county and the said John Mitchell sued out their order of sale, and caused the sheriff to appraise and sell said land on the 26th of December, 1899, and that the sheriff sold the same to the said John Mitchell for \$130.75, which said John Mitchell then paid to the sheriff; that the said county of Sheridan procured in said court an order confirming said sale, and directing the sheriff to execute and deliver a deed for said land to the said John Mitchell.

The summons in the foreclosure case was apparently served upon Mrs. Henze by leaving an alleged certified copy at her usual place of residence. Her Christian name is not in the summons. She is not sued as Mary Henze, nor does the record disclose the fact that she is Mary Henze. This sort of service cannot be defended under the decisions of this court in the foreclosure of tax liens, and some other cases. *Enewold v. Olsen*, 39 Neb. 59; *Butler v. Smith*, 84 Neb. 78; *Herbage v. McKee*, 82 Neb. 354. And where there is no service, or no sufficient service, the judgment against the person who should have been served is void, and such person may redeem from the sale made. *Clarence v. Cunningham*, 86 Neb. 434; *Humphrey v. Hays*, 85 Neb. 239; *Smith v. Potter*, 92 Neb. 39; Code, sec. 148.

In *Enewold v. Olsen*, *supra*, this court held that the name of a person consists of one given name and one surname, and, using the given name first and the surname last, constitute such person's legal name, and that to be ignorant of either is to be ignorant of such person's name, within the meaning of section 148 of the code; that the law requires that a defendant shall be sued by his true name, if the same is known or can be ascertained by the party

suing him; and that, under section 69 of the code, a court obtains no jurisdiction over the person of a defendant served with a summons by leaving a copy at *his usual place of residence*, unless such defendant is described by his true name, except in cases brought under section 23 of the code; and it was also held, under section 148 of the code, that if a defendant is sued by any name and description other than his true name, except in actions brought under section 23 of the code, a court acquires no jurisdiction over him by the sheriff leaving a copy of the summons at such defendant's usual place of residence. It was held in such case that the court acquired no jurisdiction by a copy of the summons left at the defendant's usual place of residence, and that a judgment rendered against him in the name of "F. Olsen, full name unknown," was a nullity. Section 148 of the code provides: "When the plaintiff shall be ignorant of the name of a defendant, such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name and description, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding may be amended accordingly. The plaintiff in such case must state, in the verification of his petition, that he could not discover the true name, and the summons must contain the words 'real name unknown,' and a copy thereof must be served *personally upon the defendant*." The record shows that this was not done in the instant case. If she had any interest in the premises, her right could not be extinguished except the summons was *personally* served upon her. *Butler v. Smith*, 84 Neb. 78; *Herbage v. McKee*, 82 Neb. 354.

The plaintiff contends for the right to protect that which she alleges was her homestead. It is claimed by the defendant Mitchell that, at the time the decree in favor of the plaintiff was set aside, the evidence fails to sustain the homestead claim. It is admitted by his answer that the plaintiff, Mary Henze, was the wife of the defendant George H. Henze, and that she had an inchoate right of dower in the premises at the time they were sold, because of the ownership of her husband. *Blevins v. Smith*, 104

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Mo. 583, 13 L. R. A. 445, is cited as authority for the defendants' contention. We do not so understand it. It is said in that case that Missouri has "by statute adopted the common law in regard to dower." The court then quotes from Lord Coke: "There be three things highly favored in law, *life, liberty, and dower.*" The opinion also copies from Chief Justice McKean in *Kennedy v. Nedrow*, 1 Dal. (U. S.) *415: "Dower is a legal, an equitable and a moral right, * * * favored in a high degree by law, and, next to life and liberty, held sacred." This is followed by the language of the Missouri statute securing to the wife her common law and statutory dower. The court then say: "The right of dower attaches whenever there is a seizin by the husband, during the marriage, of an estate of inheritance, and, unless it is relinquished by the wife in the manner prescribed by law, it becomes absolute at the husband's death." Section 4901, Ann. St. 1903, was in force at the time of the sale of the land under the tax foreclosure. It reads: "The widow of every deceased person shall be entitled to dower, or the use, during her natural life, of one-third part of all the lands whereof her husband was seized, of all estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, unless she is lawfully barred thereof." Among other things the Missouri supreme court say: "Indeed, the whole system is based on the idea that it is the duty of the husband to pay the taxes on his land. And a failure to pay the taxes is a default on his part. The wife is under no obligation to pay the tax. She does not own the fee; she does not reap the usufruct; certainly no system based upon justice would exact of her a tribute on property she might never enjoy, and rob her of her dower for failure to pay a tax she did not owe." It is further said: "An ordinary execution sale conveys to the purchaser all the right, title, and interest of the defendant in execution, but it has no effect upon the inchoate dower of the wife." The court quotes from *Graves v. Ewart*, 99 Mo. 13, *Powell v. Greenstreet*, 95 Mo. 13, and *Gitchell v. Kreidler*, 84 Mo. 472. In *Powell v. Greenstreet*, the judge

who delivered the opinion is quoted as saying: "It must be taken as settled law that purchasers at these sheriff's sales, made on executions in tax suits, acquire only the right, title, and interest of the defendants in the tax suits." In *Blevins v. Smith*, *supra*, it is said: "We regard the dower right as of inestimable value to the homes of this state. The trend of public opinion is rather to enlarge, as our homestead laws clearly indicate, than to cut off this sustenance of the widow." The statute is cited "as a monument to the wisdom and humanity of our commonwealth."

When dower once attaches, the husband cannot, by any act or admission of his, defeat it, and no judgment rendered against him will prejudice the right and interest of the wife. *Grady v. McCorkle*, 57 Mo. 172; *Williams v. Courtney*, 77 Mo. 587.

The right of dower, when marriage and seizin unite, is vested and absolute, and is as completely beyond legislative control as is the principle established. *Russell v. Rumsey*, 35 Ill. 362; *Steele v. Gellatly*, 41 Ill. 39.

The power of the legislature to cut off the inchoate right of dower may well be doubted. *Dunn v. Sargent*, 101 Mass. 336.

In *Davis v. Green*, 102 Mo. 170, 11 L. R. A. 90, it was held that the sheriff's deed to the husband gave the plaintiff dower in the land, and that no act or declaration of the husband could divorce the same or impair it.

In *Seibert v. Todd*, 31 S. Car. 206, 4 L. R. A. 606, it was held that, where the seizin of the husband is accompanied at its inception with a lien, the inchoate right of dower of the wife attaches in subordination and subject to the lien.

In *Bullard v. Bowers*, 10 N. H. 500, the mortgage contained a condition that the mortgagor should provide a good and comfortable home in the dwelling-house on the mortgaged premises, and a good bed for the use and benefit of Asahel Bullard during his natural lifetime, and also pay to him \$300 when he might be in need of the same for his support by reason of old age; and it was held that, so long as the mortgagee had not demanded a performance of

the condition, it remained unbroken, and that the widow of the mortgagor could not be debarred of dower.

In 1 Scribner, Dower (2d ed.), it is said in section 3, p. 481: "It was settled in the English courts of equity at an early day that as to all charges and incumbrances upon the husband's land valid and effectual against the wife, which were in their nature redeemable, there was conferred upon her, *by reason of her interest in the premises*, a right of redemption." Many English cases are cited in the note to this section, among which are *Hitchens v. Hitchens*, 2 Vern. (Eng.) 403; *Hamilton v. Mohun*, 1 Will. P. (Eng.) 118; *Squire v. Compton*, 9 Vin. Abr. (Eng.) 227. It is said in the same section that, when in the United States the right of the widow to be endowed was extended to equities of redemption of mortgages in fee, it followed as an incident thereof that she was entitled to redeem. "And accordingly it is the general, if not the universal, American doctrine that the widow may redeem the husband's lands from an existing incumbrance, and thus entitle herself to dower even as against the mortgagee."

In *Huginin v. Cochrane*, 51 Ill. 302, 2 Am. Rep. 303, it was held that where a husband purchased lands, giving his notes as security for the purchase price, and afterward, by his sole deed, reconveyed the lands to the vendor as a satisfaction of the notes, the wife's right of dower did not attach.

In *Williams v. Kinney*, 43 Hun (N. Y.) 1, it was held that "the equitable dower of the widow was subject to the equitable lien existing in favor of Huntington (the vendor), but that she had an equitable claim to have the personal estate exhausted in discharge of the personal obligation of the husband under the contract of purchase." The right to have the personal estate exhausted emphasizes the high regard of the court for the dower interest of the widow.

In *McClure v. Harris*, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 261, it is said that the widow was entitled to dower in all the land em-

braced in the mortgage which had been given by her husband.

In *Blair v. Thompson*, 11 Grat. (Va.) 441, it was held that, where W. gave a bond and security for the purchase price, the vendor's lien was not retained, and that his widow was entitled to dower in the land.

In *Steuart v. Beard*, 4 Md. Ch. 319, it was held that, where the husband had an equitable interest in the land conveyed by G. to S. subject to the payment of the sums secured by a deed, but not liable to the judgment so as to defeat the widow's title to dower, judgment having been recovered after the marriage, it was subordinate to the claim of dower, which commenced with the marriage and the purchase of the land by the husband.

In *Clements v. Bostwick*, 38 Ga. 1, it was held that, when the husband of a married woman died seized and possessed of a tract of land to which he held the legal title, the widow was entitled to her dower therein, and that the vendor's equitable lien for part of the unpaid purchase money, which was not enforced during the lifetime of the husband, would not override or defeat the widow's legal right to her dower in the land.

In *Meigs v. Dimock*, 6 Conn. 458, it was held that the widow's right of dower would be protected as against a sale by an administrator for the payment of the grantee's debts, and against D. who had gone into possession of the premises and made repairs and improvements under a conveyance from C., who was the grantee of A.

Cameron, Law of Dower (p. 4), cites Blackstone, and says: "The right of a widow to dower did not originate from any legislative or other law, but, as Blackstone says, from that ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs called the Common Law, however compounded, or from whatever fountains derived which had subsisted immemorially." He further says (p. 5): "Dower was intended for the sustenance of the widow and the nurture and education of the children, and is paramount to the debts of the husband even owing to the Crown."

In *Adler & Sons Clothing Co. v. Hellman*, 55 Neb. 266, it is said in the syllabus: "The dower right of a wife in the real estate of her husband while inchoate is not a possessory right, but is a present, subsisting right or interest of a legal character, and can only be extinguished by the voluntary release or act of the wife, or operation of law." *Butler v. Fitzgerald*, 43 Neb. 192; *Wylie v. Charlton*, 43 Neb. 840.

"Marriage and seizin are essential to the existence of an inchoate right of dower, as has already been noticed in respect to a widow's dower right." 14 Cyc. 926, citing *Price v. Hobbs*, 47 Md. 359; *Scott v. Howard*, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 319.

"When it becomes necessary to determine the value of the wife's inchoate dower interest in her husband's lands, it is competent to show the age, health, and habits of both the husband and the wife, and also to consult mortality tables of recognized authority." 14 Cyc. 926, citing *Sedgwick v. Tucker*, 90 Ind. 271; *Unger v. Leiter*, 32 Ohio St. 210; *Mandel v. McClave*, 46 Ohio St. 407, 15 Am. St. Rep. 627, 5 L. R. A. 519; *Strayer v. Long*, 86 Va. 557, 10 S. E. 574.

"An inchoate right of dower is a subject of judicial protection" 14 Cyc. 926, citing *Buzick v. Buzick*, 44 Ia. 259, 24 Am. Rep. 740; *Atwood v. Arnold*, 23 R. I. 609, 51 Atl. 216.

"It has been held, therefore, that the wife may sue in her own name to set aside a deed or other instrument made by her husband in fraud of her dower." 14 Cyc. 926, citing *Buzick v. Buzick*, 44 Ia. 259, 24 Am. Rep. 740; *Clifford v. Kampfe*, 147 N. Y. 383; *Simar v. Canaday*, 53 N. Y. 298, 13 Am. Rep. 523; *McClurg v. Schwartz*, 87 Pa. St. 521.

"It has also been held that, where lands are sold on foreclosure and a surplus remains after satisfying the mortgage debt, the wife's portion thereof may be invested for her benefit free from the claims of creditors, judgment or otherwise, the income thereof to be paid to the husband during their joint lives, and to her during her own life if

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she survive her husband." 14 Cyc. 927, citing *Matter of Brooklyn Bridge*, 75 Hun (N. Y.) 558; *Wheeler v. Kirtland*, 27 N. J. Eq. 534.

"The proceeds of a married woman's sale of her inchoate dower interest in her husband's land, although invested in other land, are a part of her separate estate, and not subject to execution for her husband's debts." 14 Cyc. 927, note, citing *Beals' Ex'r v. Storm*, 26 N. J. Eq. 372.

"In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, when the wife's inchoate dower right has once attached, it cannot be divested, except by some act of her own, done according to the forms and in the manner prescribed by statute." 14 Cyc. 929, and cases cited.

As a rule, the wife will not be precluded by judgments in actions to which she is not a party. *Herrington v. Coburn*, 108 Ill. 613; *Wilkinson v. Parish*, 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) *653; *Foster v. Hickox*, 38 Wis. 408; *Greiner v. Klein*, 28 Mich. 12.

There must be a strict compliance by the tax sale purchaser or his assignee with each condition imposed by the statute, or the sale is void, the deed void, and redemption should be permitted. *Peck v. Garfield County*, 88 Neb. 635. In that case Judge FAWCETT, delivering the opinion of this court, said that the unsworn return of the man who was sheriff was not the kind of proof required by the statute (which was an affidavit), and that it was, therefore, not competent evidence; that a tax deed issued upon such a certificate was void, and the court erred in refusing to permit the plaintiff to redeem. Also, in *Thomsen v. Dickey*, 42 Neb. 314, this court construed section 3, art. IX of the constitution, and section 123, art. I, ch. 77, Comp. St. 1893, and, reaffirming *Larson v. Dickey*, 39 Neb. 468, said the notice to redeem must be served upon the very party designated by the statute, and must contain the precise information required, and that the statements required were as jurisdictional as the service of the notice. When by its terms it is obvious that a tax deed does not convey a title, "it fails utterly to affect the rights of the original

owner." *Conners v. City of Lowell*, 209 Mass. 111. Tax deeds, good on their face, may be held invalid by reason of some error in the original assessment, or otherwise, not apparent upon examination of the deed itself. *Roberts v. Welsh*, 192 Mass. 278; *Welsh v. Briggs*, 204 Mass. 540. And where the tax sale certificate failed to specify when the purchaser would be entitled to a deed, and the deed itself failed to recite the facts which it was provided the certificate should recite, the deed itself was held to be void. To the same effect is *Anderson v. Hancock*, 64 Cal. 455. In *Vestal v. Morris*, 11 Wash. 451, it was held that the tax deed is not sufficient to pass title, when the property was not assessed in the name of the known owner, and no notice had been given by the treasurer that the duplicate assessment roll was in his hands, together with the date when taxes must be paid, and no notice had been advertised by the sheriff that the sale for delinquent taxes would be at public auction. "Compliance with all provisions of law designed for the benefit of the taxpayer is a condition precedent to the validity of the tax." 1 Blackwell, Tax Titles (5th ed.) secs. 163, 164. And great strictness is required, as shown by many cases cited. Also, Black, Tax Titles (2d ed.) sec. 162, and cases cited.

The foregoing authorities show a most jealous regard by the courts for the wife's inchoate right of dower and a continuous effort to preserve it. It would seem that an action to foreclose a tax lien against the owner of the fee is a personal action.

In *Clarence v. Cunningham*, 86 Neb. 434, this court said in the syllabus: "In a personal action to foreclose a tax lien against the owner of the fee, who is a resident of the state upon whom personal service can be made within the state, service by publication only is void." This point in the syllabus treats an action brought against the owner of the fee to foreclose a tax lien as a *personal action*. It then follows up this statement by a conclusion emphasizing the former statement, and which is that service by publication in such case, where personal service can be made within the state, is void.

In *Humphrey v. Hays*, 85 Neb. 239, this court held: "A decree foreclosing a tax lien based upon service by publication, where the owner of the land is a resident of this state upon whom personal service of summons could have been made, and the affidavit for service contains no statements which would authorize constructive service upon the land against which the taxes were assessed, is void." This would seem to be an additional authority upon the question that the foreclosure of a tax lien is a *personal action*, and that there can be no service by publication where the owner of the land is a resident of the state. If a mere proceeding against the land would be sufficient in such case, then no personal service would be necessary. In the same syllabus it is said: "Such a decree may be attacked in an action to redeem the premises from the lien for taxes and remove the cloud created thereon by such void decree." In the same syllabus it is further said: "In an action to quiet title as against a sale for taxes made under a void decree of court, an offer to pay such sum as the court may find due the defendants on account of any lien for taxes paid is a sufficient offer to do equity and a sufficient tender of any taxes due the defendants. *Payne v. Anderson*, 80 Neb. 216."

In *Humphrey v. Hays*, *supra*, Mr. Justice BARNES, delivering the opinion of this court, cited, with approval, *Payne v. Anderson*, 80 Neb. 216, and said that it was held in that case "that a judgment or decree affecting the title to land owned by a resident of this state, where the only notice is by publication, is void, where no appearance was made by or for such resident; that, in an action to quiet title as against a sale for taxes made under a void decree of the court, an offer to pay such sum as the court may find due defendants on account of any lien for taxes paid is a sufficient offer to do equity and a sufficient tender of any taxes due the defendant. The petition in this case contained such an offer, and it follows that our former rulings upon the question involved in this suit require us to affirm the judgment of the district court." In that case

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this court seems to have agreed unanimously (1) that the limitation of two years within which a party might redeem from the sale for taxes has no application to a sale made under a void decree foreclosing a tax lien; (2) also, that in such case an offer to pay such sum as the court might find due on account of any lien for taxes paid was a sufficient offer to do equity and a sufficient tender of any taxes due to the defendants; (3) that in such case an action to quiet title could be brought at any time within 10 years from the recording of the deed made on the sale under the decree. The affirmation of the several things stated would seem to show that this court has heretofore considered that the foreclosure of a tax lien and the sale of the premises under the decree rendered were all steps in a personal action, similar to the foreclosing of a mortgage, and not alone against the land. In *Clarence v. Cunningham*, 86 Neb. 434, it was held: "When a decree foreclosing a tax lien is set aside as void for want of service, the owner of the fee should be allowed to redeem from the tax lien as though no such decree had been entered." In *Smith v. Potter*, 92 Neb. 39, it was held, in a tax foreclosure proceeding by a county to recover delinquent taxes, where service was made by publication and the premises were sold under the decree of foreclosure, that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale bought subject to the right of one having a valid lien upon the premises to redeem from such sale, and that the party claiming the lien could not be debarred without a hearing, if he answered setting up his defense and demanding such hearing.

In the instant case the plaintiff is a resident of the state, and was such resident at the time of the attempted service. It therefore follows, for all the reasons given, that the original judgment against her is void. Whatever the interest is that she may have in the premises, she is entitled to protect it. Her interest is admitted to have been the dower interest of a wife in lands owned by her husband. The uniform procedure of the courts for a long period of years is to protect the inchoate right of dower held by the

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wife in her husband's realty. The subsequent repeal of the statute creating the dower interest does not divest the owner of the same of such interest as she had at the time of the sale. The rights of the parties are determined by the conditions existing when the sale was made, except as modified by the new act of 1907, touching the descent of real property. While that act repeals the inchoate right of dower held by the wife, it increases her interest in the premises owned by her husband from a mere life estate to the ownership of a fee immediately upon the husband's death. The wife then becomes one of the heirs.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to enter a decree allowing plaintiff to redeem, and finding and fixing her interest in the property.

REVERSED.

• SEDGWICK, J., concurs in conclusion only.

LEITON, J., dissenting.

If Mrs. Henze had endeavored to redeem her husband's land from the tax lien within the statutory two years after the sale, she would have been entitled to do so, having a sufficient interest in the property to extend to her his right of redemption. There is no requirement in the statute that the wife of a landowner be made a party to tax foreclosure proceedings. In a few states, such as Missouri and Illinois, in which either the statutes as to the nature of the tax upon real estate and the lien created thereby, or the statute of dower, are very different from those of this state, it is held that the foreclosure of a tax lien does not bar an inchoate dower interest. In states such as Nebraska, in which there is no personal liability on the part of the landowner to pay the tax, in which the lien attaches to the land itself, whether assessed in the name of the owner or in that of some other person, or as unknown, in which the land is not listed by the owner but by the assessor, and in which the land itself is sold to pay delin-

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quent taxes, the contrary is the rule, and an inchoate right of dower is barred by a foreclosure proceeding in which the owner is served and jurisdiction properly obtained over him. *Robbins v. Barron*, 32 Mich. 36; *Jones v. Devore*, 8 Ohio St. 430; dissenting opinion in *Blevins v. Smith*, 104 Mo. 583, 13 L. R. A. 445; Blackwell, Tax Titles (5th ed.) sec. 954. Henze was effectually foreclosed from any interest, so that even under the majority opinion all she ought to be allowed to redeem at this time is her own inchoate dower right, which will not give her any right of possession or of admeasurement until her husband's death. In other words, she redeems now, if at all, her own dower right; and cannot avail herself of her husband's redemption right, of which he has been deprived by the judgment against him. Since there was no right in the plaintiff to set aside the foreclosure proceedings and be allowed to redeem, the district court committed no error in setting aside the default decree and rendering judgment for the defendants.

ROSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur in dissent.

JANETTE E. MCKEE, APPELLEE, v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED FEBRUARY 25, 1913. No. 16,853.

1. Railroads: ACTION FOR DAMAGES: EVIDENCE. The evidence examined, and held to sustain the verdict.
2. Damages: INJURY TO CROPS. In case of the destruction of a permanent or perennial crop, such as alfalfa, the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the land before and after the destruction of the crop. *Thompson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 84 Neb. 482; *Morse v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 81 Neb. 745.

APPEAL from the district court for Harlan county:
HARRY S. DUNGAN, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Byron Clark, W. S. Morlan and Arthur R. Wells, for appellant.

John Everson, contra.

HAMER, J.

The plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant in the district court for Harlan county for \$555.42 damages because of the alleged destruction of 30 acres of alfalfa by fire alleged by the plaintiff to have been set by one of the defendant's locomotives. It is claimed in the petition that the defendant negligently and carelessly caused and permitted sparks to be cast off from the engine, and thereby ignited grass and weeds and other combustible material at and along defendant's right of way, and that the fire spread over the land of the plaintiff.

The evidence shows that one of the defendant's freight trains went by at about 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and that directly afterwards a fire was discovered, which spread over the alfalfa field and did the damage complained of. The fire seems to have started about 100 feet from the track, and before the train was out of sight. An examination of the evidence would seem to justify the conclusion that the verdict is sustained by the evidence, tending to show that sparks from the engine of the defendant set the fire. It is contended by the defendant that the rule touching the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence laid down in the case of *Union P. R. Co. v. Keller*, 36 Neb. 189, should be held to apply to this case. The rule as quoted is: "It devolves on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the fire was communicated by sparks or cinders from the railway engines. It need not be shown that any particular engine was at fault, but it will be sufficient if the fire is proved to have been set by any engine passing over the defendant's railway, and the evidence may be wholly circumstantial, as, first, that it was possible for fire to reach the plaintiff's property from the defendant's engines, and, second, facts tending to show

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that it probably originated from that cause and no other." It is said in defendant's brief: "Beyond the bare statement that it was a 'dry day,' no evidence was offered as to the condition of the field, from which the court can conclude whether a fire would likely be started from a locomotive; nor is there any evidence whatever from which the jury might infer that there was no other possible source from which the fire might have originated." The plaintiff's husband testified: "In the afternoon—I think between 2 and 3 o'clock—a freight train came through, going west, and it set fire over there in the alfalfa field, where I had a field of about 35 acres of alfalfa that I sowed that spring." He testified that the fire did burn off the alfalfa and the grass and weeds; that the alfalfa was a good stand; that he and his wife wet some gunny sacks and went out and tried to put out the fire; that the value of the land with the alfalfa on it was \$100 an acre, and that immediately after the fire the land was worth \$75 to \$80 an acre. George Davidson testified that he saw the train go by in the afternoon; and that it was warm that day; and that before the train was out of sight there was quite a smoke; and that it (the fire) went so fast after it got started that he did not think it was worth while to do anything with it; that it burned pretty nearly all over the 35 acres of alfalfa; that the alfalfa was a good stand; that the wind was blowing a pretty good gale, and that the fire burned dead matter in the alfalfa, weeds or foxtail mixed with it; that the fire started about 100 feet from the track; that the field of alfalfa was adjoining the right of way; and that the fire started in the field.

In *Thompson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 84 Neb. 482, 23 L. R. A. n. s. 310, the evidence showed that two persons saw a fire burning on a railroad right of way shortly after an engine passed, and it was held that this evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding that the fire spread from the defendant's engine. We think the evidence in the instant case fully justifies the conclusion that defendant's engine started the fire.

It is next contended that the verdict was excessive and evidently due to the influence of passion and prejudice. It appears from the evidence that about 35 acres of alfalfa was burned over. While it is true that the evidence might have been more specific touching the condition of the alfalfa after the fire ran over it, the foregoing evidence was enough to enable the jury to form an intelligent conclusion concerning the amount of damages sustained. In *Thompson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, *supra*, the jury were instructed, concerning the loss of an alfalfa crop, that the damages might be shown by showing the value of the land before the crop was burned and its value after the crop was destroyed. The jury were instructed that the measure of damages for the loss of the alfalfa would be "the difference in the value of the land with the stand of alfalfa as proved immediately prior to its destruction and the value of the land at and immediately after the destruction of the alfalfa." This court then said, Judge LERTON delivering the opinion: "There is a difference in conditions between an ordinary annual crop and a permanent crop, such as alfalfa, which justifies and requires a different rule in the measurement of damages, and we are of the opinion that a fair criterion of the damage suffered by the destruction of a good stand of alfalfa would be the difference between the value of the land with such crop standing and growing upon it and the same land without such crop." This view seems to fully sustain the verdict, supported as it is by the evidence.

In *Morse v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 81 Neb. 745, this court said in the syllabus: "Where the planting of land to a perennial crop, like alfalfa, increases the market value of such land, it is proper to show the damage done by the destruction of a stand thereof by proving the value of the land with and without such stand." In the case cited the plaintiff offered evidence which tended to prove that the overflow of water complained of in that case killed a stand of alfalfa growing on about 30 acres of land, and he offered testimony and was permitted to show

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what the land was worth with the alfalfa growing on it, and what it was worth without the alfalfa. The commissioner who delivered the opinion of this court said: "In this we discover no error. It is well known that growing to alfalfa is a hazardous process, the result cannot be accurately predicted, and failures often result from conditions altogether beyond the control of the farmer. Under these circumstances, the difference in value between land having a successful stand of alfalfa and land without the same would be a safer measure of the value of such stand than would the cost of growing alfalfa."

A careful examination of the evidence leads the court to conclude that it fully sustains the verdict. We find no error and the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

IN RE CHARLES W. WILLARD.

CHARLES W. WILLARD, APPELLANT, V. CHARLES
ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED MARCH 6, 1913. No. 17,333.

1. **Habeas Corpus: Irregularities.** When the requisition for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state clearly show the county in which it is alleged that the crime was committed and where the proceedings were begun, and the governor of this state has ordered the return of the defendant, the fact that the request for extradition by the governor of the requesting state names a different county as the one where the proceedings were begun will not be regarded so material as to require the court upon habeas corpus to discharge the prisoner.
2. **Return.** Upon proceedings in habeas corpus to test the validity of the discharge of one who is held under the governor's writ of extradition, if the return sets forth the governor's warrant and the facts which the accused is held, and the recitals of the warrant are in conformity with the allegations of the application for habeas corpus, the facts sufficient to justify the detention of the accused are sufficient.

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3. **Extradition: SHOWING: HABEAS CORPUS: QUESTIONS OF LAW.** When such requisition is made on the governor of this state, he must determine, first, whether the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the state from whose justice it is alleged he has fled by an indictment or affidavit properly certified; and, second, is he a fugitive from justice from the state demanding him? When it is made substantially to appear to the court in habeas corpus proceedings upon what showing the governor acted, it becomes a question of law for the court to determine whether or not the accused has been substantially charged with a crime against the demanding state. *Dennison v. Christian*, 72 Neb. 703.
4. **Courts: EXTRADITION: REVIEW.** The courts are bound by the construction of the extradition laws adopted by the supreme court of the United States, and the courts of this state will not review the decision of the governor in extradition proceedings upon a question of fact made before him which the law makes it his duty to decide, and upon which there was evidence pro and con before the governor.
5. **Appeal: SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.** In determining whether the evidence before the court below was sufficient to support the judgment, this court will not regard errors of the trial court in admitting incompetent evidence, if it appear from the whole record that upon the evidence conceded to be competent no other conclusion could be reached than the one reached by the trial court.
6. **Evidence examined, and found sufficient to sustain the judgment of the district court.**

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
ALBERT J. CORNISH, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

B. F. Good, E. G. Maggi, A. M. Bunting and T. J. Doyle,
for appellant.

J. B. Strode and G. E. Hager, contra.

BARNES, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the district court for Lancaster county denying the relator a writ of habeas corpus.

It appears that on or about the 12th day of June, 1912, one J. P. Bland filed a complaint in due form before Charles Humphrey, a justice of the peace in and for

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Lenawee county, in the state of Michigan, charging the relator with the crime of embezzlement, which was alleged to have been committed in that county and state on or about the 22d day of May, 1912. Thereupon, the justice of the peace issued his warrant, in due form, for the arrest of the relator, who was charged with the commission of the crime, under the name of William A. Maynard, and who, it is admitted, is the relator. Thereafter, and on the 17th day of October, 1912, the governor of the state of Michigan, upon an exhibition of the said complaint and warrant, and upon the affidavits and certificates thereto attached, made his request upon the governor of the state of Nebraska for a warrant of rendition for the delivery of the relator to one Charles E. Henig, who was designated by the governor of the state of Michigan as his agent to receive and take relator into custody and return him to that state to be dealt with according to law. It further appears that on the 9th day of November, 1912, the governor of this state duly honored the above request, and issued his warrant of rendition to the respondent, who thereupon took the relator, who was found in the city of Lincoln, and who had assumed the name of Charles W. Willard, into custody. To obtain his release, relator brought this proceeding. On the trial in the district court the writ of habeas corpus was denied, and the relator was remanded to the custody of the respondent, and from that judgment the relator has appealed.

It is conceded that but two questions are presented by the record for our determination: First, is the relator substantially charged with an offense against the laws of the state of Michigan? Second, is he a fugitive from the justice of that state?

Concerning the first of these questions, it is not contended that the complaint filed before the justice of the peace in Lenawee county, Michigan, is insufficient in form to charge the relator with the crime of embezzlement. No attack is made upon the form or sufficiency of the warrant issued by the justice of the peace upon that com

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plaint, or the warrant of rendition issued by the governor of this state. It is therefore conceded that the proceedings in those matters were regular and sufficient. The record discloses that they are amply supported by the affidavits, the certificates of the proper officers, and the showing which is contained in the bill of exceptions. It is argued that the writ of habeas corpus should have been granted, and the relator discharged from custody, because the request of the governor of Michigan contains a statement that the relator was wanted for a crime committed in the county of Van Buren, instead of Lenawee county, in that state. It appears, however, that this statement was merely a clerical error, which in no way affects the validity of the rendition warrant issued by the governor of this state, and under which relator was taken into custody. In *State v. Clough*, 71 N. H. 594, 605, 67 L. R. A. 946, it was said: "The evidently clerical error in the affidavit of the clerk of court, that the indictment was returned 'on the second Monday of February, A. D. 1892,' did not preclude a finding by the governor that the true date was the second Monday of February, 1902. The caption of the indictment, as well as the affidavit of the district attorney, fully authorized that conclusion, which is placed beyond peradventure by an amendment of the clerk's affidavit in this court. The objection urged on this ground is a refinement of technical reasoning which has nothing to commend it in the modern administration of justice in criminal cases." It should be observed that in the request for the rendition warrant the governor of the state of Michigan asks that the relator be apprehended and delivered to the respondent, who is authorized to receive and convey him to that state, there to be dealt with according to law; and the rendition warrant issued by the governor of this state authorizes and requires the respondent to take the relator into custody, and return him to the state of Michigan, there to be dealt with according to law. We are therefore of opinion that the relator's contention upon this point is without merit.

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• It is conceded that the question as to whether the relator is substantially charged with the commission of a crime is one of law. That question was first presented to the governor of the state of Michigan, who was required to satisfy himself that a crime had been committed in his state. There was also attached to his requisition evidence of that fact in the copies of the judicial acts on which the warrant for the relator's arrest was founded. These copies, together with all of the certificates, affidavits and other matters appended to, and made a part of, the request for the rendition warrant are found in the record, duly authenticated, and are sufficient to authorize the issuance of the warrant and to comply with the requisites necessary to authorize the demand as plainly specified in the act of congress, and sections 333 and 364 of the criminal code of this state. The certificates of the executive authority are made conclusive as to their verity when presented to the executive of the state where the fugitive is found. *Kentucky v. Dennison*, 24 How. (U. S.) 66.

Again, this question was first passed upon by the governor of the state of Michigan, who had before him the record of the judicial acts on which the warrant for relator's arrest was issued, and the statute of his state pertaining to and defining the crime of embezzlement. That statute, duly exemplified, appears in evidence in the bill of exceptions. It differs materially from the ordinary statutes of embezzlement found in most of the states. It makes it a crime to convert to one's own use, not only property and money belonging to another, but also money or property "which is partly the property of another and partly the property of an officer, agent, clerk, servant, attorney at law, collector," etc. The complaint charges, in substance, that William A. Maynard, in the county of Lenawee, in state of Michigan, being the agent, clerk, servant and employee of John P. Bland, did then and there take into his possession and receive the sum of \$98 by virtue of his employment as such agent, clerk, servant and employee, said money being the property of said

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John P. Bland, and did then and there convert and embezzle said money to his own use without the consent of the said Bland. The second count of the complaint charges the same, except that Maynard received the money as collector of the said John P. Bland. And the third count contains a like charge, with the exception of the allegation that the money was concealed by the said Maynard with intent to convert the same to his own use. All three counts of the complaint are fully covered by the statute of the state of Michigan above referred to, and each constitutes a crime under the laws of that state. It follows that upon the face of the proceeding the relator is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the state of Michigan. In order to avoid the effect of this record, and in his attempt to secure his release, the relator set forth in his petition what he alleges to be his contract with the complaining witness, Bland, and testified upon the trial in the district court that Bland was owing him a considerable amount of money as commissions on accounts collected by Bland himself. It is also contended that by the terms of his contract the relator was not required to account for and pay over the money belonging to his principal until after the expiration of one year from the date of his employment. It appears, however, by the terms of the contract that the relator was required to settle with Bland every 90 days; that his first settlement and accounting was due on the 19th day of May, 1912. The record discloses that demand was made upon relator for settlement and payment of the money in his hands; that, instead of making such settlement, he immediately left the county and state of his residence, to which he has never since returned.

Upon this showing it is argued that the relator was not guilty of the crime of embezzlement with which he was charged. It may be conceded that the relator's act would not constitute the crime of embezzlement in this state; but the provisions of the criminal law of the state of Michigan found in this record are entirely different

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from the provisions of the criminal laws of this state; and the matters urged by the relator to secure his release do not show or tend to show that he was not substantially charged with a criminal offense. At most, his testimony relates to matters which might be urged as a defense on his trial upon the complaint in question. As we view the record, the governor of this state correctly determined that the matters before him were amply sufficient to show that the relator was substantially charged with the commission of a crime against the laws of the state of Michigan.

Finally, it is contended that the relator is not a fugitive from justice. The testimony discloses that the public prosecutor of Lenawee county, in the state of Michigan, was acquainted with the relator personally; that he talked with him a number of times in the city of Adrian, Michigan, during the months of April and May, 1912; that he knew relator was conducting a collection business there, and was informed and believed that relator upon leaving Adrian came to Lincoln, Nebraska, and engaged in the collection business similar to that conducted at Adrian, under the name of Charles W. Willard. The respondent Henig testified that he made diligent search for the relator, beginning about the 27th day of May, 1912, and continuing to the 17th of October of that year, when he located relator under the name of Charles W. Willard at Lincoln, Nebraska. It appears beyond question that the relator was a resident of the city of Adrian, in the state of Michigan, at the time of the commission of the offense with which he is charged. The testimony discloses that he left that city on or about the 26th day of May, 1912, stating that he was going to Buffalo for the purpose of bringing his household goods to Adrian; that, instead of going to Buffalo, he went to the city of Detroit. He admits that he there assumed the name of Wilson, and gave as a reason therefor that his wife's people were seeking him in order to procure his arrest for not supporting her. He admitted that he had communicated with his

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former office but twice, and that within a week after he left Adrian; that he came to Lincoln and established a collection agency under the name of Charles W. Willard. He also testified that he intended to return to Michigan and continue his business there. It appears from the record that prior to his coming to Lincoln the relator was in the city of Grand Island, in this state, where he engaged in a like business; that an officer from that city intervened in this proceeding, and asked that the relator be remanded to his custody to answer to a crime charged to have been committed by him in that city similar to the one with which he is charged in the proceedings contained in this record.

From the testimony contained in the record, the conclusion is irresistible that when the relator left the city of Adrian he never intended to return; that he changed his name when in the city of Detroit, and there assumed the name of Wilson; that he fled from there to the state of Nebraska, and again changed his name to that of Charles W. Willard. After reading the entire record, we are of opinion that the district court of Lancaster county was justified in finding that the relator is a fugitive from the justice of the state of Michigan. *Dennison v. Christian*, 72 Neb. 703.

The trial judge having correctly resolved both of the questions presented by this record against the relator, and having properly refused to release him by the writ of habeas corpus, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

HAMER, J., dissenting.

My sense of duty compels me to record a dissent from the majority opinion. The government is to protect the people in the enjoyment of their homes, their liberty, and their lives, and they should not be disturbed in such enjoyment because of criminal proceedings commenced against them in a foreign state, unless such enjoyment has been forfeited by a clear violation of written law, and

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such violation is made manifest by the application of the demanding state supported by evidence which is satisfactory to our courts. The decision of the governor of the asylum state is not final. The alleged fugitive is entitled to sue out a writ of habeas corpus and refer the question to the courts. Hawley, *Interstate Extradition*, p. 29; *In re Briscoe*, 51 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 422. He further says: "It must appear in some way that the act charged amounts to a crime in the demanding state. This is a jurisdictional fact." On application to the courts, a prisoner may be discharged. That some one has alleged a conclusion before the justice of the peace in Michigan who issued the warrant against the alleged fugitive, and which the governor of that state seeks to comply with, should not be enough to subject the prisoner to the inconvenience, expense and ignominy of arrest and prosecution. The danger is that a loose application of the extradition law between states may be used for the mere purpose of enforcing a collection. This should not be tolerated. As this case comes here on appeal from the judgment and order of the district court for Lancaster county, it follows that the evidence must be considered as all included in the testimony taken before the district court and in the original application for the order of arrest. This application is based upon affidavits hereinafter referred to, and which were filed before the justice of the peace in Michigan.

In the view that I take of this case, the petitioner entered into a contract with one Dr. Bland for the attempted collection of a lot of doctor bills, and the contract provides for *mutual accounts* between the petitioner and Bland; that is, if the debtor paid an account to Bland, then Bland was to be indebted to the petitioner in the sum of 25 per cent. of the amount paid, and, if the petitioner collected a claim, he was to give 75 per cent. of it to Bland, and *quarterly settlements* were to be made between them, the contract looking to a *final settlement at the end of one year*. There was no guilt on the part of

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the petitioner, because Bland was indebted to the petitioner for commissions where the debtors had paid directly to Bland, and the petitioner was indebted to Bland on accounts which he had collected, and the contract was made between them on the 19th of February, 1912, and *the year* which the contract was to run had not expired and would not expire until February 19, 1913. Before *the year* was one-half over, and in May, these proceedings were commenced.

Two affidavits by Bland were filed before the justice of the peace who issued the warrant. The first affidavit contains a formal charge of embezzlement without the details, and the other affidavit proceeds in detail to set up the facts which constitute the alleged offense. One of these affidavits charges the indebtedness of the relator *on information and belief*. Of course, the charge against the accused is no stronger than its weakest statement, and, if the weakest statement is on information and belief, then the *whole charge* stands on *information and belief*, and the result is that a man is arrested and taken away from his family and prosecuted when the charge against him is on *information and belief*. The affidavit setting forth the details recites that the accused entered into a contract with the complainant under the name of the "Mercantile Law Company," and said he had a peculiar system of collecting; that he made personal calls on all debtors; that he would take statements of accounts and collect the same on a commission basis; that "he represented that he would take the accounts and collect the money due from the debtors and *settle* with me for all amounts collected on a certain date." The affidavit then sets up the fact that the petitioner "was to collect as many of said accounts as possible for me, and that he was to retain 25 per cent. of the amount collected for his work; that 75 per cent. of the amount collected was to be held by him, as my agent, for a period of 90 days from the date the contract was entered into; * * * that this contract last mentioned was entered into on or about February 19,

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1912;" that in compliance therewith he, the said Dr. Bland, gave the said petitioner a large number of accounts, beginning with Morris Duffield, \$6 and reciting the accounts, "on which accounts the said William A. Maynard has collected the sum of \$98, as *deponent is informed and believes*," said information being based upon the affidavits of the said parties last mentioned that they have paid various amounts, as mentioned in said affidavits, to said William A. Maynard on said accounts. The agreement made between Dr. Bland and the petitioner, omitting the heading and the signatures, and the closing, is as follows:

"This agreement witnesseth: That J. P. Bland of Adrian, Mich., has become a subscriber to Mercantile Law Co., of Cleveland, Ohio, and that said subscriber is entitled to the benefits herein set forth for the term of one year from above date. Mercantile Law Co. obligates itself to give prompt attention to all claims placed in its hands for collection and adjustment by said subscriber, and also agrees to apply such legal redress which will enforce collections. The subscriber hereby authorizes Mercantile Law Co. to commence actions at its discretion in the several courts of this state or of any other state on any of the claims placed in its hands, and agrees that, if such action be brought, he will in no manner interfere with the same, or cause the action to be discontinued until the case has been prosecuted to judgment, unless the consent of Mercantile Law Co. can be obtained. In consideration of the aforesaid services, J. P. Bland of Adrian, Mich., agrees to report to Mercantile Law Co. as soon as collected all payments received on claims filed for collection and to pay to said Mercantile Law Co. at once a commission of 25 per cent. on all collections and settlements made on the accounts placed in its hands, whether the money is paid by the debtor to Mercantile Law Co. or to the subscriber. It is mutually agreed that this contract shall remain in force for a period of one year from the above date, and that Mercantile Law Co. shall be entitled to its

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commission on all claims settled by either party hereto, within the life of this contract. It is further agreed by Mercantile Law Co. that it shall make settlement for all moneys belonging to the subscriber once every 90 days from the date hereof. It is mutually agreed and understood by both parties herein mentioned, that payment of the aforesaid commissions upon all collections and settlements shall constitute the full amount of liability of the subscriber."

It will be observed that the liability in this case is based upon a contract of (1) doubtful meaning, (2) uncertain "information and belief." If the mere charge against the relator in a case of this kind is sufficient to enable him to be taken from his home to a foreign state there to be prosecuted, then liberty is not very secure in Nebraska. It is not the name by which an alleged criminal act is called that determines whether the thing done is done in violation of the law; it is the act done. It is unreasonable to suppose that the laws of Michigan provide for the punishment of a collector who is not in default under a contract which he has made with his client or customer. To the writer it is time enough for Dr. Bland to insist upon his warrant for extradition when he has demonstrated the fact under his doubtful contract that the relator owes him. The contract might receive one construction in Nebraska and another in Michigan. Dr. Bland became a subscriber to the "Mercantile Law Company," and was "entitled to the benefits" set forth in the agreement "for the term of *one year*" from February 19, 1912, the date of the agreement. The second paragraph obligates the "Mercantile Law Company" to give prompt attention and adjustment by said subscriber, "and also agrees to apply such legal redress which (as) will enforce collections." The next paragraph authorizes the law company to commence actions in the courts of the state or of any other state, and obligates the doctor not to interfere with the same. The next paragraph provides the terms of compensation, and that the contract *shall remain in force for the period of*

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one year; that the parties shall make *settlement every 90 days*. It is contended by the prosecution that to make "settlement" means to make payment. The word "settlement" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary at length. That part of it applicable to this case reads: "Act or process of adjusting or determining; composition of doubts or differences; arrangement; adjustment; as, settlement of a controversy, of accounts, etc.; also, condition of affairs thus adjusted." It was not payment that was talked about, but a mere settlement, an adjustment from time to time between the parties, and there could be *no default* by either party until the *expiration of the year*. Townsend, Moran, Grouth, Kelley, Lewis, Edmund, each made payments to Dr. Bland on which the doctor owed the relator his commissions. Howes, Townsend, Kelley, Lewis, Edmund, Seethaller, Sherman, and Preston also paid money to Dr. Bland, and he retained the commission due to the relator. Dr. Bland's affidavit says they were doctor bills, "statements of accounts which were owing to me from *patients* for services rendered." It is the doctor's contention that the relator owes him *under the contract a balance* for collecting these doctor bills, many of which were old, and some of which were outlawed.

Something of an examination of the embezzlement cases in Michigan shows that the relator should not be convicted. *People v. Wadsworth*, 63 Mich. 500. In the foregoing case funds were deposited in a bank that belonged to the city treasurer. They were put in there as ordinary deposits, and it was held that the banker was not guilty of embezzlement. See, also, 3 Howell, Ann. St. (Mich.) sec. 9263a, making it a felony for a public official to appropriate to his own use moneys received in his official capacity, and section 9263c, making the failure to pay over to his successor all moneys and property collected *prima facie* evidence of the offense. In this case it was held that the accused might rebut a *prima facie* case made under the statute by proving that moneys were in fact

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received, and that the shortage represented saw-logs which he had taken in payment of taxes, in lieu of money, and which had been lost. *People v. Seeley*, 117 Mich. 263. The court held that there should be an order of court which he refused to obey. That applies to this case. There is no order of the court in this case, touching the indebtedness, which the relator refuses to obey. Along the same line is *People v. Fairchild*, 105 Mich. 437.

The law under which the relator is prosecuted reads: "Section 55. If any officer, agent, clerk, or servant of any incorporated company, foreign or domestic, or if any clerk, agent, or servant of any private person, or of any co-partnership, except apprentices and other persons under age of sixteen years, or if any attorney at law, collector, or other person, who, in any manner, receives or collects money or any other property for the use of and belonging to another, embezzles or fraudulently converts to his own use, or takes and secretes with intent to embezzle and convert to his own use without the consent of his employer, master, or the owner of the money or goods collected or received, any money or property of another, or which is partly the property of another and partly the property of such officer, agent, clerk, servant, attorney at law, collector, or other person, which has come to his possession or under his care in any manner whatsoever, he shall be deemed to have committed larceny, and, in a prosecution for such crime, it shall be no defense that such officer, agent, clerk, servant, attorney at law, or other person, was entitled to a commission out of such money or property, as commission for collecting or receiving the same for and on behalf of the owner thereof; provided, that it shall be no embezzlement on the part of such agent, clerk, servant, attorney at law, collector, or other person, to retain his reasonable collection fee on the collection, or any other valid interest he may have in such money or property." 3 Howell, Ann. St. (Mich.) sec. 9176a. The foregoing contemplates that the person making the collection shall retain his commission "or any other valid in-

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terest he may have in such money or property." The petitioner testifies, and it is not denied, that he was put to expense in the collection of these accounts. He is entitled therefore to payment. It follows, therefore, from the act itself and from the decision of this court in *Van Etten v. State*, 24 Neb. 734, as, also, *Miller v. State*, 16 Neb. 179, and *State v. Kent*, 22 Minn. 41, that the petitioner is not guilty of embezzlement under the statute.

There can be no criminal intent so long as the agent or collector is making an honest contention for what he deems to be his own. *Hamilton v. State*, 46 Neb. 284. Nor can there be a conviction where there is an unsettled and unliquidated account between the parties. *State v. Culver*, 5 Neb. (Unof.) 238. And, where the defendant in a criminal prosecution has an interest in the property or money alleged to have been fraudulently converted to his or her own use, there can be no conviction of the crime of embezzlement. *McElroy v. People*, 202 Ill. 473.

I am unable from the record to see that the relator is guilty of anything; but, if he is guilty of anything, then he is guilty of *false pretenses*. If he drew a contract and did not intend to go ahead and collect the money, but intended to get hold of some small part of it and then to keep it, and he used the contract as a fraudulent inducement for the purpose, then the thing done was not embezzlement, but it was false pretenses, and he should be arrested and tried upon that charge. *Hess v. Culver*, 77 Mich. 598, 18 Am. St. Rep. 421, 6 L. R. A. 498; *Pearl v. Walter*, 80 Mich. 317; *Knight v. Linzey*, 80 Mich. 396, 8 L. R. A. 476; *Stoney Creek Woolen Co. v. Smalley*, 111 Mich. 321; *Getchell v. Dusenbury*, 145 Mich. 197. Henig cannot lawfully return the relator to Van Buren county, because there is no charge pending against him there. There is no proof attached to the extradition warrant that the relator committed an offense in Van Buren county. If the relator is to be deprived of his liberty, first let a new application be made to the governor of Nebraska by the governor of Michigan and an orderly procedure be had.

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The relator excuses changing his name upon the ground of difficulty with his mother-in-law, who threatened to prosecute him. He is now supporting his wife and two children.

**EMERY L. MEYERS, APPELLANT, v. FURNAS COUNTY,
APPELLEE.**

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,102.

1. **Paupers: LIABILITY OF COUNTY.** Under the provisions of section 14, ch. 67, Comp. St. 1911, if any person, not coming within the definition of a pauper, shall fall sick within any county of the state, not having money or property to pay his or her board, nursing, and medical aid, it is the duty of the overseers of the poor of the precinct where such person shall be to furnish such assistance as they shall deem necessary. This gives the overseer full authority to provide the necessary medical aid to such sick person.
2. ———: ———. Where a physician is employed by an overseer of the poor to give medical aid to a destitute person, who has fallen sick, and the service required is performed, the fact that the overseer has not made a written report of his doings thereon to the county board cannot defeat the liability of the county for the service rendered under such employment.
3. ———: ———: **SUFFICIENCY OF PETITION.** The averment in a petition that a person had fallen sick under such circumstances as to show her destitution and inability to provide for herself, or be provided for by others, is a sufficient allegation of the dependence upon the county, when assailed by a demurrer.

**APPEAL from the district court for Furnas county:
ROBERT C. ORR, JUDGE. *Reversed.***

Lambè & Butler, for appellant.

R. J. Harper, W. S. Morlan and John Stevens, contra.

REESE, C. J.

This is an appeal from a decree of the district court for

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Furnas county in sustaining a general demurrer to plaintiff's petition. From a judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals.

It is alleged in the petition, in substance, that on the 23d day of May, 1908, one Bertice Overholtzer, a resident of Cambridge precinct, in said county, became sick and diseased; that it became necessary, in order to preserve her life, that she should have medical aid and attention; and that, having no money or property with which to pay for medical treatment, she was dependent upon defendant for such necessities. The character of the malady from which it is alleged she was suffering would indicate that medical relief could not be long delayed without danger to her life. While not directly so alleged, it is inferable from the petition and briefs of counsel that Dr. Green of Beaver City, which was 30 miles distant from where the patient was sick, was the county physician. The petition alleges that the application for relief for said sick person was made to one of the members of the county board, the board not then being in session, who advised that the matter be submitted to Dr. Green for instructions; that Dr. Green refused to render medical aid, but directed, in case it was an emergency, that plaintiff, who was a physician, should render the necessary service; that the local justice of the peace, the overseer of the poor in said precinct, was seen, who made a written request to plaintiff to render and attend to the needs of Miss Overholtzer, and charge the same to the county of Furnas, and thereupon plaintiff took charge of the case, and carried it to a successful termination; that the patient was destitute, and resided in said precinct; that up to the date named her relatives and friends had been able to provide the necessary medical aid, but her means at said time became wholly exhausted, and she was entirely without funds or assistance and became dependent upon the county; that, under the directions of Dr. Green and the overseer of the poor, he performed the service. Plaintiff's claim was presented to the county commissioners and rejected, from which he ap-

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pleaded to the district court. By filing the demurrer, all allegations of the petition which were well pleaded were admitted, among which were that the patient was a resident of Cambridge precinct, of which the justice of the peace was the overseer of the poor; that she was sick, destitute, and needed medical attention in order that her life might be preserved; that the justice, having authority so to do under the law, employed plaintiff, on behalf of the county, to perform the service; that plaintiff performed the service, and the compensation therefor had not been paid.

We are unable to see why, under the provisions of chapter 67, Comp. St. 1911, a cause of action was not stated. Assuming, as we must, under the averments of the petition, that the justice of the peace was in the discharge of the plain duty imposed upon him by section 14 of the act, we must hold that, upon the performance of the service, a claim arose against the county for the reasonable value of the medical service rendered.

There is no averment that the justice of the peace made a written report of his action to the county board; it being alleged that his report was oral. It is claimed that the failure of the justice of the peace to make his report in writing defeated plaintiff's cause of action, if one ever existed; that the written report is made a condition precedent to the creation of a valid claim against the county. We cannot so hold. There was no obligation imposed upon plaintiff to see that the justice performed the duty required by the statute. To hold that the claim would be thereby defeated would be equivalent to saying that one person could defeat the just claim of another by simply refusing to discharge an official but later duty, having no connection with the rendition of the service. By such a course the benign purpose of the statute could be nullified, and the destitute and suffering would be left to shift for themselves or depend upon the voluntary charity of others. This the law does not contemplate.

It is argued by counsel for the county that it is not

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sufficiently alleged that the patient had no relatives of sufficient ability to provide for her, or who had failed or refused so to do. It is true that the petition is not as specific on this matter as it might and probably should be, but as against a demurrer enough is stated to show the destitution of the patient and her need of immediate medical aid and assistance. A motion for a more specific statement in that behalf might have been interposed, but as against a demurrer the averment must be held sufficient.

It is also contended that the case at bar was not an emergency case under the provisions of section 14, ch. 67, Comp. St. 1911. The provision is: "Whenever any non-resident, or any other person not coming within the definition of a pauper, shall fall sick in any county in this state, not having money or property to pay his or her board, nursing, and medical aid, it shall be the duty of the overseers of the poor of the precinct where such person shall be to furnish such assistance to such person as they shall deem necessary." The averments of the petition seem to have brought the case squarely within the provisions of the section.

Other matters insisted upon are proper subjects of answer, if a defense, but cannot be disposed of upon demurrer.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

**ALBERT H. ARONSON, APPELLEE, v. JOHN P. E. CARLSON,
APPELLANT.**

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,098.

Appeal: AFFIRMANCE. Where the record brought to the supreme court on appeal contains no bill of exceptions, the judgment of the district court, if sustained by the pleadings, will be affirmed.

APPEAL from the district court for Polk county:
GEORGE F. CORCORAN, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

John Tongue, for appellant.

Mills & Beebe, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action in the district court for Polk county to recover a balance alleged to be due plaintiff on a judgment rendered against defendant and in plaintiff's favor in the district court for the county and city of Denver, in the state of Colorado. Plaintiff had the judgment, and the defendant has appealed.

The record brought to this court contains no bill of exceptions, and therefore the only question presented for our determination is, are the pleadings sufficient to support the judgment? The transcript discloses that plaintiff's petition was in the usual form of a declaration on a foreign judgment. Defendant's answer does not challenge the jurisdiction of the district court of the state of Colorado in which the judgment sued on was rendered. It contains no allegation of fraud on the part of plaintiff in obtaining the judgment, and contains no plea of payment or satisfaction.

As we view the record, the pleadings are sufficient to sustain the judgment of the district court, and it is therefore

AFFIRMED.

**CHARLES A. PATTERSON, APPEL-
LANT, APPEL-
LANT,**

FILED MARCH 14

Appeal: DECREE: MODIFICATION:
judgment foreclosing a real estate
substantial error found in the re-
it is provided the decree shall
it will be modified by correction
thus modified, will be affirmed

**APPEAL from the district
ROBERT C. ORR, JUDGE. Affirmed**

Lambe & Butler, for appellee

W. S. Morlan and F. W. J.

BARNES, J.

Action in the district court to
close a real estate mortgage
of certain promissory notes
plaintiff by the defendants
Sarah E. Cox. The petition
forth copies of the notes in
motion to require plaintiff to
institute and certain by attachment
motion was overruled, and
which contained: First, an
allegation that the defendant
woman; that she had had no
in which she intended to buy
that at the time the notes were
delivered defendant George
plaintiff in any sum whatsoever
was not acknowledged by defendant

It was further alleged, in
to the time when the mortgage

defendant George W. Cox was indebted to the Arapahoe State Bank; that the indebtedness to the bank had not been released; that defendants were then, and are now, residing upon and claiming the section of the land described in the mortgage as their homestead. It was also alleged that the mortgage did not set forth the true terms of the agreement between plaintiff and the defendants, and there was a prayer for a reformation of the same. It was finally alleged that the true intention of the defendants was not to alienate or incumber their homestead rights, and the answer concluded with a prayer that the petition be dismissed. Plaintiff's reply admitted that the defendants were husband and wife, and resided upon the land in question, but denied each and every allegation contained in the answer, except those specifically admitted. A trial was had upon the issues thus joined, which resulted in findings and a decree of foreclosure. The defendants have appealed.

Appellants' first contention is that the court erred in overruling their motion to make plaintiff's petition more definite and certain, and it is argued that if the motion had been sustained it would have appeared affirmatively that there was a defect of parties; that the plaintiff had no capacity to sue; and that the action was not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. As above stated, the petition contained literal copies of the notes. It appears also that the notes themselves were introduced in evidence. Under this state of facts, we are unable to see how any prejudice could have resulted in overruling the defendants' motion.

It is also contended that the action was not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, and therefore the court erred in rendering a judgment for the plaintiff. The testimony, as contained in the record, shows, beyond question, that the plaintiff was the real party in interest; that he furnished the money to and for the use of the defendants, which was the consideration for the notes and mortgage in question. Two witnesses testified positively

to those facts, and the defendants introduced no evidence to controvert this testimony.

It is also argued that the record shows that the mortgage was not acknowledged by the defendants. The only testimony offered to support that contention was the statement of the defendants that, when the notary took the acknowledgment, they were not asked if they signed the mortgage as their voluntary act and deed, and they were not required to hold up their hands at the time the acknowledgment was taken. On the other hand, the acknowledgment appears to be in due form, certified by the notary under her hand and seal, and there was other testimony by which it was shown that the acknowledgment was taken in the usual form, after the defendant George W. Cox had read the mortgage, and it had been read by one Samuel Patterson to the defendant Sarah E. Cox. No testimony was offered tending to show that the mortgage did not contain the real contract between the parties. As we view the testimony, it was entirely insufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity in the execution and acknowledgment of the mortgage.

After a careful examination of the record, we are satisfied that the defendants failed to establish any of the so-called defenses exhibited by their answer. We are therefore of opinion that the decree in question was the only one which the court could lawfully have rendered, and the judgment of foreclosure should be affirmed. It appears, however, that through some mistake or clerical error the decree provides that it shall bear interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum from and after its rendition. We find that the rate of interest provided by the notes and mortgage in question was 7 per cent. per annum, and the decree should be, and it is hereby, modified accordingly, and the judgment of the district court, as thus modified, is

AFFIRMED.

THEODORE J. MILLER, APPELLEE, v. HOMER C. BOARDMAN,
APPELLANT.

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,084.

1. **Tax Foreclosure: PROCEEDINGS IN REM: PLEADING.** Section 4, art. V, ch. 77, Comp. St. 1899, allows an action *in rem* to be brought against the land itself as defendant in tax foreclosure proceedings: (1) Where the owner of the land is not known; (2) where the action is commenced against a person who disclaims ownership. In order to confer jurisdiction upon the court to proceed *in rem* upon the first ground, it is essential that it be made to appear by a direct allegation in the petition that the owner of the land is not known, and the mere naming "the unknown owner of said land" in the title as a party defendant does not amount to an allegation of want of knowledge.
2. ———: ———. In tax foreclosure proceedings which are brought *in rem* against the land itself, the requirements of the statute and all conditions precedent must be strictly complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

APPEAL from the district court for Perkins county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

B. F. Hastings and Wilcox & Halligan, for appellant.

McGilton, Gaines & Smith, contra.

LETTON, J.

This is an action to cancel and set aside a deed based upon the foreclosure of a tax lien and for permission to redeem. The petition is very lengthy and sets forth the facts with much detail. A demurrer was filed and overruled; and, the defendant refusing to plead further, a decree was rendered in plaintiff's favor, from which defendant appeals.

The facts pleaded are substantially as follows: In 1894 the plaintiff, who was a resident of Peoria, Illinois, was the owner in fee of 160 acres of land in Perkins county, described as the northwest quarter of section 3, township

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11, range 40. In 1883 the land was sold by the Union Pacific Railway Company to one Lance under a ten-year contract, and in 1884 Lance assigned the contract to plaintiff, who completed the payments in January, 1894; but, owing to the fact that his contract had been mislaid so that it could not be surrendered, a deed was not issued to him by the Union Pacific Railway Company until December, 1905. When plaintiff received his deed he at once sent it to the clerk of Perkins county for record, and at that time he learned for the first time that tax foreclosure proceedings had been instituted and a sheriff's deed issued under the same. In the tax foreclosure proceedings, in August, 1901, a petition was filed entitled "Homer C. Boardman, Plaintiff, v. The Northwest Quarter of Section 3, in Township 11, Range 40, in Perkins County, Nebraska, and the Unknown Owner of said Land, the Union Pacific Railway Company, Defendants." The petition alleged the purchase of the land by the plaintiff from the county treasurer at tax sale, the issuance of a tax sale certificate, and the payment of subsequent taxes, and prayed for a foreclosure. It was verified, as follows: "H. E. Goodall, first being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the duly authorized attorney of the plaintiff in the above entitled action; that said plaintiff is absent and is a nonresident of the county of Perkins, and state of Nebraska; that the tax sale certificate and tax receipts herein sued on are in my hands as such attorney; that I have read the foregoing petition, and that the facts and allegations therein contained are true, as I verily believe. H. E. Goodall." An affidavit for service by publication was filed on August 14, 1901, with the same title as the petition, which set forth at length the object and prayer of the petition, and contained the following additional statement: "Affiant further says that the defendants, the unknown owners of said land are non-residents of the state of Nebraska, and that service of summons cannot be had upon said defendants, or either of them, within this state. Wherefore plaintiff prays that service may be

ardman.

lication." A notice directed the title of the petition was taken and a decree of foreclosure. The premises were sold by the sheriff, and the Before the affidavit for publication wrote to the Union Pacific that he held a tax foreclosure of land for a client; that company; and that if the he would advise his client reply to his letter, the land company wrote Mr. Goodall to A. S. Lance of Arlington and that final payment, from one Theo. J. Miller, whose address at that time Illinois. The letter also in company had no pecuniary held the naked legal title. all was attorney for Boarder from the land committed the petition to foreclose premises was.

mp. St. 1899, which was in suit was begun, provides: instituted under this chapter by law in similar causes in the owner of land is not right against the land itself, must be as in the case of a commenced against a person and itself may be substituted defendant, and the action constatable allows an action to itself in only two instances, and is not known, and the commenced against one who

IDA C. SCOTT, APPELLEE, v. JOHN R. HOUSE ET AL.,
APPELLANTS.

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,111.

Husband and Wife: NECESSARIES: LIABILITY OF WIFE. The property of a married woman is not liable for the payment of debts contracted for necessities furnished the family until after an execution against the husband for such indebtedness has been issued and returned unsatisfied. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 53, sec. 1. And the fact that no judgment has been rendered against the husband for such debt may be shown by the wife, in an action by her to enjoin the levy of an execution upon her lands to pay such a debt.

APPEAL from the district court for Thurston county:
ANSON A. WELCH, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Hiram Chase and R. E. Evans, for appellants.

T. L. Sloan and Herman Freese, contra.

LETTON, J.

This is an action to restrain the defendants from enforcing by execution a judgment against the real estate of plaintiff. The case was heard upon an agreed stipulation of facts, and at the conclusion of the trial the court entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law and enjoined the enforcement of the judgment as prayed. Defendants appeal.

The material facts which appear by the stipulation are, as follows: The plaintiff is a married woman living with her husband. A bill of particulars was filed by John R. House (defendant herein), as plaintiff, against Ida C. Scott (plaintiff herein) in justice court for the recovery of \$61.50, and interest, for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered to her at her request. She appeared, obtained a continuance, but made no appearance at the trial, at the close of which a judgment was rendered for the amount found due. A transcript of this judgment was filed in the district court, and an execution was issued and levied upon 80 acres of land belonging to her.

Defendants state the case as follows in their brief: "Appellants' claim, or case, may be stated thus: By operation of the latter portion of section 5317 (Ann. St.), the wife is made surety for necessities used by her family; that this suretyship attached to any property that the wife may ever become seized of that is not exempt from sale or execution; that, as a condition precedent to a judgment on this suretyship, there must be a judgment against the husband and an execution issued and returned unsatisfied; that the appellee in this case is concluded as to the fact of the judgment and execution against the husband, because the fact as to whether there was such a judgment and execution was a matter of defense in the action by the appellant House against the appellee, and which resulted in the judgment, the collection of which is enjoined." Defendants also state that they make no claim that the plaintiff is bound by reason of a contract made by her with House. Defendants insist that the plaintiff is concluded as to the fact of marriage by the judgment, since she did not plead coverture, and is also concluded as to whether a judgment had been obtained and an execution returned unsatisfied against her husband before the suit was brought, because these matters might have been raised as defenses before the justice, and insist that the judgment is an adjudication against her as to all such issues, and no advantage can be taken of such matters now.

While fully conceding the general principles of law with respect to former adjudication and judgments against married women urged by defendants, the writer is of the opinion that the argument made as to the conclusiveness of the judgment cuts both ways, and that a judgment cannot be shown, solely for the purposes of an execution, to be a judgment for necessities by facts dehors the record. The record does not show that the judgment was rendered for necessities furnished the family. If we concede that the defenses of coverture and of the failure to issue an execution against the husband

should have been pleaded before the justice, it must also be conceded that the fact that the judgment was sought for necessities, which gives it a peculiar force and power which it would not otherwise have, should also have been made to appear in that court. If one set of facts cannot, as defendants claim, be shown aliunde, what reason can be given for allowing the other fact as to necessities to be shown upon the other side? A majority of the court, however, prefer not to announce this view.

It is stipulated "that the basis of the claim for which the judgment complained of was rendered was for necessities furnished by the defendant John R. House to the plaintiff and her husband," and that the "judgment obtained * * * against the said Ida C. Scott was obtained without having first obtained a judgment against her husband, Frank Scott, for necessities."

Section 1, ch. 53, Comp. St. 1911, provides that all the property of a married woman of every kind and nature "shall remain her sole and separate property, notwithstanding her marriage, and shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, or liable for his debts; provided, that all property of a married woman not exempt by law from sale on execution or attachment shall be liable for the payment of all debts contracted for necessities furnished the family of said married woman after execution against the husband for such indebtedness has been returned unsatisfied for want of goods and chattels, lands, and tenements whereon to levy and make the same." This statute has been considered by this court a number of times and uniformly upheld. *George v. Edney*, 36 Neb. 604; *Small v. Sandall*, 48 Neb. 318. It was held in *Noreen v. Hansen*, 64 Neb. 858, that in such a case as this "the cause of action does not arise against her until an execution based upon a judgment against her husband has been returned unsatisfied." In *Fulton v. Ryan*, 60 Neb. 9, 13, where it was sought to avoid the effect of a plea of coverture in the answer by the allegation in the reply that the note was given for necessities, the court held

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that portion of the reply defective, "for the reason that it does not set up the fact that execution against the husband on the indebtedness had been issued and returned unsatisfied for want of property on which to levy." By this section of the statute it is a condition precedent to a sale of the property of a wife for her husband's debt that the execution against the husband has been issued and returned unsatisfied. The statute is explicit that the property of the wife is not subject to sale until this essential fact has been established. We are all of the opinion that, under a judgment which fails to show that it was rendered for necessities, the shield of the statute may be raised at any time before a sale of the wife's property, and a majority believe this fact may be shown even under judgments which recite they are rendered for necessities. Since this condition precedent to any liability upon the part of the plaintiff's property is shown not to exist, the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction restraining the levy and sale.

Having reached this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to determine the claim made that her real estate is exempt under the laws of the United States relating to the property of members of the Omaha Tribe of Indians.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

**DR. S. S. STILL COLLEGE AND INFIRMARY OF OSTEOPATHY,
APPELLEE, V. HOMER D. MORRIS ET AL., APPELLANTS.**

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,109.

1. **Married Women: CONTRACTS: VALIDITY.** A married woman may make a valid contract to pay tuition essential to an educational course for herself in osteopathy, though she has no separate estate.
2. **Appeal.** A judgment will not be reversed as excessive, where it is not challenged on that ground.

APPEAL from the district court for Thayer county:
LESLIE G. HURD, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

M. H. Weiss, George W. Berge, C. J. Campbell and C. L. Richards, for appellants.

W. E. Goodhue, Merrill C. Gilmore and Edwin G. Moon, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is a suit by payee against the makers of a promissory note for \$600, dated February 1, 1903, and payable 30 months after date. Defendants are husband and wife. The execution and delivery of the note are admitted. The wife pleads coverture, want of consideration, void suretyship in absence of a separate estate, and want of capacity to make a binding contract. The case was tried to the court without a jury, and from a judgment against both defendants for the full amount of plaintiff's claim, they have appealed. The husband did not establish any defense, and on appeal suggests no reason for a reversal of the judgment as to him. The sufficiency of the defenses interposed by the wife, however, is properly and ably presented.

When the note was executed, defendants were husband and wife, and the latter had no separate estate. Her view of the case is that she signed the note as surety for her husband, and that, having no property of her own, her contract was void and did not bind subsequently acquired property. In support of her position the following cases are cited: *Northwall Co. v. Osgood*, 80 Neb. 764; *Farmers Bank v. Boyd*, 67 Neb. 497; *Grand Island Banking Co. v. Wright*, 53 Neb. 574; *Kocher v. Cornell*, 59 Neb. 315. Is the present case controlled by the principles invoked by the wife? Her own testimony establishes these facts: Subsequent to her marriage, she and her husband took together a two-year course in osteopathy. Having finished their course, the husband signed the note in con-

troversy in an attempt to settle the tuition of both, but plaintiff refused to issue their diplomas—the evidence of their right to practice osteopathy—until the wife also signed the note. After she did so, both received diplomas, which were used by them in registering as practitioners in this state. To some extent, at least, the wife has practiced osteopathy and still has that right. Half the consideration for the note was her own tuition. Under the circumstances disclosed by these facts, could she make a valid contract to pay her tuition, though she was a married woman having no separate estate? If she could, she was a principal, rather than a surety, to the extent of her own tuition. Her education prepared her for a learned profession. It was a personal achievement. She may use it as a means of livelihood. As a practitioner she may devote her earnings to herself without interference from her husband. In that way she may accumulate a separate estate. Coverture did not prevent her preparation to practice osteopathy, nor will it take away the fruits of her profession.

The statute declares: "Any married woman may carry on trade or business, and perform any labor or services on her sole and separate account; and the earnings of any married woman, from her trade, business, labor, or services, shall be her sole and separate property, and may be used and invested by her, in her own name." Comp. St. 1911, ch. 53, sec. 4. The word "business" is evidently used in this statute in a popular and legal sense, making it applicable to any particular employment, occupation, or profession, followed as a means of livelihood. Black, Law Dictionary; Webster's New International Dictionary; *Goddard v. Chaffee*, 2 Allen (Mass.) 395; *People v. Commissioners of Taxes*, 23 N. Y. 242; *Territory v. Harris*, 8 Mont. 140; *Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch*, 47 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 273; *Beickler v. Guenther*, 121 Ia. 419. The legislation, in declaring that the earnings of a married woman for "services" shall be her separate property, clearly extends to the practice of osteopathy. If a mar-

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ried woman having no separate estate cannot enter into a valid contract to pay tuition essential to preparing herself for such a profession, the door of opportunity will be closed to many. In absence of restrictive language, the statutory right to the benefits of such a business implies the power to make contracts necessary to preparation therefor. *Stewart v. Jenkins*, 6 Allen (Mass.) 300; *Chapman v. Foster*, 6 Allen (Mass.) 136; *Bodine v. Killeen*, 53 N. Y. 93; *Frecking v. Rolland*, 53 N. Y. 422. This view is in harmony with analogous reasoning in *Tyler v. Winder*, 89 Neb. 409, wherein it was held: "A married woman who has no separate estate may employ an attorney to begin and prosecute or defend an action for divorce, and make a valid contract to compensate the attorney for his service in such action." The conclusion is that, when the wife signed the note in controversy, she entered into a valid contract to pay her own tuition at least.

As the judgment below is not assailed as excessive, it is

AFFIRMED.

JOHN M. HENRY, APPELLANT, V. CITY OF LINCOLN,
APPELLEE.

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,067.

1. **Municipal Corporations: PRIVATE ENTERPRISES: LIABILITY.** It is no part of the duty of a municipal corporation to engage in a purely business or commercial enterprise. When it seeks and obtains from the legislature permission to engage in such an enterprise, its act in so doing is entirely voluntary on its part, and, while engaging in such business, it is acting in a purely private business capacity, outside of its functions and duties as a municipal corporation, and is bound by all of the rules of law and procedure applicable to any other corporation or person engaged in a like enterprise.
2. ———: **ACTION FOR INJURIES: NOTICE.** Section 126, art. I, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1911, requiring the filing of a notice with the city clerk

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of a municipal corporation within 30 days from the time a right of action for an unliquidated claim accrues, as a condition precedent to an action thereon, applies to claims against such a corporation arising out of the performance of its corporate duties, but has no application to a case arising out of the conduct by it of a purely private business enterprise, voluntarily entered into, which is entirely outside of its ordinary governmental functions or corporate duties.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
ALBERT J. CORNISH, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Wilmer B. Comstock and J. U. Tingley, for appellant.

Fred C. Foster and D. H. McClenahan, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

From a judgment of the district court for Lancaster county, sustaining a general demurrer to his petition and dismissing his action, plaintiff appeals.

The petition alleges that the defendant is a city of the first class, and at the times set out owned and operated a system of waterworks by and through which it furnished water to its inhabitants for a compensation; that as a part of its water system it maintained station houses, wells, pumps, and other machinery, and employed a large number of servants and employees; that a part of the machinery and pumps used were operated and propelled by electricity; that plaintiff was a servant of defendant regularly employed at and about its pumping station known as Rice station; that through the negligence of defendant in several particulars, which for the purpose of this decision it is not necessary to enumerate, and without fault on the part of plaintiff, plaintiff received a serious injury. To this petition the defendant filed and the court sustained a general demurrer based upon the fact that the petition does not allege that plaintiff, within 30 days after his injury, filed a claim with the city clerk, as required by section 126, art. I, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1911. The section referred to provides: "In order to maintain

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an action for an unliquidated claim it shall be necessary, as a condition precedent, that the party file in the office of the city clerk, within 30 days from the time such right of action accrued, a statement of the amount of the claim, giving full name of the claimant, the time, place, nature, circumstance and cause of the injury or damage complained of."

The contention of defendant is that the construction placed by the trial court upon this section of the statute is settled by numerous decisions of this court. Before entering upon a consideration of those cases, let us consider the status of a municipal corporation. As generally understood, a municipal corporation occupies a dual relation to its citizens and the public. It is bound to discharge its governmental functions. In the discharge of those functions it stands as the representative of the state and has all of the governmental powers conferred upon it by statute. It is also bound to perform its corporate duties; not alone such as are expressly imposed upon it by statute, but such also as devolve upon it by reason of the governmental powers and privileges which have been conferred upon it; such as the use of reasonable diligence to keep its streets, alleys and sidewalks in reasonably safe condition for the use of the public. In the discharge of these governmental functions and performance of these corporate duties, it is subject to the control of the legislature, must assume all the burdens imposed upon it by statute, and is entitled to all the privileges, immunities and exemptions given to it by statute. The legislature, therefore, has a right to provide that, before it can be held liable for any dereliction of duty or for negligence on the part of its officers and employees, while it is acting in either of these dual capacities, a claim, in accordance with the provisions of the section of statute above quoted, shall be filed with its clerk within such reasonable time as it may fix. It is entitled to these privileges and immunities because of the fact that the functions and duties above referred to are imposed upon it by law and it must dis-

charge and perform them; but here the duties imposed upon it by law cease. It is no part of its duty, as a municipal corporation, to engage in a purely business or commercial enterprise. When it seeks and obtains from the legislature permission to engage in such an enterprise, its act in so doing is purely voluntary on its part, and it thereby assumes a third relation, separate and distinct from the dual relations above considered. While occupying this third relation no governmental functions or corporate duties, as a municipality, devolve upon it. It is then engaged in an ordinary business enterprise, and is bound by all the rules of law and procedure applicable to any other private corporation or person engaged in a like enterprise. It has no greater or higher privileges or immunities than are possessed by any other private corporation. It is subject to the same liabilities and entitled to the same defenses; no more and no less. We are not willing to indulge the presumption that the legislature intended, by the statute quoted, to grant any special privileges to a municipal corporation, while acting in such private business capacity, or relation, but rather that it intended the limitation to apply to claims against a municipality, arising out of the performance of its governmental functions or corporate duties.

In *Kelly v. City of Faribault*, 95 Minn. 293, reaffirmed in *Gaughan v. City of St. Paul*, 119 Minn. —, 137 N. W. 199, and in *Quackenbush v. Village of Slayton*, 139 N. W. (Minn.) 716, in considering a statute of that state requiring 30 days' notice to be given to a municipality of claims for injuries received from defects in its streets, sidewalks, or its public works before action therefor, it is said: "We think it very clear, from the history of the law requiring notice to municipalities of injuries thereon, and its subsequent development, that it never was intended to apply to the relations between master and servants when the latter are injured by reason of failure of the former to provide a reasonably safe place for the servant to work, or as to any absolute duties which are enjoined

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for its corporate benefit and the benefit of its inhabitants, the city is not clothed with these immunities, and is liable to be sued for injuries inflicted through its negligence in the performance of such an act." In *Reed v. Village of Syracuse*, 83 Neb. 713, we said: "Villages that lawfully engage in commercial enterprises are liable to the public the same as individuals."

In *Esberg Cigar Co. v. City of Portland*, 75 Am. St. Rep. 651 (34 Or. 282), it is held: "When a city voluntarily undertakes to construct and maintain waterworks, in pursuance of statutory authority, for its own private emolument and advantage, the works belong to it in its private, rather than in its public or governmental, capacity, though the public may derive a common benefit therefrom, and the city is, therefore, answerable to persons injured by negligence in the construction or maintenance of such works." In the opinion it is said: "But when a special power or privilege is conferred upon or granted to a municipal corporation, to be exercised for its own advantage or emolument, and not as a mere governmental agency, it is liable to the same extent as an individual or a private corporation for negligence in managing or dealing with the property rights or franchises held by it under such grant." In *City of New Orleans v. Kerr*, 69 Am. St. Rep. 442 (50 La. Ann. 413) it is held: "A municipal corporation, with respect to the private character of its powers and obligations, represents the pecuniary and proprietary interests of individuals, and the rules which govern the responsibility of individuals are properly applicable."

In *State Journal Printing Co. v. City of Madison*, 148 Wis. 396, it is said: "In furnishing water to private consumers the city is acting in a private business capacity, and not in its governmental capacity, and it is bound to exercise ordinary care, namely, that reasonable degree of care in view of the dangers involved which the great mass of ordinarily prudent persons engaged in the same or similar business would and do exercise under like circum-

stances. For any failure to exercise this degree of care, proximately causing injury to another, the city is liable to the same extent that a private person or a corporation operating a waterworks system is liable; no more and no less." In *Relyea v. Tomahawk Paper & Pulp Co.*, 102 Wis. 301, it is said: "The difference between a statute requiring notice to be served, as for example section 1339, R. S. 1878, as a condition of a right to damages for an injury through failure of duty on the part of a municipality to keep its highways in a proper state of repair, and a statute requiring such a notice to be served as a condition of recovery for injuries to an employee through actionable negligence of his employer, is that the former is a condition of the right to damages and the remedy to recover the same as well, while the latter is a condition acting on the remedy alone, the right not being dependent on the statute at all. Such difference is well defined in the books and universally recognized. In *Smith v. Cleveland*, 17 Wis. *556, it is said, in effect, that the difference between laws that the legislature may change at will and those which the constitution protects from interference to the prejudice of vested rights is that under the former the right is dependent on the law, and under the latter the right itself is independent of the law. The subject was recently discussed in *Schaefer v. City of Fond du Lac*, 99 Wis. 333, and *Daniels v. City of Racine*, 98 Wis. 649, where it is said that a right given by statute may be changed by adding new conditions, or wholly taken away by statute. There, as in most cases of the kind, the right of action was spoken of as synonymous with the right itself, and properly so. If the distinction be not kept in mind between statutory and common law rights, where the court speaks regarding a condition of the former as precedent to a right of action therefor, it will be taken as meaning that the condition is in the nature of a limitation acting on the remedy alone." The right of a servant to recover damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of his master is not dependent upon the statute.

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It is a common law right. A right by statute to compensation for injuries can be granted upon condition. That right may be changed or taken away entirely in the discretion of the legislature. Such rights are not the subject of constitutional protection, but depend solely upon the legislative will; but a common law right is independent of statute and is the subject of constitutional protection. *Relyea v. Tomahawk Paper & Pulp Co., supra.*

In the light of the above authorities, we conclude that in the installation and management of its waterworks system defendant must be treated as a private corporation engaged in a purely business enterprise, as separate and distinct from the performance of its governmental functions and corporate duties as if it were not a municipal corporation at all, and that its liability to plaintiff must be determined solely under the law and procedure applicable to a private corporation and its employee. So construing the duties and relations of the parties, we hold that defendant is answerable to plaintiff for any negligence on the part of the former which resulted, without fault of the latter, in an injury to his damage, and that plaintiff has a right to prosecute his action for such damage, if any there be, within the same time and in the same manner as any other employee similarly injured would have a right to prosecute an action for damages under like conditions.

In none of the cases cited by defendant was the municipal corporation acting in a private capacity in a purely business enterprise. In *City of Lincoln v. Grant*, 38 Neb. 369, the action was for damages caused by a change of grade. In *Nothdurft v. City of Lincoln*, 75 Neb. 76, the action was for damages by reason of a defective sidewalk. In *Dayton v. City of Lincoln*, 39 Neb. 74, it was a change of grade. In *Dovey v. City of Plattsmouth*, 52 Neb. 642, it was the location and construction of a storm sewer. *Foxworthy v. City of Hastings*, 25 Neb. 133 (erroneously cited in the brief as 46 Neb. 700) was a sidewalk case. In *Reeder v. City of Omaha*, 73 Neb. 845, the question was

the grading of a street in such a manner as to form a pond in which the infant son of Reeder was drowned. In *Reining v. City of Buffalo*, 102 N. Y. 308, it was the erection of an embankment by the city—a case of street improvement. In *Collins v. City of Spokane*, 64 Wash. 153, 116 Pac. 663, it was negligence in maintaining a foot-bridge on the public street. In *Walters v. City of Ottawa*, 240 Ill. 259, it was a defective sidewalk. In *Nichols v. City of Minneapolis*, 30 Minn. 545, it was an injury to plaintiff's horse by a defect in the street. In *Postel v. City of Seattle*, 41 Wash. 432, it was a change of grade. In *Condon v. City of Chicago*, 249 Ill. 596, it was the falling of the bank of a ditch—a street improvement case. The discussion in that case sustains defendant's contention, but, in so far as it does so, the discussion is dictum, and a reading of the case shows a want of due consideration of the precise question here involved. It will be seen that the cases from other states above cited by defendant, like the decisions from this court above cited, all relate to the performance by a municipal corporation of its corporate duties. In the decision of this case we do not depart from the rule announced in our former decisions above cited. On the contrary, we adhere to them, and in any case that might now come before us, involving the corporate duties of a municipal corporation, we would adhere to the rule announced in those cases; but they are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.

After a very careful consideration of the cases cited by the parties to this action, and after an exhaustive independent examination of the authorities, we have reached the conclusion above announced.

The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

HAMER, J., concurring.

The plaintiff and appellant sued the city of Lincoln to

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recover damages alleged to result from the loss of part of his hand. He was employed as a servant of the defendant, and was assisting in the operation of one of its pumping stations. The pumps used were operated by electricity, and the hand was injured, as claimed in the petition, by coming in contact with an electric switch. The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the petition and dismissed the action.

A decision of the case necessitates a construction of section 126, art. I, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1911. The section provides, among other things, that all claims against the city must be presented in writing, verified by the claimant or his agent, stating that the same is correct, reasonable, just, and unpaid; that no claims shall be allowed unless presented, verified, and read in open council; that "in order to maintain an action for an unliquidated claim it shall be necessary, as a condition precedent, that the party file in the office of the city clerk, within 30 days from the time such right of action accrued, a statement of the amount of the claim, giving full name of the claimant, the time, place, nature, circumstance and cause of the injury or damage complained of." The demurrer seems to have been sustained because of the absence of an allegation in the petition that plaintiff had filed the claim with the city clerk within 30 days of the date of his injury. The petition alleges that the defendant is a city of the first class existing under article I, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1907; that the defendant owned and operated a system of waterworks in the city of Lincoln, through which it furnished water to the inhabitants of said city *for compensation*; that as a part of said water system it maintained station houses, wells, pumps, engines, and other machinery, and employed many servants; that part of the machinery and pumps was operated by electricity conveyed through and controlled by wires, switches, and other electrical appliances; that on and prior to the 3d day of September, 1908, the plaintiff was a servant of the defendant, employed by it at its pumping station in which plaintiff was required to use

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and operate a switch to control the passage of the current of electricity that operated the pumps at said station, and that there passed through the wires controlled by said switch, and through said switch, a voltage of electricity of 4,400 volts; that because of so great a voltage it was necessary for the safety of the person operating the switch that the handle of the switch should be constructed of rubber or some material not a conductor of electricity; that the plaintiff was told by the defendant that the handle was of rubber; that said handle had the outward appearance of being constructed of that material; that the defendant negligently furnished the said switch and required the plaintiff to use and operate the same with a wooden handle, which was extremely dangerous, and that these facts were known to defendant, but not to the plaintiff; that the defendant neglected to provide a covering or shield for said switch and for said wires and appliances; that solely because of the negligence of the defendant city while the plaintiff was in its employ as aforesaid and on or about the 3d day of September, 1908, and while the said plaintiff was acting under the direct and immediate supervision and command of said city exercised through its servants, the exact details of which acts of negligence are fully set out in the plaintiff's petition, and without any fault whatever upon the part of the said plaintiff, a high voltage of electricity passed through the said switch and came in contact with plaintiff's hand through said wooden handle of said switch, and so burned the plaintiff's hand as to necessitate the amputation of the thumb and fore finger, and caused plaintiff to receive a terrific shock, whereby he became sick and was confined to the hospital for the period of 40 days, and expended \$100 for medical and surgical attendance, and thereby injured his nervous system, and caused him to be permanently afflicted with palpitation of the heart, and maimed and crippled him for life, to plaintiff's damage in the sum of \$10,000; that plaintiff at the time of the injury, and for more than 30 days thereafter, was an infant; that on the 19th day of

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September, 1908, the plaintiff went to the office of the city attorney of the city of Lincoln, and asked him when it would be necessary to file a claim in order to recover damages, and was then informed that it was unnecessary to file such claim within any certain time; that the plaintiff relied upon the advice of the city attorney and filed his claim December 29, 1908; that said claim was received and considered without objection as to the time when the same was filed, and was referred to the city attorney and the unliquidated claims committee; that they acted on the merits of said claim without objecting to the time when the same was filed, and that said committee reported that said claim should be allowed; that September 5, 1908, two days after the injury, the water commissioner of the city had notice of the time, place, and cause of the injury. It is apparent that the city officials did not consider that the failure to file the claim within 30 days from the time of the injury would release the city. That is evidenced by the fact that the city attorney informed the plaintiff that it was unnecessary to file the claim within any certain time; and it could have been no part of the plan of the city to deceive the plaintiff until after the 30 days had expired; and it is seemingly apparent that the council for the city did not regard the statute as applicable to cases of this kind, for the reason that the claim was received and was considered without objection as to the time when it was filed, and the city attorney and the claims committee acted on the merits of the claim without objecting to the time when it was filed, and the committee reported that the claim be allowed.

The plaintiff, after the demurrer was sustained, elected to stand upon the petition, and a judgment was rendered dismissing plaintiff's action at plaintiff's costs. The legislature did not intend to have this provision apply to such cases as that which we are now considering. When a city goes into the same business as a private citizen or a private corporation, it ought to be liable for its acts of negligence just as they are liable. When the city engages

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in furnishing water or gas or electricity for the use of the people, it is well to remember that it does not do so under the exercise of any political power. If a municipality by reason of its negligence causes injury to one of its employees for which it should be held liable because of such negligence, then it ought not to be necessary for the plaintiff, in order to maintain his action, to file in the office of the city clerk, within 30 days from the time of the injury, a statement of the amount of his claim for damages, and the time, place, nature, circumstances, and cause of the injury complained of. To impose such a burden upon the injured person is to discriminate against labor and refuse it an equal opportunity in the courts with other legitimate articles of barter, bargain and sale, whether of merchandise or professional or mechanical services, and therefore it could not have been within the legislative intent to deny labor the opportunity, where its owner is injured, to recover for the injury done. Where there is a failure to file such notice in the office of the city clerk within the time alleged, it should constitute no bar to the plaintiff's right to maintain an action against the city for the full amount of his damages. The people who labor may not always be advised of their rights, and they ought not to be caught with traps, pitfalls, or deceit of any kind. Oftentimes a serious injury would prevent the injured person from making an investigation. Laborers are seldom familiar with the ways of business. There ought to be no barriers or obstacles interposed which would prevent the laborer from getting the damage to which he is legitimately entitled because of injuries sustained by reason of the negligence of the city while the injured servant is in its employ. The city is and ought to be liable for its negligence, to the same extent as a private person or a corporation, whenever it engages in private business for compensation.

In 28 Cyc. 1256, it is said: "A municipality, being not only a public agency, but also a *quasi-private* individual, is therefore subject to the law; for its wrong to the public

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it may be prosecuted, and for its torts against individuals it may be sued in a civil action for damages like a private corporation." It is further said on p. 1257: "The one class of its powers is of a public and general character, to be exercised in virtue of certain attributes of sovereignty delegated to it for the welfare and protection of its inhabitants or the general public; the other relates only to special or private corporate purposes, for the accomplishment of which it acts, not through its public officers as such, but *through agents or servants employed by it.*" In the former case its functions are political and governmental, and no liability attaches to it at common law, either for nonuser or misuser of the power, or for the acts or omissions on the part of its officers or the agents through whom such governmental functions are performed, or the servants employed by such agencies. In its second character above mentioned, that is, in the exercise of its purely municipal functions, or the doing of those things which relate to special or private corporation purposes, the corporation stands upon the same footing with a private corporation, and will be held to the same responsibility with a private corporation for injuries resulting from its negligence, and will be liable for the doings of its officers, agents, or employees acting within the scope of such municipal power, or of the servants employed by such officers.

In *City of New Orleans v. Kerr*, 69 Am. St. Rep. 442 (50 La. Ann. 413) it is said: "A municipal corporation, with respect to the private character of its powers and obligations, represents the pecuniary and proprietary interests of individuals, and the rules which govern the responsibility of individuals are properly applicable." In *Esberg Cigar Co. v. City of Portland*, 75 Am. St. Rep. 651 (34 Or. 282) it is said: "When a city voluntarily undertakes to construct and maintain waterworks, in pursuance of statutory authority, for its own private emolument and advantage, the works belong to it in its private, rather than its public or governmental, capacity, though the public may

derive a common benefit therefrom, and the city is, therefore, answerable to persons injured by negligence in the construction or maintenance of such works." In *Bowden v. Kansas City*, 105 Am. St. Rep. 187 (69 Kan. 587) it is said: "A municipal corporation is liable for negligence in the care and control of public property in the discharge of a ministerial duty, irrespective of whether or not an income is derived from it." In the same case it is said: "A municipal corporation is liable to a fireman for injuries sustained through its negligence in not furnishing him a reasonably safe place to work in one of its fire stations."

In *Burke v. City of South Omaha*, 79 Neb. 793, it is said in the syllabus: "The making, improving and repairing of streets by a municipal corporation relate to its corporate interest only, and it is liable for the wrongful or negligent acts of its agents in performing such duties." The judgment of the district court in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed by this court. In *Reed v. Village of Syracuse*, 83 Neb. 713, it was held: "Where a village, engaged in supplying water and manufacturing gas for its own use and for sale to private consumers, so installs a tank for the storage of gasoline that it leaks into the pumping pit of the waterworks and causes an explosion in which an employee of the village is injured, the question whether such explosion is attributable to negligence on the part of such village is for the jury."

In *Hollman v. City of Platteville*, 101 Wis. 94, it is said in the body of the opinion: "When the act done is within its chartered powers and relates to the administration of local or internal affairs, as distinguished from its legislative, discretionary, or *quasi-judicial* duties, the rule of *respondeat superior* applies, and the city will become liable for the act of its servants and agents, which it has authorized or adopted." In *City of Toledo v. Cone*, 41 Ohio St. 149, the city was held liable to an employee for injuries resulting from the negligence of the superintendent of the cemetery. In *Donahoe v. Kansas City*, 136 Mo. 657, it was held: "The construction of sewers in a city

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is a corporate and ministerial function as distinguished from a governmental one and a city is responsible for injuries arising from its negligence in the performance of the work." In 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.) 1197, it is said: "It is held, as a rule, that a city in supplying water or light to its inhabitants acts as a private corporation, and is subject to the same duties and liabilities." In *State Journal Printing Co. v. City of Madison*, 134 N. W. 909 (148 Wis. 396) it is said in the syllabus: "A city furnishing water to private consumers acts in a *business* capacity, and it must exercise the care that ordinarily prudent persons engaged in similar business would exercise under like circumstances." In 28 Cyc. 1258, it is said: "In the exercise of its purely municipal functions, or the doing of those things which relate to special or private corporate purposes, the corporation stands upon the same footing with a private corporation, and will be held to the same responsibility with a private corporation for injuries resulting from its negligence." In *Relyea v. Tomahawk Paper & Pulp Co.*, 72 Am. St. Rep. 878 (102 Wis. 301) the court held, as stated in the syllabus: "Laws changing the time for, or conditions of, the enforcement of common law rights are in the nature of statutes of limitations, which, if of such a character as to materially affect the right itself, are within the inhibition of the constitution in regard to the passage of laws impairing the obligations of contracts or taking property without due process of law." In *Smith v. Cleveland*, 17 Wis. *556, it is said, in effect, that the difference between laws that the legislature may change at will and those which the constitution protects from interference and the prejudice of vested rights is that, under the former, the right is dependent on the law, and, under the latter, the right itself is independent of the law. In *Kelly v. City of Faribault*, 95 Minn. 293, it is said in the syllabus: "Chapter 248, p. 459, laws 1897, requiring 30 days' notice to be given to a municipality of claims for injuries received from defects in its streets, sidewalks, or its public works, before action therefor, does *not apply* to a

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case where an employee or servant asks for redress for injuries from the negligence of a city in failing to provide a reasonably safe place for its servants to work, or other absolute duties of the master." In *Bradley v. City of Eau Claire*, 56 Wis. 168, it is held: "The words 'claim or demand' in a city charter which provides that 'no action shall be maintained by any person against the city * * * upon any *claim or demand*, until such person shall first have presented his claim or demand to the common council for allowance,' etc., apply to claims or demands arising *upon contract* only, and not to a claim or demand arising out of a tort"—citing *Kelley v. City of Madison*, 43 Wis. 638. See, also, *Sutton v. Snohomish*, 11 Wash. 24, 48 Am. St. Rep. 847; *Jung v. City of Stevens Point*, 74 Wis. 547; *Lay v. City of Adrian*, 75 Mich. 438. In *Nance v. Falls City*, 16 Neb. 85, it is said: "The word 'claims' in section 80 of the chapter relating to cities of the second class applies alone to those arising upon contract, and not upon tort, as for the death of a person through the negligence of the city." It is the opinion of the court that the city was acting in its *private business capacity*, and that while it acted in that capacity it was bound to exercise a reasonable degree of care, in view of the charges involved, and that for any failure to exercise this degree of care it is liable for an injury to another, as a private person or corporation might be. In *Shields v. Town of Durham*, 118 N. Car. 450, it was held: "Section 757 of the code, requiring that claims against municipal corporations shall be presented to the proper authorities and demand for payment as prerequisites to an action to enforce such claims, applies only to demands arising *ex contractu*, and not to those arising *ex delicto*." *Giuricevic v. City of Tacoma*, 57 Wash. 329, sustains the plaintiff's case. In that case an electric light pole standing in the street fell and injured the plaintiff because the city caused the earth about the pole to be excavated.

The following are sidewalk cases, and do not apply to this case, because of the fact that in sidewalk cases there

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is no liability for damages, *unless expressly given by statute*: *Davidson v. City of Muskegon*, 111 Mich. 454; *Springer v. City of Detroit*, 102 Mich. 300; *Kenyon v. City of Cedar Rapids*, 124 Ia. 195; *Hay v. City of Baraboo*, 127 Wis. 1; *Van Frachen v. City of Fort Howard*, 88 Wis. 570; *Jones v. City of Albany*, 151 N. Y. 223; *Borough of Youngsville v. Siggins*, 110 Pa. St. 291. We do not intend to overrule our prior decisions, and adhere to them as they have been heretofore announced.

LETTON, J., dissenting.

I have no quarrel with the opinions with regard to the liability of a municipal corporation to its employees for its negligence while engaged in *quasi-private* enterprises where no limitation is imposed by statute, but this is not the question before us. The real question involved is whether the legislature has power, in creating a municipal corporation, to impose conditions upon the right to maintain actions against the same.

The provisions of the statute under consideration in this case apply to *all claims*, liquidated and unliquidated, whether based upon contract or *based upon the torts* of the municipality. There are two lines of authorities upon this question, but the matter has already been considered by this court and a definite principle established. The cases which have arisen have not been based upon negligence of the corporate authorities in the operation of waterworks, electric light plants, or other public service activities, but the fundamental question of the power of the legislature to impose conditions upon the granting of the right to sue municipal corporations for any cause has been involved and determined. This court has held that a failure to comply with the conditions prescribed by the statute is a valid and sufficient defense against a cause of action *the right to which is guaranteed by the constitution of the state*. It was said in *City of Lincoln v. Grant*, 38 Neb. 369: "Our conclusion is that the filing of the statement contemplated by the charter of the city is in the

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nature of a condition precedent to the right to prosecute an action for damages, and is a material allegation in order to state a cause of action." It was further said: "In our opinion the provision under consideration is a reasonable exercise of the legislative power, and consistent with the soundest public policy." See, also, *Dayton v. City of Lincoln*, 39 Neb. 74; *City of Lincoln v. Finkle*, 41 Neb. 575. These are all cases in which the right to recover damages from the city was preserved by the constitution to the plaintiffs, since their property was taken or damaged for public use. A constitutional right of action is certainly as sacred as a common law right of action. If the legislature can impose terms upon the exercise of one, it seems to me an inevitable logical conclusion that it can impose terms upon the exercise of the other. Mr. Dillon considers this subject at length in 4 *Municipal Corporations* (5th ed.) sec. 1613, and cites many cases upholding the power. The doctrine is also clearly and forcibly stated in the recent case of *Condon v. City of Chicago*, 249 Ill. 596, in line with the holdings of this court. The force of that opinion is not disclosed in the majority opinions. The fact is that the action was by an employee of the city who was alleged to have been injured by its negligence as a master in not providing a safe place to work. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the injury was received in a street. In that case, as in this, it was argued that there is a distinction between the liability of a municipal corporation with regard to its streets, and its liability with respect to injuries to its employees, and that as to the latter it stands upon the same footing as a private corporation. The court said, speaking of municipal corporations: "The liability of such corporations upon their contracts and for their torts is the same as that of private corporations or individuals, and notice is no more necessary as a condition precedent to an action against a municipality than against an individual, unless required by a statute. The power of the legislature, however, to require notice has been generally

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recognized, and in many of the states a previous notice of presentation of the claim is essential to the maintenance of an action against a municipal corporation, either in all cases or in certain kinds of cases. In some jurisdictions the statute requires notice in actions *ex contractu* only; in some it applies to all claims, whether in tort or contract; in others it is limited to injuries arising from defective streets; in others it includes personal injuries of all kinds; and in still others all actions of tort." It pointed out that the cases of *Kelly v. City of Faribault*, 1 Minn. 293, and *Giuricevic v. City of Tacoma*, 57 Wash. 329, cited in the majority opinions, were brought under statutes referring specifically to injury from defects in streets, while the Illinois statute like the Nebraska one applies to "all claims." There is no distinction made in the statute as to the nature of the claim. It says "all claims," and includes "torts" by name. The court has heretofore refused to ingraft any distinctions or modifications on the statute, and it should adhere to this position. While the humanitarian doctrine of the majority opinion may commend itself to our sympathies, the legislature, in my opinion, had the power to impose the conditions, and this court should neither minimize them by an attempted construction of a plain statute, nor depart from its former holdings. If the law is to be changed, let it be done by the legislature.

MARION O. AYRES, APPELLEE, v. GEORGE BARNETT ET AL
APPELLANTS.

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,089.

1. Injunction: TRESPASS: INSOLVENCY. One who has repeatedly trespassed upon the land of another, and threatens to continue such trespass, may be enjoined from so doing; and the question as to whether or not the trespasser is insolvent is immaterial.

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2. ———: ———: REMEDY AT LAW. An owner of real estate is not required to permit the devastation of his timber land by a trespasser and seek relief in an action at law for damages. He may prevent such trespass by injunction.
3. Stipulations: EVIDENCE. The pleadings, and the stipulation of the parties in evidence, examined and set out in the opinion, *held*, that plaintiff was not required to show ten years' adverse possession in order to entitle him to recover.
4. Evidence examined, and *held* ample to sustain the findings and decree of the trial court.

APPEAL from the district court for Dakota county: GUY T. GRAVES, JUDGE. *Affirmed*.

Paul Pizey and Alfred Pizey, for appellants.

R. E. Evans, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

The controversy in this case is over a strip of land some eight or nine rods in width, on the south line of lot 5, section 32, township 29, range 9, in Dakota county. The question is as to whether this strip is a part of lot 5 or a part of the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section 32, lying immediately south of lot 5. From a decree of the district court, finding that the strip is a part of lot 5, and perpetually enjoining defendant from trespassing thereon, defendant appeals.

The case was originally commenced against defendant Barnett alone, but prior to the trial defendant Eimers was brought in and an amended petition filed. In this petition plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of lot 5 and has been in possession of the same for more than 12 years last past; that defendant Barnett "has entered upon said premises and has cut and hauled away, and is cutting and hauling away, and threatens to continue to cut and haul away, and has appropriated and continues to appropriate and threatens to appropriate, the timber which stood and is standing upon said real estate;" that the chief value of the real estate is in the timber; that if defendant is per-

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mitted to continue he will cut down and destroy all of the growing and standing timber; that Barnett is insolvent; that plaintiff is wholly without adequate remedy at law; that the claim of Barnett is a cloud upon plaintiff's title; that defendant Eimers claims some interest, the exact nature of which is unknown to plaintiff, but that whatever its character "the same is without basis either in law or fact and is a cloud upon plaintiff's title." Plaintiff prays that defendants be restrained from claiming said real estate, from entering thereon, from cutting or hauling away any timber, trees or logs, or trespassing upon said premises; that plaintiff's title be quieted, and for general equitable relief. Defendant Barnett answered, admitting that there is a strip along the south side of lot 5 about nine rods in width "which defendant has laid claim to since the 1st day of March, A. D. 1909 (and before), claiming that said strip is a part of the south half of the southwest quarter of said section 32; and defendant further admits that he is in possession of said property and has been since the 23d day of January, A. D. 1909;" alleges that his claim to the property and his right of possession is based upon two contracts, which he sets out, and which are shown to have been executed to him by defendant Eimers; and denies all other allegations in plaintiff's petition; prays that the injunction asked for by plaintiff be denied and plaintiff's action dismissed; that plaintiff be forever enjoined from interfering with his right of possession of the strip of land in controversy, and for general relief. Defendant Eimers answered, alleging that he is the owner and in possession of that portion of the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section 32 embraced in his contract with defendant Barnett; that Barnett has entered into a contract of purchase and is in possession of the tract under such contract; and for further answer adopts the answer of defendant Barnett. For reply plaintiff said: "Comes now the plaintiff, and, for reply to the answer of the defendants, denies that he has ever been in possession of said property."

erty of plaintiff, adverse and adverse years next before 1 Barnett since the be the owner, "has threatens to cut t said Barnett is ins has any right, title in controversy or t defendants be perp the land or from c and to the same.

Defendant conte absolutely upon th ant Barnett, and : sufficient to sustain not think this ques belonged to plaint the same, and was ting down the tir him from so doing, or not he was ins plaintiff would not content himself wi

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The third point p to show ten years' do not think any s fendant having stj the record title, it plaintiff had been verse possession on done or attempted

FAWCETT, J.

This action originated in justice court, and was appealed to the district court for Adams county, in which court there was a verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiffs sued to recover for goods sold and delivered. The answer, among other things, alleges that the goods purchased were a special line and design of jewelry; that, for the purpose of inducing defendant to purchase the goods, plaintiffs represented that defendant should have the exclusive sale of that line of goods in the Hastings market; that, in reliance upon those representations, the purchase was made; that such representations were the sole and only inducement that caused him to enter into the contract; that the representations were fraudulent and false, and known so to be by plaintiffs when made; that at the time of the purchase plaintiffs had already, on that same day, sold the same line of goods to a rival jeweler in the city of Hastings, which fact was unknown to defendant; that defendant learned of the sale to his rival about 30 days later, whereupon he immediately notified plaintiffs of his rescission of the contract and the reasons therefor, and returned all of said goods to plaintiffs. It appears from a motion subsequently filed that defendant's answer originally contained the allegation: "And at said time, the said O. C. Zinn had been given the exclusive sale of said goods in this market." Upon motion of plaintiffs this allegation was stricken from the answer, to which defendant duly excepted. The reply is a general denial, coupled with the allegation that plaintiffs refused to accept the goods when returned to them, and immediately returned them to defendant; admits that prior to the sale to defendant plaintiffs had sold to Zinn goods of the same special line to the amount of about \$30.

There is a conflict in the evidence as to the issues thus tendered. The jury, as we think upon sufficient evidence, found the issues in favor of defendant. This verdict set-

ties the question in favor of defendant that the goods were purchased by him under an express agreement that, in purchasing this special line of goods, he was to have the exclusive sale of that line in the city of Hastings. This being true, defendant had a perfect right, upon discovery of the fact that he had not been given such exclusive sale, to rescind the contract. He exercised that right immediately by notifying plaintiffs of his election to rescind and by returning all of the goods purchased. He had this right regardless of the question as to whether he had suffered any real injury by reason of the deception practiced upon him. *MacLaren v. Cochran*, 44 Minn. 255.

Plaintiffs rest their claim for reversal upon three points: (1) That, under the undisputed evidence, the verdict should have been for plaintiffs. This assignment is disposed of by what we have already said. (2) Error of the court in giving instruction No. 12, to the effect that if the jury believed from the evidence that plaintiffs "had made a false representation to the defendant in regard thereto, and the defendant relied thereon, this would be fraud." In commenting upon this instruction, counsel say that there was no evidence that the agent represented to defendant that he had not sold goods elsewhere in Hastings. The representation that he would give defendant exclusive sale of this special line of goods was a false representation, known to be false and impossible of execution when made, and we think was sufficient to justify the language used in the instruction. (3) That the court erred in overruling the objections of plaintiffs to a certain portion of the opening statement made by defendant's counsel. The language used in the opening statement was that defendant expected to prove that, at the time plaintiffs made the sale of the goods to him, they had already entered into a similar contract with a competitor. This statement was objected to at the time by counsel for plaintiffs, and the objection overruled.

In the course of the trial, defendant offered to prove by his competitor, Mr. Zinn, the fact which in his opening

statement he said offer was objected material, and the o of the trial court offer, and that it made to the staten ing statement of th the deception, alleg action between pla fendant which wo dence that plaintiff similar contract w and material upon had erroneously st press allegation re the right to prove of fraud.

Finding no error
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STATE OF NEBRASKA.

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1. **Boundaries:** EVIDEN
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Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, and Frank E. Edgerton, for plaintiff.

Brown, Baxter & Van Dusen, F. M. Walcott and Frank M. Tyrrell, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

This action was originally begun in this court, and upon the first trial judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. Afterwards, upon a showing of newly discovered evidence, a new trial was granted, and the Honorable John J. Sullivan was appointed referee to take evidence and report findings of fact and conclusions of law. The referee took a large amount of additional testimony, and filed his report, finding generally in favor of the defendant. The attorneys for the state have filed exceptions to this report, and the case has been submitted upon additional briefs and oral argument.

In the former opinion (90 Neb. 307) the issues and the principal points of the controversy are stated. It was also stated in that opinion that "the parties substantially agree that if the 'Ball corner,' located 45 chains and 48½ links west of the northeast corner of section 36, is the site of the corner established in 1882 by McElroy, the government surveyor, as the northwest corner of the section, we should find for the defendant." It was found from the evidence, as it then stood, that the "Ball corner," mentioned in the above quotation, was not shown to be the location of the corner established by the surveyor, McElroy. The additional evidence taken by the referee relates mostly to this question, and he finds that the evidence establishes the identity of the so-called "Ball corner" with the corner established by the surveyor, McElroy. The referee appears to have given unusual attention and care in the investigation of the case, and in his report he says:

"Two theories are admissible: (1) That McElroy established the Ball corner as the northwest corner of the

section; (2) that McElroy established the northwest corner a mile west of the Ball corner.

"The second theory is supported by evidence and circumstances worthy of consideration, but it is, in my judgment, completely overborne by the proofs adduced in support of the first theory. The evidence given at the first trial, plus that produced at the second trial, preponderates greatly in favor of defendant's contention, and fully satisfies me that the truth is the Ball corner was the first interior section corner established by McElroy in the 1882 survey of township 30. All the original section corners and some of the quarter-section corners on the north line of the southern tier of sections in township 30, west of the Ball corner, are now satisfactorily located by the evidence, and are shown to bear a proper relation to the Ball corner, assuming it to be the northwest corner of section 36. The corner at the bend of Snake creek, about four miles north of a point one mile west of the Ball corner, is now proved with practical certainty to be the government corner for sections 2, 3, 10 and 11. No corners have been found on the line described in the McElroy field notes running north from the southwest corner of section 36. It further appears from the testimony of old settlers that in early days the government corner five miles west of the Ball corner was understood to mark the west boundary of the township.

"These salient facts, well established, as I think, by the evidence now in the record, make a revision of the former finding with respect to the location of the northwest corner of section 36 imperative. It would not be possible to present within reasonable bounds any condensation of the great mass of evidence given at the trial that would materially aid the court in dealing with exceptions to this report. To give a just impression of its value, it would be necessary to set out an abstract of it. Perhaps I have given too much weight to some and too little to other testimony, but, as a result of it all, I feel fully convinced, in the light of the new evidence, that the court was wrong in

holding that the Ball corner was not established by McElroy as the northwest corner of section 36.

"I further find that McElroy, in making the interior survey of township 30, ran a line due north from the southwest corner of section 36, 40 chains, to the edge of the Boardman marsh where a mound was erected. He did not, however, cross the marsh, but went around it, and established the Ball corner on the assumption, doubtless, that it was half a mile north of the mound erected on the south side of the marsh. From this corner he ran straight lines north and south, and thus fixed the boundaries of section 36 as a tract containing approximately 480 acres. In other words, he eliminated by error what would have been the northwest quarter of the section had it been of statutory dimensions.

"But if the state's claim with respect to the location of the northwest corner of section 36 were conceded, the judgment should, nevertheless, in my opinion, go in favor of the defendant. To deprive him of the property in dispute under the admitted facts would, it seems to me, be altogether unconscionable. I do not see how it can be done without disregarding entirely maxims of equity which are and ought to be of universal application. The state, as a suitor in its own court, is bound by self-imposed bonds to accord to an adversary the full measure of justice which it claims for itself. It cannot, under equitable principles, demand equity without offering to do equity. Year by year, from 1904 to 1912, acting through its duly constituted agents, it collected taxes from defendant as the owner of the land in dispute and expended them for public purposes. It has never made restitution; it has never offered to make restitution. It is here asking this court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, to award to it the land patented to defendant by the general government, while all the time holding fast to the money which defendant paid it on the assumption that the property was his. It has not offered to do equity, and has, therefore, no just claim to equitable relief.

"The equitable doctrine of laches stands also in the state's way. Not only by its affirmative action in taking and using money collected from defendant as taxes, but by its long inertia as well, it has forfeited the right to invoke equitable intervention in its behalf. Not only has defendant expended money and labor upon the property in the justifiable belief that it was his, but with the lapse of time and the death, dispersion and loss of memory of witnesses, the difficulties of establishing his claim of ownership have been very materially enhanced. His plight is far worse now than it was at the time when the state ought, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, to have commenced this suit. I do not think the fact that school lands are, by the constitution, set apart for educational uses absolves the state, wherever they are involved, from the obligation of equitable doctrines. The state has a proprietary interest in school lands and is bound to devote them to a specific purpose—one of the many purposes which it is organized to carry into execution. It is true that the state has declared itself to be a trustee for school lands, fines, penalties and forfeitures. This means merely that it has resolved to dedicate certain of its own property and funds to educational uses; but, conceding that the court is here dealing with a technical trust, that fact cannot influence the decision. I have never understood that the existence of a trust of any character was sufficient to free either the trustee, the *cestui que trust*, or the chancellor from the obligations imposed by sound morality.

"My conclusion upon the whole case is that the petition should be dismissed and all costs taxed to the state."

The case has been thoroughly briefed and ably presented, both on the part of the state and on the part of the defendant, and the evidence as to this location of this section corner by the surveyor, McElroy, in the original survey has been thoroughly analyzed and carefully presented. The question is not without difficulty, and we realize the force of the suggestion of the referee that both

theories are worthy of discussion and careful consideration. We think, however, the conclusion of the referee upon this point is supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Having reached this conclusion, we do not find it necessary to consider and discuss the questions suggested as to estoppel and laches, and desire to modify our former opinion in that respect so far as to leave those questions undetermined.

Upon the main question above stated, the report of the referee is approved and confirmed, and judgment entered for the defendant accordingly.

DECREE FOR DEFENDANT.

ROSE, J., dissenting.

After a full hearing and a careful consideration of the evidence, without the aid of a referee, a decree in favor of plaintiff was entered at a former term. *State v. Ball*, 90 Neb. 307. In my judgment the findings on the first trial were correct. I do not agree with the referee and the majority that the newly discovered evidence requires a different judgment. The exceptions should be sustained. I also dissent from that part of the majority opinion opening the questions of estoppel and laches for future consideration. The doctrine that petty administrative officers by means of unauthorized acts can dispose of state school land in violation of provisions of the constitution should never be sanctioned. If the constitutional and statutory system of holding and controlling school land may be substituted for unauthorized acts of taxing officers, who can tell whether any land belongs to the permanent school funds? Is morality in this respect to be the test of the rights of the state as intimated by the referee? Are ideas of unwritten, indefinable moral obligations, floating in the inner consciousness of judges, and arising from conflicting testimony of litigants, to be the means of depriving the sovereign of school land? Is trespass to be substituted for law? Unless there is some idea

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that constitutional government administered by written statutes is to be abandoned in a material respect, the questions of estoppel and laches, as announced in the former opinion, should not be open to further controversy.

Estoppel and laches are properly applied to rational persons who have the power to contract and to act in all their dealings as free agents, but those doctrines have no application to a sovereign having only power to act through departments and officers whose duties and powers are limited and defined by written statutes. Individuals are not wronged by applying to the state a rule which does not apply to them, because the powers, duties and acts of officers are shown by public records available to all. Courts ought not to assume in advance that the state will be immoral in its administrative dealings in regard to its school land. The legislature, if asked, will enact proper laws to correct any wrong or to appropriate money to pay any proper claim. In the meantime the attorney general should assert the rights of the state as they exist under present institutions. Any other view disregards the philosophy on which constitutional government administered by means of written statutes is founded. I am therefore compelled to dissent from that part of the majority opinion opening the questions of estoppel and laches.

BARNES, J., concurs in dissent.

WILLIAM M. MORNING, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF LINCOLN,
APPELLEE.

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 16,968.

1. **Municipal Corporations: STREETS: DEDICATION.** Land cannot be dedicated to the public for a street by deed, unless such deed is executed by the owner of the land. If there are outstanding liens which afterward ripen into full title, such attempted dedication by the owner of the equity of redemption alone, without the knowledge or consent of the lien-holder, will be of no effect.

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2. ———: ———: ———: **ESTOPPEL.** If the deed of dedication is not recorded, and the holder of such lien has no notice of the existence of the deed, or that there is any claim of right on the part of the public or of any individual to use the land as a street, the fact of such user will not estop the lien-holder to deny that he consented to such dedication.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
LINCOLN FROST, JUDGE. *Reversed with directions.*

Morning & Ledwith, for appellant.

Fred C. Foster and D. H. McClenahan, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

The plaintiff began this action in the district court for Lancaster county against this defendant to quiet his title in a certain city lot described in the petition, and to cancel a deed of dedication executed by a former owner of the lot. The district court entered a decree in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.

The petition alleges that one Lizzie E. Reeves was formerly the owner of the lot in question, and neglected to pay the county and city taxes assessed thereon for the year 1889, and subsequent taxes, and that on the 29th day of November, 1890, the lot was duly sold at a regular tax sale, according to law, and that the Farmers Loan & Trust Company purchased the lot at that sale, and afterwards the purchaser paid the subsequent taxes and foreclosed its lien for taxes and a decree of foreclosure was duly entered, and pursuant thereto the lot was duly and regularly sold by the sheriff of the county under the order of the court, the sale confirmed, and a deed duly ordered, executed and delivered to the Farmers Loan & Trust Company. The deed was regularly recorded in the proper office on the 23d day of August, 1898. The plaintiff purchased the lot from the Farmers Loan & Trust Company, and in July, 1902, the said company executed a deed of conveyance to the plaintiff conveying the said lot, which deed was duly recorded in August, 1902. In December,

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1890, the said Reeves executed a deed of dedication dedicating the lot to the public as a street. This deed by some oversight was not recorded until in June, 1906. These allegations are admitted in the answer, and are not controverted in the evidence. There is evidence tending to show that the lot has been for many years more or less used by the public, but there is no evidence that the plaintiff ever consented to such use, or that the plaintiff, prior to the year 1906, knew or had any reason to suppose that the lot had been dedicated to the public, or that it was being used as a street under any claim of dedication or other right. Under these circumstances, it seems clear that the plaintiff's interest and title in the lot has not been acquired by the public or affected by the attempted dedication and user. In *Warren v. Brown*, 31 Neb. 8, 19, it is said: "To establish the existence of a public road by dedication by deed, it must appear that the grantor was the owner of the lands when the dedication was made." In *Gate City v. Richmond*, 97 Va. 337, 33 S. E. 615, it is held that one who holds only the equity of redemption has no power to make a valid dedication of the land to public use. In that case the owner of the land executed a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage and afterwards sold his equity of redemption, and it was held that the purchaser had no power to dedicate the land to public use. In *Hays v. Perkins*, 109 Mo. 102, 18 S. W. 1127, the owner of the land attempted to make a dedication to public use while there was a judgment against him which was a lien upon the land. The court said: "Hays could not, by laying the land off into lots and streets, affect the lien of the judgment. As against this judgment the plat could not operate as a dedication of the streets to public use. The sale when made related back to the date of the judgment and thus defeated the dedication."

In the case at bar there was not only a valid lien for taxes of at least as high a grade as the lien of a judgment, but the land had actually been sold by virtue of the lien, and the interest so acquired in the land afterwards ripened

l Co. v. Omaha Coal & Building Supply Co.

. Surely the owner of the equity of
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rest in the land superior to his own,
nese interests. There is no evidence
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ink this suggestion makes the reason
; for if the owner of the equity of re-
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eat prior liens, although they were
ie of the land.

e district court is reversed and the
h directions to enter a decree for the

REVERSED.

COMPANY, APPELLEE, v. OMAHA COAL
SUPPLY COMPANY, APPELLANT.

MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,055.

ICT. The trial court should not submit a cause
here is such a substantial conflict in the evi-
ue presented that a finding of the jury for
be sustained. If the court would be required
ct for defendant, upon the pleadings and evi-
the plaintiff should be directed.

n the pleadings and evidence stated in the
urt rightly directed a verdict in favor of the

district court for Douglas county:
DGE. *Affirmed.*

dy, for appellant.

and J. W. Woodrough, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

The defendant is a corporation, and since the commencement of the transaction involved in this litigation has changed its corporate name, perhaps more than once. The plaintiff was engaged in the manufacture of Cleveland expanded metal lath, at Cleveland, Ohio, and in December, 1907, the defendant, in the name of the "Omaha Coal & Building Supply Company," entered into contract with the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff made the defendant its exclusive agent for the city of Omaha for the sale of its lath. In this contract the plaintiff agreed to furnish the lath at the price and on the terms named in the contract, and it was also agreed that the contract was subject to cancelation by either party upon 60 days' notice. Afterwards, the defendant ordered a car-load of the lath, which was duly shipped by the plaintiff and received on or about the 28th day of January, 1908. The plaintiff brought this action to recover the contract price for the lath, and, upon trial in the district court for Douglas county, the court directed the jury to find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the amount claimed, and, judgment having been entered, the defendant has appealed.

The defendant, in its answer, admitted the contract and the receipt of the lath as above stated, and alleged that before making the contract, and "as consideration for which defendant was to accept said offer, and as a representation of fact relied upon by the defendant, upon which defendant's acceptance of said offer was based, the plaintiff, through its agents and servants, deceitfully, knowingly and fraudulently stated and represented to the defendant that said Cleveland expanded metal lath was suitable for and reasonably fit for general building use in the city of Omaha, and in such territory immediately adjacent thereto as the defendant sought to cover in its sales; and that said Cleveland expanded lath was as serviceable and as marketable, and as reasonably fit for use as the Herringbone lath, which latter lath has been satisfactorily

places where defendant company
for a number of years; and that
metal lath, which in its manu-
sented is made to be placed on
atisfactorily serviceable and rea-
cular use." The supposed failure
and represented is alleged in the

"Said lath was not and is not
t for general building use in the
commercial territory contiguous
Said lath was not and is not as
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the allegations of the answer as
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or the defendant upon the plead-
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uld not be submitted to the jury,
l by the court.

opinion stated, in effect, that the

Garry Iron & Steel Co. v. Omaha Coal & Building Supply Co.

evidence showed without any substantial conflict that the lath in question "is one of general use * * * all over the country * * * and has a value known and accepted among builders and the trade." There is evidence tending to show that this lath had not been used at all in Omaha, and that the defendant had no knowledge whatever of the Cleveland expanded metal lath at the time it entered into the contract, but this is not in conflict with the evidence of the dozen or more witnesses who testify that this lath was in general use in St. Louis, Kansas City, San Francisco, Cleveland, and other cities throughout the country.

The trial court also concluded "that the defendant at the time the contract was made had a general knowledge of metallic lathing." The defendant says that this is erroneous, because the evidence shows "that not only was the defendant unfamiliar with Cleveland expanded metal lath, but that it had not handled any metal lath." We think the evidence shows beyond question that the defendant at the time of entering into this contract had a general knowledge of metallic lathing. Mr. Monaghan, the defendant's manager, who ordered the goods in question, testified that he had never seen or known of that lath at that time, and that no member of the defendant company had, but he also testified: "We had sold it (metal lath) and bought it from others, and were familiar with the stock lath, but did not carry it ourselves. If we got a call for metal lath, we got it from those who had it and delivered it, and in that way dealt with it, but not extensively. In that way I had informed myself of the different kinds of lath on the market, and what its purposes were, and what it was adapted to, and what it ought to look like, and how it ought to feel, whether it was stiff or not, and how it was used." The evidence shows that metal lath was very much used in Omaha, and that the defendant was then, and had been for a long time, engaged in dealing in building materials, including metal lath, and the witness was no doubt correct in saying that

informed of the different kinds of lath, uses were, and what it was adapted to, to look like, and how it ought to feel, for or not, and how it was used.

The trial court was right in concluding in the value for building purposes corrugated lath and that in question is herein one might be better for certain depending largely upon the conclusion it." The defendant admitted the concept of the property, and had the burden of the alleged defense. Two grades of lath were purchased, called 24 gauge and 27 gauge. The defendant testified that "the 24 gauge is thicker lath." The defendant offered no evidence of any difference in the use of these grades of lath. We can find no evidence whether it is contended that the 24 gauge is more effective or whether there is any difference, or whether the respective grades were used under different conditions and were used as in-

called two witnesses who testified as to the use of lath. Mr. Anderson, who had been in the plastering contract business for 20 years, testified that he was familiar with the character of lath used in Omaha; that in general the distudding and joists is 16 inches, but in some places are what are called 12-inch centers; that the Cleveland lath on the Omaha Gas Works was used, and found "it would take too much mortar to cover it, so we did not use it any more than about 50 yards on 16-inch centers. The lath was not flexible. When we applied the mortar on from the ceiling, and it would take a great deal of mortar to fill up the depressions left on the ceiling. The lath bagged down after we had to fill the whole surface in

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order to get it even with the bagged places to make the surface level. This required the use of more plaster. Double tying means when you tie for 16-inch centers between the joists. We double tied this lath. We do not have to tie the Herringbone lath at all. It will stand without tying, but the Cleveland lath will not. After we found how the Cleveland lath operated, we refused to use any more of it." He also stated: "I don't consider it worth anything for 16-inch centers; I lost more material and labor than what the difference is between the Herringbone and this lath, or about such an amount." He said: "There was no value to it." When asked what was the market value, he answered: "The only thing I know about the market value is what they ask for it when they sell it. I think that was 16 to 17 cents per square yard. * * * It was valueless to me. Q. Well, how about the trade generally beside yourself? A. I considered it for every man that used it, it was valueless. Q. You mean by that without market value? A. Yes." On cross-examination he testified that he used the Cleveland lath afterwards, and paid the regular price for it. The other witness called by the defendant was Mr. Rice, who testified that he had been in the plastering business for 40 years, and "saw the Cleveland lath on the Hanson restaurant on Sixteenth street." The lath was on before he saw it, and they could not plaster on it at all. "We had to give the lathers extra time for the work. The lath required more labor than ordinarily. The extra cost of mortar and labor required in using the Cleveland lath amounted to one-third more than in the case of the use of any other lath I ever used." They made no attempt to state which grade of the Cleveland lath they used, nor the conditions under which they used it, nor any defect in its material, manufacture or design. They stated conclusions, and their evidence shows that they are stating matters of opinion, and not facts from which the jury might draw a conclusion.

The plaintiff called Mr. Dietz as witness, who testified that he had been a lather for 27 years, and had used large

quantities of material, lathing 18,000 yards on one building. He had used the Pittsburg and Herringbone and Cleveland lath. He named several important buildings on which he had used the Cleveland lath. He described the Herringbone lath as follows: "The Herringbone lath is awfully weak. In fact, you can't use it on 16-inch centers. It is like a lot of ribs, and will break if you bend it. You can bend the Cleveland lath in any way you want. It's heavier and stiffer. To my estimation it is 100 per cent. better than Herringbone lath. The Herringbone lath is too weak and will sag if you put it on 16-inch centers, or ceilings, or partitions, and, if you get mortar on it, it will sag down. It is almost impossible to use it on 16-inch centers. The Cleveland lath is better in every way, and I have never had any trouble with it. I have no interest in this case." Mr. Sparks had been a plasterer about 16 years, and he testifies that "Cleveland lath is very superior to the Herringbone lath in regard to stiffness, and in requiring less mortar, less time for workmen, and that the Cleveland lath, when used on 16-inch centers, will give good results, being heavier and stiffer than the Herringbone lath, and that, when putting mortar on the Herringbone lath, it will drop back and go through, which is not the case with the Cleveland lath, and that the Cleveland lath is the best for general use and for all purposes the witness ever used lath." Several other witnesses for the plaintiff testified to the same effect.

It will be noticed that none of the defendant's witnesses testified to any defect in the lath in its material, manufacture, workmanship, or design. The evidence is without conflict that this lath is in general use in many places; that it is regarded by contractors and builders as a standard article; and that there is a variety of opinion as to which of several kinds of metal lath is the most desirable, depending, so far as this evidence shows, upon the kind of work that is being done and the conditions and circumstances under which it is used. After the defendant had received the lath in question, which was in January, 1908,

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there was considerable correspondence between them as to the merits of the lath and the price of the market and the payment of the claim. The letter to the plaintiff on the 15th of May stated that the defendant had paid the plaintiff on the account, and under date of May 26 the defendant stated that the market in Omaha on metal lath declined 2 cents per yard, and that the defendant was making concessions in price until the profit amounted to 1 cent but had failed to get the business; that the lath was being sold on the market at 14 cents per yard less than, or practically equal to, the cost of the defendant, and that the defendant would be unable to handle the lath on a margin of $\frac{1}{2}$ a cent a yard and would not afford to sell it below cost. The letter of the 26th of May will endeavor to introduce this lath in this market, and it seems only justly fair that you should make a concession in prices to us. The lath is thought very satisfactory by contractors who have used it. It answers very satisfactory on 12-in. centers, but does not answer as well on 16-in. centers. The Herringbone lath is the ideal lath on 16-in. centers, and especially for special work. On exterior work, the Garry lath is giving very satisfactory results. Now, consider this matter carefully from a business standpoint, and advise us as soon as you can make our price at Omaha the same as we are getting at Cleveland. I am almost certain that you will be able to enable us to get the business, and at least meet the price quoted by Sunderland Bros. on Herringbone lath. We want to introduce this metal lath in Omaha at a price a little more favorable than that price at which the Herringbone lath is sold." The letter of May 26 shows that the defendant had investigated and tested the lath and that what was claimed to be a point in favor of the Herringbone lath, and also points in favor of the lath made by the plaintiff, and amounts to an admission that the lath made by the plaintiff was a compliance with their contract.

Under these conditions, the general state

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witnesses that they were dissatisfied with the lath and preferred to use some other manufacture would not support a finding that the lath was defective, or that the defendant had in any way violated the terms of its contract.

The district court was therefore right in instructing the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff, and the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

PETER D. THOMSEN, APPELLEE, v. BERNHARD J. JOBST,
APPELLANT.

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,062.

1. **Master and Servant: DANGEROUS APPLIANCES: ASSUMPTION OF RISK.**

The general rule is that an employee who, without objection on his part, works under dangerous conditions, with full knowledge of the danger incurred by him in so doing, will be held to have assumed the risk. But when the employer, who also knows the dangerous conditions, orders the employee to so perform the work notwithstanding his protest, and enforces the order with threats of discharge from employment, and himself stands by and directs the employee in doing the dangerous work, he will not afterwards be heard to say that the employee assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory negligence in obeying his orders.

2. ———: ———: **NEGLIGENCE OF MASTER.** The master is not necessarily negligent because he uses such machinery or appliances as are not in general use. But when he requires an implement to be used in a dangerous manner, under dangerous conditions and surroundings, and in a manner and under conditions more dangerous than the usual method, he may be guilty of negligence in so doing.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
HOWARD KENNEDY, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Greene, Breckenridge, Gurley & Woodrough, for appellant.

Weaver & Giller, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

The plaintiff recovered a judgment in the district court for Douglas county for damages on account of injuries sustained while in the service of the defendant. The defendant has appealed.

There is little, if any, conflict in the testimony. The record discloses the following facts: The defendant, at the time the accident in question occurred, was a contractor and builder, carrying on his business in the city of Omaha. The plaintiff was a carpenter some 35 years of age, having had many years' experience in that line of work, and having been employed by the defendant from time to time. On the 17th day of May, 1909, plaintiff was working for the defendant, who was just completing a contract for the erection of a six-story warehouse for the Moline Plow Company. The job was completed, with the exception of a small amount of finishing in a showroom, situated in the sixth story of the building. The unfinished work required the nailing of some short pieces of molding around the top of a wooden post which was from 14 to 16 feet high. One Rasmus Nelson, who was defendant's foreman in charge of the construction work, told plaintiff to finish the top of the post. Plaintiff testified that he said to Nelson: "Ain't I going to have a scaffold for that?" Nelson said: "A man that can't work on that stepladder can't work on this building." Plaintiff thereupon placed a stepladder, which had been constructed on the premises by himself and a fellow workman, and with some tools and the pieces of molding, which had been sawed for the purpose of finishing the post, ascended to the top of the ladder, and, while standing in that position, commenced to nail the pieces of molding in place. Nelson stood by directing the work, and called his attention to the fact that one piece of the molding was not straight. Plaintiff attempted to fit the molding, and in so doing pushed the stepladder away with his feet. He caught hold of the molding, but

enough to hold his weight, and he fell thus sustained the injuries of which he

he testified that the use of a stepladder and one of his witnesses stated that it was a man ought not to use it at all. This however, that it was possible to do the use of a stepladder, but that a man ought not to be as careful of himself as he the plaintiff admitted that he knew the use was dangerous, but stated that he used it not want to lose his job. Defendant testified that it was customary to use a step-ladder pieces of molding, like those in question, at a scaffold was not required, and was used for such a purpose, unless large amounts of molding were to be fastened in place. It was the defendant upon the hearing that the evidence was not sufficient to render defendant liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, and the court erred in refusing to direct the jury to find in his favor.

The stepladder is generally considered to be one of the tools that any workman is supposed to know. There are many cases holding that one who uses a tool cannot be heard to say that they did not know it was dangerous, and that he was not aware of the condition here. Plaintiff testified that the use of the stepladder under the circumstances was dangerous, and, under ordinary circumstances, he would be held to have assumed the risk of so using it. The defendant also admits that the evidence in the case from which it was determined that, under the circumstances, to use the stepladder it was used was dangerous. The question to determine is: Can the defendant now prove that plaintiff knew the danger that he assumed that he assumed the risk and was

guilty of contributory negligence?

In *Lee v. Smart*, 45 Neb. 318, it is said: "Where the servant, in obedience to the requirements of his master, incurs the risk of machinery or appliances which, although dangerous, are not of such a character as to threaten immediate injury, or where it is reasonably probable that they may be safely used by extraordinary caution and skill, the master will be liable for a resulting accident." This conclusion appears to be derived from the language used in *Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Finlayson*, 16 Neb. 578. Several other opinions of this court are cited as upholding this doctrine. The reason of this exception from the general rule is not stated in the opinion in *Lee v. Smart, supra*. The court appears to rely upon the authorities cited as a sufficient support for the holding. In that case it was conceded that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the dangerous character of the implement used, and yet the defendant was not allowed to defeat his action on the ground that he had either assumed the risk or had been guilty of contributory negligence. It is difficult to perceive how these former cases can be distinguished from the case at bar. If the defendant is not allowed to assert assumption of risk or contributory negligence because he has promised to remedy the defect in the dangerous implement, and so induces the plaintiff to continue its use, why should he be allowed to rely upon such defenses when he has insisted that the defendant shall continue to use the dangerous implement, and has induced him to do so by a threat of this nature, and not only that, but has stood by and directed him in the dangerous use of the implement. See *Sapp v. Christie Bros.*, 79 Neb. 701, and note to *Lowe Mfg. Co. v. Payne*, 30 L. R. A. n. s. 442.

The defendant complains that evidence was received over his objection "that some other way of conducting the business than that which was used was usual and customary." In *Central Granaries Co. v. Ault*, 75 Neb. 249, 255, it was upon rehearing held that the master is not necessarily negligent because he uses such machinery and appliances as are not in common use. It is thought that

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such a rule would tend to prevent the adoption of better and safer tools and appliances. The holding of the trial court is not inconsistent with *Central Granaries Co. v. Ault, supra*. The evidence admitted in the case at bar was not that the implement used was not in common use. It was to the effect that it was not customary to use a stepladder in work of this nature, under conditions there existing, and that the method used was more dangerous than the ordinary one, and this is clearly competent under the rule as stated in *Central Granaries Co. v. Ault, supra*.

The case is very close upon the facts presented, but we cannot say that the findings of the jury are so clearly wrong as to require a reversal. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

BARNES, J., dissenting.

I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority. The record in this case clearly shows that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by his own negligence in using a stepladder, which the opinion concedes is an ordinary appliance, simple in its nature and construction; one which the testimony shows is customarily used in performing the particular work required of plaintiff, and on which he was engaged at the time his injuries occurred. The ladder was not defective or in any manner out of repair, and its use was entirely familiar to plaintiff, who was a skilled and experienced mechanic. If he had used the ladder with ordinary care, the work required of him could have been safely performed. In such a case the great weight of authority is that the master is not liable for the servant's injuries. *Vanderpool v. Partridge*, 79 Neb. 165; *Marsh v. Chickering*, 101 N. Y. 396; *Sweeney v. Berlin & Jones Envelope Co.*, 101 N. Y. 520; *Standard Oil Co. v. Helmick*, 148 Ind. 457; *Cahill v. Hilton*, 106 N. Y. 512; *Borden v. Daisy Roller Mill Co.*, 98 Wis. 407; *Sellers v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 87 Neb. 322. The majority opinion seems to be founded upon the rule announced in *Lee v. Smart*, 45

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Neb. 318; *Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Finlayson*, 16 Neb. 578, and *Sapp v. Christie Bros.*, 79 Neb. 701.

It should be observed that in *Lee v. Smart, supra*, it appears that the plaintiff was injured by reason of a defective wagon brake. He had called the master's attention to the defect, and had been told that he could safely use the wagon because the streets were level. Afterwards the defendant sent the plaintiff across the bridge spanning the Missouri river at Omaha, with this wagon heavily loaded with green lumber. The plaintiff had never driven over the bridge, and therefore was not aware of its condition. When he reached a point near the Iowa end of the bridge, and while attempting to hold the wagon from descending a sharp incline, his team got beyond his control, and, as a result, his injuries occurred. It was held that the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury, and a judgment in his favor was affirmed.

In *Sapp v. Christie Bros., supra*, defendants furnished the plaintiff with a light wagon for use in delivering goods and wares about the city of South Omaha. The wagon was not then, and never had been, provided with a brake. The neck-yoke which the plaintiff was required to use appeared to be somewhat old and season-cracked, and the "pole-eye" or leather attachment in which the end of the wagon pole is inserted was considerably worn and weakened. It appears, however, that the neck-yoke was repaired to some extent with baling wire, and the plaintiff was told that the defendants were rushed with business just then, but that, when they got up with their orders, they would have things fixed a little better. Plaintiff began work on Monday morning, when the foregoing conversation took place. He remained in his employment continuously until about noon of the following Thursday, when he attempted to deliver a load of feed to one Mc-Masters. The shed or stable to which the delivery was to be made stood adjoining an alley extending through a block of ground, and connecting two streets. It was a

public way, much used and traveled, but the surface of the ground was some 10 or 12 feet lower where the building stood than was that of the street whence the plaintiff approached it. Plaintiff sitting on the wagon, reined his team into the alley, and started down the incline. In some manner the end of the neck-yoke, to which the hame straps were attached, broke off while the wagon was descending, and that end fell down; immediately the leather "pole-eye" gave way, the pole dropped to the ground, struck an obstruction, bent and broke, and a piece of it flew upward and hit the plaintiff and knocked him from the seat, inflicting the injuries complained of. In that case a judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. But it must be observed that the defects of which plaintiff complained were called to the attention of the defendants, and there was a promise to repair.

In *Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Finlayson*, *supra*, the plaintiff was an engineer in the employ of the defendant company. He was furnished with a defective engine, and, by reason of the defects, an explosion occurred by which the plaintiff was severely injured. The defendant's attention had been directed to the condition of the engine, and there had been a promise to repair. The plaintiff had judgment, which was affirmed by the supreme court, and it was said: "If an employer knowingly furnishes an employee defective machinery with which to work, and which machinery, though dangerous, is not of such character that it may not be reasonably used by the use of care, skill, and diligence, and the employee, in obedience to the requirements of the employer, uses and operates such dangerous machinery carefully and skilfully, believing there is no immediate danger, and when it is reasonably probable it can be safely operated with such care, the employee does not assume the risk, and if he is injured by such machinery without fault or negligence on his part, the employer will be held liable for the damages resulting from such injury."

It should be observed that the foregoing cases are ex-

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ceptions to the general rule; and it is apparent that the facts of this case are not the same as those upon which the rule in those cases is founded. As I view the case, in order to affirm the judgment of the district court, the majority have taken an additional step in the direction of declaring the existence, in this state, of an employer's liability law. Our legislature, so far, has not seen fit to abrogate the common-law rules by which the liability of the master to the servant have heretofore been determined. Until the adoption of what is known as an employer's liability law, I feel that we should adhere to the common-law rule, as declared by the great weight of authority in this country. I am therefore of opinion that the defendant's motion to direct a verdict in his favor should have been sustained.

For the foregoing reasons, I am of opinion that the judgment of the district court should be reversed.

FAWCETT, J., concurs in this dissent.

ROBERT J. TATE, APPELLANT, V. ROBERT F. KLOKE,
APPELLEE.

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,092.

1. **Contracts: CONSTRUCTION.** Effect must be given to a written memorandum and deed executed pursuant thereto as one transaction, in the light of the facts as they existed at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed.
2. **Appeal: TRIAL DE NOVO: DECREE.** The issues presented by appeal to this court in a suit in equity must be tried *de novo*, and a proper decree entered or directed. Upon the issues and evidence stated in the opinion, the decree of the district court is reversed, and decree directed in favor of the plaintiff.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county.
ALEXANDER C. TROUP, JUDGE. *Reversed with directions.*

Tivan, Edmund C. Strode, Jesse L. Root, et al, for appellant.

Ansom and A. S. Churchill, contra.

plaintiff was in the real estate business, review, Pierce county, and the defendant was of a bank at West Point, and was residing

Under an agreement between them they purchased several tracts of land in Pierce county. The plaintiff advanced the money for these purchases, and the defendant sold the land purchased in his name. The plaintiff was to receive one-half of the proceeds in the sale and purchase of the land, and that after allowing the defendant, out of the proceeds of the sale of the land, the money which he had advanced for the purchase thereof, together with interest thereon, the net proceeds should be equally divided between them. In October, 1903, they purchased a tract of 240 acres, the N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ and the E. $\frac{1}{2}$ of N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$ of a section 36, T. 12 N., R. 10 E., S. 1, in Pierce county, at a cost to them, after deducting the plaintiff's commission as real estate agent, of \$1,400. A few days later they purchased the remaining

N. $\frac{1}{4}$ of the section at the price of \$1,400. When the land was disposed of, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant had not actually paid to him his one-half of the net profits. The district court for Douglas county, the plaintiff, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff

was not sold in tracts as it was purchased, the N. $\frac{1}{4}$ of the section was first sold, and after the E. $\frac{1}{2}$. There is some controversy between the parties as to the sale of each of these quarters, but no controversy related to the last sale of the section. While the parties held this land, they entered into a partnership in the real estate

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business with one Engler who had formerly been the cashier of the defendant's bank, and they conducted real estate business in the name of Tate & Engler at Plainview for some time, and undertook to sell this half section of land. The contention in regard to the sale of the N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$ will be considered later. The plaintiff contends that, after the relation between himself and the defendant had been somewhat changed by the forming of the new partnership with Mr. Engler, it was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that Tate & Engler might sell the N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$, and have for their services in so doing all that they could obtain therefor over and above \$5,450. The defendant denies this agreement, and this constitutes the main controversy between the parties.

The plaintiff and Mr. Engler both testify positively to this agreement and understanding between the parties, and the defendant as positively denies that any such agreement or understanding was ever had. These three men appear to have had confidence in each other. This evidence shows that they were not very careful in making their contracts. The business was mostly done in general conversation. No writings were at any time executed between them, and it is not unusual, under such circumstances, that there should be honest misunderstanding. The conflict in their testimony does not appear to be in regard to the facts, nor in regard to the language used by them in their various talks about the matter. Each appears to have misunderstood the other's meaning, and this led to their subsequent difficulty. It does not appear to us to be a case of fraud or false swearing. Tate & Engler found a purchaser for this N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ in one Heyn, who, it appears, agreed to purchase it for \$6,400. They told the defendant that they had a purchaser for the land, and asked him to convey the land to them, according to their understanding, for \$5,450. After some conversation in regard to the matter, the defendant agreed to do so, and they paid to him \$500 thereon, and the defendant executed and delivered to them the following

Tate v Klocke.

West Point, Nebr., Oct. 23d, 1905. Re-
agler \$500 as part payment for the pur-
east quarter of section 17, township 27,
\$5,450, and to assume a mortgage of
d drawing interest at the rate of 5%.
to be paid in cash on March 1st, 1906,
ge of \$1,400 drawing 6% interest. To
fore March 1st, 1906. (Signed) R. F.
n resided near West Point, and was
he defendant, and apparently had be-
nsacted some business with him. The
ed that they were obtaining \$6,400 for
Heyn, and then it appeared that there
l understanding between the defendant and
regard to this quarter section of land.
isted that he had consented that the
l for \$5,450, if that was the best price
ined. The plaintiff contended that it
at Tate & Engler should have the land
for their services in finding a purchaser
le should have all they could obtain for
agreed price of \$5,450. On account of
ling the sale to Mr. Heyn failed. The
that the above memorandum was pro-
d misrepresentation, in concealing from
which the land had been contracted.
n, the original agreement between the
dant contemplated that the lands pur-
aken in the name of the defendant, and,
be by him deeded to the purchaser. The
at, in making this agreement to deed
to Tate & Engler, he supposed that it
hether it was so deeded or deeded by
e purchaser, and that he did not par-
why they desired to have the deed to
l of to the purchaser. However that
s that the defendant retained the \$500,
e afterwards, and after he had full in-

formation of the claim of the plaintiff an understanding of their agreement, he pursuant to the memorandum which he has as a final disposition of the whole cannot now say that the deed and the memorandum of which the deed was given to Tate procured by fraud. This memorandum consistent with the plaintiff's understanding, and are wholly inconsistent with claim.

There is not much conflict in the evidence as to the disposal of the N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$ of the section exchanged this quarter, taking an 80-acre county in part payment. The defendant was the purchaser, and recited in the deed \$6,000. The defendant testifies that Moore had the opportunity to make the exchange, but they were taking the 80 acres of land in Cass County and they would make the quarter section of land for \$5,000. The defendant now insists that he was to have all of the difference between the price of this quarter section of land and the price to him agreed upon. The agreement between Moore and the defendant as to the sale of this quarter was, as usual between parties, somewhat indefinitely expressed, but we think from the construction of the language used is that, the quarter for the 80 acres of land, the price of the quarter for the purpose of settlement should be considered as \$5,000. The N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$ having been purchased together for \$6,000 gross, and the remaining eighty per cent of the price paid for the respective quarters being a matter of estimate. It was impracticable to say definitely the price for each quarter section separately. None of the parties could state definitely the amount paid for taxes and other expenses, and it is difficult to determine accurately what the net profit of

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action was. However, giving the defendant the benefit of his own testimony in regard to these expenses, we find from the evidence that the defendant paid for the three eighties \$6,600, and for the other 80 acres \$1,400, making \$8,000 paid for the half section. The defendant, according to his testimony, should be allowed about \$1,210 for interest on the money he invested and for taxes paid by him. He received for the N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$ \$5,000, and for the N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ \$5,450, and collected rents on the land amounting to \$324.35, leaving a net profit of \$1,564.35. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to one-half of this net profit, with interest thereon at 7 per cent. per annum from their settlement, March 1, 1906.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded, with instruction to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff as above indicated.

REVERSED.

HAMER, J., dissenting in part, and concurring in the conclusion.

The majority opinion finds 320 acres of land bought by the plaintiff and defendant for \$8,000; and the title taken in the name of the defendant, Kloke, who was a bank president, and who furnished the money under an agreement that he was to have one-half of the net profits when the property should be sold. The plaintiff formed a partnership in the real estate business with one Engler under the name of Tate & Engler, and after he had made the arrangement with Kloke. Tate & Engler undertook to sell part of the land, the N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$, and plaintiff contends it was agreed between him and the plaintiff that Tate & Engler might sell this particular quarter, and for their services for selling it were to have whatever they could obtain over and above \$5,450. The defendant testified that he consented the land might be sold for \$5,450, if that was the best price that could be obtained for it. The plaintiff, Tate, and Engler, his partner, testified that no such an agreement was made. Tate & Engler found a

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purchaser for this N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ at \$6,400, a Mr. Heyn, and a writing was signed by the defendant, in which he acknowledged the receipt from Tate & Engler of \$500 as part payment on the purchase price at \$5,450, and containing details of the items of the proposed payment of the remainder. The defendant made the deed to Tate & Engler after he had full information touching the matter in dispute. The majority opinion does not find any fraud in the representations of the plaintiff made to the defendant, Kloke, concerning the price for which this quarter was agreed to be sold, but finds that the sale to Heyn failed because of the misunderstanding, and says: "The conflict in their testimony does not appear to be in regard to the facts, nor in regard to the language used by them in their various talks about the matter. Each appears to have misunderstood the other's meaning, and this led to their subsequent difficulty. It does not appear to us to be a case of fraud or false swearing." And at the same time the majority opinion says this: "We cannot now say that the deed and the memorandum, in pursuance of which the deed was given to Tate & Engler, were procured by fraud. This memorandum and deed are consistent with the plaintiff's understanding of their agreement, and are wholly inconsistent with the defendant's claim."

The majority opinion seems to me to be in disregard of the evidence, so far as that evidence relates to the N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$, and the contention of the plaintiff and defendant concerning the same; but as the sale of that quarter failed, and therefore no actual profit was made upon it, and as it cannot with certainty be said that an improper division of the profits on the other quarter was made by the opinion, it follows that no one may say that the conclusion reached is wrong. I dissent from so much of the opinion as discusses the contention between the plaintiff and defendant and refuses to consider that the plaintiff is charged with fraud, or that there is any evidence touching that fact; but if there was fraud there was no result from it, because there was no sale of the N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ and there

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ve been no profit realized from it. I therefore
the conclusion.

**STANNARD, APPELLEE, v. ORLEANS FLOUR & OAT-
MILLING COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS; E. S.
LAND, APPELLEE.**

FILED MARCH 14, 1913. No. 17,097.

L and Tenant: LEASE: CONSTRUCTION. A lease, like a deed,
is made for the purpose of securing liabilities existing and
incurred; and when the conditions under which it is made
and the subsequent conduct of the parties show that such was its
purpose, there being no express provision in the lease to the con-
trary, it will be so construed.

Good Notes: BONA FIDE HOLDER. The sale, indorsement and
negotiation of a promissory note does not necessarily constitute the
purchaser a *bona fide* holder thereof for value without notice of
existing equities. In an action thereon by the purchaser, he must
show and prove that he is such *bona fide* holder, or the note will
be subject to equities existing between the original parties.

What: LIEN. Ordinarily the lien of a judgment extends only
to the interest and rights of the judgment debtor in the property
existing at the date of the lien, or acquired during its exist-

LIENS: PRIORITY. If a judgment creditor is a stockholder
largely interested in his judgment debtor, a corporation, and
the corporation, with his knowledge and consent, enters into a
contract with one K., pursuant to which K. advances money for
repairs and repairs of the corporate property with the
understanding that he is to be reimbursed out of the property so
used, the claim of K. for money so advanced will in equity be
subject to the lien of the judgment.

PRIORITY: ACCOUNTING: APPEAL. In an action to establish
priority of liens and foreclose the same, if a lien-holder has
possession of the property and paid expenses and received
profits in controlling the same, the court should take an account
of profits and expenses and apply the net profits, if any, upon
the lien. If an appellant from the decree of the trial court did
not insist upon such accounting at the trial and objected to the
appointment of a referee to take such account, he will not be

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entitled to a reversal in this court because such accounting was not taken. Upon affirmance of the decree, the trial court can take such accounting before the sale of the property.

APPEAL from the district court for Harlan county:
HARRY S. DUNGAN, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

E. J. Clements, R. R. Schick, John Everson and Thomas & Shelburn, for appellants.

R. L. Keester and F. H. Strout, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

The plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Harlan county to foreclose two real estate mortgages upon mill property situated in that county. The defendant Kirtland answered, admitting the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, and alleged that he had a lien upon the property for improvements and machinery and for certain other liens paid by him, and asked that the same be adjudged a lien, subject only to the lien of the plaintiff. The defendants Mary A. Spear and Henry Wenholz answered, alleging judgment liens on the property and asking that they be made first liens thereon. The court found that the liens of the plaintiff and of the defendant Kirtland were prior to those of the defendants Spear and Wenholz, and the defendants Spear and Wenholz have appealed.

On the first day of May, 1908, the defendant Orleans Flour & Oatmeal Milling Company, a corporation, was the owner and was operating the mill in question, and was largely indebted to various persons, including the bank of which the defendant Kirtland was president. The mill property needed large repairs and improvements, and on that day the company entered into a contract with defendant Kirtland, whereby it leased the property to the defendant Kirtland for the term of 10 years. The lease contained the following provisions: "And the said party of the second part, in consideration of leasing of the prem-

es as above set forth, covenants and agrees with the party of the first part to pay to said party of the first part as rent for same, the sum of the one-half profits, payable as follows, to wit: After deducting all expense from total profits, balance of profits to be divided equally every year on the 1st day of May, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918. Said first party to pay for all repairs and keep mill in first class order. Also the said second party to have privilege of putting in new machinery and material as is necessary to keep mill in first class repair and order, and such machinery and material used in repairing shall be the property of the said second party till paid for by said first party. Said milling and grain business to be run under the name of the Orleans Milling & Elevator Company, and all stock and grain bought after date of this lease shall be the property and under the supervision of E. S. Kirtland, party of the second part, during the life of this lease. And it is further covenanted and agreed, between the parties aforesaid, that profits due to party of the first part as rent on said premises shall be paid to party of the second part on the 1st day of May each year, during the life of this lease, to be applied on the indebtedness to the party of the second part until said second party is fully paid."

The appellants insist that under this lease the defendant Kirtland was required to operate the mill property for the full term of 10 years, and that he might purchase outstanding liens for the purpose of protecting his tenancy, but for no other purpose, and that he was in fact the real owner of the notes and mortgages upon which the plaintiff based his action, and that, as the defendant Kirtland could not maintain an action to foreclose his mortgage or other liens during the term of his tenancy, therefore the plaintiff could not maintain this action, and that the liens of the judgments of the appellants should be declared to be the first liens on the property. It was insisted that the trial court should have taken an account of the profits of the business while under the control

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of the defendant Kirtland, and sh same upon the claims of the defen the execution of this lease, the defe the owner of the notes and morty plaintiff's claim, and afterwards them to the plaintiff. The defenda for improvements and repairs to tl erty, amounting to \$11,354.59.

There is some discussion in the t plaintiff is an innocent purchaser sued upon, without notice of th thereto, but that question is not pr There is no allegation in the plead nocent purchaser and purchased the nor is there any evidence tending tention. The plaintiff's claim must as it would be considered if now o defendant Kirtland. The judgment A. Spear was entered in the dist county on the 15th day of November not appear when the term began at must be considered as a lien from ment was against the defendant Orl Milling Company, and became a li as that company had in the proper judgment of the defendant Henry in the county court of Harlan cor thereof was filed in the office of th court for that county on the 17th d and became a lien upon the property date. It appears from the eviden milling company had, at the time o Mr. Kirtland, been conducting the and was very much involved in debt was in bad condition, needing repa To construe the terms of the lease respective parties thereunder, we sisting conditions and the practical

parties themselves have given to the transaction. Mr. Olmstead, who was the president of the milling company, and had been in the active management of the business, continued in that capacity; and it appears that the company had neglected its corporate organization. The business was not being managed by the directors of the company, if indeed there was a board of directors, and the affairs of the company seem to have been left largely, if not entirely, in the hands of Mr. Olmstead. He continued in active participation in the management of the business after the execution of the lease. He ordered most, if not all, of the machinery and materials for improvements to the property, and himself, in the main, drew the checks in payment therefor, Mr. Kirtland furnishing the money.

Under these and other circumstances appearing in the record, it must be considered that the purpose of the lease was to furnish means to continue the business, and to secure Mr. Kirtland, and the bank he represented, in the claims held against the company. The improvements were mostly made before the judgment of Mary A. Spear became a lien upon the property, and her lien could not give her any greater rights as against Mr. Kirtland and his claim than were possessed by the company at the time her judgment became a lien. We think the trial court was right in preferring Mr. Kirtland's liens to her lien.

In his cross-petition Mr. Kirtland alleged that the defendant Wenholtz participated in the organization of the defendant company, and was at the time of entering into the lease one of the principal stockholders therein; that Mr. Wenholtz knew the conditions of the lease and the subsequent management, and made no objection thereto. These allegations are denied by Mr. Wenholtz in his answer; but there is evidence tending to establish them, and no evidence to the contrary. Under these circumstances, the court was right in subjecting his lien to that of Mr. Kirtland.

The ordinary procedure would be to take an account of the rents and profits of the business and apply them upon

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the claim of Mr. Kirtland in entering the decree. The evidence was taken at the April, 1910, term of court, and after finding the priority of liens the court appointed a referee to take such account, and the defendants Spear and Wenholz took an exception to the appointment of the referee. At the next term the court found that the referee had not reported, and proceeded to enter judgment upon his former finding. No objection appears to have been made to this by the parties now complaining. We cannot, therefore, reverse this judgment for this irregularity. If it should be desired by the parties, the trial court can proceed to take this accounting before ordering the sale.

We find no substantial error in the record, and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

LEITON, J., not sitting.

WILSON T. GRAHAM, APPELLANT, V. ROBERT HANSON ET AL., APPELLEES.*

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,110.

1. Vendor and Purchaser: ACTION FOR DEPOSIT: BURDEN OF PROOF.

Where a sum of money is deposited in the hands of a third person, as the balance of a purchase price of certain real estate, to be paid to the vendor when the land in question is surveyed, and a plat thereof together with a certificate to the effect that the title of the purchaser is valid, and that no mountain is situated upon the land, the burden of proof is on the vendor to show a substantial compliance with the agreement, in order to entitle him or his assignee to the payment of the fund deposited.

2. ———: ———: DEFENSES: BURDEN OF PROOF. In such a case, if the defendant seeks to prevent the payment of the money so deposited, on the ground that the land attempted to be sold and conveyed to him has no potential existence, the burden is upon him to establish such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

3. Evidence examined, and found to be insufficient to establish that defense.

* Rehearing denied. See opinion, p. 605, *post*.

AL from the district court for Douglas county:
A. DAY, JUDGE. *Reversed with directions.*

e, *Ellick & Brome*, for appellant.

B. *Pulsifer, Parish & Martin* and *W. C. Lambert*,

ES, J.

tiff commenced this action in the district court
glas county, to recover the sum of \$2,000, which
n deposited with the First National Bank in the
Omaha, and \$1,000 deposited with a bank in Con-
n the state of Kansas, as a balance of the purchase
a tract of land situated in the Republic of Mexico,
written agreement, which reads as follows:

“Omaha, Nebraska, Nov. 15, 1906.

stipulated and agreed by the undersigned parties
n settlement of Mexican land proposition as fol-
It is stipulated and agreed that \$2,000 is to be
h the First National Bank of Omaha. \$1,000 of
ft by G. M. Culver, and \$1,000 by J. G. Armstrong,
Winston and W. V. Bennett, until parties of the
part have 10,630 acres surveyed and a plat of the
furnished to Mr. Culver and Mr. Hanson. The
question is in a tract of land known as La Joya
state of Oaxaca, Mexico.

ly, of this land is covered by a mountain at or near
De Sol, and it is understood that the mountain
ed in this contract is not to mean hills, then
to be a reduction allowed of \$1 per acre for the
vered by said mountain, and to be taken out of the
equally. As soon as the land is surveyed, the
s to be turned back to G. M. Culver, Armstrong,
and Bennett at once, or if any of said land is
by the said mountain, \$1 per acre shall be paid
rt Hanson, and the balance $\frac{1}{2}$ to G. M. Culver and
r $\frac{1}{2}$ to Armstrong, Winston and Bennett.

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"It is further agreed that a certificate of examination shall be furnished by J. L. Starr Hunt, as soon as it is possible to procure same, or from some other reputable attorney as to the title of the land in question. The surveying in question is to be done at once or as soon as it is possible to procure surveyors and men to do same. The \$1,000 now in the Farmers' and Merchants' Bank at Concordia, Kansas, mentioned in former contract, is also to be turned over to Armstrong, Winston and Bennett as soon as the plat is furnished Culver and Hanson, or to the president of the Toltec Tropical Company of Concordia, Kansas. (Signed) Robert Hanson, G. M. Culver, J. G. Armstrong, W. J. Winston, W. V. Bennett."

It was alleged that Armstrong, Winston and Bennett had complied with all of the conditions of the agreement on their part, and had assigned to plaintiff the money deposited under the contract; that plaintiff had made demand upon the bank for the money mentioned in the contract, which demand for payment had been refused. It was further alleged that the bank was threatening and was about to pay the fund in question to the defendants, or some other person designated by them. Plaintiff prayed for an order of injunction restraining the bank from making such threatened payment, and for a judgment for the sum of \$3,000, with interest thereon, and for other further and general equitable relief.

To this petition defendant Robert Hanson filed a separate answer, admitting the nonresidence of himself and Culver, the sale of 10,630 acres of land to the Toltec Tropical Land Company, the making of the deposits in the Kansas bank and the First National Bank of Omaha; averred that in executing the written agreement for the deposits he was acting as an officer and agent of the Toltec Tropical Land Company; disclaimed having any right, title or interest in the funds on deposit; averred that they were the property of the Toltec Tropical Land Company, and denied all other allegations of plaintiff's amended petition. Thereafter, the defendant the Toltec

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Tropical Land Company filed a petition of intervention, and averred its corporate existence; alleged that the defendant Robert Hanson was at all times its president and general manager; that all of his acts in respect to the matter in controversy were on behalf of and for the intervener; alleged a transfer to the intervener prior to the commencement of this action of all of the interest of the defendant G. M. Culver in the fund in controversy; alleged that plaintiff is not the real party in interest, but that the real parties in interest are intervener and the defendants Armstrong, Winston and Bennett; alleged an assignment by Culver, prior to the commencement of the action, to intervener of all of the interest in the fund in the First National Bank of Omaha; and averred that prior to November 15, 1906, the intervener had agreed to purchase from the defendants Armstrong, Winston and Bennett 10,630 acres of forest land in Mexico, and had agreed to pay therefor the sum of \$20,000; that it had paid in cash the sum of \$500, and had on deposit, for the purpose of paying the balance of said purchase price, the further sum of \$18,500, and had by agreement retained in the bank at Concordia, Kansas, the sum of \$1,000 to cover the expenses incident to a survey of said land; that the defendants Armstrong, Winston and Bennett had caused to be executed to the intervener a deed, purporting to convey lands in Mexico, describing by metes and bounds the land alleged to have been conveyed; that Armstrong, Winston and Bennett had agreed to have the land surveyed and identified by cutting through the forest a path or line around said land; that this had not been done on November 15, 1906, at the time the contract of that date was made; that defendant Hanson, in making the contract, acted solely for intervener; that defendants Armstrong, Winston and Bennett failed to comply with the terms of said agreement, having failed to cause the land to be surveyed, or to cause the plat of the survey to be furnished to the intervener, or to the defendants Culver or Hanson, and failed to procure and deliver to intervener,

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or any one in its behalf, a certificate of examination by J. L. Starr Hunt, or any other attorney, or person, as to the title of the land in question; that, upon execution of the agreement of November 15, 1906, there was paid to defendants Armstrong, Winston and Bennett all moneys remaining due and unpaid upon the purchase price of the land, excepting the \$2,000 remaining in the hands of the Omaha bank, and the \$1,000 remaining in the hands of the bank at Concordia, Kansas. It was further alleged, that the two funds in the banks aforesaid became the property of the intervener, and that ever since November 15, 1906, intervener has been entitled to receive this money, but intervener has been kept out of the use of the money; and it was prayed that the funds be adjudged the property of the intervener, and ordered turned over to it, and for a judgment against the plaintiff and the defendants Armstrong, Winston and Bennett for interest on the fund from November 15, 1906, and for general equitable relief.

Intervener also set up as a further defense that defendants Armstrong, Winston and Bennett did not own the 10,630 acres of land conveyed to the intervener; that the title thereto had failed, and it was sought to recover a judgment in favor of the intervener and against the defendants Armstrong, Winston and Bennett for the portion of the purchase price paid, with interest and damages. This last mentioned cause of action was by a demurrer eliminated from the pleadings, and the plaintiff answered the petition of intervention by denying all of the averments thereof not specifically admitted; admitted the intervener to be a nonresident corporation; and alleged that it was prohibited from transacting business in the state of Nebraska by reason of its failure to comply with the law of this state as to filing statements with the attorney general, and obtaining an occupation permit, pursuant to the laws of this state.

Defendant Winston answered plaintiff's amended petition by admitting the purchase of the land by Hanson, and the conveyance of title to the Toltec Tropical Land Com-

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pany, the making of the agreement, and the deposit of November 15, 1906, and the compliance by Armstrong, Winston and Bennett with that agreement; denied the assignment of the claim against Hanson to the plaintiff, Graham; and averred affirmatively that he had never authorized such assignment. The answer of the First National Bank admitted its possession of the \$2,000 deposit, averred that it was a mere stakeholder, and was ready and willing at any time to turn the money over to whomsoever the court should designate is entitled to receive it. A trial was had to the court upon the foregoing issues, and resulted in a finding and judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, supported by affidavits which are found in the bill of exceptions. The motion was overruled, and the plaintiff has brought the case to this court by appeal.

The appellant contends that the district court erred in its findings for the intervener, the Toltec Tropical Land Company; that its findings and judgment thereon awarding to the intervener the fund deposited in the First National Bank of Omaha are not sustained by the evidence. Upon the issues made by the pleadings, in order for the plaintiff to recover the fund in question, he was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the land sold and conveyed to the intervener by Armstrong, Winston and Bennett, known as the Nebraska Tropical Development Company, had been surveyed; that a proper plat of such survey, together with a certificate of the validity of the Toltec company's title to the land in question, had been furnished to the defendant Hanson or the Toltec company by J. L. Starr Hunt, or some other reputable attorney of the city of Mexico, and that there was no mountain situated upon the said tract of land.

Plaintiff, to maintain this issue, produced the deposition of one Herman Erle, taken in the city of Mexico in May, 1910, who testified, in substance, that in the early part of 1907, commencing January 10, he began a survey of the land in question, and completed his work in the

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month of March following; that he surveyed the land and established the corners; that the land surveyed by him was the tract conveyed to the Toltec company, as shown in a plat or map called "Graham's exhibit A 1," which is a certified copy of the official map of what is known as the La Joya tract. At the examination of witness Erle, the defendants produced a small plat or copy of the plat furnished defendant Hanson by Armstrong, Winston and Bennett, showing the portion of the La Joya tract surveyed by the witness. It appears that the plat or map of the survey made by this witness was not certified at the time it was delivered to defendant Hanson, but either the plat so furnished or a copy of it was afterwards sent to the surveyor, his certificate was appended to it, and it was delivered to the defendant Hanson. The evidence of surveyor Erle is not disputed, nor is his reliability, competency or integrity directly called into question. There is also found in the bill of exceptions a certificate made by one Lawrence Bedford, who, it appears, is a reliable, practicing attorney of the city of Mexico, in which he stated that, upon an examination of the title of the land in question, it is his opinion that it was properly conveyed to the Toltec company, and its title thereto is good and perfect in all respects. This evidence is not directly disputed by the defendants, but it is contended that the vendor, the Nebraska company, was required to have the surveyor cut a path through the forest of tropical growth on the lines of survey sufficient to enable defendants to ride around the land, and thus view and examine it. It must be observed that the written contract contains no such agreement. We are therefore of opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to authorize and require a finding for the defendants upon this question. It is strenuously contended, however, that the Toltec company obtained nothing by its deed from the Nebraska company, because the land described therein had no potential existence, or, in other words, the whole tract, or at least a part of it, was the property of other

persons or corporations. It must be conceded that to maintain that issue the burden of proof was on the defendants.

The record discloses that the La Joya lands, of which the tract in question is a part, amounting to some 60,000 acres, were sold and conveyed by the municipality of Jacatepec to one Karl E. Sheldon, by a deed dated the 13th day of October, 1904, executed in his favor by Mr. Francisco Santiago, municipal agent for the municipality of Jacatepec, according to the orders of the political chief of the district of Tuxtepec, and approved by the government of the state of Oaxaca, under a decree of the court of first instance, in a proceeding in which all of the persons, corporations, companies and municipalities bordering upon the land in question, or in any other way interested therein, were made parties, who had all renounced or granted the land, so far as their interests were concerned, to the municipality of Tuxtepec, to be sold by it to the grantee above named; that Karl E. Sheldon conveyed to the Nebraska company, limited, on the 17th day of November, 1904, something over 17,400 acres of this land, which conveyance appears to be regular and in accordance with the laws of Mexico; that thereafter the Nebraska company sold and conveyed the land in question, which is a part of the La Joya tract, amounting to 10,630 acres, to the defendant the Toltec company, and, as above stated, the land so conveyed to the Toltec company was surveyed, and the corners established by the witness, Herman Erle.

To overthrow this evidence the defendants produced the deposition of one Delaney W. Cobb, taken in the city of Mexico, who testified, in substance, that he had had some experience in engineering and surveying; that he was acquainted with the lands in the vicinity of what he designates as the Piedra De Sol, a well-known and established landmark, something over three miles distant from the nearest corner of the land in question, in a southeasterly direction; that he was also well acquainted with

the location of another well-known and established landmark, a considerable distance from the southwest corner of this land, known as Mano Marquez; that these landmarks were situated upon the north bank of the Rio De Cajones river; that he had traced the course and followed the meanderings of this river from Piedra De Sol to Mano Marquez, and that this river runs through the tract of land in question; that on the south bank of the river is the municipality of Ozumacin, that on the east of La Joya are the lands of the Rendon company, that on the north bank of the river he found coffee plantations, and other improved tracts of land that belonged to corporations or companies other than the Toltec company. This witness, however, does not claim to have surveyed the lines of the tract of land in question, or that he was ever upon the land, unless he was there at the time he was following the course of the Rio De Cajones river. His testimony is corroborated by the evidence of one Williamson, who also claims to have some knowledge of the river and of the lands south of the La Joya tract.

It is argued that surveyor Erle should have started his survey at Piedra De Sol, and, failing to do so, his work was not entitled to credit. It appears, however, that Erle commenced his survey at what is known and conceded to be the northwest corner of the municipality of Jacatepec; that, starting from that point, he ran his survey to a point which he established as the northwest corner of the land in question; that from that point he surveyed the line between the municipality of Chiltapec and Jacatepec, that line being the north boundary of the Toltec company's land; that he continued his survey along the line, and established the northeast corner of this land; that he then went back and surveyed from the northwest corner directly south, and established the southwest corner of the land; that from that point he ran a line in a northeasterly direction to the place where he established the southeast corner of this tract; that he did not run the line between the southeast corner and the northeast cor-

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s land, because it was not required, the remaining survey being merely a matter of mathematical accuracy; that the tract thus surveyed contained a tract of more than 10,630 acres; that in running his lines he did not cross the Rio De Cajones river, which was so far from the south line of his survey that he was not able to find it or ascertain its locality; that there was no land in the vicinity of his lines of survey, and that the tract of land which he surveyed is what is known as the Toltec forest.

In unnecessarily extending this opinion, it may be said that his testimony was strongly corroborated by other evidence, including the testimony of one Vickers, who made an examination of the land and the surrounding country. We are therefore of opinion that defendants failed to establish their defense that the land claimed by the Toltec company had no potential existence. The preponderance of the evidence is against them.

It is stated upon the hearing of this case that another case is pending in the district court for Douglas county involving one of the parties to this action, in which the Toltec company was seeking to recover the price of this land from defendants Armstrong, and Bennett, or the Nebraska company, and, for this reason, we decline to decide the merits of that case. The result in this case, and what is said in this opinion, will have any bearing upon the trial of that case. We do not determine that the defendants failed to establish their defense of nonexistence of the land in question, but the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain their claim.

a judgment in their favor.

This case seems to depend largely upon the case pending between the vendor and vendee of the tract of land in question. The claim of this plaintiff depends upon the rights of the Nebraska company as against the intervener herein. The determination of that case will dispose of some, if not all, of the issues in this case. The bank will, of course, retain the fund involved until the main case is disposed of.

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The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to continue the same until the case between these defendants and the intervenor is disposed of.

REVERSED.

FANNIE SVANDA, APPELLEE, v. FRANK SVANDA, JR.,
APPELLANT.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,126.

1. **Divorce: NONSUPPORT.** Where a husband, having sufficient ability, without just cause, fails and absolutely refuses to contribute anything to the support of his wife, the court may grant her a decree of divorce.
2. **Marriage: ANNULMENT: INSANITY.** Mere weakness of mind is not a sufficient ground for the annulment of a marriage, unless it amounts to idiocy or insanity. Nor will circumstances tending to show fraud, combination or circumvention on the part of the father and friends of the wife to induce one to marry his daughter give the court authority to decree the annulment of the marriage, unless the petitioner was an idiot or insane, within the meaning of those terms, at the time the marriage ceremony was performed.

APPEAL from the district court for Richardson county:
JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Edwin Falloon, S. P. Davidson and Roscoe Anderson,
for appellant.

Reavis & Reavis, contra.

BARNES, J.

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Richardson county to obtain a divorce from her husband, Frank Svanda, Jr., on the ground of nonsupport. The petition was in the usual form. Service of summons was had upon the defendant, and thereupon Frank Svanda, Sr., the father of defendant, procured his own appointment

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as his son's guardian, and in that capacity filed an answer to plaintiff's petition, admitting the marriage, denying nonsupport, and alleging, in substance, that at the time the marriage ceremony was performed the defendant was mentally incompetent to enter into the marriage contract, that the marriage was void, and prayed that plaintiff be denied a divorce, and that defendant have a decree annulling the marriage, and for costs. The reply was, in substance, a general denial. Upon a trial of the issues thus joined, plaintiff had the findings and judgment, and the defendant has appealed.

As we view the record, plaintiff clearly established her allegation of nonsupport. In fact, it is not claimed by the defendant that at any time since about one month after the marriage he has contributed anything to the support of his wife, although he is possessed of some property, and was able, by his labor on the farm, to furnish her with proper food and clothing.

Defendant, to maintain the issue of mental incapacity, produced the evidence of three physicians, who claim to have examined him upon the eve of the trial. They testified, in substance, that at the time they examined him he was mentally incompetent to contract marriage. It must be observed, however, that the physicians had never examined the defendant at any other time, and knew nothing about his mental condition either before or at the time when the marriage ceremony was performed.

A witness was also produced who stated that, when defendant was about 17 years of age, he attended his school. He testified that defendant was dull, and made little or no progress in his school work. Other witnesses testified that defendant, when a boy, was backward and retiring in his disposition, and preferred the company of neighbor boys rather than the society of girls; that at times, when company or strangers came to the home, he kept out of sight, to some extent, at least. Two other witnesses testified that they were of opinion that defendant was not competent to make contracts. But it should

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be observed that each of those witnesses had contracted with him in the way of purchase and sale of property. In fact, it may be said that defendant was not possessed of any great degree of mental power; but the testimony of his own witnesses shows that he was able to carry on the ordinary business of farming; that he rented 80 acres of land from his father for several years, which he successfully farmed on his own account; that he had a team of his own, as well as other personal property.

It is claimed, however, that defendant did not ask the plaintiff to marry him, and this fact is urged as evidence of his mental incapacity. It appears, however, that the plaintiff was employed as a domestic at the home of defendant's father and mother; that after she had been there something over a month the father and mother told her that, if she and Frank (meaning the defendant) would get married, they would give them 160 acres of land; that after talking the matter over plaintiff and defendant agreed to the proposition; that defendant's father purchased him a suit of clothes and furnished him with money with which to pay the expenses of the marriage, and thereupon defendant and plaintiff went over to the home of plaintiff's parents; that the following day, March 12, 1907, they went with her father to Pawnee City, where they were married by a justice of the peace; that they returned to the home of plaintiff's father, where they remained that night, and the next day they went to the Svanda home, where they lived as husband and wife for about a month, when, by reason of the conduct of defendant's father towards the plaintiff, the defendant took her to her father's home, promising to visit her every other day, and told her that as soon as he had his corn planted he would come for her and they would make a home for themselves; that some days after defendant left her father's house he returned and informed her that he would have nothing more to do with her, and from that time to the day of the trial defendant failed and refused to live with plaintiff or furnish her any means of support whatsoever.

The burden of proof in this case was on the defendant to show such mental incapacity on his part as would render his marriage with the plaintiff void. On that question it was said in *Elzey v. Elzey*, 1 Houst. (Del.) 308: "Imbecility of mind is not a sufficient ground of divorce, unless it amounts to idiocy or insanity. Nor will intoxication at the time of the marriage, accompanied with circumstances of fraud, combination, or circumvention on the part of the father and friends of the wife, to induce the petitioner to marry his daughter, give the court jurisdiction to decree a divorce, unless the petitioner was *insane*, within the meaning of the act." In that case it was further said: "It would be dangerous, perhaps, as well as difficult, to prescribe the precise degree of mental vigor, soundness and capacity essential to the validity of such an engagement; which, after all, in many cases depends more on sentiments of mutual esteem, attachment, and affection, which the weakest may feel as well as the strongest intellects, than on the exercise of a clear, unclouded reason, or sound judgment, or intelligent discernment and discrimination, and in which it differs in a very important respect from all other civil contracts."

It must be observed that it was neither alleged nor proved that defendant was insane or an idiot when the marriage ceremony was performed, and there is much competent evidence in the record which tends to show that defendant had sufficient mental capacity to enter into the marriage contract at the time the ceremony was performed; and, although the testimony is conflicting, in view of the rule above stated, we are of opinion that the findings of the district court are amply sustained by the evidence.

It appears that the decree of the district court gave the plaintiff \$400 as permanent alimony, and \$100 as attorney's fees. We assume that the trial court took into consideration the fact that in another action, tried in that court, plaintiff had on appeal recovered jointly with defendant an interest in 120 acres of valuable land, and

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therefore the court allowed her only \$500 as the amount of her permanent alimony and attorney's fees.

As we view the record, the judgment of the district court was right, and it is therefore

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., ROSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

LETON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

JOSEPH H. BRUGMAN ET AL., APPELLEES, V. HENRY J.
BRUGMAN, APPELLANT.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,128.

1. **Deeds: CANCELATION: MENTAL CAPACITY: BURDEN OF PROOF.** Where it is sought to cancel a deed for the want of mental capacity of the grantor to make the instrument, the burden of proof is on the one who alleges the mental incapacity.
2. ———: **EXECUTION: MENTAL CAPACITY.** In determining the mental capacity of the grantor to execute a deed, if it clearly appears that when the instrument was executed the grantor had the capacity to understand what he was doing, knew the nature and extent of his property, and what he proposed to do with it, and to decide intelligently whether or not he desired to make the conveyance, it cannot be said that he was incompetent or incapable of executing the instrument.
3. ———: ———: **UNDUE INFLUENCE: HUSBAND AND WIFE.** A conveyance of real estate by a wife to her husband for an express, nominal consideration may raise a presumption of undue influence; but this is a rebuttable presumption, and, if the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction are such as to show that her act was just and for her own good, the burden of proof rests on the one who attacks the conveyance to establish the fact of undue influence.
4. ———: ———. The undue influence which will avoid a deed is an unlawful or fraudulent influence which controls the will of the grantor. The affection, confidence and gratitude of a parent to a child, a husband to a wife, or a wife to her husband, which inspires the gift, is a natural and lawful influence, and will not render it voidable, unless this influence has been so used as to confuse the judgment and control the will of the donor. *Hacker v. Hoover*, 89 Neb. 317.

IAL from the district court for Boone county:
B. HANNA, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

k D. Williams, for appellant.

. Vail, contra.

IES, J.

action was commenced in the district court for county to cancel and set aside a quitclaim deed d and delivered by one Julia A. Brugman, now d, to her husband, Henry J. Brugman, conveying an undivided one-half interest in the west half of 29, township 21, range 6 west, situated in that

A trial in the district court resulted in a decree plaintiffs, and the defendant Henry J. Brugman sealed.

the issues made by the pleadings, the burden of was on the plaintiffs to show that their mother, A. Brugman, paid a part of the consideration for purchase of the land in question out of her separate

The plaintiffs to maintain that issue produced testimony of Joseph Brugman to the effect that, when about nine years of age, he heard it stated in conversations in the family that his mother had at ne received about \$1,400 from her father's estate, part of that money was contributed to the purchase of certain property, used as a home for the family, in David City; that the proceeds of that property were a part of the purchase price of the land in question. On the other hand, defendant Henry J. Brugman d that at the time he married his wife they each ed a small amount of money, which was used up in paying expenses; that his wife, later on, received about from her father's estate, which was used in defraying expenses during a long period of illness from she was suffering, in household expenditures, and in business ventures; that when the family moved to David

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City his wife had only about \$100; that no part of her estate was used in the purchase of the David City property; that he purchased that property with the results of his own labors as a carpenter, and with money borrowed from his sister; that he built a house thereon, and otherwise improved the property; that the proceeds of the David City home furnished the money consideration for the land in question, which was and is heavily incumbered, and at his request was conveyed to himself and wife jointly; that from the proceeds of his labor on the farm he has paid the taxes assessed against it, and the interest on the mortgages, and reduced the amount of the incumbrance; that he has made lasting and valuable improvements on the farm; that, owing to his wife's ill health, she was unable to assist him in bearing his burdens; that he has paid a large sum of money as hospital fees and for medical attendance in his endeavors to cure her maladies; that he has been compelled by his own labor to carry on the farm, and at the same time care for his sick wife, and perform his own household work, such as cooking his own meals, etc.; that the plaintiffs left home, and for many years have been engaged in business for themselves; that they have furnished nothing for the support of either their father or mother, and have contributed nothing to pay for or improve the land in question. As we view this evidence, plaintiffs have failed to establish the allegations of their petition, so far as this branch of the controversy is concerned.

Plaintiffs, by their petition, alleged that, at the time the deed in question was executed, their mother, Julia A. Brugman, was of unsound mind, and incapable of understanding the nature of the transaction, and that she was mentally incompetent to make such an instrument. Defendant Henry J. Brugman denied those allegations, and therefore the burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs to maintain that issue.

The evidence discloses that Mrs. Brugman was a large woman, weighing about 250 pounds; that it was always

her to move about; that in May, 1906, while her husband upon the farm, she suffered a stroke, which affected her right side, and her speech somewhat labored; that her husband was careful and considerate in attending to her; that later on, he took her to a hospital in Columbus, where she was treated by a firm of physicians, Martyn, Evans & Evans; that she received benefit from the treatment, and in the early part of the year returned to the farm, where she was cared for by her husband; that during that fall, and the following winter, she attended church on Sundays, and was able, to some extent, to move about; that in the fall of 1907 her husband again took her to the Columbus, where she was placed under treatment by the doctors above named; that the defendant Brugman asked Doctor C. D. Evans, a member of the bar, to advise him whether his wife was capable of making a deed in controversy; that Doctor Evans told him he would let him know later on; that, in pursuance of the defendant's request, a consultation was held between Doctor C. D. Evans, Doctor D. T. Martyn, Doctor W. S. Evans, and Doctor J. B. Evans; that they all participated therein, and came to the conclusion of one accord that Mrs. Brugman was competent to make the deed, and a letter was written by Doctor C. D. Evans to her husband so advising him; that Doctor Evans, when giving his testimony in the instant case, stated that, if he wrote such a letter, he was mistaken as to her condition at that time. However, that appellant, Henry J. Brugman, received the letter, and his testimony as to its contents was: "If you have any papers you wish your wife to sign, she is in a capable condition to sign them down." In response to that letter Brugman went to Columbus on June 18, 1907, and while there saw Doctor J. B. Evans, who said his wife was capable and to go ahead. He was asked by the doctor to go to the office of Mr. Beecher, a notary

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public; that Beecher drew the deed at his request, and thereupon they drove around to the Doctor's office, where Doctor W. S. Evans identified Mr. Brugman, and told Mr. Beecher that it was all right, to go up and execute the papers; that on reaching the hospital, and going to Mrs. Brugman's room, they found her sitting in a chair, with a book in her lap. When asked how she was, she said: "About like always." Her husband then told her that Mr. Beecher was a notary, and had come down to get her to sign the deed. There were present the notary, a Mr. Fisher, who witnessed the deed, and one of the sisters in charge of the hospital; that the notary thereupon explained to Mrs. Brugman that he had come there to make a deed transferring her interest in some land to her husband. The notary read part of the deed to her, stated its contents, and what it conveyed, and she went over to the table, he assisting her in walking, and signed the deed with the pen in her right hand, and acknowledged it as her voluntary act; that the deed was then delivered to Brugman, who filed it for record in January following his wife's death. Brugman testified that he did not think he had been down to see his wife but once before the deed was signed; that he visited her that afternoon; that she asked him in particular about the boys; that thereafter he went down to Columbus to see her about every two weeks until the latter part of the fall; that she always recognized him, and always asked about the boys; that he first noticed, about the middle of August, that she was getting weaker, and her speech was more labored; that he was there again about September 22; that his wife was getting weaker, but still she recognized him; that he was in poor health, and saw her but once more while she was alive; that he took the title from her to the land so that if anything happened to him the boys would get it as his heirs.

It further appears that on October 28 he had a sale of all of his personal property, and put the proceeds, amounting to \$1,662.24, into the farm. The notary testi-

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fied that he drew the deed in controversy on June 18, 1907; that he went with Brugman on the same day to his wife's room at the hospital; that he did not notice anything unusual in her mental condition; that he took her acknowledgment believing her competent to execute the deed; that he partly read and explained the deed to her, and that he would not have certified to the deed had she not assented to it as her voluntary act. It should be observed that Doctor Martyn and Doctor W. S. Evans both testified that they saw Mrs. Brugman, and treated her nearly every day, at and about the time she made the deed in question; that she was capable of executing it, and they testified positively that in their opinion she was mentally capable of executing that instrument. There is considerable testimony in the record tending to show that Mrs. Brugman's mind was somewhat affected by her illness, and that she was physically weak and very ill.

It is not every weakness of mind arising from old age or sickness, or other causes, that will avoid a deed. There must be a total want of reason or understanding. *Johnson v. Phifer*, 6 Neb. 401. Mere mental weakness will not authorize a court of equity to set aside an executed contract. *Mulloy v. Ingalls*, 4 Neb. 115; *Schley v. Horan*, 82 Neb. 704; *Mann v. Keene Guaranty Savings Bank*, 86 Fed. 51. In order to vacate a deed on the ground of mental incapacity of the grantor, it is necessary to show such a degree of mental weakness as renders the maker of the deed incapable of understanding and protecting his own interest. The mere circumstance that the mental powers have been somewhat impaired by age or disease is not sufficient, if the maker of the deed still retains a full comprehension of the meaning, design and effect of his act, unless by reason of undue influence of the grantee he was unable to exercise his will in that respect. Therefore, to our minds, the evidence is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of Mrs. Brugman's mental capacity, and the testimony of defendant's witnesses tending to establish her competency to make the deed in question.

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We come now to consider the question of undue influence: It may be conceded that, where a wife makes a deed of property to her husband for a stated nominal consideration, undue influence on his part may be presumed; but that is a rebuttable presumption, which may be overthrown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. On this question the evidence discloses that Brugman had visited his wife but once or twice from the time she went to the hospital at Columbus in the early spring of 1907 to the date of the conveyance, and therefore the opportunity to even suggest to her that she should make the conveyance, much less to urge her to perform that act, was practically wanting. It also appears, without dispute, that there was no meeting between Brugman and his wife on the day the deed was executed prior to the time of its execution; that when Brugman, the notary and the witnesses called upon Mrs. Brugman at the hospital, her husband took no part in the conversation; that the purpose of their visit was communicated to Mrs. Brugman by the notary, who also explained to her the nature of the transaction, and gave her whatever assistance she required to enable her to sign the instrument. This of itself seems sufficient to overthrow the presumption of undue influence. In addition to this testimony, it must be presumed that Mrs. Brugman was aware of her husband's financial condition. She knew that the farm was heavily incumbered; that in order to facilitate the renewal of the mortgages, and thus prevent foreclosure proceedings, and save the farm for his use and the future use of their children, the only feasible way to accomplish that end was to invest him with the whole title to the estate. This was a wise, just and equitable method of procedure. In such case there is no presumption of undue influence. Indeed, in cases of this kind much depends upon the circumstances, and when it appears that the deed of gift or voluntary conveyance is a just and natural act, and one which a person in full possession of his faculties might and ought to make, then the burden remains with the

assails the gift or conveyance. *Cudney v. Cud-*
N. Y. 148; *Schofield v. Walker*, 58 Mich. 96;
Kastell, 56 Wis. 444.

influence which will avoid a deed is an unlawful
illegitimate influence, which controls the will of the

The affection, confidence and gratitude which
the gift from a wife to a husband is a natural
and legitimate influence, and will not render it voidable, un-
less influence has been so used as to confuse the judg-
ment and control the will of the donor. *Hacker v. Hoover*,
17.

It appears in this case that Mrs. Brugman did a just,
reasonable, and natural act. She did what any
person in the full possession of his faculties and uninflu-
enced by the wrongful pressure of another might well
do. Her sons were each and severally working
for themselves. They had not contributed to the care and
support of their mother. The land was not productive,
heavily incumbered at a high rate of interest,
and taxes required to be paid yearly. It was necessary
to pay the taxes and the insurance, and some repairs
to the premises would be required each and every year.
She was an invalid, with attendant heavy expenses. She
thought her husband had performed most of the house-
hold and had conducted the farm, and looked after her
well; that his health was failing, and his bur-
den heavy. He was the only person on whom she
relied for sustenance and sympathy, and she evidently
thought that he could better care for her, and for him-
self, and the property in question could be saved from the
hands of the creditors and made available for their use.

I am therefore of opinion that, in view of all of the
circumstances, the findings and judgment of the district
court should have been for the defendant.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is reversed and the action is dismissed.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

C. J., ROSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.
J., SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

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JOHN M. ADAMS, APPELLANT, v. ANDREW O. ANDERSON ET
AL., APPELLEES.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,129.

Justice of the Peace: CHANGE OF VENUE: STATUTORY PROVISIONS. Sections 958 and 958a of the code, as amended by the legislative session of 1905, have not changed the rule announced in *Martin v. Mershon*, 3 Neb. (Unof.) 174, that "an order of a justice of the peace, granting a change of venue, made on an *ex parte* hearing and before the return day of the summons, is void."

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
LINCOLN FROST, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Claude S. Wilson, for appellant.

O. B. Polk, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action to cancel a judgment rendered against the plaintiff in justice court of one Joseph Devine, a justice of the peace of Lancaster county, and to enjoin its collection. A demurrer to the petition was sustained; plaintiff stood upon his petition, refused to further plead, and his action was dismissed. From that judgment plaintiff has appealed.

It is conceded that the only question presented by the record is: Has a justice of the peace the right or authority to order a change of venue, in a case commenced in his court, before the return day of the summons, on the application of the defendant, in the absence of and without notice to the plaintiff. Plaintiff's petition alleged, in substance, that on the 1st day of August, 1910, the defendant Anderson commenced the suit in the justice court of Joseph Devine, a justice of the peace of Lancaster county, against plaintiff, to recover the sum of \$14; that a summons was issued, returnable August 12, 1910, at 2 o'clock P. M., which was duly served upon the plaintiff herein; that on August 9, 1910, some three days before

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urn day of the summons, the plaintiff in this case, who is the defendant in that action, filed an affidavit with the justice asking for a change of venue; that on the 11th day of August the justice, at plaintiff's request, in the presence of and without notice to the plaintiff in that action, ordered a change of venue; that before the return day the justice of the peace delivered to the plaintiff a transcript transferring the action to the justice court of Justice Stevens, and delivered the transcript, together with the files in his office, to the plaintiff; that plaintiff thereupon filed the transcript in Justice Stevens' court, and the cause was set for hearing at 2 o'clock P. M. of August 1910; that on the return day of the summons, at 2 o'clock P. M., Anderson, the plaintiff in the action, with his attorney, appeared in Justice Devine's court, and on application the order for a change of venue was set aside, and thereupon Anderson filed a substituted bill of particulars, and demanded judgment against this plaintiff. A jury was impaneled, and a trial was had, which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of Anderson against the plaintiff herein; that more than 10 days thereafter Justice Devine issued an execution to the defendant Peck, as constable, commanding him to collect said judgment, and on the 12th day of September, 1910, plaintiff filed his petition in this case, to which the defendant above mentioned was sustained, and, as above stated, the action dismissed.

It is conceded by counsel for the plaintiff that a question like the one here presented was determined by this court in the case of *Martin v. Mershon*, 3 Neb. (Unof.) 141, and, but for the amendment of 1905 to sections 958 and 958a of the code, that judgment would be decisive of this case. It is contended, however, that by the amendment in question a justice of the peace is given authority, in plaintiff's absence, and without notice to him, to order a change of venue, on the application of the defendant, before the return day of the summons, and therefore *Martin v. Mershon*, *supra*, is not in point.

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We think plaintiff is mistaken in this contention. The amendment of 1905 (sec. 958) provides: "If the *application* for such change be made by the defendant on or before the return day of the said cause, the defendant shall be required only to pay the costs of the justice for making the transcript and certificate and also the docketing and filing fees of the other justice; and all other costs in the case shall abide the result of the suit and shall not be demanded on granting a change of venue." As the law stood before those sections were amended, it had sometimes occurred that the plaintiff in an action, in order to prevent a change of venue, had subpoenaed a large number of witnesses to appear before the justice on return day, and in such case the defendant, in order to obtain a change of venue, was required to pay the fees of the plaintiff's witnesses. It seems quite clear to us that the only purpose of the amendment was to prevent the plaintiff from imposing such a hardship upon the defendant in order to prevent him from obtaining a change of venue. There is nothing in the sections, as amended, which in terms authorizes the justice to make an order granting a change of venue, in the absence of plaintiff, and without notice to him before the return day of the summons. It is argued, however, that, if the order for the change of venue was void because it was prematurely made, the justice should have considered the application, and granted the change on the return day of the summons. It was alleged in plaintiff's petition, however, that before the return day he had taken the files in the case, with his application for a change of venue, and transferred them to Justice Stevens' court. Therefore the application was not before Justice Devine on the return day of the summons, and he was not required to consider it.

We are of opinion that, notwithstanding the amendment above mentioned, this case is ruled by *Martin v. Mershon*, *supra*; and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., ROSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

LETTON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

Painter v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.

TER, ADMINISTRATOR, APPELLANT, V. CHING-
 NGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY ET
 ES.

LED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,142.

FOR INJURIES: DIRECTING VERDICT. In an action
 ad company to recover for personal injury alleged
 used by the defendant's negligence, it is necessary
 f to prove by competent evidence that the negli-
 efendant was the proximate cause of the injury
 and, where plaintiff fails to furnish such proof, it
 ie trial court to direct the jury to return a verdict
 nt.

t be established by inference and conjecture in
 the testimony of competent and unimpeached eye-
 nedy v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 80 Neb. 267.

ERS: STATUTORY PROVISIONS. Where a passenger
 under the charge of the carrier as he begins his
 a passenger being transported, and is within the
 ction 3, art. I, ch. 72, Comp. St. 1911, until he is
 rtunity to leave the premises of the carrier at his
 t if it appears that the passenger, having reached
 ourney, has departed from the car, and has had a
 and opportunity to avoid injury from the opera-
 , or further necessity of relation with the servants
 ie ceases to be a passenger, and thereafter is not
 action afforded by the statute.

FOR INJURIES: DIRECTING VERDICT. Where it is
 he uncontradicted evidence of competent witnesses
 it's injuries were not caused by the negligence of
 that the plaintiff was injured at a time when he
 iger "being transported over the defendant's road,"
 ing of section 3, art. I, ch. 72, Comp. St. 1911, it
 ie trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant.

ie district court for Hall county: JAMES
 1. *Affirmed.*

n and J. L. Cleary, for appellant.

rthur R. Wells and O. A. Abbott, contra.

BARNES, J.

This action was brought by the administrator of the estate of one Lloyd Painter for negligently causing the death of plaintiff's decedent. On the trial in the district court for Hall county, and after the introduction of all of the evidence, the court, on motion, directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. Judgment was rendered on the verdict, and the plaintiff has appealed.

It is appellant's main contention that the district court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant. By his petition it was alleged, in substance, that on the 29th day of December, 1908, his decedent bought a first class ticket from the defendant company at Ravenna, Nebraska, and on the morning of that day took defendant's train No. 44, a full-vestibuled passenger train, for Grand Island; that he delivered his ticket to the conductor, Charles Holts, and that, as the train approached Grand Island, brakeman Prey, who was made a defendant, called the station; that decedent left his seat and started toward the door; that he stepped on the platform as the train was pulling into Grand Island; that he had every reason to believe that the platform was protected; that the vestibule was dark and not protected; that the platform was up and unguarded, and that the plaintiff's decedent, without any negligence on his part, fell through and was thrown from the train. It was further alleged that it was the duty of the railroad company to keep vestibule platforms closed; or, if left open, to have an employee, either brakeman or conductor, present to warn passengers and protect them from falling through the opening; that the platform door in said vestibule was not protected, and that Holts, the conductor, and Prey, the brakeman, individually and as employees of defendant, carelessly, negligently and unlawfully permitted the vestibule to remain open and unprotected, and negligently left the said open place unguarded; that, as a result of said negligence, Painter fell through the said opening and under said train, and that the defendants thereby caused his death.

The defendant company, by its answer, admitted that Painter was a passenger on its train from Ravenna to Grand Island on December 29, 1908; but denied that he fell from its train as it was approaching Grand Island, and alleged that he alighted at said station without injury after the train had stopped at the usual place of delivering and receiving passengers. The answer further denied each and every other allegation not specifically admitted or denied; and alleged that any injuries to the person of Lloyd Painter which were received at or about the time mentioned in the petition, and therein alleged to have resulted in his death, were caused by his own gross negligence, his voluntary and excessive use of intoxicants, and by a violation of defendant's rules and regulations brought to his notice, and his injuries were not caused by any negligence or fault of defendant. Defendants Holts and Prey filed a general denial to the plaintiff's petition. To the answer of defendant company, plaintiff replied specifically, denying each of the several allegations of the answer.

There is no conflict in the evidence as to the fact that Lloyd Painter was a passenger on the defendant's train from Ravenna to Grand Island at the time alleged in the pleadings. The plaintiff, to further maintain the issues upon his part, produced the testimony of certain witnesses, from which it appeared that after the defendant's train left the station at Grand Island Painter was found lying beside the track between 400 and 500 feet north of the depot, in an unconscious condition, with both of his feet cut off; that it was apparent that he had received his injuries by being run over by the defendant's train. Plaintiff produced no evidence, however, showing or tending to show that Painter fell from the defendant's train in the manner alleged in his petition. In fact, plaintiff produced no testimony showing or tending to show the manner in which Painter received his injuries. On the other hand, conductor Holts testified that he saw Painter in the depot at Ravenna before the train arrived at that

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point; that the train was late, and Painter was finding fault because he had been called to take the train too soon; that he showed signs of intoxication; that he talked loud, and conducted himself in such a manner as to attract Holts' attention and the attention of other persons waiting in the depot; that he learned before the train arrived that decedent's name was Painter. His testimony was corroborated by defendant Prey, who was his brakeman, and was waiting for the arrival of his train, and a number of other witnesses who were present in the depot at Ravenna at that time. Holts further testified that after the train started from Ravenna he took up Painter's ticket, and was requested to call him when the train reached Grand Island; that he notified brakeman Prey of Painter's desire to be awakened at Grand Island, as that was the place of his destination; that Painter occupied a seat in a chair car next behind the smoker; that he kept in mind the fact that Painter had requested that he be awakened at Grand Island, and when they were nearing that station he called the brakemen's attention to that fact. Holts also testified that he had a passenger on his train named Flynn, who had a ticket from Mason City; that he had seen Flynn at different times before, and knew that he was on the train that night because he had also asked to be awakened at Grand Island; that Flynn was riding in the forward chair car on the north side, three or four seats from the front end, and sat about opposite Painter; that when they arrived at Grand Island and after the train stopped at the depot, both Painter and Flynn went out of the front door of the chair car and got off at the same opening between the smoker and the chair car; that brakeman Prey was guarding the opening. The witness further said: "I was at the opening at the head end of the rear chair car when I saw Painter walking north. I had told Prey to be sure and awaken him, and had asked Prey if he had gotten off. The trap doors were opened by brakeman Prey about 1,000 feet before we reached the station, * * * two were opened; he first

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ed one, and then went ahead. I guarded the first one
he opened the second. The vestibules were lighted
Pintsch gas lights. The vestibules are always
ed." Holts was corroborated by the evidence of
man Prey, who stated that he guarded the vestibule
e front end of the chair car where Painter alighted;
he saw Painter get off the train onto the platform
the train had stopped at the depot, and saw him
north, or rather northeast along the platform
rds the rear of the train.

vin Flynn, who was the passenger mentioned by con-
r Holts, testified that he came to Grand Island on
No. 44, December 29, 1908. He said: "Upon ar-
I got off the train and went in a bus from the Bur-
on station over to the Union Pacific depot. Then I
back to the Burlington station, arriving there about
lf hour after the train had first arrived and found
ter lying in the men's waiting room with his feet cut
I recognized Painter. I had seen him on the train.
le in the second seat from the front end of the north
of the car and Painter rode on the south side, a seat
o back from me. I got on at Mason City, and Pain-
ot on at Ravenna. When I got up to get off the car
rand Island, Painter was in the car there sitting
I got off the steps and the trainman was standing
, but I can't say who he was. The train had stopped
I got off. The opening at which I alighted was
t six feet north of the bay window in the depot."

ie Stephen Velda, a witness for the defendant, testi-
in substance, that he was in the depot at Grand
d when No. 44 came in on the morning of December
908; that the train was standing still when he came
of the depot. He further said: "When I got out of the
epot, I kept toward the north end of the depot, to get
across the street, the train was in my way. While I was
walking along the train I saw the man standing right
next to the cars between the second and third coach, but
it was on the rear end. I looked at him and saw there

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was nothing wrong, and I kept on going across the street, and went about a couple of car lengths, and when I got across the tracks * * * I heard the train start off, and at the same time I heard somebody call for help, and I turned around and started back, and saw the man lying there, and saw what the trouble was with him. * * * When I heard the outcry, the train had moved about 250 feet."

The brakeman, Harry Prey, testified, in substance, as follows: In the station at Ravenna before the train left that morning, I had seen a man who was said to be Mr. Painter. He wore a light hat and a black overcoat. He was on the train after we left Ravenna, sitting four or five seats back, on the south side of the chair car. I was going through to close the vestibule doors when he motioned to me, and said: "Will you see that I get off at Grand Island?" When near Grand Island I awakened him, and also awakened the rest of the Grand Island people; and after they whistled for the station I started from the rear end, and took my time going through to see that everybody was awakened who was to get off at Grand Island. I came into the vestibule at the head end of the rear chair car, and opened that vestibule. Conductor Holts was there. I then went on through the next car, where Mr. Painter was; that was the chair car right back of the smoker. I took my time going through there to see that everybody was awake. I came to Painter and touched him on the shoulder, and said, "Grand Island!" I called that car as I went through, and then went on into the smoking car, and did the same thing there, taking time to see that everybody was awake, and I came back to the end of the first chair car, behind the smoker, and opened that vestibule. I remained there until the train stopped at the depot. From the time that vestibule was opened until the train came to a dead stop at the station nobody got out of that opening. I opened the two vestibules. The rest of the vestibules were closed. After we stopped at Grand Island Painter got off at the

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where I was. He was the last passenger to get to the opening that I was guarding. The last I saw of him was about six or seven feet north of the opening, walking towards the depot. After he alighted the conductor came and wanted to know if that man got off—the man that he had told me about. I pointed him out and he said, “There he goes.” He got off the train and did not receive any injuries while getting off, walking unaided, looking out for himself. The last time Painter got off was about opposite the baggage door. The waiting room and station office were on the north side. I knew nothing about the accident when I was on the Island. The first I heard of it was at Aurora. I got word by wire. No witness disputes this in any way. It thus appears that the plaintiff cannot prove the allegations of his petition as to the place at which his decedent was injured.

If he contends, however, that, if the evidence was sufficient to establish his charge of negligence, still his case should have been submitted to the jury on the issue, it is not material. At the time when his decedent was injured he was within the protection of section 3, art. I, ch. 72, Comp. St. 1911, which provides: “Every railroad company, as aforesaid, is liable for all damages inflicted upon the person or persons while being transported over its road, except in cases where the injury done arises from the negligence of the person injured, or when the injury sustained is due to the violation of some express rule or regulation of said road actually brought to his or her attention. It must be observed that the cause was not tried on the theory; and, as we view the evidence, it fails to establish that plaintiff’s decedent was a passenger “being transported” over defendant’s railroad at the time the accident occurred. The section of the statute quoted has been construed by this and other courts in many cases, and the rule is well settled that after a passenger, as defined in the statute, places himself under the charge of the carrier as he begins his journey until he is afforded

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an opportunity to leave the premises of the carrier at his destination, he is a passenger being transported; but if it appears that the passenger, having reached the end of his journey, has departed from the car, and has had a reasonable time and opportunity to avoid further injury from the operation of the train, or further necessity of relation with the servants of the carrier, he ceases to be a passenger, and stands toward the carrier as one of the ordinary public. *Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sattler*, 64 Neb. 636; *Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co. v. Hagblad*, 72 Neb. 773, 790; *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Mann*, 78 Neb. 541; *St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Beecher*, 65 Ark. 64, 44 S. W. 715; *King v. Central of G. R. Co.*, 107 Ga. 754, 33 S. E. 839; *Hendrick v. Chicago & A. R. Co.*, 136 Mo. 548, 38 S. W. 298; *Pittsburgh, C. & St L. R. Co. v. Krouse*, 30 Ohio St. 222; 6 Cyc. 541, 542.

As we view the evidence, plaintiff's decedent had ceased to be a passenger when he received his injuries. The defendant company had safely delivered him from its train to its depot platform, and afforded him an opportunity to safely depart from the place where he was delivered. He had, in fact, left the depot and the depot platform, and must have wandered along the track by the standing train to a point at least 150 feet from the end of the depot platform. He had broken away from the care of the defendant's servants, and therefore was not a passenger "being transported" when he was injured. Plaintiff's petition does not charge, nor does the evidence show, that the defendant company was guilty of any breach of duty to the decedent after his safe delivery upon the depot platform. Therefore we are of opinion that the district court properly sustained the defendant's motion, and directed the jury to return a verdict in its favor.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., ROSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

LETTON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

WILLIAM S. ROWND V. STATE OF NEBRASKA.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,857.

Forgery: INFORMATION: SUFFICIENCY. In an information for forgery, the phrase, "did knowingly * * * utter and publish * * * a true and genuine, * * * a certain false, forged and counterfeited check," etc., sufficiently avers guilty knowledge that the instrument was forged. The use of the word "knowingly" is equivalent to an allegation that the person knew the facts subsequently stated.

Criminal Law: CONTINUANCE: REVIEW. Where the adverse party admits that witnesses, if present, would testify as stated in an affidavit for a continuance, and the party presenting such affidavit afterwards reads such statement in his affidavit as evidence to the jury, there is presented no ground for a reversal of the final judgment of the trial court because of its refusal to grant the continuance asked. *Catron v. State*, 52 Neb. 389.

Forgery: IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED: EVIDENCE. Evidence that the defendant, during the time that the forged check, which he was charged with having uttered and published, was executed, presented for payment, and the payment of it obtained, was registered as a guest at a hotel in Omaha under the name of H. B. Sanford, and that the defendant and Sanford were one and the same person, when considered with the other evidence in the case, was competent as tending to identify the defendant as the person who uttered the forged instrument.

—: —: —. Testimony that a niece of the defendant, who was intimate with the woman whose name was purported to be signed to the forged check, had access to her checks and private papers, knew of her business affairs, knew how much money she had and in what bank she kept it, that she was absent from the city of Omaha, that defendant and his said niece were intimate and were frequently together during that time, was competent as tending to identify the defendant and establish guilty knowledge on his part at the time he uttered and published the forged check.

Criminal Law: WITNESSES: INDORSEMENT OF NAMES ON INFORMATION. It is not a sufficient objection to the testimony of a witness that his name indorsed on the information was misspelled, in that, on the original information it was spelled Schmidt, while on the substituted copy it was spelled Schmitt, it appearing that the name on each information represented one and the same person.

6. **Forgery: IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED: EVIDENCE.** Evidence that the

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defendant, when arrested, had in his possession another check payable to him under his assumed name of "H. B. Sanford," together with a pawn ticket issued to him under the name of "W. S. Sanford," was competent to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged against him.

7. **Criminal Law: INSTRUCTIONS: ALIBI.** An instruction containing the phrase, "The defendant has introduced evidence tending to establish what is known as an alibi," is not a disparagement of that defense, and is not subject to any just criticism. *Nightingale v. State*, 62 Neb. 371.

8. **Evidence examined**, its substance stated in the opinion, and *held* sufficient to sustain the verdict.

ERROR to the district court for Lancaster county: **ALBERT J. CORNISH, JUDGE.** *Affirmed.*

T. J. Doyle, for plaintiff in error.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, and *Frank E. Edgerton, contra.*

BARNES, J.

William S. Rownd, hereafter called the defendant, was tried in the district court for Lancaster county on an information charging him with the crime of uttering and publishing a false, forged and counterfeited check for the payment of money. He was found guilty as charged in the information, and was sentenced to the penitentiary, under the indeterminate sentence act, for a term of from one to twenty years. To reverse that judgment he has brought the case to this court by a petition in error.

The charging part of the information upon which the defendant was tried reads as follows: "That the said William S. Rownd, alias W. S. Raymond, in the county and state aforesaid, on or about the 19th day of April, 1912, in said county and state, he, the said William S. Rownd, alias W. S. Raymond, having in his custody and possession a certain false, forged and counterfeited check for the payment of money, which is in the words and figures as follows, to wit, 'Omaha, Neb., April 17, 1912. No. —

maha National Bank. (27-2) Pay to the order of Stanton \$220.00 two hundred and twenty dollars. n's Department—Mary Sutman'—did knowingly, fully and feloniously utter and publish the same as and genuine; with the unlawful and felonious intent and there to defraud, contrary to the form of the s in such case made and provided and against the and dignity of the state of Nebraska."

ppears that to this information the defendant filed urrer, which was overruled, and defendant contends he court erred in overruling his demurrer. It is l that there is no averment in the information that fendant uttered the check, knowing the same to be , and therefore the information was insufficient to the commission of a crime. Many authorities are n support of this contention, and it may be con- that to charge the crime of uttering and publishing ed check, as defined in section 145 of the criminal he words, "knowing the same to be false," or their lent, must appear in the information, and where vords are wholly omitted from the information it ot sustain a conviction. It must be observed, how- hat the word "knowingly" is not omitted from the ation. But it is argued that, as it is used therein, it be held to modify and relate only to the charge ering and publishing the check in question, and ore it is not charged that defendant uttered and hed that instrument, knowing it to have been . This is not a new question, and there are cases which support defendant's contention. But

the rule announced in those cases is not sustained by the greater number and better considered decisions in this country. We think the rule is that the word "knowingly," as used in the information in this case, qualified all words following, and it is thereby equivalent to the words used in the statute, "knowing the same to be false." In *United States v. Clark*, 37 Fed. 106, it was held that "an indictment under Rev. St. U. S.

sec. 3893, charging that defendant did knowingly deposit for mailing and delivery certain obscene pictures, etc., is not open to the objection that it is not alleged that the defendant knew the character of that which he deposited." In 2 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure (2d ed.) sec. 556, it is said: "The adverb will suffice when so employed as to satisfy the demand for directness." In *State v. Williams*, 139 Ind. 43, the court held: "In an indictment for forgery the phrase, 'did * * * knowingly utter, publish and pass * * * as true and genuine, a certain false, forged and counterfeit promissory note,' etc., sufficiently avers the guilty knowledge that the instrument was forged." The court said that the use of the word "knowingly" is equivalent to an allegation that the person knew the facts subsequently stated; that to knowingly utter a forged instrument is the usual form of expression, and fully avers the guilty knowledge that the instrument was forged. As we view the weight of authority, the district court did not err in overruling the defendant's demurrer to the information.

It is also contended that the court erred in overruling the defendant's motion for a continuance. The affidavits in support of the motion alleged that two witnesses living in Kansas City were desired at the trial; that notice had been served to take their depositions in Kansas City, and before they were taken the defendant was arrested and placed in jail in that city until he was liberated by habeas corpus. In opposing the motion for a continuance, it was admitted in open court, by counsel for the state, that the witnesses named would testify, if present, that from April 12 to April 25, 1912, W. S. Rownd was in Kansas City every day, and that he was not in the city of Lincoln during that period.

The granting or refusal of a continuance is a matter of discretion with the trial court, and ordinarily will not be reviewed by the supreme court. Error can be predicated upon the ruling of the district court only in cases where there has been an abuse of discretion; and it has

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been universally held by this court that, where the state offers to admit that an absent witness will testify to the facts alleged in the affidavit for a continuance, it is not error to overrule the motion. *Catron v. State*, 52 Neb. 389; *Russell v. State*, 62 Neb. 512; *Foster v. State*, 79 Neb. 259. It appears that the affidavits were read in evidence as though the statement contained therein was the testimony of the absent witnesses. Therefore there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in overruling defendant's motion for a continuance.

It is next contended that the court erred in receiving in evidence the hotel register and cashbook of the Wellington hotel in Omaha, which showed that H. B. Sanford of Kansas City, Missouri, registered at that hotel April 13, and that he paid his room rent on April 26, 1912. The proprietors of that hotel, a Mr. and Mrs. Hamilton, both testified positively that the defendant, W. S. Rownd, was the man who registered at their hotel as H. B. Sanford, and that they saw him practically every day of the time between April 13 and April 26. For the purpose of showing that the defendant Rownd and H. B. Sanford were one and the same person, this testimony was competent. After defendant's arrest there was found in his room, and among his effects, a check made payable to H. B. Sanford, and a pawnbroker's receipt indorsed by W. S. Sanford. This testimony was objected to as incompetent and immaterial, but was received by the trial court. It is now contended that the defendant's objections should have been sustained. It appears that these papers were taken from defendant's trunk in Lincoln, after his arrest. They were links in the chain of identification by which it was sought to prove that defendant was the man who uttered the check in question in the City National Bank at Lincoln. The fact that Rownd registered at the Wellington hotel at Omaha for two weeks, during which time he came to Lincoln and secured the money on the check, may be said to have been established, if the testimony of the Hamiltons was believed.

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It also appears in evidence that, while defendant was registered at the Wellington hotel, he was in frequent communication with one Elsie Waters, who is admitted to be his niece. Defendant contends that this evidence was incompetent and highly prejudicial, and for its admission the judgment should be reversed. We think this testimony was competent, and was properly introduced for the purposes of identification. The testimony also developed the fact that Elsie Waters was intimate with Mary Sutman, whose name appeared to be signed to the forged check. It was also shown that Elsie Waters had access to the private papers of Mary Sutman; that she knew of her business affairs, knew how much money Mary Sutman had, and in what bank she kept it. The testimony also showed that Elsie Waters called upon the defendant while he was registered at the Wellington hotel under the name of Sanford, talked with him over the telephone at various times, and occasionally met him on the street. There was some evidence tending to show that the signature of Elsie Waters resembles that of the signature on the forged check. This testimony was strenuously objected to, and error is predicated for its reception. This evidence not only tended to identify the defendant as the man who uttered the check, but also tended to establish a guilty knowledge on his part at the time he uttered and published it. There was also a letter introduced in evidence, written by Elsie Waters to Mary Sutman, which was mailed in Omaha on April 16, some two days prior to the time the defendant appeared in the City National Bank of Lincoln and presented the check for payment. This evidence showing the close acquaintance of Elsie Waters with the defendant is material and competent. The state was required to identify the man who uttered the forged check as the defendant on trial, and this evidence was competent. It also tended to show the probability of the defendant's having the check purporting to be signed by Mary Sutman, as well as the knowledge on his part that it was a forgery. We are therefore

that all of this evidence was material and com-

pendant's contention that the court erred in receiving the testimony of one John Schmidt, over the objection that his name was not indorsed upon the information. It appears that the original information was lost, and by agreement of the parties a copy was made by counsel for the defendant was agreed upon a copy of the original information. On motion of the defendant's attorney, he was permitted to indorse on the substituted information the names of the witnesses who were named in the original information. Among the witnesses was the name of John Schmitt. Objection was made to the testimony of this witness because his name in the original information seems to be spelled "Schmidt" instead of "Schmitt," as it appears upon the substituted information. It would seem that this objection was without merit. The two names are pronounced alike, and it is not contended that they were used to identify different witnesses. But, as a matter of fact, the evidence related to the same person whose name was indorsed on the original information.

The defendant contends that the court erred in receiving the testimony of the check made by one E. W. Roberts payable to H. B. Sanford. This check was in a picture frame beside a card picture found in the trunk of the defendant at a time subsequent to his arrest. It is contended by the state that this check was an important piece of evidence, in that it tended to identify Rownd as the H. B. Sanford who stopped at the Wellington hotel from April 26, 1912, and who uttered the forged Lincoln on the 18th day of that month. It is contended that this evidence did not bear directly upon the issue submitted by the defendant, but it served to identify the man who did commit the crime with the defendant who was charged with its commission. The defendant had in his possession a check payable to H. B. Sanford taken in connection with the other evidence

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which we have previously discussed, was competent evidence to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged.

Defendant contends that the court erred in receiving the testimony of one Brouillette. That witness testified that he took Elsie Waters to two different dances in April, 1912; that on one occasion she told him that Mrs. Sutman was coming back from Canada because there had been a check forged on her for \$200. It appears that this statement was made to Brouillette before it was known that the forged check in question had been passed. This testimony tended to show a plan of action between Elsie Waters and the defendant, which indicated an arrangement by which the check was forged, and finally presented to the bank in Lincoln for the purpose of having it cashed. The evidence found in the record in relation to the conduct of Elsie Waters and the defendant, together with their intimacy, rendered the evidence in question competent.

Error is also predicated on the admission of the testimony of one Scott. It appears that he was employed by the insurance company that was attempting to find the man who had defrauded the Omaha and Lincoln banks. The witness was present at the time the room and trunk of defendant were searched immediately subsequent to his arrest. He testified that he found among those effects the check signed by Roberts, a pawn ticket signed by the name of W. S. Sanford, which was issued by one L. Goldman of Kansas City under No. 9502. It appears that when Scott examined the effects of the defendant he made a memorandum in regard to the pawn ticket, and reported the same to a detective office at Kansas City, after which he destroyed his memorandum. The witness remembered the number of the pawn ticket which was signed by W. S. Sanford, but was compelled to refer to a copy of his report to identify the date, which was March 20, 1912. This testimony was competent under the rule announced in *Erdman v. State*, 90 Neb. 642, 651.

rs from the evidence that the defendant was the name of W. S. Raymond; that he was maha under the name of H. B. Sanford. There is record evidence of expert witnesses on hand—the effect that the same man signed W. S. Sanpaw ticket, and H. B. Sanford on the register ington hotel in Omaha, and on the register of a House in Kansas City.

ossible, within the limits of this opinion, to of the 80 assignments of error contained in but all of them have been carefully considered, view the record, the evidence objected to was and was properly admitted, and this is sufficient to those assignments.

tended that the court erred in giving to the ction No. 5. It was the theory of the defend— was not in the city of Lincoln at the time the obtained on the forged check at the City Na—, but was in the city of Kansas City. Instruc— stated the law relating to that defense. The on to the instruction is the use of the words, “show what is known as an alibi.” It is argued xpression is a disparagement of the defense. his objection is too technical to receive serious on. A like instruction was given by the court *Wale v. State*, 62 Neb. 371, where it was said: unction, we think, is not subject to any just

There was evidence in the instant case tend— an alibi, and the court properly put the ques— the jury by the instruction complained of.

it is contended that the evidence was insuffi—tain the verdict. As we view the record, the d by Mary Sutman that the check in question

It was shown by the testimony of Neil Dunn, on clerk for the City National Bank of Lin— he defendant in this case came into the bank and 11:30 o'clock on April 19, 1912, and pre—beck to have it cashed. Payment was refused;

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but, at the suggestion of the witness, Rownd left the check with him for collection. He testified that he saw Rownd write on the back of the check the name "C. A. Clark." The check was sent to the Omaha National Bank for collection. On April 22 the City National Bank was notified that the Omaha National Bank had credited it with the amount of the check, and on April 25, about 11 o'clock, or shortly afterwards, Mr. Rownd, the defendant, entered the front door of the City National Bank, approached the desk of the witness Dunn, who handed him a cashier's check for the amount of the forged check, less collection. The defendant immediately indorsed it, took it to the paying teller, and there secured the money. The witness Dunn positively identified Rownd as the person who cashed this fraudulent check in his bank. The identification seems to be complete and positive. It is true that Dunn admitted on cross-examination that he was not infallible, but he was positive that the defendant was the man who obtained the money on the forged check. This evidence, if believed by the jury, would be sufficient to sustain the conviction.

The state also showed by Harold and Sadie Hamilton, proprietors of the Wellington hotel in Omaha, that the defendant William S. Rownd registered at their hotel April 23, 1912, as H. B. Sanford, and remained there until April 26. They related so many details about his visit that it is hardly possible that they could be mistaken about him. He was blind in one eye, and wore a glass eye. This was noticed by the Hamiltons at the time he was their guest. It appears that he frequently came to the desk and talked with them, and on one occasion got locked in his room, and had to come down on the fire escape. They also had some controversy with him at a time he was entertaining Elsie Waters in his room. These matters tend to show that the Hamiltons could not be mistaken in identifying the defendant as H. B. Sanford.

The state also showed that in Rownd's effects was the check made payable to H. B. Sanford. Defendant ad-

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mitted that he was in Kansas City on May 19, and the register of the Blossom House in that city contains his signature on that date as H. B. Sanford. It appears that that signature was written by the same man who registered as H. B. Sanford in Omaha. The state showed the intimate acquaintance between Sanford and Elsie Waters, the niece of the defendant, by several witnesses. This tended to identify the man Sanford as the defendant Rownd, and also tended to show the guilty knowledge of the defendant in passing the forged check. The state further showed, by expert witnesses on handwriting, that the name C. A. Clark, as indorsed on the fraudulent check, and the name C. A. Clark, written on what is called exhibit 1, which is in evidence, were written by the defendant, and were written by the same man. The state also showed by several expert witnesses that the man who wrote the name H. B. Sanford on the hotel register in Omaha signed W. S. Sanford to the pawn ticket in Kansas City.

It further appears that Elsie Waters knew that the check in question had been forged, and that Mary Sutman, whose name appeared to be signed to it, was absent from the city of Omaha, and was in Canada at the time the check was presented for payment; that communication could not be had with Mary Sutman until a sufficient time would elapse to secure its collection; that a sufficient amount of money was deposited in the Omaha National Bank by Mary Sutman to pay the check, and that defendant and Elsie Waters were together at Excelsior Springs and Kansas City after the check in question was paid. It is true that defendant produced the depositions of four persons who declared that Rownd was in Kansas City during the time the forged check was cashed in Lincoln. Upon this question there was a clear conflict of testimony; but it was the province of the jury to determine the effect of this evidence.

It may be further said that, if the jury believed the testimony of the state's witnesses, it showed that Sanford

Iams v. M

was at the Wellington hotel in of April, 1912, to the 26th of time the check in question was by the bank in Lincoln, and it the defendant could come to Li act business, if he so desired, thus be seen about the hotel v each day during the whole tir Wellington hotel.

As we view the evidence, it verdict, and finding no prejudi judgment of the district court

LEETON, J., not sitting.

FRANK IAMS, APPELLEE, V. W
APPELLA

FILED MARCH 28, 19

Constitutional Law: OFFICERS: STA
act of April 10, 1911, which atten
tion board and to vest the same
and jurisdiction, is in conflict wi
constitution, which specify the p
tute the executive department o
other executive state office shall
duties now devolving upon office
stitution shall be performed by t
v. Porter, 69 Neb. 203.

APPEAL from the district c
JAMES N. PAUL, JUDGE. *Affirm*

Grant G. Martin, Attorney
Ayres, for appellants.

John L. Webster, William
Doyle, contra.

LEITON, J.

This is an action to restrain the stallion registration board created by the act of April 10, 1911 (laws 1911, ch. 1), from collecting the fees prescribed in that act for the examination of stallions, for the renewal of the certificates provided for by the act, and for recording transfers of ownership, and from further enforcing the provisions of the act. The petition alleges that the defendants, while pretending to act under the statute, have interfered with the sale of horses by the plaintiff; that the market value of his horses has been reduced and depreciated and his business injured, and that the board, unless restrained, will continue its unlawful interference with his business. It is further alleged that the act violates the constitution of the state of Nebraska in a number of its provisions, and is therefore void. The admissions in the answer, together with the evidence, practically substantiate the main allegations of fact in the petition. The district court found that the facts stated in the petition were true, and further found that the act in question was unconstitutional as "an unlawful attempt to create state executive officers in violation of sections 1 and 26, art. V of the constitution of the state of Nebraska," and granted the relief prayed. The defendants appeal.

Section 1, art. V of the constitution of the state of Nebraska, is as follows: "The executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, treasurer, superintendent of public instruction, attorney general, and commissioner of public lands and buildings, who shall each hold his office for the term of two years from the first Thursday after the first Tuesday in January next after his election, and until his successor is elected and qualified: Provided, however, that the first election of said officers shall be held on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November, 1876, and each succeeding election shall be held at the same relative time in each even year there-

after. The governor, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, and treasurer, shall reside at the seat of government during their terms of office, and keep the public records, books and papers there, and shall perform such duties as may be required by law."

Section 26 of the same article provides: "No other executive state office shall be continued or created, and the duties now devolving upon officers not provided for by this constitution shall be performed by the officers herein created."

The fundamental question presented in this case is whether the act of 1911 violates these provisions of the constitution. Much condensed, the main provisions of the act are, as follows:

Section 1 provides, in substance, that every owner or keeper of any stallion or jack kept for public service or for sale, exchange or transfer, shall procure a certificate from the stallion registration board, "which shall be composed of the following named officers: The secretary of the Nebraska state board of agriculture, the professor of animal husbandry of the University of Nebraska, and the deputy state veterinarian."

Section 2. In order to obtain such certificate, there shall be presented to said stallion registration board an affidavit, signed by a veterinarian, who shall be approved and appointed by said board, to the effect that he has personally examined such stallion or jack, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief it is free from certain specified diseases; and if the animal is pure bred there shall also be presented a certificate of registration issued by certain specified stud book associations. The act further requires that the certificates issued shall bear the signature of the inspector and the stallion registration board, and shall have attached the official seal of the board; provides for the annual re-examination of the animals; that the board shall have power to revoke certificates for cause; requires the posting of the certificate or a copy of the same by the owner at the place of service, the recording of the certifi-

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cates by the board, the issuance by the board of certificates of transfer of ownership in case of the sale, exchange or transfer of each animal; and provides for the collection of fees for the issuance and renewal of certificates. The funds thus derived shall be used by the board "for the printing of certificates, clerical service, payment of inspectors, and the publication of an annual report which shall contain an alphabetical list of stallions and jacks which have been granted certificates and such other information as will tend to promote the best interests of the horse breeding industry in Nebraska." It also provides that a violation of the provisions of the act shall be a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.

The appellants argue that it was not the intention of the makers of the constitution that all administrative state offices, except those named in section 1, art. V, should be abolished, and the establishment thereof barred for the future by section 26 of the article, and, to illustrate, say there was at that time a warden of the state penitentiary, and a superintendent of the Nebraska hospital for the insane, who were each the chief executive officers respectively of the institutions named, were paid by the state, and charged with the duty of general supervision over the persons employed in such institutions, and argue: "Surely there is more reason for holding that the warden of the state penitentiary and the superintendent of the Nebraska hospital for the insane, who receive substantial remuneration from the state for their services and have charge of important state institutions, are executive state officers than there is for holding that the members of the stallion registration board, who receive no compensation whatever for their services rendered as members of said board, are such officers." They also argue that this court in *Wallace v. State*, 91 Neb. 158, has upheld the constitutionality of the "Indeterminate Sentence Law," which established a state prison board, and that the powers of this board are as executive in character as those of the stallion registration board. They also cite *In re Barnes*, 83 Neb. 443, as upholding their views.

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The appellee contends that the language of the constitution is plain and unambiguous; that the duties of the members of the board are executive in character and state wide; and that the ordinary significance of the words used, and the prior decisions of this court, clearly show that the members of the board would, if they performed the duties imposed upon them by the act, be holders of "an executive state office."

The question presented is not a new one in this state. In 1883, only eight years after the constitutional convention was held, and while the memory of its discussions must have been fresh, under the practice then prevailing, the opinion of the judges of this court was taken upon the question as to whether railroad commissioners would be state executive officers, and as to whether such an office, if created by the legislature, would come within the inhibition of the constitution. In the opinion in *In re Railroad Commissioners*, 15 Neb. 679, it is said: "Even were it not inhibited by other clauses of the constitution, we do not think that it is desired or contemplated to invest such railway commission with the power to make laws, or even to interpret or apply them, but that such duties would be to aid in carrying the laws into effect. Hence their duties would be executive, and if state officers, if paid out of the state treasury, and their field of duty co-extensive with the territorial limits of the state, they would be state executive officers." As a necessary consequence, it was held that the creation of such an office was inhibited by section 26. See, also, *In re Appropriations*, 25 Neb. 662.

In another case, when passing upon the question of the validity of an act of 1887, providing that the attorney general with four other specified existing state officers shall constitute a board of transportation, it was insisted that the law was invalid for the reason that, "under the provisions of our constitution, no such board could be created or have an existence;" but it was held that, since the duties of the board were imposed upon executive offi-

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ials who were named in section 1, art. V of the constitution, the provisions of section 26 were not violated. In that opinion (*Pacific Express Co. v. Cornell*, 59 Neb. 364, 375) it is said: "The constitution makers sealed the doorway to any more executive state offices, and must have done so, knowing and contemplating the future growth and development of the state and the consequent birth and existence of further duties; and their manner of disposition of them was that the constitutional officers should attend to them." Following this decision, and that in *Nebraska Telephone Co. v. Cornell*, 59 Neb. 737, to the same effect, it became the practice in this state to create executive boards, the members of which were composed of existing state officials; and, in order to relieve these officers from the onerous additional duties imposed upon them, the several acts provided for the employment of deputies or secretaries to aid in or to carry on the administrative details necessitated in the work of the board. These acts have uniformly been upheld. *State v. Eskew*, 54 Neb. 600; *Merrill v. State*, 65 Neb. 509; *McMahon v. State*, 70 Neb. 722, 726. The validity of other acts making existing state officers commissioners of certain bureaus, or members of certain executive boards, as, for example, the Bureau of Printing, the State Board of Equalization, the State Fire Commissioner, the State Board of Pharmacy, the State Inspector of Oils, the State Board of Health, the State Board of Irrigation, and other executive departments, has never been questioned. The legislature itself has continuously for a long period of time construed the provisions of section 26 as prohibiting the creation of state executive boards composed of members other than the executive state officers named in the constitution. When it sought to establish a railroad commission with broad executive and administrative powers and duties extending throughout the state, it was thought necessary to amend the constitution in order to allow this to be done without imposing the additional burden of these duties upon the existing state officers. In 1899 the legis-

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lature attempted to create a state registry of brands and marks and a state brand and mark committee, and cattle owners desiring to use a brand or mark were required to certify a description of the same and file it for record. The power to decide as to the right to use such a brand was conferred upon this committee, and a fee was required to be paid by the applicant for recording the brand. The duties of this committee were state wide, and their compensation and expenses were to be paid out of the fees derived from the cattle owners. The secretary of state was made a member of the committee, as well as three reputable, representative stock raisers to be appointed by the governor from those largely interested in cattle. The act was held invalid in *State v. Porter*, 69 Neb. 203. Judge SULLIVAN, writing the opinion, said: "The act of 1899 assumed to vest the brand and mark committee with executive powers and jurisdiction throughout the state. This being so, the members of the committee would, if the act were valid, be executive state officers; but there can be no executive state offices other than those mentioned in section 1, art. V of the constitution. The legislation we are considering was, of course, abortive and void."

We can see no substantial difference in principle between the duties and powers of the brand and mark committee and those of the stallion registration board. Paraphrasing the language of Judge SULLIVAN, the act of 1911 assumes to vest the stallion registration board with executive powers and jurisdiction throughout the state. This being so, the members of the committee would, if the act be valid, be executive state officers; but there can be no executive state officers other than those mentioned in section 1, art. V.

We can see no force in the argument of appellants that the offices of warden of the state penitentiary and superintendent of the state hospital for the insane are state executive offices, and that, if the stallion registration board is not warranted by the constitution, these offices are also unwarranted. The offices named are not within

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executive officers, as intended by defined by this court. Their jurisdiction, but is confined to certain specific

The case of *Wallace v. State*, 91 Md. 1, held the validity of the act of 1911, appointment by the governor of a state whose duties are concerned with the care of prisoners in the state penitentiaries with respect to the final pardoners are merely advisory to the governor by appellants. In that case it was discussed, that the act is not in conflict with art. V, and that the duties of the board are not of such a character as to bring into question the position of state executive officers. It was held in the opinion, that there may be some question as to the constitutionality of some of the provisions, but the court, following decisions in conformity with the settled law in this subject in favor of the validity of the

act, as we disregard the plain language and depart from its settled construction, we hold this act invalid. In so far as it affects the duties of executive officers, it is clearly a devious custom and practice of the board. The purposes of the act seem beneficial, and may easily be remedied by new legislation. The board of the legislature now sitting, if they have satisfied that body of its value to the state, to re-enact its provisions, impositions upon the board upon the state officers; and we hasten to pass upon the opportunity may be afforded so

The district court is right, and is

AFFIRMED.

Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Peterson.

**SPRINGFIELD FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, AP-
PELLEE, V. PAUL PETERSON, APPELLANT.**

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,043.

1. **Compromise and Settlement: CONCLUSIVENESS.** After an agreement to compromise and settle an actual controversy has been made by the parties in interest, the original matter in dispute is not a proper subject of suit or defense, where fraud, mistake or duress in procuring the contract is not pleaded.
2. **Insurance: PROOF OF LOSS: MISSTATEMENTS.** In the law of fire insurance, a misstatement of fact in the proof of loss, if made after the insurer and the insured have entered into a contract to compromise and settle the damages in dispute, is not a proper subject of suit or defense, where the insurer did not rely upon the misstatement, and where it was perfunctorily made, without any fraudulent intent.

APPEAL from the district court for Washington county:
WILLIAM A. REDICK, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Jefferis & Howell and Herman Aye, for appellant.

Greene, Breckenridge, Gurley & Woodrough, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is an action for money had and received. For the term of one year from March 23, 1909, plaintiff insured defendant against loss by fire to the extent of \$1,300 on a linotype and \$200 on a stereotyping plant, and authorized concurrent insurance, which was written in the Hartford Fire Insurance Company to the extent of \$1,000 on the linotype and \$200 on the stereotyping plant. The building containing the property was destroyed by fire April 27, 1909. This controversy is narrowed to the insurance on the linotype. Plaintiff's proportion of the liability, estimated at \$889.67, was paid to defendant June 7, 1909. To recover back that sum is the purpose of this suit. In the petition the relief demanded is based on two grounds: (1) Defendant was not the sole owner of the property at the time of the fire, and for that reason was not entitled

to any indemnity under the terms of his policy. (2) In violation of his insurance contract, he procured payment by false statements in his proof of loss. The facts constituting both grounds of relief were denied in an answer containing an affirmative plea of the compromise and settlement of plaintiff's proportion of the loss at \$889.67. In a reply plaintiff denied the compromise and settlement, and repleaded that payment was made in reliance upon false statements made by defendant in his proof of loss. The case was tried to the court without a jury. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff for \$616.87, defendant appeals.

The judgment is challenged as being without support in the pleadings and evidence. That plaintiff's policy was issued, that it was in force when the fire occurred, that the linotype was damaged to some extent, are facts not open to controversy. At the time of the fire defendant, on the record made, was clearly the owner, within the terms of the insurance contract.

The other ground of relief pleaded by plaintiff is unavailing for the following reasons: The evidence shows, without contradiction, that before proof of loss was made an adjuster of plaintiff saw where the linotype stood in the ruins of the consumed building. He had the same opportunity as defendant to determine the nature and extent of the damages. After the terms of the compromise had been agreed upon, the proof of loss was made by defendant in a perfunctory way, without any intention of misleading or defrauding the insurer. That the statements therein were not relied upon by plaintiff is shown by its own testimony. Plaintiff not only entered into the contract of settlement, but paid the loss. The compromise was pleaded and proved by defendant. In absence of fraud, mistake or duress, it is binding on the parties. *Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Bredehoft*, 49 Neb. 152; *Gandy v. Wiltse*, 79 Neb. 280; *Slade v. Swedeburg Elevator Co.*, 39 Neb. 600; *Massillon Engine & Thresher Co. v. Prouty*, 65 Neb. 496. The truth is that the linotype had been in a

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fire. Falling plaster and other debris had covered it in the ruins. Both parties saw the situation. The machine was injured. There was a loss to adjust. The parties were competent to make an agreement, and the amount of damage was a lawful subject of contract. The adjuster and defendant, each apparently relying on his own acumen, began and concluded negotiations for a settlement, without uncovering the machine. Evidence directed to the issue of fraud in the proof of loss indicates that defendant had the better of the bargain, that this was not discovered until after the linotype had been uncovered and cleaned, and that the debris had protected it. Plaintiff denied the settlement, but was mistaken. It did not plead fraud, mistake or duress resulting in an unconscionable settlement. Such a plea was necessary to relief based on that ground. *Gandy v. Wiltse*, 79 Neb. 280. It follows that the relief granted to plaintiff was outside of the pleadings and evidence. The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

PAUL PETERSON, APPELLANT, v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, APPELLEE.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,044.

Judgment: PLEADING AND PROOF. A judgment granting relief outside of the pleadings and evidence is erroneous.

APPEAL from the district court for Washington county:
WILLIAM A. REDICK, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Jefferis & Howell and *Herman Aye*, for appellant.

Greene, Breckenridge, Gurley & Woodrough, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is an action to recover fire insurance under a contract of compromise and settlement fixing the loss at

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a term of one year from March 23, 1909, and plaintiff against loss by fire to the amount of \$1,300 on a linotype and \$200 on a stereotyping machine. Plaintiff had a concurrent insurance, which was Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company, for \$1,300 on the linotype and \$200 on the plant. The building containing the property was destroyed by fire April 27, 1909. Plaintiff offered evidence of the promise and settlement of defendant's promise and settlement, and pleaded the defenses: (1) Plaintiff was not the sole owner of the property at the time of the fire, and for that reason was not entitled to any indemnity under the terms of the insurance. (2) In violation of his insurance contract, plaintiff made statements in his proof of loss and thus invalidated the insurance. The case was tried to the court and a judgment in favor of plaintiff for \$711.11 was rendered. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff for \$711.11 plaintiff has appealed.

The court decided on the identical evidence contained in *Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Peterson*, 100 Mo. 241, 1901, for the reasons therein stated the result was the same.

The court granting relief to defendant, being out of the case and evidence, is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

DE WOLF, APPELLEE, V. ALBERT RETZLAFF,
APPELLANT.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,087.

REMARKS: HARMLESS ERROR. Harmless error in an instruction to the jury is not ground for reversing a judgment on

FOR NEW TRIAL: EXCESSIVE VERDICT. Where the verdict is questioned as excessive in the motion for a new

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trial, mere excess in the amount of recovery is not reviewable under the assignment that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
WILLARD E. STEWART, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

T. J. Doyle and G. L. De Lacy, for appellant.

Morning & Ledwith, contra.

ROSE, J.

Defendant broke the fibula and the tibia of his left leg, and employed plaintiff, who is a physician and surgeon, to reduce and treat the fractures. For professional services rendered and expenses incurred between March 16, 1910, and April 20, 1910, plaintiff brought this suit to recover \$239.35. Defendant admitted plaintiff's employment, but pleaded malpractice, and demanded damages in the sum of \$5,000. Upon the verdict of a jury, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for \$250.50. Defendant appeals.

Complaint is first made of the following instruction: "If you find for the plaintiff, you will so say by your verdict. If you also find for the defendant on his damage claim, you will deduct the larger item from the smaller, as the case may be, and return a verdict accordingly."

The criticism is that the jury were permitted to allow plaintiff compensation for professional services, and to award damages for malpractice growing out of the same services, though one claim, if established, would necessarily defeat the other. If the position thus taken is correct, it is clear that defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction, because the verdict shows on its face that the jury specifically found in favor of plaintiff for the full amount of his claim, and against defendant on his cross-petition for damages. The occasion for deducting one claim from the other, therefore, did not arise.

The correctness of the following instruction is also

s the duty of a patient to exercise or-prudence, and obey all reasonable in-y the surgeon, and if he fails in these olications arise in the matter of healing uries being treated by the surgeon, and s are such as may have been caused by ary care and prudence on the patient's ilure to obey reasonable instructions of urden is upon him to show that such infavorable results were not due to his ary care and prudence, but were due to want of skill of the surgeon."

. cannot be approved as an accurate law applicable to the issues and facts.

it as an erroneous direction that, in an ctice, the burden is on a patient charg-prove that complications or unfavorable due to contributory negligence on his but not deciding, that the position thus nt is tenable, should the judgment be iving of the instruction quoted? In an-ion, further details of the case must be njury occurred on a highway while de-g on a wagon load of lumber, with his the front end. A horse kicked him and elow the knee. Both bones were broken ough the flesh, causing ugly lacerations.

he drove to the home of his brother. ere within an hour, dressed the wounds, res, so he says, and wrapped the leg in i of wire and wood. The splint was ff after his arrival. It is described by t posterior splint." The evidence shows uently used by skilful and careful sur-three days the patient was taken a short ne of his parents. After a week or more o his own home. There he had the at- and her mother. Nearly every day for

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five weeks after the injury, plaintiff removed the bandages and dressed the wounds. He frequently stated to defendant that the fractures had been properly reduced, and that conditions and improvement were satisfactory, considering the nature of the injuries. The fears of the patient were often aroused by his wife and mother-in-law, who discussed the danger of blood-poisoning and censured the physician. Defendant became dissatisfied, complained of the treatment and consequent suffering, feared blood-poisoning, discharged plaintiff, and employed Dr. Finney, who removed the splint, broke whatever union had been formed, treated and dressed the wound, placed the bones in apposition, and put the leg in a plaster cast. Dr. Finney's testimony tends to prove that a complete use of the broken leg would not have been restored without a change of conditions as he found them. That defendant will entirely recover from his injuries is not now questioned. The principal charges of negligence imputed to plaintiff are that he failed to replace the broken ends of the bones in true apposition; that the leg below the fractures was left in an unnatural or crooked position; and that the splint used did not properly immobilize the limb. In all of these particulars the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that plaintiff in performing his professional services was neither unskilful nor negligent, though the testimony is not in perfect harmony on that issue. On the witness-stand defendant himself evinced a purpose to be both truthful and candid. The verdict of the jury, however, based as it is on all of the evidence, determines the fact that plaintiff's services were skilfully and carefully performed. Though there is proof that in a few minor particulars directions of the physician were not strictly observed, there is no convincing evidence that "complications" or "injuries" came from that source. Plaintiff's own testimony virtually shows that no harm was caused by disregarding instructions. He testified that the bones had been in continuous apposition during his treatment, and that when he made his last examination before being

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ed, the leg was in its natural position, and that
ies were improving normally. Defendant had
dangerous infection. His wife's testimony indi-
t Dr. Finney used considerable force in breaking
before he reset the bones. In one of the instruc-
jury were told that plaintiff could not recover, if
had been placed in apposition by Dr. Finney for
time. With the record and the evidence in the
outlined, it does not appear that the jury were
that defendant was prejudiced by the instruc-
cised.

Also argued that the recovery is excessive. De-
argues this point on the ground that the evidence
cient to sustain the judgment, there being in the
or a new trial no assignment that the verdict is
. Mere excess in the amount of the recovery
e corrected on appeal in that way. *Hammond v.*
, 56 Neb. 631; *Lowe v. Keens*, 90 Neb. 565.

AFFIRMED.

A. ELLIOTT, APPELLEE, V. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,112.

PARTIES: REVIEW. In the title of a petition, the naming of
le A. Elliott" as plaintiff, instead of "Mattie A. Elliott, ad-
tratrix of the estate of Howard Elliott, deceased," is not a
d of reversal in a record showing that defendant answered
merits of an amended petition containing the correct title,
hat, without prejudice to defendant, the case was tried as if
had been no such defect.

and Servant: INJURY TO SERVANT: ASSUMPTION OF RISKS.
mployee does not ordinarily assume risks arising from con-
s beyond his knowledge and not obvious to a person of his
lence and understanding.

———: **NEGLIGENCE OF MASTER.** A master who puts an in-
tended servant to work in a hazardous position among

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electric power wires carrying dangerous currents of electricity, without properly instructing him in regard to his duties and without giving him specific warning of incident dangers not obvious to a person of his experience and understanding, cannot justify such conduct by showing that the servant had represented himself to be an experienced lineman in telephone work involving no danger from electricity, where the master knew in advance that the servant had never had any experience in working among dangerous wires.

4. **Negligence: QUESTION FOR JURY.** Negligence in constructing and in using electric wires carrying dangerous currents of electricity is a question for the jury, where the evidence on that issue is conflicting.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
WILLIAM A. REDICK, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Greene, Breckenridge, Gurley & Woodrough, for appellant.

W. C. Lambert and S. L. Winters, contra.

ROSE, J.

While Howard Elliott was in the employ of defendant, he came in contact with electric wires among which he was working at the top of a pole and was instantly killed. This is an action by his mother as administratrix of his estate to recover resulting damages in the sum of \$25,000. Upon a verdict of a jury, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for \$7,500. Defendant has appealed.

A reversal is demanded because the mother of decedent brought the suit in her own name instead of suing for damages as administratrix. It is true that the title of the petition is defective in naming "Mattie A. Elliott" as plaintiff, instead of "Mattie A. Elliott, administratrix of the estate of Howard Elliott, deceased." The ruling on this point, however, is adverse to defendant for the following reasons: In the body of the petition there is a proper plea that plaintiff is the duly appointed and qualified administratrix of her son's estate. An amended petition

correct title was filed. Before trial the defect was specifically called to the attention of the court by or demurrer. Defendant pleaded to the merits of pending petition. The trial would not have proceeded differently had the action been brought in the name administratrix. It was shown by the evidence that she was a widow, with a number of children, and that her husband had contributed regularly to her support. Following instructions the administratrix was treated as an individual, and in her representative capacity the jury returned a verdict in her favor. In this respect the judgment is the same. Defendant was not prejudiced by the irregularity of the proceedings, and it would be carrying a technical objection too far to reverse the judgment on this ground.

If the assignments of error presents this question: whether there was an erroneous refusal to direct a verdict in favor of defendant on the grounds that Elliott accepted employment with full knowledge of its hazards; that his death was caused by assumed risks; that negligence on the part of defendant was not the proximate cause of his death; that defendant was not negligent in locating or constructing the overhead wire at the place of the accident, or in failing to warn of danger? Attention is thus directed to the questions submitted to the jury. By means of extension-arms attached to the top of a 30-foot pole 25 feet above the ground Elliott was engaged with other employees in electric power wires running along the north side of electric street railway track between South Omaha and West Omaha. Three wires, each carrying 5,300 volts of electricity, were attached to insulated pins on a cross-arm in the center to the top of the pole. There was a cross-arm at each end of the cross-arm. The other power wires were 17½ inches from the south wire and 35 inches from the north one. A metal trolley bracket, hanging over the street railway track, swung from the pole 31½ feet below the cross-arm. Two concatenated wires, one above the other, hung over the street car track, the upper wire being attached to an insulated pin on the south end

of the bracket. The bracket itself was supported by an iron rod running from the outer end to the top of the pole. The upper wire is the messenger and bears the weight of both, while the lower one is the trolley wire which carries electric currents and applies them to the trolley on the street cars. The trolley wire carried 500 volts of electricity and the messenger wire carried practically the same voltage. In addition to the wires described, a small, uninsulated copper wire was attached at one end to the messenger wire. It wound around the metal trolley bracket, followed it nearly to the pole, ran down the pole to a cluster of incandescent lamps, and from there, through a switch, to the ground. One of the obvious effects of this copper wire was to undo the insulation protecting the trolley bracket and the iron rod from the electric currents carried by the messenger wire.

It will thus be seen that within three feet of the top of the pole there were four wires, one metal trolley bracket, and an iron rod, all carrying electricity. Elliott ascended the pole by means of spur climbers, and, to prevent falling, fastened himself to the top with a belt. With the upper part of his body between the north power wire and the one next to it, and his left foot near the trolley bracket and the copper wire, he had taken a position on the east side of the pole, intending to unscrew the nut from the bolt which held the cross-arm in place, and to assist in raising the cross-arm on extension-arms already bolted to the pole. He carried a metallic brace and bit, either attached to his belt or in one hand. A fellow servant on the west side of the pole a little lower down handed him a 12-inch iron monkey-wrench. He took it for the purpose of unscrewing the nut at the top of the pole. There were sputtering sounds. The brace and bit fell to the ground. His body swung from his belt.

The pleadings raised these issues: Did Elliott assume the risks of his employment knowing the conditions and danger? Was defendant guilty of negligence in failing to properly instruct Elliott of his danger or in using the un-

. copper wire connecting the messenger with the bracket and the ground? Was such negligence imate cause of Elliott's death? He began work July 12, 1909, and was killed the next day. He r before worked on lines carrying dangerous cur- during the two days he had been in defendant's is experience with high voltage wires was limited or five poles. The danger incident to his work was killed existed only on one other pole, and not appear that he had unbolted the cross-arm

Defendant relies on testimony of the manager oloyed Elliott, of the foreman in charge of the d of other witnesses, to show that the employee esented himself to be an experienced lineman; knew the dangers incident to such service; that een told of the dangers; that he promised to be and that he had presented himself already for a lineman's work. The court, however, was d to accept all the testimony of this nature as e of the issue. The manager admitted that old him his work as a lineman had been confined one lines carrying electricity in harmless quanti-. The manager's warnings of danger, as shown n testimony, were general in their nature. From ourt or jury might properly infer that they were ded for a lineman who was experienced in work- ing wires carrying dangerous currents of electric- foreman in charge of the work in hand was on or near it when the accident occurred. He ad- at Elliott had asked him about the danger, and

him of having had no experience with "hot Elliott was not specifically warned of the danger pper wire and the bracket, carrying, as they did, ge of the messenger wire, running beneath the ntial power wires, and communicating with the

Nor does the evidence conclusively show that new, or should have known, of such danger. If, , testimony that Elliott represented himself to

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be an experienced lineman and appeared for work with a lineman's outfit is uncontradicted, both the manager and the foreman, when he was employed, knew he had no previous experience among dangerous wires like those on the pole where he was directed to work. Not having such knowledge, they could not send him into a place of danger without proper instructions, and justify their conduct by showing that he represented himself to be an experienced lineman in telephone work involving no danger from electricity. When all the circumstances are considered, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that Elliott's knowledge, experience and representations did not, under well-settled rules of law, prevent a recovery on the ground that he assumed the risks to which he was exposed. The question was one for the jury.

Was there evidence tending to show negligence in the use of the uninsulated copper wire, which carried electricity along the trolley bracket to the ground, and in failing to specifically warn the inexperienced employee of the danger? There is some direct proof on the affirmative of this issue. Exhibits introduced by defendant, in connection with other evidence, indicate that, except for the copper wire, the trolley bracket would have been protected by an insulated pin from the voltage of the messenger wire. There was the same necessity for insulating the copper wire that there had been for protecting the bracket. The effect of using the copper wire in the manner described, without insulation, was to make three unprotected conductors to the pole and one to the ground, where, otherwise, there would have been none. The evidence of negligence in this respect is sufficient.

Was the negligence proved the proximate cause of Elliott's death? Mere contact with one of the three power wires among which Elliott was working did not cause the accident. This is shown by the evidence. When Elliott was at the top of the pole his fellow servant told him that his arm was against a wire. He replied: "I know it." An electrician to whom Elliott had first reported for work

d: "I told him that he wanted to be very careful e wires in handling them, if he had to touch them ' Of the three power wires, the one by the pole on ith side was the nearest to Elliott's left side. His t was near the copper wire and the bracket. His ould have been caused by a short circuit resulting simultaneous contacts with two power wires, or ne power wire and either the copper wire or the t. If death resulted from contacts with two power the negligent use or construction of the copper wire t a contributing cause. The other explanation, r, is more substantial. Simultaneous contact above low, when the conditions are observed, could have d from resetting the spurs in the pole or from l motions of the limbs or the body, either in adjust- n using tools. That the fatality occurred in this way orted by proof of burns on the left arm and on the e, by an opening in the sole of the left foot, and by in the left shoe. Defendant insists, however, that ter theory cannot be 'accepted, because, if the cur- ad been short-circuited in that manner, the voltage ne of the power wires, it is asserted, would have the small copper wire, which was left in its former on. On conflicting evidence, the jury found other- id settled that question adversely to defendant. In ew of all the evidence, the case was properly sub- to the jury without error in the instructions. The on evidence are also approved.

further argued that the judgment is excessive. On int Judge BARNES and the writer are of opinion e recovery exceeds the damages proved by at least

On the contrary, it is held by the majority that trict court did not err in sustaining the verdict as d.

AFFIRMED.

Baker v. Central Irrigation District.

**DORA BAKER, APPELLEE, V. CENTRAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT
ET AL., APPELLANTS.**

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,022.

1. **Waters: IRRIGATION DISTRICTS: LANDS SUBJECT TO ASSESSMENT.** In order to subject lands to the payment of taxes and assessments for the support of an irrigation ditch, the boundaries of the irrigation district must be sufficiently definite and certain to identify the land to be irrigated thereby, and the amount thereof. Section 28, art. II, ch. 93a, Comp. St. 1901.
2. ———: ———: **BOUNDARIES: DESCRIPTION.** In surveying the boundaries of an irrigation district, where straight lines are not followed, meander lines should be set out with sufficient definiteness to substantially indicate the route followed and to identify the lands sought to be embraced within the district. In such a case a description by metes and bounds, which would be sufficient in an ordinary deed, is sufficient.
3. ———: ———: ———: ———. In making such a survey, a call in one of the main lines or courses, "From a point on the section line about 800 feet east of the southwest corner of section 10, Tp. 21, R. 54, thence in a northeasterly direction to the east line of section 10," is too indefinite and uncertain to determine how much of the land through which such call is intended to run is within the irrigation district.
4. ———: ———: **ASSESSMENTS: INJUNCTION.** In a suit in equity by a landowner to restrain an irrigation district from procuring the taxation of her lands for the support of its irrigation ditch, if it appears that the plaintiff in such suit has in fact used water from the defendant's ditch, upon a certain number of acres of said land, an injunction is properly refused as to such lands so watered, even though it may be found in the same suit that plaintiff's lands generally, by reason of uncertainty in the description of the boundaries of such district, are not taxable therein.-

APPEAL from the district court for Scott's Bluff county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. Affirmed.

L. L. Raymond and James E. Philpott, for appellants.

*W. W. White, F. A. Wright and J. G. Mothersead,
contra.*

FAWCETT, J.

Plaintiff is the owner of the south half, and the north-east quarter, of the southwest quarter, and the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 10, township range 54 west, in Scott's Bluff county. The defendant is organized for the purpose of purchasing the canal and franchises of the Central Canal, which purchase was made and bonds to the amount of \$21,000 issued for carrying out the purposes of its organization. Plaintiff instituted this suit in the district court for Scott's Bluff county, and in paragraph 3 of her petition alleges: "That by a portion of said land is within the boundaries of said irrigation district, although said irrigation district has taxed all the said land for irrigation purposes. That much of said land as lies south and east of a line commencing 800 feet east of the southwest corner of said section 10, running thence in a northeasterly direction until it intersects the east line of section 10 at a point north of where the east line of section 10 intersects the north bank of the North Platte river, was never included in the defendant district. That an exact description of the land included by the defendant district for irrigation purposes and the amount thereof cannot be given, for the reason that the field notes of the survey of said district do not show the point on the east line of said section 10 where the straight line commencing 800 feet east of the southwest corner of said section intersects the east line thereof. Plaintiff states that from natural causes but a small tract of plaintiff's land lying north and west of the land above described lands, amounting to not more than 695 acres, is susceptible of irrigation from the ditch of the said company, and such was the case when said district was formed." In paragraph 7 the petition alleges: "That plaintiff has frequently requested said district and its officers not to include her said lands within the boundaries of said district, and to exclude the same, and to levy no taxes on same for irrigation purposes, but defendant

refuses to comply and still refuses to do so." The prayer is: "Wherefore, she prays that her said lands be declared nonassessable for irrigation purposes for support of defendant district; that said lands be detached from said district, and that all persons acting for and on its behalf be enjoined from levying or assessing taxes against said land for irrigation purposes; that the taxes already assessed be declared null and void, and that the cloud upon her title to said lands be removed, and she have such other and further relief as equity and justice may require." We have quoted all of the petition necessary to be considered here.

For answer to paragraph 3 of the petition defendant denies the allegation that the land lying south and east of the line referred to was never included in defendant district; alleges that "the said 'straight line,' commencing 800 feet east of the southwest corner of section 10," is only assumed so to be by plaintiff and is fictitious; avers the facts to be "that a line commencing at said point 800 feet east of said southwest corner, thence northeasterly, east, northeasterly, etc., varying in the points of the compass only so as to pass over the most practicable route for defendant's canal to the east line of section 10, includes within defendant district all of plaintiff's lands as were, as it is alleged by plaintiff, never included in the defendant district; * * * that the last above named line, so including plaintiff's lands, is the line so commencing 800 feet east of said southwest corner of section 10;"-that at the time of the organization of defendant district on or about June 10, 1901, plaintiff's said lands were included within the boundary of defendant district; that all of said lands then and there became, were, and ever since, and now are a part of the real property of defendant district, and as such are subject to assessment and taxation for the payment of the purchase by defendant of the central ditch and all its rights and franchises for the use of defendant, and also subject to assessment and taxation for the payment of all other

liabilities incurred in the necessary maintenance and operation of said central ditch for the use and benefit of the defendant; that 90 acres or more of plaintiff's lands included within the boundary of defendant's district are irrigable. As to paragraph 7 of the petition, quoted above, the answer is a general denial. The reply, in substance, is a general denial.

By its decree the court found: "That the boundaries of the defendant district are so indefinite and uncertain that they do not show, nor can it be determined therefrom, just how much of plaintiff's land is within the defendant district; that the plaintiff has used water to irrigate 20.59 acres of her land set out and described in her petition; and that she is liable for the taxes levied and assessed for such number of acres. The court further finds that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed as to the taxes levied and assessed against 139.41 acres of her said lands; that injunction against the assessment and collection of taxes for irrigation purposes against the 20.59 acres should be denied. To which findings both plaintiff and defendant separately except. The court further finds that it is without jurisdiction to hear and determine just what lands are irrigable. To which finding plaintiff excepts." Judgment was entered in accordance with these findings. From this judgment defendant appeals.

It will be observed that only two questions are really before us for review: (a) Whether or not the court erred in holding that the boundary of defendant district is so indefinite and uncertain that it cannot be determined how much of plaintiff's land is within defendant district; and (b) whether the court erred in holding plaintiff liable for the taxes upon 20.59 acres of land, upon which the evidence shows she had actually used water, instead of upon 26,695 acres, which in paragraph 3 of her petition plaintiff said is susceptible of irrigation from defendant district. Upon the first of these points defendant argues that the allegations above quoted from paragraphs

3 and 7 of plaintiff's petition constitute an admission by plaintiff that her land is in defendant district. We are unable to concur in this construction of the pleading. It will be observed that the quotation from paragraph 3 of the petition consists of four sentences. If the allegation rested upon the first two sentences, it might possibly bear the construction defendant places upon it, but the third sentence precludes that construction. In that sentence it is distinctly alleged that the description of the land included in defendant district cannot be given, and states the reason why it cannot be done. The call of the survey in controversy is: "From a point on the section line about 800 feet east of the southwest corner of section 10, Tp. 21, R. 54, thence in a northeasterly direction to the east line of section 10, Tp. 21, R. 54, thence north on said section line to the south bank of the North Platte river." Who can say from this description where this "northeasterly" line would strike the east line of section 10? It cannot be and is not claimed that a "northeast" line was intended. Such a line would intersect the North Platte river some distance west of the east line of section 10, and therefore would never intersect the east line of the section. There is nothing in the call to indicate that a meandering line was intended, such line to correspond with the topography of the ground over which it was being run, so that the east line of the section might be reached by following the desired grade of the ditch. The call does not read, as brief of counsel for defendant suggests it might have read: "Thence northeasterly on a uniform grade of one and eight-tenths foot per mile to the intersection with the east line of said section 10." Even such a call would to some extent be uncertain, for the reason that one surveyor, in running such a line to the east line of section 10, might survey around high places or depressions, while another might go straight through the former and over the latter. We have carefully examined the evidence and plats submitted, and from neither are we able to determine where this so-called northeasterly line would,

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the course indicated by defendant's counsel reach the east line of section 10.

lant district was organized June 10, 1901. es not show whether it was organized under s of section 28, art. II, ch. 93a, Comp. St. r section 2, art. III of that chapter. In either rription under consideration is insufficient. rt. II, *supra*, provides that, when an applica- priate water is made, "said application shall name and postoffice address of the applicant, om which said appropriation shall be made, if for irrigation a description of the land to hereby, and the amount thereof." Section 2, a, provides that the petition "shall set forth rly describe the boundaries of said district." vision exactly similar to the one last above upreme court of California, in *Central Irrri- ct v. De Lappe*, 79 Cal. 351, say: "Several e taken to the description contained in the ey are based upon the requirement of the n of the act that such petition 'shall set forth rly describe the proposed boundaries of such t is probable that this provision requires a y metes and bounds, for it is 'the boundaries' e described, and not merely the district. k that a description by metes and bounds e sufficient in an ordinary deed is a com- the provision." We think the California pplies the correct test. That the description eration here utterly fails to meet this test is to require discussion. We think the district arranted in holding that this description was ndefinite and uncertain to warrant it in hold- s land subject to taxation for the support of tch.

cond point, we think the court was right. lding that the boundaries were too uncertain ide what lands of plaintiff were in the dis-

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trict, the court would have been compelled to grant plaintiff relief as to all of her lands, but for the fact that the evidence shows that she had actually used water upon 20.59 acres. Such being the fact, the court properly required her to do equity by paying the taxes assessed upon that much of her land. It could not consistently do more, and equity would not sanction less.

The judgment of the district court appears to us to be right. It is therefore

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and ROSE, JJ., concur.

LETON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

AMASA E. MAINE, APPELLEE, v. MARTIN T. HILL,
APPELLANT.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,085.

Appeal: STRIKING AMENDED ANSWER. Where an amended answer does not tender any defense not provable under the original answer, it is not reversible error to strike it.

APPEAL from the district court for Richardson county:
JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

James R. Wilhite and Edwin Falloon, for appellant.

Reavis & Reavis, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

Plaintiff brought suit in justice court in Richardson county upon an account for goods sold and delivered. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim. In the district court plaintiff filed a petition substantially the same as the bill of particulars filed in justice court. Defendant filed in the district court the same answer and counterclaim which he had filed in justice court. The reply was a general denial. With the pleadings standing thus, the

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led for trial and a jury impaneled. The only
that then took place is the journal entry of the
in it is recited that the case was called for
petition, answer, and reply, both parties being
trial. Jury impaneled, naming the jurors.

this cause came on further to be heard, the
d closing of the case given the defendant.

plaintiff objects to the introduction of
ny on the part of the defendant, and moves
to instruct the jury to return a verdict
ntiff for the amount of his claim with lawful

Whereupon the defendant asked and obtained
court to amend his answer to plaintiff's peti-
being done, the plaintiff moved the court to
amended answer from the files, which, after
f counsel and consideration by the court, was
Defendant excepts. Thereupon this cause came

to be heard upon motion of plaintiff for an
verdict, and the defendant refusing to answer

standing upon his amended answer, said mo-
ting the jury to return a verdict in favor of
s sustained and the jury was so instructed.

excepts." The verdict of the jury is then set

e journal entry proceeds: "Now on this 13th
er, it still being one of the days of the regular

term, 1910, the cause came on further to be

e verdict of the jury returned herein; and, it

hat no motion to set aside said verdict and for

of this cause has been filed by said defendant,

dered, considered and adjudged by the court

laintiff have judgment on said verdict, and

over of and from said defendant the sum of,"

lant made no attempt, after his amended an-
tricken, to offer proof under his original an-

which he had asked and been given the right
l close, but saw fit to stand or fall upon the

ie court upon his amended answer, the only

question presented for court erred in striking, carefully examined both cover wherein the amended defense from that tendency answers set out quite chased by defendant jewelry, of no value received the goods he worthless character, or perpetrated upon him; the portion of them, but, in instances, all of the goods ant, who had to refund had paid therefor. The said defendant has offered all said goods unsold to followed by a counter answer alleged: "But the order of plaintiff, will produce said jewelry back to the plaintiff. The value of said jewelry was so sold by this defendant for this amount of money." The counter amended answer tends to defendant's original answer sustaining the motion for the amended answer was a tempt to offer proof which might and should have been refused to answer further amended answer. We respectfully insist upon an order of the district court which was made, and particularly in answer, he has stated a

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the court. He should not stand idly by and let the plaintiff go against him, and then ask this court to reverse the judgment in the court below. His original brief in the district court tendered a defense. The court sustained that defense, and there is nothing to show that the district court would have reached a different result. It should at least have been re-

AFFIRMED.

SENTENCE.

The plaintiff's motion is too technical. The defendant offered fake jewelry as a compliance with the court's order, but it was entirely worthless. The case was tried in the justice court, and plaintiff failed; he then moved to the district court, and prevailed on a technical point in his brief that the defendant's amended answer was out because it changed the issues. This court does not justify what it now finds one, still less plausible, and is compelled to pay his money for. The court ought to dissent.

REMARKS.

PELLANT, V. MARIA PANKO ET AL.,
APPELLEES.

MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,115.

HOLDING. One not served with process in an action, or by an authorized attorney appear in court, is not bound by a judgment rendered therein.

REMARKS: **AUTHORITY:** **QUESTION FOR JURY.** Where, in an action, one not made a party when the action was first brought, or served with process, is subsequently made a party by the appearance of an attorney, who signs such pleadings in the name of said person, and the authority of such attorney to make such appearance is denied, and, upon a

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trial of that issue in another action, the evidence is conflicting, the question of the authority of the attorney to enter such appearance is one of fact for the jury.

3. **Contracts: EXECUTION: QUESTION FOR JURY.** In an action upon a contract partly written and partly in parol, where the making of the contract, by one of the parties who did not sign the same, is denied, and the issue thus presented rests upon conflicting evidence, the question is one of fact for the jury.
4. **Wills: RELINQUISHMENT: LIABILITY OF SURETY.** Where a daughter of a deceased father, who has filed a contest of the will of such decedent which gives the entire estate of \$30,000 to decedent's widow, is induced by the husbands of two of her sisters to withdraw such contest and to execute a written relinquishment of all interest in her father's estate and all interest in the estate of her mother, the beneficiary under the will, at her death, for the stipulated sum of \$4,000, under a written agreement that they will be surety for the payment of such sum, the fact that the mother, after such withdrawal, fails and refuses to pay the sum stipulated will not, of itself, relieve such sureties from liability upon their contract.

APPEAL from the district court for Johnson county:
JAMES R. HANNA, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Samuel P. Davidson, for appellant.

George A. Adams, E. Ross Hitchcock, D. W. Livingston
and *Hugh La Master*, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

This action was instituted in the district court for Johnson county to recover a sum alleged to be due on an express contract. The court directed a verdict in favor of defendants, and from a judgment thereon plaintiff appeals.

The issues presented by the pleadings, so far as it is necessary to consider them here, are substantially as follows: Matteus Panko died in Otoe county, leaving his widow, defendant Maria Panko, his sons, the defendants Matteus, Godfrey and Terman, and his daughters, the plaintiff and Minnie and Pauline Harms, wives respec-

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tively of the defendants Harm and Henry Harms. After Mr. Panko's death, defendant Maria filed what she claimed was the will of the decedent, together with a petition for the probate of the same. This will devised all of the estate of the decedent absolutely to defendant Maria. Plaintiff filed objections to the probate of the will upon the grounds that at the date it was alleged to have been executed decedent was not mentally competent to execute a will, and was coerced into signing the same by the mother and three sons above named. Subsequent to filing such contest, the defendants, the mother, the three sons, and the two sons-in-law, acting for their wives, attempted to arrange a settlement of the estate. Plaintiff did not participate in these negotiations. It was considered by defendants that, if they could secure a settlement with plaintiff, the rest of them would have no difficulty in getting together. It was thereupon agreed that the defendants Harms should conduct the negotiations with plaintiff. In accordance with that arrangement, they called upon plaintiff, and, after first suggesting \$3,000, which sum was rejected by plaintiff, the sum of \$4,000 was finally agreed upon; plaintiff agreeing to accept that sum in full of her share of her father's estate, and also agreeing not to ask for any share of the estate of her mother, Maria Panko, at her death. Thereupon the defendants Harms presented to her, and she and her husband signed, the following instrument: "Sterling, Nebraska, March 12, 1906. I, Mrs. Anna Lipps, a daughter of Matteus Panko, deceased, and Mary Panko, wife of, and beneficiary under the will of, Matteus Panko, do hereby, agree that for and in consideration of the payment of \$4,000 or get the equivalent in notes owned by the said estate of Matteus Panko, deceased, I will accept the same in full of my share of said estate, and for the said consideration I further agree that I will not ask for any share or interest that I may have under the law in the property or estate of my mother, Mary Panko. Anna Lipps, Charles Lipps. In presence of Jno. Boatsman.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of March, 1906. Jno. Boatsman, Notary Public. (Seal.)"

Before plaintiff would sign the above instrument, she demanded security that the \$4,000 would be paid to her as agreed. Thereupon, in order to induce her to enter into the agreement, the defendants Harms, in whom plaintiff seems to have had great confidence, agreed to secure the payment of the money stipulated, in writing, as follows: "We, the undersigned jointly and severally agree that we will be surety for the payment of the above consideration upon the completion of the probate of the estate of Matteus Panko, deceased. Henry Harms. Harm Harms."

In compliance with the agreement, and in consideration thereof, plaintiff withdrew her objections to the probate of the will, and the same was admitted to probate as the last will of her father, and defendant Maria became the owner of all the estate, which the stipulation shows amounted to about \$30,000. Plaintiff prays judgment for the \$4,000, with interest from the date of the contract. The defendant Maria Panko denies that plaintiff had any grounds for objecting to the probate of the will; that any agreement was made between plaintiff and any of the defendants to which she was a party, or that she procured the written waiver set out in the contract; and alleges that plaintiff withdrew her objections to the allowance of the will on her own motion, and without any inducement on the part of the answering defendants. The main defense relied upon by all of the defendants, however, is a prior adjudication between the parties. Upon this point the answers of the defendants Panko allege that about October 6, 1906, the defendant Maria filed her petition asking that the estate be finally closed and the terms of the will carried out. When this petition was filed, Pauline Harms, wife of defendant Henry Harms, and others of the heirs of decedent filed their objections to the allowance of the petition for discharge, and filed a petition in the county court, setting out a contract of settlement with

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which they claimed included the contract tiff's petition, and under which settlement between them and their mother that the ke as her share of the estate \$7,000, and, to plaintiff of the \$4,000 stipulated in the st of the estate was to be divided among The county court found in favor of the against their mother. She thereupon ap- strict court, in which court judgment was or of the mother, and upon appeal to this nent was affirmed. The defendants allege ase was taken to the district court, plain- appearance in that proceeding and joined children in their demand for an enforce- tract which they were litigating, and that ich appearance she is bound by the judg- y the district court and affirmed by this her right to recover in this action is there- her reply plaintiff specifically denies that r appearance in that proceeding, or ever attorney or attorneys to enter her appear- lenies that she participated or authorized for her in prosecuting an appeal of that rt. The defendants Harms also plead that e agreement set out in plaintiff's petition ty for Maria Panko, and were only to be eon in case the contract was carried out ko was unable to pay the amount named allegation is denied by plaintiff.

ues thus joined, a trial was entered upon court and a jury. At the conclusion of the directed a verdict in favor of defendants, em, upon the following grounds, as shown

"Gentlemen of the jury: * * * I have nents on the part of counsel, and have con- a disposition of this case myself without
 * * * I reached the conclusion that
 oe county and the supreme court have tried

and determined all the issues which have been tried before, and that there are no facts in the case which have not heretofore been determined in the other courts. That being true, there are no facts at this time to be submitted to you. That the courts in Otoe county have jurisdiction of the matter to try and determine any such matter they saw fit on facts and matters in controversy in the case. It is not for me to determine whether these courts acted wisely or not. Suffice it to say the supreme court has acted upon and adjudicated this case. You are therefore instructed, gentlemen of the jury, to return a verdict into this court finding in favor of the defendants, and each of them, and as against the plaintiff."

Plaintiff urges three principal grounds for reversal: (1) That the question as to whether plaintiff was a party to the proceedings in the district court for Otoe county and in this court should have been submitted to the jury. (2) That the question as to whether or not the contract set out in her petition was a binding contract between plaintiff and all of the defendants was conclusively established. (3) That, even if it should be held that plaintiff cannot recover as against the defendants Panko, she is still entitled to a judgment against the defendants Harms upon the indorsement on the contract signed by them. We will consider these assignments in the order named.

1. Should the question as to whether plaintiff was a party to the proceedings in the district court for Otoe county have been submitted to the jury; or, to state it another way, did the evidence so clearly and conclusively show that she was a party to that suit that the court could determine the question as a matter of law? It is undisputed that, when the petition was filed in the county court in that proceeding by Pauline Harms and others, it expressly alleged that Anna Lipps (plaintiff here) refused to join in their petition, and it is not claimed that she ever participated in that matter in the county court. When the case was appealed to the district court, Mrs. Harms and her associates filed their petition in that court,

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in which they again alleged that Mrs. Lipps refused to join in their petition. After the appeal had been lodged in the district court, that court, on April 5, 1907, entered an order requiring all persons interested as heirs of Matteus Panko, deceased, to appear in said proceeding within ten days, and providing that, if they did not so appear, then an order should issue "bringing said persons into court on peril of forfeiting all interest in said estate." On April 23, 1907, Messrs. Hitchcock and Adams, who were appearing in said proceeding as attorneys for Mrs. Harms and her associates, and who are appearing here as attorneys for the defendants Harm and Henry Harms, filed an alleged written appearance of Mrs. Lipps, which recited that she was one of the parties who filed objections to the probate of the will of the decedent; that she now comes into court pursuant to the order of the court theretofore made, and joins in the application of Mrs. Harms and her associates, and adopts their application as her own, and prays that she may be joined as one of the applicants therein, and that the assets of said estate be divided and apportioned as therein prayed for. This appearance is signed "Anna Lipps, by E. Ross Hitchcock and George A. Adams, her Attorneys." Plaintiff and her husband both testify that they never authorized the attorneys, who signed that appearance, to sign the same, or to in any manner appear for her in that proceeding; that, when solicited by the attorneys to appear, she refused to do so; that, when told by the attorneys that the court had ordered her to be brought in, she insisted that she was not interested in that transaction; that she had no interest in her father's estate, but was relying upon her contract for \$4,000. This is not a literal statement of her testimony, but it is a substantial statement of it. The testimony in opposition to plaintiff and her husband was mainly that of the two lawyers who made the appearance. Their testimony substantially is that, when Mrs. Lipps was asked to enter her appearance and join the proceeding, she objected on the ground that she did not want to

incur any more expense; did not want to pay attorney's fees; that one of the defendants Harms then stated that would be all right, that they would pay the attorney's fees; that thereupon she gave her consent for the attorneys to enter her appearance. This testimony is denied by plaintiff and her husband. There is no evidence that plaintiff or her husband ever signed or verified a pleading or paper of any kind in either the district court or this court. Upon this point it is somewhat significant that, when the case was appealed to this court, the appeal bond was signed by both of the defendants Harms and their wives, but was not signed by either plaintiff or her husband. If the case stood upon the above evidence alone, it was clearly error for the court to determine, as a matter of law, that the attorneys were authorized to enter plaintiff's appearance in that proceeding. No summons was served upon her, and if she never authorized any attorney to enter her appearance, nor participated in the prosecution of that case in the district court or in this court, then she is not bound by the judgment entered therein, and such judgment is not a bar to her prosecution of this action. This was a material issue of fact, which, resting, as it did, upon conflicting evidence, plaintiff was entitled to have submitted to the jury. But we think there was another strong reason why the court should not have directed the verdict upon that point. If the contract set out in plaintiff's petition was entered into between her and the defendants, and she had fully performed her part of that contract by withdrawing her contest of the will, and had thereby permitted the will to be admitted to probate without contest, and the estate of decedent to pass under the will to defendant Maria Panko, then plaintiff had no interest in the estate of the decedent, and the order of the court requiring all persons interested as heirs of Matteus Panko, deceased, to appear did not apply to her; and the lawyers were in error when they told her that it did so apply. Under that contract, if established, the defendants Panko and the defendants Harms were all antagonistic

parties to her. Under that contract defendant Maria Panko would be liable to her for the payment of the \$4,000 expressed therein, and, in the event of her failure to pay the same, defendants Harms would be liable under their written agreement to be surety for the payment of the same. The lawyers who entered plaintiff's appearance in that suit were then and are now representing the antagonistic interests of the defendants Harms. Occupying that relation, they could not, disinterestedly, also act for plaintiff. As attorneys for defendants Harms, they were bound to know and to then understand that, if Mrs. Lipps entered her appearance and joined their clients in submitting the questions involved to the court in that proceeding, she would, to say the least, be jeopardizing her rights under the contract which they knew she held. We do not wish to be understood as holding that the attorneys acted in bad faith. What we do say is that those questions were proper for the consideration of the jury, and it was for the jury to determine whether or not plaintiff had joined in that proceeding and thereby submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the district court.

2. It is equally clear that the question as to whether or not the contract set out in plaintiff's petition was a binding contract should, at least, have been submitted to the jury. Indeed, there is much force in the contention of her counsel that her contract was conclusively established by the evidence. The testimony of plaintiff and her husband is that the contract was presented to them by the defendants Harms; that it was stated to her that an attempt was being made to settle the estate of her father; that \$3,000 was first suggested, which sum Mrs. Lipps refused to consider. Thereupon, \$4,000 was named. This amount she agreed to accept, provided they, the defendants Harms, would say it was all right. It is apparent that she did not have confidence in her mother and brothers, but did have confidence in the defendants Harms; that, as an inducement to her to sign the contract, they made and signed the indorsement upon the back of it.

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The next morning after the contract was signed, the defendants Harms, all of the defendants Panko, and the Reverend Mr. Beckman, pastor of the church to which they all belonged, met at the home of defendant Maria Panko. Some attempt is made by Matteus Panko to show that he was not present during the interview which then took place, but there is ample testimony in the record to warrant a holding that he was present. One thing is not disputed: At that interview some question was raised as to whether the contract should not have been acknowledged or sworn to before a notary. At the conclusion of the interview Matteus took the contract to Mr. John Boatsman, a notary public, for the purpose of having it put in proper form by him. Mr. Boatsman called up Mrs. Lipps and her husband by telephone, told them that he had the contract there, and either took their acknowledgment or administered the oath to them by telephone. At any rate, at the conclusion of his interview with them over the telephone, he attached his jurat to the contract. We are unable to see how Matteus can escape responsibility, whatever it may be, for anything that occurred at that interview.

Coming now to the interview itself, it clearly appears from the testimony that the Reverend Beckman read the contract over to the defendants in English, and again in German. It was read in German for the benefit of defendant Maria Panko, who understood German much better than she did English. Reverend Beckman testifies, and in this he is corroborated by defendants Harms, that he explained the contract in both English and German, and then asked them all if they understood it and would agree to abide by it; that they all, including defendant Maria Panko, answered in the affirmative. Defendant Henry Harms testified that, after the paper had been explained to them all, he suggested to Mr. Beckman that a contract in writing should be drawn up and signed by all of the parties, but that Mr. Beckman said: "He knew the family as well as I did or better, and we'd all better stick to

the contract. That suggestion was made right in Mrs. Panko's house. Mr. Beckman got up and said, 'All should understand this agreement, and is willing to, all should understand this, all who do will come and shake hands with me for the binding of this agreement,' and she (referring to Maria Panko) was the first that went, and every one of us stood up. We were satisfied with it." After the contract was signed, plaintiff went to her mother to obtain the \$4,000. Her mother told her "she would pay it just as soon as the will was probated. She said she would pay the \$4,000." It is conceded that the contest was withdrawn by plaintiff. After it was withdrawn, defendant Maria told plaintiff's husband that she would willingly pay the \$4,000, "but now Matteus Panko objected." Further discussion is unnecessary to show that the question as to whether or not the contract was duly entered into by all of the parties should, to say the least, have been submitted to the jury.

3. Are the defendants Harms liable under their written indorsement upon the contract in suit, regardless of the question as to whether or not sufficient was done by the defendants Panko to bind them? Again we say this question should, at least, have been submitted to the jury. The evidence shows that they were the parties who induced Mrs. Lipps to sign the contract set out in her petition, under which she agreed to accept \$4,000, not only as in full of her share of the estate of her father, but also in full of any claim she might have as an heir of her mother upon her death. They were interested in having her make the contract. Their wives would be beneficiaries under it, and through their wives they would indirectly be beneficiaries also. They knew when they induced her to sign the contract that it would bind her to withdraw her objections to the probate of the will. They were conducting negotiations with Maria Panko and the brothers of their wives. They expected that, if Mrs. Lipps withdrew her contest and permitted the will to be probated, their wives would at once obtain a substantial portion of the estate of their

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father; and if it subsequently transp. with whom they were acting in concer the agreement they were making through no fault of Mrs. Lipps, we a that fact would release them from th they had assumed.

We hold, therefore, that upon all urged by plaintiff, and above discuss erred in directing a verdict in favor

The judgment is therefore reverse manded for further proceedings in opinion.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and ROSE, JJ

LETTON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ

MARTIN NELSON, APPELLEE, V. DANI
APPELLANTS.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No.

Judgment: CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE: JURISDI and the case at bar *held* ruled by *Stall* and other cases cited in the opinion.

APPEAL from the district court
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Affirme*

Wilcox & Halligan, C. H. Sloan, F Burke, for appellants.

L. O. Pfeiffer and Hoagland & Ho

FAWCETT, J.

From a judgment by the district co in favor of plaintiff in a suit to rede of land from a foreclosure by the c

liens, defendants appeal. No bill of exceptions has been presented. The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether the decree is supported by the pleadings.

The land involved is the southwest quarter of section 2, township 14, range 45, in Deuel county. The land was patented by the United States to Otto N. Holden, May 27, 1891. On February 18, 1909, Otto N. Holden and his wife, Emma C., conveyed the premises to plaintiff. The suit to foreclose the tax liens, being the suit under which defendants claim title, was commenced February 15, 1900. The petition was filed by the county attorney in the name of the county. In the petition the defendants were designated as "O. N. Holdeen and Mrs. O. N. Holdeen, his wife, real name unknown." The verification was by the county attorney, and recited that "I cannot discover the true name of the defendant designated 'Mary Holden, his wife.'" The affidavit for publication of summons was also by the county attorney. The affidavit recites "that the above named defendants O. N. Holdeen, first real name unknown, and Mrs. O. N. Holdeen, his wife, first real name unknown, are nonresidents of the state of Nebraska," and further recites: "Service of summons cannot be made on said defendants, or any of them, within this state." The published notice runs to "O. N. Holdeen, first real name unknown, and Mrs. O. N. Holdeen, his wife, first real name unknown, defendants."

The question now is: Did the court, by the petition, affidavit and published notice above set out, obtain jurisdiction to enter a decree of foreclosure in that suit? Under section 148 of the code, and numerous decisions of this court, that question must be answered in the negative. There is no contention here but what the patentee, under the patent from the United States, was Otto N. Holden. It is therefore established that that was his true name. It is not shown, nor attempted to be shown, that Mr. Holden had taken title to the land by his initials, so as to bring the case within the rule announced in *Stratton v. McDermott*, 89 Neb. 622, reaffirmed in *Butler v. Farm-*

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land Mortgage & Debenture Co., 92 Neb. 659. We therefore hold that the case is ruled by section 148 of the code, and by *Encicold v. Olsen*, 39 Neb. 59; *Gillian v. McDowall*, 66 Neb. 814; *Stull v. Masionka*, 74 Neb. 322; *Herbage v. McKee*, 82 Neb. 354; and *Butler v. Smith*, 84 Neb. 78.

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and ROSE, JJ., concur.

LETON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

ADELAIDE BODE, APPELLANT, v. PETER H. JUSSEN ET AL.,
APPELLEES.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,135.

1. **Acknowledgment: CERTIFICATE: IMPEACHMENT.** "The certificate of an officer having authority to take acknowledgments cannot be impeached by showing merely that such officer's duty was irregularly performed." *Council Bluffs Savings Bank v. Smith*, 59 Neb. 90.
2. **Mortgages: CONSIDERATION: MARRIED WOMAN.** A mortgage executed by a wife upon her separate property, to indemnify one who is a surety upon an official bond of her husband, who has misappropriated the funds coming into his hands by virtue of his office, in the hope, or upon the assurance from her husband, that the execution of such mortgage will save him from arrest and imprisonment for his crime, is not void for want of sufficient consideration moving to the wife.
3. ———: **DURESS.** Nor is such a mortgage void as having been obtained under duress, where it appears that the mortgagee neither in person nor through an attorney or agent resorted to any undue means by way of threats or deception to obtain the execution of such mortgage.
4. **Husband and Wife: MORTGAGE BY MARRIED WOMAN.** A married woman may mortgage her separate estate or property to secure the individual debt, or to indemnify the sureties upon an official bond, of her husband.

APPEAL from the district court for Richardson county:
JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

vin Falloon, for appellant.

wis & Reavis and *A. R. Scott*, *contra*.

SCOTT, J.

Plaintiff brought suit in the district court for Richardson County to cancel a mortgage which she had executed, jointly with her husband, upon her separate property. Defendants made the mortgagees and her husband parties; the plaintiff is under an allegation that he has a homestead right in the premises. From a decree dismissing her suit, she appeals.

The mortgage and the note which it was given to secure both dated April 17, 1906. The note is signed by defendant husband, E. O. Bode, and his brother, Ernest A. Bode. The mortgage is signed by plaintiff and her husband. The date of acknowledgment is of the same date, and is attested by Amos E. Gantt, notary public.

Three years or more prior to the date of the mortgage, E. O. Bode had held the office of city treasurer of Falls City. It had developed that he was short on his accounts. On the day the mortgage was executed by defendants Jussen and Holland, who were sureties on his official bond, met him upon the street in Falls City and asked him about his shortage. He stated that he was somewhere about \$1,800, but, upon figuring the matter up, he concluded that it might run to \$2,300. He was then interrogated as to what he could do in the way of securing the defendants. He stated that his brother would sign with him, and, when asked if he could give any other security, he stated that he could give them a mortgage upon the home property. He was asked if his brother would sign. He answered that she would. The plaintiff then went upstairs to the office of Judge Martin, a practicing attorney of that city. Mr. Martin was advised of the situation, and, upon his suggestion, the note and mortgage were drawn for \$2,500, so that it would be

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sure to cover any items Bode might have omitted in his calculations. Thereupon, Bode requested Mr. Gantt, a practicing attorney of many years' standing, who was also a notary public, to accompany him to the Bode home for the purpose of obtaining the signature and acknowledgment of the plaintiff. On their way to the home they met plaintiff. Mr. Bode, out of the hearing of Mr. Gantt, told his wife of the trouble he was in. It appears to have been the first notice she had had that her husband was a defaulter. Plaintiff and her husband both say that he then told her that he needed \$2,500 to straighten matters out; that something must be done right away, or he was liable to be arrested and imprisoned, and stated to her that he wanted her to sign the paper he had with him, which was the mortgage. Thereupon, Mr. and Mrs. Bode proceeded to their home, the notary, evidently not desiring to intrude, following them at a short distance. Upon reaching their home, Mr. and Mrs. Bode had some further conversation, in which Mr. Gantt took no part, after which the mortgage was signed by plaintiff. It was then taken by Mr. Gantt to his office and his notarial seal affixed, when it was given to Mr. Bode and by him delivered to the defendants Jussen and Holland. As soon thereafter as the liability of Jussen and Holland upon the bond had been ascertained, they paid the same, aggregating \$2,380, to the proper city authorities.

As the basis for her demand that the mortgage be canceled, plaintiff alleges substantially: That she derived no benefit from the mortgage; that it was executed and delivered without consideration; that she never acknowledged the execution of the same to be her free and voluntary act; that the notary never asked her that question; that the mortgage was executed under duress, in this, that she at that time was in a "delicate" condition; that she was greatly alarmed when told by her husband of the situation he was in, so much so that she did not know what she was doing; that she is a married woman; that the mortgage was upon her separate property, and was given

a debt or obligation of her husband. In his the husband alleges that the defendants Jussen and Holland threatened him with prosecution and told him to fix up said shortage; that he told them they would immediately place to his credit \$2,500 bank, to be used by him in the discharge of his debt; that he would sign the mortgage and induce his wife to sign the same; that Jussen and Holland, after obtaining the mortgage, did not place the money to his credit as alleged; and that as a consequence thereof the investigation of the condition of his accounts was not stopped, he was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted of the crime of embezzlement; that the mortgage was signed by him under duress; that at the time it was signed he was in a state of great excitement, was distressed and his mind weakened in will, and, believing that the execution of the mortgage would save him from the calamity threatened prosecution, he signed the same.

The answer of defendants Jussen and Holland deny the facts as to any duress or attempted duress on their part; they allege the facts leading up to the execution and delivery of the mortgage, and the payment thereunder, substantially as above stated. The decree found generally in favor of the defendants; adjudged the mortgage to be a valid mortgage, duly executed, acknowledged and delivered for a valid and sufficient consideration; that no fraud or duress was used or practiced upon plaintiff or her husband by the defendants, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with her cost.

It can be seen that the questions involved here are: (1) Was the mortgage duly acknowledged within the meaning of the law in relation to acknowledgments? (2) Was there sufficient consideration moving to plaintiff for its execution? (3) Was it executed under duress? (4) Can a mortgage by a married woman upon her separate property to secure a debt of her husband, be enforced, if the instrument does not specifically state that it is her intention to encumber her separate property or estate? We will consider these points in their order.

1. Was the mortgage properly acknowledged? Upon this point there is neither allegation nor proof that any fraud was practiced upon plaintiff to procure her signature to the mortgage. It is argued by counsel for plaintiff that in obtaining his wife's signature Bode was acting as the representative of defendants Jussen and Holland, and that his statement to his wife that, if the mortgage were not signed, he would be arrested and sent to prison was, in effect, and in law, the threat of Jussen and Holland. The clear preponderance of the evidence is against this contention. It shows that the giving of the mortgage was not even suggested by Jussen and Holland, but by Bode himself; that all they said to him about his wife signing was to ask him, when he made the suggestion, if his wife would sign; that they had nothing to do with sending Mr. Gantt along as a notary to take the acknowledgment; that they gave no directions, nor did they make any threats; that everything that was done by Bode in that connection was done on his own initiative. As to what transpired when the acknowledgment was taken, Mr. Gantt frankly states that he does not remember the conversation. He testified: "Mrs. Bode asked me where to sign the mortgage, and I told her where to sign. We spoke of it as a mortgage, but I am not positive that I told her where to sign the mortgage. * * * I have no recollection of Mrs. Bode being asked whether it was her voluntary act and deed. I presume I did. That is all I can say." The words, "I presume I did," were, upon motion of plaintiff's counsel, stricken. The testimony of Mr. Gantt is substantially that which any honest notary would be compelled to give when testifying four years after the time an acknowledgment had been taken. The only evidence offered by plaintiff to in any manner impeach the certificate of acknowledgment was the testimony of herself and her husband. In *Council Bluffs Savings Bank v. Smith*, 59 Neb. 90, we held:

"The certificate of an officer having authority to take acknowledgments cannot be impeached by showing merely that such officer's duty was irregularly performed.

"When the party executing a deed or mortgage knows that he is before an officer having authority to take acknowledgments, and intends to do whatever is necessary to make the instrument effective, the acknowledging officer's official certificate will be, in the absence of fraud, conclusive in favor of those who in good faith rely on it."

There is no question but what plaintiff and her husband knew that Mr. Gantt was an officer having authority to take acknowledgments. They knew that he had been taken out there for the express purpose of taking their acknowledgment to the mortgage which they there signed. No fraud or deception was practiced by the notary. The parties were in their own home. The mortgagees were not present. To hold that mortgagors can deny the acknowledgment of a mortgage and thereby defeat it, upon their naked assertion that a formal question was not asked, would open the door to fraud and perjury and make recorded acknowledgments a snare and a delusion. No one could safely deal with land on the faith and truth of public records if such a rule were to obtain. In *Pickens v. Knisely*, 29 W. Va. 1, 16, it is said: "For reasons of public policy and to protect innocent purchasers, it has been uniformly held that, when a married woman appears before a justice for the purpose of acknowledging a deed, and does in some manner attempt to do what the law requires to be done, the certificate is conclusive of the facts therein stated as regards innocent purchasers." If the notary failed to ask the formal question as to whether or not plaintiff acknowledged the deed to be her free and voluntary act, such failure was, at most, an irregularity only.

2. Was there a sufficient consideration moving to plaintiff for the execution of the mortgage? It seems unnecessary to discuss this assignment. She was told by her husband that he was a defaulter; that unless the mortgage was executed he was liable to be arrested and imprisoned for his crime. This would entail loss of support, and disgrace, not only upon the husband, but upon herself and

family. No true wife would, under such circumstances, refuse to execute a mortgage upon her home, and we do not think a court will ever be found to hold that a mortgage so executed is without consideration.

3. Was the mortgage executed under duress? If the testimony of E. O. Bode were to be taken as true, possibly it might be so held. But, as we have already stated, the clear preponderance of the evidence is against plaintiff upon the point that her husband was acting for the bondsmen in securing the mortgage. He was not doing anything of the kind. He was acting for himself in an earnest endeavor to save himself from arrest and prosecution, and protect the reputation of his family. Nothing was said to plaintiff by any person except her husband, and he was not delegated by Jussen and Holland to make any statements or threats to her. In such a case the rule announced in the cases cited in plaintiff's brief, and in the recent case of *Hoellworth v. McCarthy*, ante, p. 246, not cited, does not apply.

The allegation and testimony by Mr. Bode, that the agreement with Jussen and Holland was that they were to deposit \$2,500 in the bank to his credit, is not only denied by them, but is too incredible to be believed. It is taxing our credulity to ask us to believe that two business men, who are sureties upon the bond of a public officer who confesses to them that he is a defaulter, would place a sum aggregating the amount of his defalcation in his hands, or in a bank subject to his check, and trust to his honesty in applying that money in the payment of the shortage. They would be much more apt to fear that if the money were so deposited he might immediately withdraw it and depart for parts unknown.

4. Can a mortgage by a married woman upon her separate property, given to secure the debt of her husband, be enforced? The law upon that point must be taken as settled in this state. Section 2, ch. 53, Comp. St. 1911, which is the same as it was at the time the mortgage in suit was executed, provides: "A married woman, while the mar-

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riage relation subsists, may bargain, sell, and convey her real and personal property, and enter into any contract with reference to the same in the same manner, to the same extent, and with like effect as a married man may in relation to his real and personal property." This section of the statute was carefully considered by this court in *Grand Island Banking Co. v. Wright*, 53 Neb. 574. The authorities are there collated and carefully considered, and the conclusion reached that, where a wife executes a mortgage upon her own real estate to secure an indebtedness of her husband, the mortgage will be sustained; but, if the wife also signs the note, she cannot be held upon that for any deficiency after the sale of the premises, where it is not disclosed that in executing the note and mortgage it was the intention to bind her property generally. In *Buffalo County Nat. Bank v. Sharpe*, 40 Neb. 123, we said: "The wife executed and acknowledged as her voluntary deed and act, and delivered to Gallentine, the mortgage on her separate property to secure the payment of the note which evidenced the debt of the husband, and the consideration being its extension of payment. This was a contract which she had the power to make and by which she, bound her property for the payment of the amount of the note." That is to say, she bound the property set out in the mortgage; but, under the rule announced in *Grand Island Banking Co. v. Wright*, *supra*, she did not bind any other estate she may have had outside of that set out in the mortgage. In *Watts v. Gantt*, 42 Neb. 869, we held: "A married woman may in this state mortgage her separate estate or property to secure the payment of the individual debt of her husband. A loan of the money to the husband creating the debt so secured is a sufficient consideration for her executing and delivering the mortgage." And so in this case, while plaintiff may not have received any direct cash consideration for the execution of the mortgage in suit, it was executed, as we have shown, upon a sufficient consideration, and is therefore valid.

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Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and ROSE, JJ., concur.

LETTON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

PETER H. JUSSEN ET AL., APPELLEES, v. ERWIN O. BODE ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,599.

The syllabus in *Bode v. Jussen*, ante, p. 482, applied to this case.

APPEAL from the district court for Richardson county:
JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Edwin Falloon, for appellants.

Reavis & Reavis and *A. R. Scott*, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

This suit was instituted in the district court for Richardson county to foreclose the mortgage involved in *Bode v. Jussen*, ante, p. 482. By agreement of parties it was argued and submitted with that case. Both cases rest upon substantially the same evidence. The district court upheld the mortgage and entered a decree of foreclosure. Defendants appeal. For the reasons stated in *Bode v. Jussen*, supra, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and ROSE, JJ., concur.

LETTON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

**HOLLADAY, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM HENRY RICH
ET AL., APPELLEES.**

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 17,047.

s: COMPETENCY. In an action by a married woman for performance of a contract to convey real estate, her husband has a direct legal interest in the result, within the meaning of section 329 of the code.

———. In an action to set aside a deed executed by a person afterwards deceased, because the same was executed in violation of an alleged contract of the grantor with the plaintiff, the defendant who claims under such deed is the representative of the deceased person, within the meaning of section 329 of the code.

. Notes, Gift of: RIGHTS ACQUIRED. One who takes promissory notes as a gift without paying any consideration therefor acquires only the right of the donor therein.

and Purchaser: INNOCENT PURCHASER. One who purchases property to be paid for wholly in the future is not an innocent purchaser for value as against the rights of a third party of which the purchaser has notice before making payment.

Title: EVIDENCE. This being an action in equity, we have reviewed the evidence, some of which is outlined in the opinion, and find that it supports our former judgment in favor of the defendant, which is therefore adhered to.

REVERSAL of case reported in 92 Neb. 91. Former judgment affirmed.

OK, J.

Charles Badger some time before his death sold and conveyed the land in question to the defendant William Henry Rich, for the agreed price of \$7,000, and took in return therefor notes secured upon the land. Afterward Dr. Badger transferred the notes to the defendant College, a Wisconsin corporation. The plaintiff brought his action in the district court for Valley county, claiming that Dr. Badger had agreed to convey the land for a sufficient consideration, and had, pur-

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suant to that agreement, actually executed and delivered a deed thereof to her, and asked that the conveyance to Rich be set aside and her title quieted in the land, or, if the deed to Rich was held valid, that the defendant Milton College be required to turn over the notes to her. The defendant bank was made a party because the notes had been deposited in the bank. The trial court found the issues generally in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff has appealed. Upon a former hearing the judgment was reversed and a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff. 92 Neb. 91.

William J. Holladay, the plaintiff's husband, was called as a witness for the plaintiff, and the defendants objected on the ground that he was disqualified under section 329 of the code, which provides: "No person having a direct legal interest in the result of any civil action or proceeding, when the adverse party is the representative of a deceased person, shall be permitted to testify to any transaction or conversation had between the deceased person and the witness," with specified exceptions. In *McCoy v. Conrad*, 64 Neb. 150, it is said: "In order to justify excluding this testimony three things must concur: First, the witness offered must have a direct, legal interest in the result of the litigation; second, the evidence offered must relate to transactions and conversations had between the witness and deceased; third, the evidence must be offered against one who is a representative of the deceased person." Does Mr. Holladay have a direct legal interest in the controversy? In the commencement of this action he was joined as plaintiff. Later the action as to him was dismissed. It is insisted that his liability for costs makes him directly interested. But his liability for costs is limited to costs incurred by the defendants while he was a party. And it does not appear that the defendants incurred costs during that time that they could recover from Mr. Holladay if they were successful in the action. Is Mr. Holladay's interest as husband of the plaintiff of such a character as must be held to be a direct legal in-

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terest within the meaning of the statute? In *Gillette v. Morrison*, 9 Neb. 395, it is held that in an action by a married woman in regard to her separate property the husband has no direct legal interest in the result of the suit. And in *Hiskett v. Bozarth*, 75 Neb. 70, the precise point here involved was presented, and it was held that the husband was not disqualified. But in *Wylie v. Charlton*, 43 Neb. 840, it was held that in a similar action by the husband the wife was incompetent as a witness because the wife's inchoate right of dower was a charge and incumbrance upon the real estate of the husband, and could not be avoided except by the voluntary act of the wife. This case was cited in *Hiskett v. Bozarth*, *supra*, and distinguished from that case on the ground that the husband's right of curtesy "may be defeated by the deed of the wife and without the consent of the husband," but this is not true under the statute, as it now exists. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 23, sec. 1. Under that statute the husband has an interest in the real estate of the wife that cannot be defeated by any act of the wife. So that now the rule announced in *Wylie v. Charlton*, *supra*, applies equally to husband and wife, and under that rule Mr. Holladay had a direct legal interest in the result of the suit, within the meaning of the statute.

The plaintiff contends that the adverse party was not the representative of the deceased, within the meaning of the statute, and quotes the following also from *McCoy v. Conrad*, *supra*: "The statute is 'limited in its reason and spirit by fair construction to contests on litigation upon claims between other persons and the deceased, existing prior to his death; to such suits and proceedings as the deceased would have been, if living, a necessary party, and since which his heirs, devisees, and legatees, personal representatives or assigns, are compelled to prosecute or defend for him in his place.'" This language was quoted from the supreme court of Michigan. The last clause of the quotation is not as accurate as the first. The plaintiff's claim as against Dr. Badger existed prior to his

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death. Dr. Badger conveyed this right to Rich. Mr. Rich, therefore, as Dr. Badger's assign, is compelled to defend for him in his place. In *McCoy v. Conrad, supra*, and *Williams v. Miles*, 68 Neb. 463, the right of property, the ownership and title of the deceased were not questioned. Here the case is entirely different. The right of this plaintiff existed before Dr. Badger's death and before his conveyance to Rich. Her right of action was then precisely the same that it is now. She could have maintained her action then as well as now, but it must then have been against Dr. Badger. Whatever right Dr. Badger had to withhold the property from her he has conveyed to Mr. Rich, and Mr. Rich now represents him in that controversy. This precise point was decided in *Kroh v. Heins*, 48 Neb. 691. This claim existed between another person and the deceased prior to his death, and this is the test applied in *McCoy v. Conrad, supra*. It follows that Mr. Rich, the adverse party, is "the representative of a deceased person." The evidence of Mr. Holladay cannot therefore be considered.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff's husband had a farm of 320 acres in Valley county, and that many years ago he transferred this farm to his wife, and that Dr. Badger had the benefit of the use of this farm and the rentals thereof for some 15 or 16 years. One witness testified that the rentals amounted to at least \$250 a year, and we have not observed that this evidence was contradicted. There is also evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff many years ago received a legacy of \$300, and that this was turned over to Dr. Badger, and also that the plaintiff earned money in school-teaching many years, which was used by the family; and that the plaintiff became the owner of a house and lot which was sold by Dr. Badger and a large part of the proceeds used by him. There is also evidence tending to show that Dr. Badger's wife, the plaintiff's step-mother, had a farm adjoining the land in dispute, known as the "Weaver farm," and that the plaintiff at the solicitation of Dr. Badger exchanged

section of her land for the Weaver farm. One testified that the land so exchanged by the plaintiff more valuable than the Weaver farm. He estimated the difference in the value was at least \$1,300, as evidence tending to show that Dr. Badger represented to the plaintiff that, as the farm in her farm, the Weaver farm would be much valuable to her because it adjoined the land in dispute that the two tracts together would be a valuable tract that it was upon this consideration that she consented to make the exchange, relying upon him to convey this land in question to her. Mrs. Badger is a witness in behalf of the defendants, and in support of this exchange. She made no denial of the contention that the exchange was made upon representation and promise that the land in dispute was conveyed to the plaintiff. It will be seen from the evidence that the evidence tends to show that Dr. Badger valued the land at least \$4,000 or \$5,000; and, the defendants called and examined witnesses who testified that the evidence known at least some of the circumstances show that the consideration for the promise relied upon by the plaintiff, there is no evidence contradicting the evidence produced by the plaintiff upon that branch of the case. The only evidence tending to show that Dr. Badger represented to the plaintiff any other consideration than the value of the land.

It was testified that Dr. Badger some time before his death became addicted to the use of narcotics, and was for that reason incapable of transacting business. This allegation was sustained by the evidence. He was, however, more than 60 years of age. Mrs. Badger, as a witness for the plaintiff, testified in regard to his physical and mental condition at the time and prior to the transfer of the land to the defendant Rich, and afterwards several letters written by Dr. Badger were offered and received in evidence in support of the plaintiff's contention. In one of these letters, under date of January 1, 1903, she said: "You have no idea how feeble

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and forgetful he (Dr. Badger) is, and it worries him so much. Says I will have to help him about the farm, etc., but when he is out of hearing and trying to do business I cannot be of much help as he is liable to forget before he gets into the house. * * * He is not fit to do business of any kind and he feels it, the Meyers boys left the farms in very bad shape." In another letter, under date of March 30, 1904, she said: "Unless people are perfectly honest they have all the chance in the world to take advantage of him for he takes their say-so about everything as he knows he cannot keep straight in his own mind. He so often asks me about business matters that he has done that I know nothing about, for I did not at the time, and he can't remember what he has done." He seems to have had great confidence in the plaintiff and her husband for many years, and was very anxious to have them live in his neighborhood. At one time it was understood that they would do so, but for some reason this plan was changed. The defendants contend that it was upon this condition that Dr. Badger was to convey this farm in question to the plaintiff, and there is some evidence to indicate that Dr. Badger so understood it. Several witnesses testified that Dr. Badger frequently said that this plaintiff was to have his farm after his death. This language is consistent with the idea that he intended to give her the farm at some future time as a gift. It is also consistent with the idea that the farm was regarded as hers, and that he expected to use it as he did her other land as long as he lived. Several witnesses testify positively that he frequently said that this was the plaintiff's farm, and that he was attending to it and fixing it up for her.

The plaintiff's husband frequently acted for her in regard to her property and interests, and defendants introduced in evidence a letter written by him to Dr. Badger under date of April 25, 1905, which was soon after the land in question was conveyed to the defendant Rich. In this letter he said: "I am more than sorry to learn that

you have sold your farm. Had I known that you wanted to sell, I would have bought it." The defendants rely upon this letter as an admission that the farm belonged to Dr. Badger; but the letter as a whole strongly indicates that the writer, at least, believed that the plaintiff and himself had been greatly wronged by the conveyance of the land to Mr. Rich. He also said in the letter: "I would not have allowed that farm to have gone out of my hands during my life. You know that the Weaver place is not good for much as it stands now, but what cannot be helped must be endured. You was the promoter of that land trade, and persuaded me that that trade was just the thing for me to do, and that it would give me a good home all in a solid block. I have been an easy mark for more than one. I left everything in your hands; you have done as you wanted with it; so all is well that ends well. I will drop the subject, as it is probably not particularly interesting to you." He considered that, until Dr. Badger had deeded the land away, it belonged to himself and his wife, but by Dr. Badger's deed it had gone out of his hands. He and his wife had no title of record, and that he should suppose that the deed to a third party would be an effectual bar to their rights, or at least that he should not then have contemplated legal process to recover those rights, is not strange. They contend that they had been induced to exchange for the "Weaver place" on the promise that the land in question, together with that place, would make a desirable farm, and he suggested to Dr. Badger that the "Weaver place is not good for much as it stands now." He upbraids him with being the promoter of that trade, and having "persuaded me that that trade was just the thing for me to do, and that it would give me a good home all in a solid block." This language is wholly unintelligible, upon any evidence in this case, unless Mr. Badger had induced the trade for the "Weaver place" upon the promise and understanding that the land in question should be conveyed to this plaintiff. The writer then says that he has been an easy mark for more than one, and fol-

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lows it up with the statement that would have no meaning, unless it was a direct accusation that he had been an easy mark for Dr. Badger. The remark that the subject is probably not particularly interesting to Dr. Badger insinuates strongly that Dr. Badger must know that he had violated the contract.

The plaintiff was not allowed to testify, but there is evidence tending to prove that Dr. Badger executed a deed conveying this land to the plaintiff and delivered the deed to her, and afterwards upon the representation that he desired that the deed should name the plaintiff's husband also as grantee, and perhaps other representations, procured the deed from the plaintiff to make such changes, and failed to return it. There is evidence indicating that this deed still remained among Dr. Badger's papers after his death, and was destroyed by interested parties. Afterwards Dr. Badger executed a conveyance that is called a lease. It provided that the plaintiff and her husband should have the land in question as long as Dr. and Mrs. Badger lived, and should furnish them the necessaries for their support, and after their death should have the land absolutely. Still later the plaintiff and her husband executed an instrument for the purpose of canceling this so-called lease. It is a quitclaim of "all our interest, claim and demand in and to the certain leasehold interest heretofore made." It does not purport to quitclaim the land itself, but contains a clause granting Mr. Badger "full power and authority to deal with said above described property as they may deem proper." As Dr. Badger had been using all the lands of all the parties as he deemed proper, this last clause must be construed in the light of that fact. The evidence in regard to the execution and delivery of the deed is perhaps not so definite and conclusive as to establish that fact, but the clause in the so-called lease subsequently made, that after the death of Dr. and Mrs. Badger the plaintiff and her husband "shall come into full and immediate possession of said property, and this lease put on record shall be to the said Holla-

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l and complete title to said property free and all incumbrance of every form and kind," is with the contention that the land was promised to be the property of the plaintiff. If the deed was executed and delivered, as contended by the defendant, and returned to Dr. Badger for correction, it was at Dr. Badger's intention that this instrument, which was a lease, as equivalent of the deed which he had executed. The plaintiff and her husband appear to have been very generous with Dr. and Mrs. Badger, and acquiesced in everything and anything that Dr. Badger was fit to do with, not only his own property, but the plaintiff's property also.

It is some claim put forth in the briefs that the defendant Milton College is an innocent purchaser of the land, so that its title cannot be questioned. The evidence shows that it was a question that the notes were a pure donation to the college, and were so received and understood by the plaintiff. The agreement to pay interest during the life of Dr. Badger, and Mrs. Badger, or either of them, constitutes consideration for the notes, as it merely amounts to the plaintiff's promise to pay the interest that was to be paid by the plaintiff on the notes, the college taking the principal and returning it after the time limited. Mr. Rich was well acquainted with the land and existing conditions, and it is of course, a claim to be an innocent purchaser; even if he had not made payment at the time this action was brought, and therefore could not be an innocent purchaser, but he made such payments as he might make after notice. There is no doubt of the good faith of the college and its motives, and it would appear that to aid such an institution is a worthy object. Dr. Badger is not to be criticised for his desire to advance Christian education. In his age and position, it is likely that he forgot his obligation to this plaintiff, and he mistakenly supposed that because she had no title of record, and he himself had the title of record, he could withdraw his promise and take the land as he thought best under all circum-

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The evidence is in some respects complicated, and perhaps somewhat inconsistent, but we think that, taken as a whole, the proof shows that this plaintiff has fully paid for this land, and that, in consideration thereof, Dr. Badger considered this land to belong to the plaintiff and promised to convey it to her as alleged.

The judgment heretofore entered in this court is adhered to.

JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.

LETTON, J., not sitting.

ROSE, J., dissenting.

The evidence outlined in the opinion of the majority is, in my judgment, insufficient to justify the decree pronounced. I think the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. I am therefore compelled to adhere to my former dissent.

HAMER, J., dissenting in part, and concurring in the conclusion.

I concur in the conclusion that the court should adhere to the judgment heretofore rendered.

1. While the cogent argument contained in the majority opinion is strong, it appears to me that it might be still stronger and absolutely conclusive if it contained all of the material facts in the case, some of which, no doubt, are left out by inadvertence.

2. I am not satisfied that William J. Holladay, the plaintiff's husband, was disqualified to testify as a witness under section 329 of the code. I therefore dissent from so much of the opinion as holds that he was disqualified. Under the present decedent law, the plaintiff's husband had no direct legal interest in the result of the action, as the contingency by which he might possibly become entitled to the use of the land, or have an heirship in it, had not arrived. His wife was then living. And there is a waiver of the protection offered by section 329

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because of the introduction of witnesses by the defense who testified as to the transaction and as to what was said by the neighbors and by Dr. Badger himself. When the defendant shows part of the transaction, the whole may be shown by the plaintiff. *American Savings Bank v. Harrington*, 34 Neb. 598; *Parrish v. McNeal*, 36 Neb. 727; *Bangs v. Gray*, 60 Neb. 457. See, also, *Dodd v. Skelton*, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 475; *McCoy v. Conrad*, 64 Neb. 150; *Williams v. Miles*, 68 Neb. 463. As the effect of the section, if given a literal interpretation, is to cut the court off from the evidence showing the facts, the rule should not be applied unless it is strictly required by a reasonable interpretation. In *Parker v. Wells*, 68 Neb. 647, it was held that a wife might testify in favor of her husband in relation to conversations and transactions had with a person since deceased in all cases, except where the result of the suit, if favorable to the husband, would invest her with some direct legal interest in the subject of the controversy, and it was held that a dower interest did not disqualify her. This rule is seemingly analogous to that which ought to be in force in the present case.

3. I dissent from so much of the opinion as finds that Dr. Badger was not using a narcotic. One witness, Oscar Babcock, saw him every day, and testified that the doctor told him he could not keep up without medicine, and that the doctor said to him: "I can't leave it alone, I can't live without it." He also said that he used the purest article that he could get; that he did not buy it in town; that he could get a better article by sending away for it; that he bought \$4 worth at one time; that he said: "I can't keep up without it." A number of witnesses testified that he failed to recognize his nearest neighbors; that he would meet them and say "I don't know you"; that he got very bad physically; that he would say, "I can't call your name," and then, when the man told him his name, he would not be able to place him; that he gradually became weaker, and at times was seemingly unconscious of his surroundings; that he imagined there was something

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the matter with the chimney when there was nothing the matter with it; that he gave away his library, and wanted to give away his household goods and furniture; that he gave the preacher, M. B. Kelly, his horse and buggy; that he seemed dazed, and would commence to run, and that he would then catch hold of a telephone pole near his house to prevent himself from falling; and, in the language of Mary B. S. Badger, he became very nervous and forgetful, and was unable to remember "while he was turning around." In another letter she describes the doctor as "not fit to do business of any kind." And again "I can see his memory fail every day. * * * There is no question but what his brain is bad and heart also." It is apparent that he used something that was expensive. It was a drug that he sent away to get. He said that he could not keep up without it. The evidence seems to justify a finding that it was a narcotic.

4. I dissent from so much of the opinion as fails to find that the deed to William Henry Rich and the donation of the notes and mortgage to the college were obtained by the undue influence of William Henry Rich, Mary B. S. Badger, and M. B. Kelly, the preacher.

Dr. Badger was frail, and his mental power was much reduced by illness and old age. He was frequently ill, and he was beyond 80. The step-mother of the plaintiff had a direct interest in the conveyance of the land to Rich and the donation to the college. She became a beneficiary by that transaction, because after her husband's death she was to receive the interest. In view of the doctor's weak condition, his probable habits as to the narcotic, and with these strong and designing people around him, there was plenty of evidence, as it seems to me, to fully justify the conclusion of undue influence. At the time of the execution and delivery of the deed to the defendant Rich, Dr. Badger was extremely feeble, very infirm in his body, and hazy and uncertain in his mind, and also at the time that he delivered the notes and mortgage to the defendant Milton College, through M. B. Kelley, the traveling preacher.

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Kelly wrote to the president of Milton College: "You will doubtless be agreeably surprised to find it (the donation) \$8,000 instead of \$5,000." He wrote the president at another time: "Hoping this will all be satisfactory to you and rejoicing in the privilege of bearing even a very *small part* in this *worthy transaction*, I remain very sincerely yours, M. B. Kelly." When examined about the matter of the donation, he said: "This correspondence with Milton College in reference to acceptance of this donation and what they would do *nearly all transpired through me.*" Kelly seems to have been there when the notes and mortgage were made to Milton College. When he had received the notes and mortgage, *he sent them to the college.* He was proud of what he did. Milton College gave nothing for the mortgage and notes except a guaranty that the interest would be paid, and, of course, if Rich paid the interest, as he promised in the notes that he would, then the college would be out nothing. William Henry Rich knew Dr. Badger, and was farming the land. He was helping to keep the plaintiff from coming into her own. While he was not called as a witness, his deposition was taken in support of plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and in that deposition he describes the execution of the deed to himself at Dr. Badger's house, and the delivery to the doctor of the mortgage. At that time Rich testified that the doctor had told him that he had given the Holladays a deed, and that he had written to have it sent back. He therefore knew that the deed had been delivered, and whether that fact appeared from the deposition or from testimony taken at the trial proper was immaterial, as it was one of the things properly before the court to be considered by it. Rich knew that he was a party to this questionable transaction. Mary B. S. Badger and M. B. Kelly each knew the transaction was questionable.

Of course, it is always a worthy object to aid a school or college, but I believe the blame should be placed where it belongs. Mary B. S. Badger, the step-mother, William Henry Rich, who received the deed for the land and who

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made the notes and mortgage, and M. B. Kelly were all in it, and they are all responsible for the wrong done, while the college is merely called upon to give up something for which it paid nothing. Mary B. S. Badger, the step-mother, William Henry Rich, the purchaser of the farm, and M. B. Kelly were all interested in persuading this frail old man to forget his daughter and his duty. I have not observed anything said in the majority opinion touching the father's statements, made from time to time to the neighbors, that the improvements on the farm were for the daughter, or that he joined her name with his as one of the lessors of the land in crops. At least three witnesses describe these improvements, and what the father said about everything being for his daughter Kate (Mrs. Holladay). I have not observed that anything is said in the opinion about the daughter (Mrs. Holladay) going home from Kansas City to North Loup in August, 1904, to take possession of the farm, as she had agreed to do, and when she got there finding that her father claimed that he had rented the farm the day before to the defendant Rich. Mrs. Holladay then had her daughter with her when she went up there ready to go ahead with the arrangement made to farm the land and take care of the old folks; but, as they could not get possession of the land, they went back to Kansas City. The step-mother, Mary B. S. Badger, and the defendant Rich were active in this. The omitted facts show undue influence. There can be no doubt about it under the law. *In re Estate of Paisley*, 91 Neb. 139; *In re Estate of Frederick*, 83 Neb. 318, 321; *Orchardson v. Cofield*, 171 Ill. 14, 40 L. R. A. 256, 63 Am. St. Rep. 211.

I refer to the former opinion of this court (*Holladay v. Rich*, 92 Neb. 91), because it contains a fuller and more complete discussion of the facts than I am able to give in this brief review.

GEORGE K. HOWELL, APPELLANT, v. MILTON B. NORTH,
APPELLEE.

FILED MARCH 28, 1913. No. 16,777.

1. **Brokers: CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND: VALIDITY.** A contract in writing made by a letter of proposal and an acceptance between the owner of real estate and a broker or agent, authorizing him to sell the owner's land at a stipulated price and upon certain terms as to payment, which fails to state the amount of the agent's commission, is void, if such contract is made and is to be performed in this state. *Danielson v. Goebel*, 71 Neb. 300.
2. ———: ———: **PLEADING.** When such a contract is made for the sale of land situated in the state of Colorado, which is to be performed in that state, a petition for the recovery of the agent's commission, which alleges the making of the contract and performance on the agent's part, and so much of the statutes of Colorado as shows that the contract is valid under the laws of that state, is not vulnerable to a general demurrer.

APPEAL from the district court for Adams county:
HARRY S. DUNGAN, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Tibbets, Morey & Fuller, John A. McKenzie and Guy A. Coe, for appellant.

M. A. Hartigan, contra.

HAMER, J.

This is an action to determine whether the plaintiff should recover a judgment based upon defendant's alleged promise by letter to pay a commission for the finding of a purchaser for real estate sold in Colorado. The defendant at Hastings, Nebraska, wrote a letter to the assignor of the plaintiff at Lincoln, Nebraska, describing the land, which is near Akron, Colorado, and stating the terms of sale and price, and that he was willing to "allow a fair commission out of this." When the case was presented in the district court, the defendant called the attention of the court to the demurrer contained in his answer, and also demurred *ore tenus* to the petition, and

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the demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered for the defendant. From this judgment the plaintiff appeals to this court.

It is contended that the facts will not support a judgment for the plaintiff, and section 10856, Ann. St. 1909, is quoted: "Every contract for the sale of lands, between the owner thereof and any broker or agent employed to sell the same, shall be void, unless the contract is in writing and subscribed by the owner of the land and the broker or agent, and such contract shall describe the land to be sold, and set forth the compensation to be allowed by the owner in case of sale by the broker or agent."

The defendant sets forth the letter which he wrote to the plaintiff. This letter, among other things, provides that the writer will give until March 1 to sell at the price named. Attached to his letter is a plat of the 19 quarters of land proposed to be sold. On this letter, as appears by the copy in defendant's brief, is written the words: "Accepted, Jan. 10, '07, Conti. Realty Co. T. K." A copy of the letter, omitting the plat, is as follows: "Hastings, Neb. 1907. Continental Land Co., Lincoln, Neb. Gentlemen in reply to your of the 8 in regard to my ranch at Akron Colo. I hav 19 quarters all in a body & lays within a mile & a $\frac{1}{4}$ of Akron that is the north side of it & has a fair ranch house and stable for several horses & a shed for a 140 cattle and a good well & mill all fenced & cross fenced & about 60 acres of farm land, all this land lays very nice and my price is 6 dollars per acre one half cash & one fourth in One year & balance to two years at 6 per cent. Will low a fair comishen out of this. Will only give til March 1, to sel at this price the reanch is leased till november 1 next so if you care to take & try & sel it al rite I will make a smaul plat of it."

It is contended by the plaintiff that the only way by which the offer could be accepted was by the performance of its conditions; that is, finding a buyer for the land of the defendant at the price named and according to the terms designated. The petition contains a statement that

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the assignor of the plaintiff, on the 14th of January, 1907, wrote and mailed to the defendant a letter as follows: "Omaha, Neb., Jan. 14, '07. M. B. North, Hastings, Neb. —Dear Sir: In reply to your letter of the 9th inst. addressed to our Lincoln office will say that we have a party for your 19 quarters S. W. of Akron, but Mr. Healey was just in our office and in talking over some other matters he incidentally mentioned that he had bought this land, paid for it, had a contract on record in Akron same having been recorded on the 7th day of this month. We would like to sell it to our party but cannot conveniently do so if you have already sold it. Kindly write me personally about the situation. I want your letter to me awaiting me at the Akron hotel the first thing Wednesday morning. Yours very truly, Continental Realty Company, By ———, Pres." That the Continental Realty Company, by and through its agent, Kharas, proceeded to Akron, Colorado, and there, on or about the 16th day of January, 1907, received from the defendant through the United States mail the following letter: "Hastings, Nebr., 1-15-07. Continental Realty Co. Mr. Healey has got no contract whatever to sell my ranch, and I am very much surprised to hear of such a move that he has made, and I will prosecute him if he makes any attempt to sell my property. He cannot have it for sale at any price now or at all, and as far as signing a contract I have not signed a contract with any one, nor will I give any one the exclusive right to sell it. I will see if he gets around there, and I will have him looked after, as I have men there looking after my business. So what Healey told about a contract is false. Yours Resp. M. B. North."

It is further alleged in the petition that on or about said date the said Kharas, as the agent of the said Continental Realty Company, at Akron, Colorado, sold said land to one George M. McCoid, and thereupon sent from Brush, Colorado, and caused to be delivered to the defendant, Milton B. North, the telegram of which the following is a copy: "Brush, Colo. 5:15 P. M. 1-16-1907.

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M. B. North, Hastings, Nebr. My buyer accepts offer in your letter of the 9th or will give five fifty all cash. Wire me acceptance at Maekham Hotel, Denver, or he will buy elsewhere. Theodore Kharas." Also that said McCoid was and is ready, willing and able to comply with the terms of said contract to be performed on his part, but the defendant, wholly disregarding the terms of said agreement, refused to comply with the same, and refused to pay the said company for their services in selling the land. Also, that on the — day of —, 1907, the said company, for a valuable consideration, sold and assigned all their right, title, claim and demand in and to said claim and their cause of action against the defendant to the plaintiff, George K. Howell, who is now the owner and holder thereof, and that there is now due and owing from the defendant to the plaintiff the sum of \$1,000 and interest on the same from the 1st day of February, 1907. Also, that the contract was understood by the parties to be performed in and governed by the laws of the state of Colorado, and that the law of the state of Colorado at that time was, and now is: "Where a landowner lists or enters into a contract with a real estate broker for the sale of his lands, the broker is entitled to recover his commission whenever he has procured a customer who is ready, able and willing to purchase the property at the price and upon the terms named by the landowner, even though said contract or listing was not in writing, and although no definite commission has been agreed upon."

When the defendant at Hastings, Nebraska, on the 15th of January, 1907, wrote to the Continental Realty Company at Akron, Colorado, that Mr. Healey had no contract to sell the ranch, and said that he was surprised to hear of Healey's move, and that he would prosecute Healey if he attempted to sell the property, and that Healey could not have the property for sale, and this letter was sent in response to the one written to North by the Continental Realty Company the day before, the defendant recognized the claim of the plaintiff to sell the land, and was inclined

to make the claim of the plaintiff exclusive by a proffer to prosecute Healey. It would seem that this letter was sufficient to justify the assignor of the plaintiff in the belief that the company was to go ahead with the sale. This was followed up by a wire from Brush, Colorado, on the 16th of January, to the defendant, to the effect that the buyer accepted the offer and would comply with it, or that he would give a less amount in cash. The telegram does not appear by the petition to have been answered. The offer made by the defendant with reference to the sale of the lands was represented and made for the second time in the state of Colorado, being first made in the state of Nebraska. This offer was likely to become a valid contract in Colorado by the performance of its conditions at that place. It would seem that the act made the offer a contract at the time when it was made and at the place where the act was to be performed. The act was to be performed out at Akron, Colorado, and it was to be performed concerning the subject of the contract which was then there. This contract would appear to be binding in any event whenever the plaintiff's assignor discovered a buyer and sold the land to him. Whatever may be the effect of the offer made in Nebraska, there can be no question about the effect of the offer and its acceptance when the purchaser was found in Colorado and the land was actually sold. The purpose of the statute was to protect landowners from the fictitious claims of real estate dealers who actually never sold the land they claimed to sell and never earned the commissions for which they were claimants, but it was never the intention of the legislature to protect the real estate owner against legitimate claims for services which he authorized in writing and which were honestly rendered. The facts alleged charge that plaintiff's assignor was the agent of the defendant to find a purchaser for the land. It was immaterial for what reason the sale failed. *Lunney v. Healey*, 56 Neb. 313; *Love v. Miller*, 53 Ind. 294; *Reasoner v. Yates*, 90 Neb. 757. There was a plat attached to the letter. The

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description is sufficiently accurate. The rule is that, if the contract contains data from which the land may be identified and ascertained with certainty, that is enough. *Powers v. Bohuslav*, 84 Neb. 179.

The contract in this case is made for the sale of land situated in the state of Colorado, and the contract is to be performed in that state. The petition seeks to recover the agent's commission for work done in the state of Colorado. The statute of Colorado is shown by the petition. The contract does not seem to be in conflict with it. The contract is therefore valid under the laws of Colorado. It follows that a sufficient cause of action was stated in the petition. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in harmony with this opinion.

REVERSED.

SEDGWICK, J., dissents.

GEORGE W. HADLOCK ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. FREEMAN S. TUCKER, MAYOR, ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 16,813.

1. **Municipal Corporations: ORDINANCES: PUBLICATION.** Where a city charter requires that ordinances and other proceedings shall be published in a newspaper published in such city, but there is no requirement that the paper in which the publication is made shall be printed therein, and there is no paper printed therein, the publication of such proceedings is sufficient if published in a paper printed elsewhere, so far as the mechanical work is concerned, but circulated in the city from an office maintained therein to local subscribers generally to the same extent as though printed there, and such publication will not be held invalid.
2. ———: **STREET IMPROVEMENTS: CONTRACT.** Where a bid for the paving of a street exceeded the engineer's estimate to the extent of a few dollars, the excess being limited to one item, and the bid as made was accepted by the city council, but upon entering into the contract the slight excess was discovered, and the excess eliminated, and the contract brought within the estimate, the contract was not thereby void.

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—: INJUNCTION. Where a city of more than 1,600 and 5,000 population, by its proper officers, entered into an agreement with a contractor to pave a street within the city, and the contractor proceeded with the work under his contract and in the direction of the city officers until the completion thereof, a taxpayer of the city, with full knowledge of the progress of the work, will not be heard to enjoin the payment therefor or the completion of the contract.

From the district court for Douglas county:
C. TROUP, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Thompson, for appellants.

Olmsted, Carl E. Herring and Frank L. Mc-

J.

In an action to enjoin the officers of the city of Douglas county, from paving, curbing, gut-bdraining Main street in said city, to enjoin the city of any evidences of debt to pay for the same, and to enjoin the contractor from doing the work or receiving therefor.

Set forth in the second amended and supplemental petition of the plaintiffs are resident freeholders and taxpayers of the city of Florence, which is a municipal corporation having a population of more than 1,000 and less than 5,000, that defendant Tucker is the mayor of the city, and that defendants Craig, Price and Allen are each one of the aldermen thereof; that the population of the city is about 1,500, and the assessed value of the taxable property therein was \$341,591 at the last assessment, and that the taxes thereon exceed that sum; that on or about the 2d day of January, 1909, the city council pretended to pass, and purported to approve, an ordinance ordering the paving and subdraining of Main street therein between the railroad tracks near the south side of Jackson street and the south line of Briggs street, and advertised for bids for the work, but did not call for bids

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for 8,390 square yards of the surface, which was within and along the street railway tracks, and the city has let the contract for the work to defendant Ford, but excluding the said strip along and within the street railway tracks; that the said ordinance formed but one paving district, which included all the property within the city, and the improvement district comprises the whole of the city; that the city is the owner of property fronting and abutting on said Main street and within the district, as well as the owner of certain other property within the city, but that it has provided no fund with which to pay the tax for the improvement, and that there is no money in any fund of the city which can be appropriated to pay the same; that the total appropriation for the fiscal year, from May, 1909, to May, 1910, was the sum of \$8,000, apportioned as follows: For street and alley fund, \$2,700; for water fund, \$1,800; for lighting purposes, \$1,250; for officers' salaries, \$1,350; for park fund, \$200; and for miscellaneous purposes, \$700; that the city has drawn warrants against said fund to the extent and amount of \$11,000; that on the day on which the contract was let there had been contracted debts against the city and against the street and alley fund, and for miscellaneous purposes, a sum in excess of \$3,400, which had been appropriated, and debts contracted against the city, including the lighting fund, the water fund and salary fund, more than \$5,500, and there are outstanding valid warrants for the current and previous years more than the sum of \$18,000, but for the payment of which no appropriation had been made, and said warrants were drawing interest at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum, and for the payment of which no provision had been made, or funds provided; that the whole of said city is within the school district, of which it forms a part, and the school district has voted the limit of taxes that can be raised, and is unable to levy any tax on its property within the city to pay for the improvement of Main street, and that all the taxes levied by the school district will be needed for the purpose of

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e schools therein; that the mayor and council have authority to impose a tax for paving the street property not abutting on or adjacent to the street, and are without authority to order Main Street paved, or for the creation of an improvement for the purpose of paying the cost of such improvement by an ordinance requiring the improvement to be first introduced and read on the 2d day of January and passed to a final vote on the same day, not read on three different days, nor was the ordinance being suspended; that it is an ordinance of the city; that it has not been passed, nor published in a newspaper printed or published within the city, but has been published in a paper published elsewhere, and no further publication of said ordinance has been made at the time of the publication of the ordinance; that no newspaper printed and published in the city at the time of the publication of the ordinance had been published therein for more than one year; that no estimate of the cost of said improvement was furnished by the city engineer of said city and the city council prior to the time of advertising for bids, and no publication was made for or by the ordinance; that the cost of paving, curbing and subdraining the intersections on Main Street will exceed the sum of \$10,000; that no fund was provided to pay the same, nor can be; that no public meeting has been had on the question of paving Main Street and no petitions therefor filed; that the city council designed for the improvement of the street on Main Street with the working plans prepared therefor, and the plans were indefinite and uncertain, and did not furnish a basis upon which a contractor could bid with certainty as to upon which the city could award a contract; that, with other reasons, the whole proceeding was void. It is further alleged that after the institution of this suit the mayor and city council let the contract to the defendant Ford upon his bid for the making of the improvement, but excluding the portion above

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referred to as being within and along the street car tracks, and said Ford is about to and, unless restrained, will proceed to do the work, which will be to the irreparable injury of the taxpayers of the city; that the bid of Ford was not the lowest bid for said improvement; that the bid exceeded the estimates of the city engineer; that the contract entered into with Ford did not conform to his bid, and was signed by the mayor for a price and cost differing from the price and cost named in the bid, no other or further bids being called for or received prior to said change; that the bids were never advertised as required by the terms of the ordinance, nor published in a legal newspaper printed in said city; that the city of Florence has no sewer system, and that one will soon have to be provided for, in which case the sewers will have to intersect and cross Main street in many places, and in some parts will have to be constructed along and in the street, and it would be unwise and unjust to tax the people for paving before the sewer is laid; that the ordinance above referred to is indefinite and uncertain, in that it provides no method or system of assessment by which the taxes may be levied; that the advertisement for bids, and under which bids were received and contract let, is indefinite and uncertain, in that no time limit for either the beginning or completion of the work is given, thereby depriving the city of receiving fair bids for the work of constructing the improvement; that the contract described is the only one entered into between the city and Ford; that since the commencement of this suit the contractor has proceeded with the work, and is grading and paving that part thereof between the tracks of the street railway company and for one foot on each side thereof with the intention of charging the same to the city, and, unless restrained, the mayor and council will pay for the same in violation of the express terms of the contract. The prayer of the petition is sufficiently shown by the former part of this opinion.

Separate amended answers were filed by Tucker, Craig, Price, Allen, and the city of Florence, on the one part, and

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rd and Jackson in their own behalf. They are of ength, but will have to be briefly summarized herein. rmer admits the official character of the answering ants; that the city of Florence is a municipal corporation having more than 1,000 and less than 5,000 tion, and "is governed by the provisions of chapter bbey's Annotated Statutes for the year 1909;" that ffs are resident freeholders of that city; that on ut the 2d day of August, 1909, the improvement of street in said city was ordered by ordinance duly ; that the improvement district thereby created in- all the real estate within the city; that pursuant ordinance the city advertised for bids for doing the that bids were received, opened and considered; ie contract was awarded to Ford for doing the work; e soon thereafter began and has now completed the that the school district comprises all the property listric, and is the owner of the land where its school- stands, and the city is the owner of real estate its limits. All unadmitted averments are denied. lled that ample provision has been made for con- 1 with any sewer system that might thereafter be ed in the city, without interference with the pave- on Main street; that the ordinance requiring the vement was legally passed; that the same and the ere legally advertised; that the city engineer's esti- f the cost of the improvement was on file with the erk before the bids were advertised for; that the ct for the work was regularly awarded and ex- ; that the pavement of the street was demanded by ople, and the improvement constituted a special to all the real estate within the city. It is further l that, after the refusal of the court, in the first in- , to grant a restraining order prohibiting the coun- m opening the bids and letting the contract, the ere opened and the contract awarded to Ford, who e lowest responsible bidder, and soon thereafter, on nber 28, 1909, plaintiffs filed their amended and

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supplemental petition, setting up said facts, alleging the invalidity of the contract, and again asking for an injunction, but that they did not call the matter to the attention of the court, nor seek any action thereon until the month of January, 1910, although during the interim the contractor had been at work, torn up Main street, the principal thoroughfare of the city, and rendered it impassable for its entire length, about one mile, and the width of said improvement, had laid the concrete on the east half of the street for the entire distance, and for from one-fourth to one-third of the distance on the west side thereof, the material for both the concrete and brick work, sufficient to complete the entire improvement, delivered on the ground at an expense of nearly \$40,000; that during all that time plaintiffs were present in Florence, knew of the progress of the work, and are now thereby estopped to deny or question the invalidity of the contract or the proceedings in the performance thereof. It is further alleged, in substance, that the Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Company had a single track along said street, which between its rails and for one foot on each side thereof measured seven feet; that there was no provision of law whereby the city could require or compel the paving of a greater width, nor to construct a double track in and along said street and pay for the paving thereon; that the said company refused to lay a double track, unless the city waive the provision of the statute whereby the company could be required to pave between its rails; and, to induce the construction of the double track, which could not be enforced by the city, the city, for the betterment of the public service on said street, and the advantage of the city generally, yielded its right to have the paving paid by the street railway company, and adopted a resolution by which it waived the "statutory requirement in so far only as it provides for the street railway company to pave between its tracks and one foot beyond the outer rails;" that, in pursuance of said resolution, the street railway company removed the old single

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ck rails and constructed a new and heavy rail double ck, and, at its own expense of about \$35,000, paved the ire space between the rails with vitrified brick paving cks, and that the whole improvement had been com- ted; that the defendant city has paid for the engineer- ; and inspection services on said work in excess of any essment that will be made on the city property, and appropriation is necessary for that purpose.

A joint answer was filed by Ford and Jackson, contain- ; admissions similar to those contained in the answer the city officers, and alleging that the city purposes ring for the pavement outside the outer rails of said cks and between the double track, and the contractor urge the expense thereof to the city; that the contractor proceeding with the work; that the proceedings from inception thereof, to and including the advertisement bids, the bid of Ford, and the letting of the contract him, were regular and in accordance with law and the linance of the city; that the city and school district own roperty in the city as alleged. It is alleged that the tract has been fully completed and performed by Ford, l the same has been duly accepted by the city. Other rments of the petition are denied. It is further al- ed that prior to August 9, 1909, plaintiffs had knowl- ge that the city contemplated the improvements of in street in the manner provided for, and of the pas- ge of the ordinance of August 2 of that year; that bids re to be called for and opened by the council in open sion; that action on the bids were deferred for investi- tion; that on the 20th of August, 1909, plaintiffs insti- ed this suit, alleging the invalidity of the proceedings l proposed contract, and seeking an injunction against : same; that a restraining order was issued, but which, on a full hearing, was subsequently set aside, and an unction was refused; that the bid of Ford was subse- ntly accepted, the contract awarded and entered into, which defendant was required to begin the performance reof within ten days after the signing and delivery

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thereof, and to complete the work on or before December 31, 1909, of all of which plaintiffs had knowledge; that Main street is and was the principal thoroughfare and only business street in the city, and on the line of road leading from Washington county and the north part of Douglas county into the city of Omaha; that the contract required the tearing up of the street and laying the pavement thereon for the distance of one mile and the full width of the street, and necessitated the removal of a large plant and equipment to the place of work, the making of contracts of purchase of paving brick at Galesburg, Illinois, and Buffalo, Kansas, and other supplies, at great cost and expense, which defendant proceeded to do, to and in which plaintiffs acquiesced, and in no manner opposed the same, taking no action thereon until September 28, 1909, when they filed their amended and supplemental petition, in which they repeated the averments of their original petition, and, in addition thereto, alleged the invalidity of the contract, but did not bring the matter thereof to the attention of the court for action thereon, during all of which time the defendant was proceeding and had proceeded with his contract, as he was bound to do by the terms thereof, and in the meantime Main street was torn up, rendering it impassable, the concrete laid for the entire distance on the east half and for about one-fourth to one-third of the distance on the west half, the material for the concrete and brick work delivered on and along the street at an actual cost of nearly \$40,000, when the inclement conditions of the weather prevented the further prosecution of the work until the next spring, when he prosecuted the same to full completion in the month of May, 1910; that plaintiffs took no action in the prosecution of their suit until January, 1910, when they filed another supplemental petition, the only purpose of which was to prevent the city from issuing its bonds. An estoppel is pleaded against plaintiffs by reason of their inaction in asserting objections to the improvement within proper time.

Plaintiffs replied to the answer of defendants by a general denial, and admission that the city council pretended to pass a resolution concerning the double tracking of the street railway line, denying that the street railway company refused to construct a double track along Main street, alleging that the mayor, city council and city attorney informed the taxpayers, before the letting of the contract, that the street railway would double track its line within the city and pave the street between the tracks and for one foot outside thereof, and that the street railway had passed resolutions to that effect; that the said street railway company did not comply with the resolution, and did not complete said double track until long after January, 1910, and that the work between the tracks and for one foot outside the outer rails thereof was not commenced or done until the month of March, 1910.

Upon a trial being had in the district court, a finding and decree were entered substantially as follows: A general finding in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants upon the allegations touching the issue of bonds; that the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction as prayed; a perpetual injunction against the city of Florence, its officers and agents, restraining them from issuing the bonds of the city in payment of the improvement referred to; that Jackson and Ford are restrained from receiving or accepting any bonds of the city therefor. Costs expended by plaintiffs in all matters relating to the proposed issue of the bonds are taxed to defendants. Upon the other issues involved, the finding and decree are in favor of defendants, and the suit is dismissed at plaintiffs' costs in so far as said issues are concerned. Plaintiffs appeal.

As the decree of the district court upon the question of the right of the city to issue its bonds for the purpose of providing funds with which to pay the contractor for paving the street was in favor of plaintiffs, and no cross-appeal having been taken by defendants, that part of the decree must be taken to be a final adjudication of the question, with which we have nothing to do, and no further

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reference need be made to it. The decree as to the other issues is quite general, the finding and decree being specific in nothing, except the dismissal of the petition, and we have found it very difficult, owing to the condition of the record, to discuss and determine the exact contentions of the parties, notwithstanding the very able and exhaustive brief and argument presented by plaintiffs' counsel. There seems to be no doubt that the paving of the street has been fully completed by the contractor, and the work approved and accepted by the city officers. While it is true that the proceedings of the council in letting the contract were irregular, and, in some respects, probably censurable, yet we find nothing in the evidence showing that the contractor should be deprived of his compensation for doing the work, if there is any method by which provision may be legally made for his payment. It is true that this action was commenced soon after the letting of the contract, by which it was sought to restrain its execution, and a restraining order was issued, but was dissolved upon the preliminary hearing for a temporary injunction, and the injunction was refused. This did not have the effect of releasing the contractor from a compliance with his contract with the city. Amended and supplemental petitions were filed as the work progressed under the contract, but no injunctions were applied for by procuring action thereon by the courts, and the work was finally completed and accepted by the city officers. The street is now paved, and, with the exception of one contention hereinafter noticed, we are unable to detect any claim of a failure to comply with all the provisions of the contract so far as the construction work is concerned.

There is some objection to the manner in which the publication of the ordinance and other matters in which notice of the proceedings were made. The evidence tends to show that no paper was printed in the city of Florence at the time the publication was made; that there were papers issued and sent out from offices maintained in the city, but the mechanical work of printing was done in

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, adjacent to the city, and sent in bulk to the office, was maintained in Florence, and from that office uted to the subscribers. The statute (Comp. St. h. 14, art. I, sec. 59) does not require that the news- in which the ordinance is published shall be printed city, but that the publication shall be made "in newspaper published in said city or village." The ce shows a sufficient compliance with the statute.

next contended that the bid of Mr. Ford, to whom ntract was awarded, exceeded the city engineer's te. It appears that the items which exceed the en- s estimate were of little importance, and when the ct was finally entered into those items were brought the estimate, and the contract was not for an ve amount. The slight error in the bid could not the contract void.

inance No. 254, passed by the mayor and council of ant city of Florence on the 2d day of August, 1909, ich the grading and paving of Main street were d, provided for the payment of the cost of the im- nent by the city, "except such portion thereof as e paved by the Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Rail- ompany." By this language the cost of paving the excepted that expense from that assumed by the nd clearly indicated the purpose of requiring the railway company to pay the expense of grading and ; along its tracks, then upon the streets, as provided rmitted by the charter of the city. The ordinance olished contained the same provisions. The pub-

notice to contractors contained the recital that would be 31,841 yards of paving to be constructed, that, in the event of the Omaha & Council Bluffs

Railway Company laying double tracks on said f said street, there will be 23,451 yards of paving, st of which will be taxed to the real estate within istrict, and 8,390 yards of paving, the cost of which be paid by the said railway company." The ordi- requiring the street to be paved was passed August

2, 1909. The engineer's estimate of the cost of the improvement was filed the 4th of the same month, in which it is estimated that there will be 31,841 square yards of pavement, and that, "in the event of the Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Company laying double tracks on said part of said street, there will be 23,451 square yards of paving, the cost of which will be taxed to the real estate within said district, and 8,390 square yards of paving, the cost of which must be paid by the said street railway company." All the proposals and bids were based upon the ordinance, the estimate and the publication constituting the foundation of what should follow in the contracts and work.

The charter of the city (section 69, subd. IV) provides: "Any street or other railway company occupying with any track any street, avenue or alley or portion thereof which may be ordered paved, repaved, or macadamized may be charged with the expense of such improvement of said portion of such street, avenue or alley so occupied by it between its rails and for one foot beyond the outer rails, and the cost thereof may be collected and enforced against such company, in such manner as may be provided by ordinance, or the mayor and council or board of trustees may by ordinance require such company to pave, repave, or macadamize such portion of such street, avenue or alley occupied by said tracks, and for one foot beyond its outside rails." At the time of the commencement of the proceedings to secure the pavement of the street, the street railway company maintained a line of railway thereon, consisting of a single track, on which it was operating its cars. On the 25th of September, 1909, the mayor and council adopted a resolution waiving "the provision in chapter 14, article I, of the Compiled Statutes of the State of Nebraska 1909, which requires the street railway company, in the event of street paving in cities like Florence, to pave or pay the cost of paving between its rails and to a distance of one foot on the outer sides thereof." It is then resolved that, in consideration of the

ction, without delay, of the double tracks, "the Florence agrees to and does hereby waive said city requirement in so far only as it provides for let railway company to pave between its tracks and beyond the outer rails." The street railway constructed the double track. While the use of the word "may" in the charter might be construed to create doubt on the part of the city as to whether the cost of paving should be borne by the street railway company it is the opinion of the writer that that question does not arise here, as the whole of the proceedings, including the ordinance, estimates, publications, bids and contracts, show that all persons, including the citizens and the city, were given to understand that the cost of the paving referred to was to be borne by the street railway company, and I am unable to see that the city and council had any power or authority, at the time of the passage of the resolution of waiver, to change their mode of conduct formerly publicly adopted. The construction of the double track was in the first instance a matter for the consideration of the street railway company and for its own benefit. It was its duty to provide accommodation for the public in accordance with its franchise and the use of the street. It owed a duty to the public growing out of the advantages given by its franchise, and, as long as it fully discharged that duty in all respects, the public had no further demand, and I am unable to see how the mayor and council could by their resolution exonerate or release the company from paying the cost of the paving, with which it is bound by law, and impose the burden upon the general taxing public of the city, but in this view I am not sustained by the majority of the court. It is the opinion of the dissenting associates that, as the contractor has paved the portion of the street in question in good faith, and with a great outlay of money, depending upon the faith and confidence of the city, he should not be deprived of his compensation for the work performed, and, since he was not

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restrained by injunction, or other process, from constructing the pavement, and his contract required him to push the work, he should not now be required to lose the money expended under his contract at the suit of these plaintiffs, who took no decisive action, before the full completion of the work, that would justify the contractor in delaying to perform his contract with the city.

The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

CAROLINE KNAUF ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. ANNA J. MACK
ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,147.

1. **Wills: CONSTRUCTION: DEVISE: PARTITION: REPAIRS: DESTRUCTION OF HEDGES: DISTRIBUTION.** A testator, the owner of real estate, devised his land to his sister for life, remainder in fee to her son, upon condition that he outlived his mother, the life tenant. In case of his death before her decease, the land should be sold after her death, and the proceeds divided between a daughter of his sister and certain collateral relatives in Germany, the niece taking one-half, the other half to be equally divided between the foreign legatees. The will also provided that neither the niece nor her husband should have any interest in testator's property. The will was admitted to probate, and the life tenant retained possession of the land until her death, which occurred nine years after the death of the testator. Her son, the conditional devisee of the remainder, died during her lifetime. During her lifetime her daughter and her husband occupied the farm with her, paying her rent therefor. During her life, and the tenancy of the daughter, certain repairs were made upon the land by the daughter. During the same period certain hedges growing upon the land were cut down. At the time of the decease of the testator there was a valid mortgage on the whole of the land, and which became due thereafter. *Held*, First, that neither the daughter of the life tenant, nor the foreign legatees, had any interest in the land, and neither was entitled to partition thereof. Second, that the daughter of the life tenant was not entitled, as against the other legatees, to compensation for repairs upon the land during the lifetime of the life tenant in possession. Third, that she was not chargeable for damages to the realty caused by cutting the hedges

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during the life and possession of the life tenant. Fourth, that the only interest she had in the estate was her distributive share of the proceeds of the sale, after the payment of the costs and the indebtedness of the testator.

2. **Partition: CROSS-PETITION: ISSUES: REVIEW.** The owner of the mortgage, executed by the testator, was made a party to the suit of the foreign legatees, and he appeared, set up his mortgage, and asked a foreclosure thereof, to which no objection was made, and a decree was entered foreclosing his mortgage. Whether the proceeding was or was not regular, the issue was tried, and no objection can now be made to it. *Carson v. Broady*, 56 Neb. 648.
3. ———: ———: **SALE: REVIEW.** Since the will gave no direction as to who should sell the land, and conferred no specific authority upon any one to make the conveyance, it was not prejudicial error for the district court to direct the sale in the foreclosure proceeding; the surplus, if any, to be paid into court for distribution according to the provisions of the will. The court having acquired full jurisdiction over the subject matter and all the parties interested, it was proper to retain such jurisdiction and finally close the litigation.
4. *Carson v. Broady*, 56 Neb. 648, distinguished.

APPEAL from the district court for Richardson county:
JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE. *Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.*

S. L. Geisthardt, for appellants.

Reavis & Reavis, contra.

REESE, C. J.

It appears from the record in this cause that Karl (sometimes written Charles) Becker, a resident and citizen of Richardson county, died on the 3d day of October, 1900, seized in fee of the south half of the southwest quarter of section 25, township 3, range 16, in said county. He died leaving a last will and testament, which was subsequently admitted to probate in the county court of said county. We are unable to find a complete copy of the will in the record, but the part set out, upon which this controversy arises, is copied and apparently agreed

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upon as all that is necessary to be considered, and it will be so treated. He was unmarried. His sister, Elizabeth Heuser, survived him. The clause of the will out of which the dispute arises is as follows: "My sister, Elizabeth Heuser *nee* Becker, shall up to the time of her death, have unlimited control over my farm. After the death of my sister Elizabeth Heuser *nee* Becker neither Anna Johanna Mack *nee* Heuser nor her husband Jacob Friedrich Mack shall have any claim or right to any of my former property; but it shall belong to the son of my sister Heinrich Julius Martin Heuser. Should the son of my sister Heinrich Julius Martin Heuser die before his mother Elizabeth Heuser *nee* Becker, then and in that case my former property shall be sold to the highest bidder, and the amount realized from said sale, shall be divided in two equal parts. The first one-half my sister's daughter Anna Johanna Mack *nee* Heuser, shall receive; the second half shall be divided in equal shares between the children of my brothers and sisters in Germany, who are still alive at that time."

Mrs. Heuser died about the 1st day of October, 1909. Prior to her decease her son, Heinrich Julius Martin Heuser, departed this life, so at the time of her death there was no one in whom the fee in remainder could, by virtue of the will, vest. After the death of the testator, the property was occupied by the life tenant to the time of her death. With her the said Anna Johanna Mack, her daughter, and Jacob Friedrich Mack, husband of Anna Johanna Mack, resided on and cultivated the farm. After her decease they continued their occupancy to the time of the trial. The estate was closed by the administrator, with the exception of disposing of the land, and he sought the direction of the court as to his duties under the will. The children of the testator's brothers and sisters, all of whom lived in Germany, brought suit to have the land sold and the proceeds of the sale divided as directed in the will, making the Macks, Jussen, the administrator, William Becker, Jr., August B. Becker, John W. Powell

Frederick, Sr., the four latter mortgagees of defendants.

He answered, setting up the clause of the will, that, as Anna Johanna was to have one-half of the land, and that she and her husband were the owners of one-half of the real estate, and that they had made improvements, and that they had lived on the 40 acres on which they resided, and that the land should be partitioned, allowing her designated 40 acres on which they lived, and partition accordingly. August B. Becker filed an answer and cross-petition, alleging the ownership of the land by assignment for \$1,200, executed by the testator during his lifetime, which was unpaid, and seeking a judgment for the amount of the mortgage. Jussen, the administrator, filed an answer asking instructions as to his duties under the will. The cause was tried to the court, resulting in a judgment foreclosing the mortgage in favor of August B. Becker in default of payment ordering the land all sold as one tract, and that Anna Johanna Mack should receive one-half of the proceeds of the sale to partition.

The court noted that the will provides that neither Anna Johanna Mack nor Jacob Friedrich Mack "shall have any right to any of my former property," but that, upon the termination of the life estate of Elizabeth Heuser, the land should vest in fee in her son, but if he die before the property "shall be sold to the highest bidder, and the amount realized from said sale shall be divided into two equal parts," one-half to Anna Johanna and the other half to the designated legatees in Germany, clearly indicating the intention of the testator that Anna Johanna Mack shall not receive any part of the proceeds, but that what she should receive would be in money. We find no authority for the partition of the land as ordered by her. It is to be further noted that the part of the will before us gives no direction as to whom the land is to be sold, the provision being that "shall be sold to the highest bidder."

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There is some objection to the foreclosure of the mortgage in this action. If we concede that the proceeding is somewhat irregular, although we do not so decide, yet, as the issue was presented by the pleadings without any attack, and the court given jurisdiction of the whole matter, we are unable to see who could be prejudiced thereby. If the land is "sold" under the foreclosure proceeding, it would avoid the necessity of a sale by any other person. If then the surplus, if any, is divided in accordance with the provisions of the will, those provisions will have been carried out in all essential particulars. We see no prejudicial error in the order directing the land to be sold under the foreclosure proceedings.

A claim was presented against the Macks for the rents and profits of the land for the years 1909 and 1910. The life tenant died in October, 1909. The court properly refused to charge them with the rents and profits of 1909, but charged them with the rent for 1910 in the sum of \$320. It was further sought to charge them with the value of certain hedges on the farm alleged to have been destroyed during their possession of the land; but, as the evidence tends to show that whatever injury was done to the hedges was done during the lifetime and possession of the life tenant, it should not be charged to Mrs. Mack. Mrs. Mack presented a claim of about \$700 for repairs and betterments placed upon the land. She testified that none of them had been made since the death of her mother, the life tenant. There was therefore no error in refusing to allow her anything in that behalf. This case is therefore clearly distinguished from *Carson v. Broady*, 56 Neb. 648.

The decree of the district court wherein it orders a partition of the land is reversed and partition is refused. That part of the decree ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of the property thereunder is affirmed. If it shall appear that any party to the suit has paid off the mortgage debt as permitted by the decree, either by redemption or assignment, such party will be entitled,

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after the payment of the costs, to the reimbursement of the amount so paid, with interest, before a division of the proceeds of sale is made. Of the surplus, if any remains, Anna Johanna Mack will be entitled to one-half, and the legatees in Germany the other half, as directed by the will.

The cause is remanded to the district court, with directions to proceed as indicated in this opinion.

JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.

BARNES, LETTON and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

ALLEN G. FISHER, APPELLEE, V. DELIA O'HANLON ET AL.;
JAMES ROWAN, APPELLANT.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,153.

1. **Bills and Notes: NEGOTIABILITY: CONDITIONS IN MORTGAGE.** Where a promissory note, negotiable in form, by which the maker promises to pay a certain sum in money, at a certain specified time, is made, and the note is secured by a mortgage, the reservation in the mortgage of an option on the part of the mortgagor to pay a part of the amount due at any time he may elect before maturity does not destroy the negotiability of the note secured by the mortgage.
2. ———: **BONA FIDE HOLDER.** A holder of a negotiable promissory note "in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (1) That it is complete and regular upon its face. (2) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact. (3) That he took it in good faith and for value. (4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it." Comp. St. 1911, ch. 41, sec. 52.
3. **Attachment, Property Subject to: PROMISSORY NOTES.** "The indebtedness of the maker upon a promissory note, before its maturity, is not the subject of attachment. His obligation is not

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to the payee named in the note, but to the holder, whoever he may be." *Gregory v. Higgins*, 10 Cal. 839. See, also, *Clough v. Buck*, 6 Neb. 343.

APPEAL from the district court for Dawes county:
WILLIAM H. WESTOVER, JUDGE. *Reversed with directions.*

Albert W. Crites, for appellant.

Allen G. Fisher, Andrew M. Morrissey, William P. Rooney and William D. Elmer, contra.

REESE, C. J.

On the 9th day of November, 1908, Henry Hern and Maria Hern executed their promissory note to Delia O'Hanlon for the sum of \$500, due five years after date, with interest from date at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum. The note is negotiable in form, and, so far as the note itself upon its face is concerned, it is conceded to be negotiable. However, it was secured by a mortgage, which contains this stipulation: "The said Henry Hern and Maria Hern to have the privilege of paying the sum of \$25 or \$50 at any time during the five years on account of said principal sum." Otherwise the reference to the note is in the usual form. The note, as appears upon its face, matures November 9, 1913. Some time prior to the 12th day of November, 1908, plaintiff commenced suit against Mrs. Delia O'Hanlon in the county court of Dawes county. On the 7th day of December, 1908, the sheriff of the county made a return to the county court of summons and writ of attachment and garnishment, "from which the court finds that due and legal service of each of said writs has been made on November 23, 1908, by delivery to defendant in person in said county of true and certified copy of each writ, together with all indorsements thereon," and on said date Henry Hern and various banks "have each been attached as garnishee and their fees paid, and that thereby there was attached on said date a certain note and mortgage dated November 9, 1908, payable five

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date, from Henry Hern to defendant," the the note and mortgage above herein referred wer of the garnishee was taken, and, upon the laintiff, the cause was set down for trial upon for December 12, 1908, at 9 o'clock A. M., to the cause was continued. On that day the ried in the absence of an appearance by de e court found due and legal service of sum- rit of attachment had been made, and ren- ent against defendant in favor of plaintiff for was ordered to pay the money due upon the irt as it matured. The defendant was ordered the note and mortgage to the sheriff or the order of sale of the attached property. The as "forbidden to receive, receipt for, or col- the money due thereon, and the garnishee o pay any portion of the debt" to "any person court or its officer." The above reference to ngs is taken from a partial transcript of the filed in the office of the county clerk of ty, which was offered in evidence on the trial e in the district court. No formal transcript nent was offered. The possession of neither mortgage was ever obtained under the gar- roceedings, nor was either sold under any e. Plaintiff brought this suit in the district close the mortgage, alleging substantially the ets, and making Henry Hern, Maria Hern, lon, Mrs. Jackson, and James Rowan defend- in filed his answer, with a cross-petition al- nership of the note and mortgage, their trans- in due course of trade before maturity, the ay interest due, and seeking a foreclosure s. O'Hanlon and Mrs. Jackson failed to an- cree was entered, with findings in favor of claring the note due by reason of the failure est, and ordering the foreclosure in favor of defendant Rowan appeals.

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It appears that Mrs. O'Hanlon and Mrs. Jackson are sisters, both well along in years, and neither familiar with the customs of trade and commerce. Mrs. Jackson was possessed of some means. Mrs. O'Hanlon was practically destitute, with the exception of the 160 acres of land in Dawes county, which had come to her by inheritance. It had been necessary for her to make a number of trips from her home in Chicago, Illinois, to Chadron, and, in order to do so, she borrowed the necessary money to pay her expenses from Mrs. Jackson, until the indebtedness amounted to \$525. Soon after receiving the note and mortgage from Hern, and on the 25th day of November, 1908, she executed an assignment of the note and mortgage to Mrs. Jackson, and caused them to be sent to her by mail to Beaver Dam, Wisconsin, where Mrs. Jackson resided. Soon thereafter they met, and Mrs. O'Hanlon paid Mrs. Jackson the \$25 remaining due, thus satisfying her obligation to Mrs. Jackson. At a later date, alleged to be on or about the 22d day of October, 1909, Rowan purchased the note and mortgage from Mrs. Jackson, the evidence showing that he paid the sum of \$500 in money therefor. The deposition of Mrs. O'Hanlon, Mrs. Jackson and Mr. Rowan were taken at Chicago. Mrs. O'Hanlon testified to the transfer of the note and mortgage to Mrs. Jackson, the time and consideration, the indebtedness to Mrs. Jackson, and the subsequent payment of the \$25 remaining due. These facts were testified to by Mrs. Jackson, and that the note and mortgage were received by mail and accepted by her as payment on the \$525 debt due from Mrs. O'Hanlon, and that at the time of the acceptance of the note and mortgage, and the final satisfaction of the balance due her and cancelation of the indebtedness, she had no knowledge or information that any effort had been made by plaintiff to reach the debt and the note and mortgage by attachment or other process. She also testified to their sale to Rowan, and the receipt of the sum of \$500 in money therefor. Mr. Rowan testified to the payment of the money and the receipt of

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e and mortgage, indorsed by Mrs. O'Hanlon and Jackson, without any knowledge or information of attachment proceedings,

e note is not yet due, according to its terms, there doubt that what was done in the way of its transfer before maturity. But it is contended by plaintiff a clause in the mortgage giving the makers of the e option of paying sums of \$25 and \$50 on the any time they might desire to do so, destroyed the ability of the note and rendered it nonnegotiable the rule that the note and mortgage considered to- constituted the contract. If the provision in the ge rendered the note nonnegotiable, it may be con- hat, so long as it remained in the hands of the ment defendant, the debt was liable to attachment

If the note was negotiable and passed into the of innocent purchasers for value, before maturity, purchaser would be protected. We are not aware is identical question has been decided by this We are therefore required to consult the decisions r courts of last resort, for we find nothing in the of this state settling the question.

Howie v. Hume, 13 App. D. C. 286, a negotiable every note was executed by the makers, and at the the instrument, and below the signatures, were the "with privilege of paying all or any portion any fore maturity," signed by the makers. It was held s did not affect the negotiability of the note. See, *Louisville Banking Co. v. Gray*, 123 Ala. 251, where ne rule, in principle, is applied, and *Louisville g Co. v. Howard & Kornegay*, 123 Ala. 380. In *School District v. Hall*, 113 U. S. 135, the school

had issued its negotiable bond under the pro- of a statute which declared that the instrument be "payable at the pleasure of the district at any fore due," and it was held that this did not de- he negotiability of the bond; that it created only on of the maker to pay before maturity, but that

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the holder could not exact payment until the day of maturity had passed. In *Mattison v. Marks*, 31 Mich. 421, it was held that a promissory note, by which the maker agreed to pay a certain sum "on or before" a day named, was a negotiable instrument; that the words "on or before" only gave the maker the option before the date of maturity, but conferred upon the holder no right to enforce payment before that time. See, also, section 4, ch. 41, Comp. St. 1911. In *Cunningham v. McDonald*, 98 Tex. 316, it was held that "a promissory note is not rendered nonnegotiable by the fact that the maker, promising to pay by a day certain, reserves to himself by its terms the right to pay sooner." In *Leader v. Plante*, 95 Me. 339, a promissory note was made payable "within one year after date," and it was held to be negotiable; that the option to pay did not destroy its negotiability.

The authorities are not entirely harmonious upon the question of what recitals in a note render it nonnegotiable. But we have found no case where it is directly held that the reservation of a mere option on the part of the maker of an otherwise negotiable note or bond to pay a part of the debt before maturity, the exact time for maturity being fixed, destroys the negotiability of the note. In so far as the time when the payee may demand and enforce payment, this note, even with the stipulation of the mortgage included as a part of it, complies strictly with the requirements of section 1, ch. 41, Comp. St. 1911, known as the "Negotiable Instruments Law."

The case of *Campbell v. Nesbitt*, 7 Neb. 300, is relied upon by plaintiff as sustaining his view of the right to attach the debt in question, but it gives us no real light upon the question, as the note in that case became due on the 10th day of March, 1872, and was attached in 1874, long after its maturity, and while yet in the hands of the payee, who did not transfer it until in November, 1874, and after judgment had been rendered against the garnishee. The note was clearly dishonored and had lost its negotiable quality at the time of its transfer to plain-

tiff Campbell. Without pursuing this subject further, we hold that the reservation of the option in the mortgage did not destroy the negotiability of the note.

As to the defendant Rowan being a *bona fide* holder for value before maturity, the evidence is all one way. Whether true or false, he testified that he made the purchase without any knowledge of the attachment proceedings, in good faith, and paid the sum of \$500, the face of the note, in money. He is supported in this by Mrs. Jackson, who testified that he paid her the money, and that she indorsed and delivered the note to him. It is provided by section 52, ch. 41, Comp. St. 1911, that a holder in due course is one who has taken the instrument under the conditions that it is complete and regular upon its face; that he became the holder before it was overdue, and without notice of any previous dishonor, if such was the fact; that he took it in good faith and for value, and without notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. So far as is shown by the evidence, he appears to have come within the provisions of this section. It is true that he had never seen the land and knew little or nothing about its quality or the condition of the title, except what information he had obtained from the indorsers, with whom he had been acquainted for many years, and it would be quite natural for one of his want of experience in commercial affairs to rely upon their fairness and to presume that 160 acres of Nebraska land would be sufficient security for \$500.

The note being negotiable, and its possession and custody not having been obtained under the attachment and garnishment proceedings, the question arises as to what rights, if any, plaintiff acquired by his action. In *Gregory v. Higgins*, 10 Cal. 339. in an opinion by Judge Field, it is said: "The indebtedness of the garnishee was upon a promissory note, which did not mature for several months thereafter. From the very nature of a promissory note, it is evident that, before its maturity, the indebtedness of the maker thereon cannot be the subject of

attachment. His obligation is not to the payee named in the note, but to the holder, whoever he may be. From its negotiability, it may often pass into the possession of parties entire strangers to the maker, and, even if held by the defendant at the time of garnishment, it does not follow that it would be in his hands at its maturity, and, if transferred before maturity to a *bona fide* holder, it could be enforced, even if paid upon the attachment. *McMillan v. Richards*, 9 Cal. 365, 418; *Sheets & Grover v. Culver*, 14 Ia. 449. It follows that the notice served upon Marshall, previous to the maturity of his note, did not operate as a garnishment of the amount in his hands. Nor would the notice, served subsequent to the maturity, have any greater effect, unless the note was, at the time, in the possession of the defendant, from whom its delivery could be enforced on its payment upon the attachment." In *Clough v. Buck*, 6 Neb. 343, Judge GANTT, in writing the opinion of the court, said: "It seems to be a general rule that a negotiable note or bill is not, before maturity, subject to attachment. The reason of the rule is well stated in *Gregory v. Higgins*, 10 Cal. 339"—and quite a lengthy excerpt is copied from the opinion with approval. In 2 Wade, Attachment, sec. 458, it is said: "Whatever be the form of commercial paper that evidences the original liability of the party summoned, as a general rule, he cannot be charged as the debtor of the payee, if the paper was negotiable when issued, and still retains its negotiability"—citing a number of cases, and stating the reasons for the rule in the text with considerable elaboration. In 1 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments (5th ed.) sec. 800a, it is said: "The purchaser of a bill, note, or other negotiable instrument for value and before maturity, is not, as a general rule, affected by any litigation to which he is not a party, which may then be pending, and in which the instrument is involved, nor will a decree or judgment, when rendered in such litigation, affect him, the doctrine of *lis pendens* having no application to negotiable instruments." See, also, Drake, Attachment (7th ed.) sec. 582 *et seq.*

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Some questions involving the procedure are presented, but they need not be noticed. After a patient and careful investigation of the subject, we are led to the conclusion that plaintiff acquired no rights by his garnishee process, and that the decree of the district court foreclosing the mortgage in his favor cannot be sustained; that, as Rowan was made a defendant and presented his mortgage asking a foreclosure thereof, the court should retain the case and make a final disposition of it. Henry Hern, the maker of the note, sold the mortgaged premises to William Hern, who assumed the payment of the mortgage debt, and who is made a party defendant herein, and subsequent to such sale, and during the pendency of this suit, the said Henry Hern died, but no serious question arises from these facts, the said William Hern being a party defendant.

The decree of the district court foreclosing the mortgage in favor of plaintiff and dismissing Rowan's cross-petition as a first lien is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court, with directions to dismiss plaintiff's suit, and to enter a decree in favor of Rowan foreclosing the mortgage.

REVERSED.

BARNES, LETTON and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

JENNIE BELLE ADAMS, APPELLEE, v. WALTER SCOTT,
APPELLANT.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,150.

1. **Marriage: ANNULMENT: INSANITY.** This state has adopted the prevailing rule that while absolute inability to contract, insanity or idiocy, will avoid a marriage, mere weakness of mind will not, unless it extends so far as to produce the derangement that avoids all contracts by doing away with the power to consent. *Aldrich v. Steen*, 71 Neb. 33.
2. ———: ———: ———. The courts of this state are not authorized

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to decree a marriage contract void on the ground of insanity or idiocy of one of the parties, except for such want of understanding in such party as to render him or her incapable of assenting thereto.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
LINCOLN FROST, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

John E. Loice and George W. Miller, for appellant.

G. E. Hager, F. C. Foster and F. A. Boehmer, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action to annul a marriage for the alleged incapacity of one of the parties to the contract. The action was brought in the district court for Lancaster county by one Dora Doyle, as the next friend of Jennie Belle Adams, against Walter Scott, to whom Jennie was married on the 2d day of October, 1910, alleging that she was insane or an idiot at the time of her marriage.

It appears, without dispute, that Jennie was left by her mother at an institution called the "Tabitha Home," located in the suburbs of the city of Lincoln, when she was ten years of age; that at the time of her marriage she had been in that institution for 16 years; that during all of that time she had been required to perform menial labor in the nature of washing, scrubbing and other domestic service, without remuneration; that she had been compelled to wear cast-off clothing and coarse shoes, much too large for her; that she had been given very little schooling; that for a short time there was a German teacher at the Home, from whom Mrs. Scott learned to speak German and count in that language. This was the extent of her education. During the 16 years she was at the Home she had been but three times to the city of Lincoln, and once to the state fair. She was industrious and faithful and performed her tasks well. For some 10 years prior to the marriage Walter Scott, the defendant, had been the bookkeeper at the Home, and had thus become acquainted with her. He had noticed her condition,

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purchased her some articles of clothing, among is a pair of shoes which were small enough to fit with which she was greatly pleased. A short ore her marriage defendant left the Home and remunerative employment in the city. He had Jennie that he would procure a suitable home and would take her away from the institution. g to his promise, on the 2d day of October, 1910, red at the Home and informed Jennie that he y to take her away. He gave her suitable wear-rel, and told her to dress herself up nicely and ld go and be married. She dressed herself suit-ne out, got into the buggy, and went with him to where they procured a license, and went before Stevens and were married. When they failed to return to the Home, and the authorities there rtained the fact of the marriage, they came to and caused Scott and his wife to be arrested and in the city jail. Mrs. Doyle took her back to the nd the defendant Scott was discharged. After a tt sued out a writ of habeas corpus to obtain the f his wife from the custody of those in charge of ie, and thereupon Mrs. Doyle commenced this the next friend of Mrs. Scott, to annul the mar-A trial resulted in a decree for plaintiff, from is appeal is taken.

ant contends, among other assignments of error, decree is not sustained by the evidence, and is to law. As we view the record, the case may be of by a determination of this question.

etition alleges, and the answer admits, the secur-license and the marriage in question, in due con-to law. In such a case every presumption of law or of the validity of the marriage until it is re-and the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to is presumption. *Ward v. Dulaney*, 23 Miss. 410; *ichter v. Nonnemacher*, 159 Pa. St. 634; *Anony-Pick*. (Mass.) 82.

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To maintain this issue, plaintiff produced the evidence of Mrs. Doyle, who testified, in substance, that she had been acquainted with Jennie Belle Adams since about two hours after her marriage; that she talked with her at the time, and asked her if she knew what it meant to be married, and put it in very plain words. She told her what her husband would expect of her, and Jennie said: "I will never do it." Jennie said her husband had rented a room for her, and that she was going to live in that room and do light housekeeping. The witness did not ask her whether she could do anything in the way of work, or keep house. She told Jennie to dress herself so she could take her out to the Home, and Jennie said: "You will have to put in my combs." The rest of her clothes were on, she having slept that way all night; that she did not know Jennie until the morning after she had been put in jail; that Jennie's mind was that of an overgrown child. She stated that her conclusions were based on general observations; that she did not examine Jennie as a doctor would.

One Doctor Miller testified that he had been called to the Tabitha Home as a physician, and has acted four years at that Home; that he occasionally visited and examined the inmates there; that he had examined Jennie about two and a half or three years ago; that she could not do the ordinary work of a person of her age and size; that she did not know the difference between right and wrong; that she could not take care of herself; that he had discovered defects by her conversation and general appearance, which was a result of lack of mental growth; that she could not learn to take care of herself; that she had the mental capacity of a child 15 or 16 years of age in some ways; that she had not much unity of thought or continual line of reasoning; that in his opinion she was born with a normal brain that would develop or could be developed normally; that she would smile when he spoke to her. He also testified that he did not know that Jennie had learned to speak German; that the food she got at

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stitution would make a difference in her mental pment; that he had seen Jennie use what they called p"; that he had nothing to do with the people work- ere at that class of work; that Jennie would not even if she was paid for it, and would not under- what you meant if you offered to give her a present. a Osthoff testified that she lived at the county jail; he had charge of the woman; that Jennie told her d been put in the Home when she was 10 years of hat her mother never came to see her, and she cried that; that Jennie stated that she was married, and d to live with Mr. Scott; that she was his wife, and he was married to him. On redirect examination ated that, when the girl was first brought to the he thought she was a crazy woman; that, after she out the circumstances, she thought she could not anything else; but, after she was with her several she saw she was not crazy; that Jennie showed a f education, but knew how to work, and did it right; e did what she was asked to do, and did it well. it of space forbids any further statement of the ce produced by plaintiff. We deem it sufficient to at like testimony was given by some other witnesses. st be observed, however, that no witness for the iff testified that Jennie was either insane or an idiot. A. H. Mayer, for the defendant, testified, in sub-, that he had lived in Lincoln for 7 years; that he anager of the Tabitha Home from 1903 to 1905; e became acquainted with Mr. Scott and Jennie Adams at the Home; that Jennie did not have much ion, but was a good and willing worker; that she ed, helped in the laundry, washed dishes in the n, and turned the washing machine, putting in from 2 hours a day at that work; that they had a German teacher out there, and Jennie had learned to read rite German; when he came there Jennie was 19 old; she wore shoes actually big enough for himself, r clothes were the same way; that she was required

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to wear just what was donated to the Home. He had noticed that she always kept herself clean. He said Jennie had been in his charge for 12 days at his home, and he had taken particular notice of her after Judge Cornish had placed her in his charge; that he had taken particular notice of her for the reason that his wife had been "in the same shoes as what Jennie Belle Adams is today." He stated that Jennie had taken his baby out in her arms, and had been around his babies; that she offered to work at his home without being asked; that she had done her work faithfully and honestly; that she did not act insane or feeble-minded at his home; that he had talked to Jennie about her marriage on the second night she was there. She said she had married Mr. Scott to get a happy home; that she had been a slave at the Home, and had not received any money since he left; that, although Mr. Scott was a little older than she was, he had promised to give her a home; that she would be true and faithful to him if they lived together.

Justice Stevens testified that he had met Mrs. Scott, and performed the marriage ceremony; that he had had experience in performing marriage ceremonies, and looking into the faces of people and judging as to their competency; that he did not notice anything peculiar about Jennie, and was surprised when there was any objection to the ceremony; that she seemed reticent, but took part in the conversation to some extent; that he thought she appreciated what was going on; that she seemed pleased, and seemed to be able to appreciate the remark made by him as to the simplicity of their wedding arrangement; that she had no prompting as to how she should answer at the marriage ceremony, and answered the questions as propounded to her intelligently; and there was nothing whatever that would cause him to suspect that there was anything wrong.

Reverend Henry Heiner testified that he had lived in Lincoln about 28 years; that he had been connected with the Tabitha Home from 1887 to 1895; that he was ac-

d with Jennie Belle Adams; that she understood a contract; that when something was promised her in of clothing she did her work most cheerfully; that says remembered and expected the things promised; e had an opportunity to learn German and Eng- d that she had learned both; that she had some ability, and could sing songs.

or John T. Hay, whose competency as a specialist al and nervous diseases is beyond question, testi- t he had made an investigation in this case as to cy of Jennie Belle Adams. The physical signs of may be an abnormally large head or abnormally ead, and a lack of symmetry in the features; pe- form of the bones, especially the palate and the nd lack of expression in the face; that he had ap- ose tests to Jennie Belle Adams to a certain ex- d physically found no marked defect, except that a little short of stature compared to her breadth; somewhat awkward in her movements, but her were fairly formed and symmetrical; and he discover no abnormality in the shape and size of d; that he questioned her, and she answered his is readily and correctly; that she impressed him ; a very ignorant person. She gave her name, and she was born in Omaha, but could not tell where ia. She gave her age as 26; said that she had been an school for a certain length of time, and had to speak some German. She could count both an and English; she could write her name, make nd make figures; she knows the name of the city; ws where she lives; she knows the street on which ie is situated; and was rational as far as he knew; was a rational person, and was not insane or an hat she was in a normal condition, was not de- and he could not say in law that she was feeble- but that from a medical sense he saw that she , and that she was not insane; she was not de- she could classify forms, and understand what

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was going on around her in matters pertaining to her own welfare; that she knows she is married, and is willing to live with her husband, and is very decided about not going back to the Home; that she seems to appreciate her condition and situation at this time; and that she is not deranged on any subject, according to his understanding of the word.

Jennie was called as a witness, and testified, in substance, that she had never been in court before; that she was married to Mr. Scott; that she wanted to marry him; that she did not know what the action was brought against her for; did not know anything about court proceedings; that she had been up town once since she had been at the Home; that she did not want to go back; that she liked Mr. Scott; that she loved him; that she expected to cook for him, expected to keep house for him and sweep and scrub for him. She stated that when she married Mr. Scott she had promised to be faithful to him; that she would do whatever he wanted her to do; and that she would keep house for him; that she understood what she was to do as a wife; and that Mr. Scott as a husband was supposed to work and bring in the money to keep her on; that she understood that she was being married; that they stood up while being married. She stated that the judge asked her if she would love, honor and obey her husband, and she said she would; that Mr. Scott had said he would protect, cherish and be faithful to her, and that she understood.

The testimony of defendant Scott corroborated the evidence of his other witnesses.

To avoid extending this opinion to an unreasonable length, we have been compelled to omit some of the testimony. We are satisfied, however, that the evidence fails to sustain the plaintiff's allegation that at the time of her marriage Jennie Belle Adams was either insane or an idiot. At most, the record only shows that her mind was to some extent weak and undeveloped. But it seems clear that she understood the nature of the marriage contract,

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ch of what was expected of her as a wife. In such the courts are not authorized to annul the mar-

state seems clearly to have adopted the pre-rule that, while absolute inability to contract, in- or idiocy, will avoid a marriage, mere weakness it, unless it extends so far as to produce the de- ment that avoids all contracts by doing away with ver to consent. *Aldrich v. Steen*, 71 Neb. 33; 1 , Marriage and Divorce (6th ed.) sec. 127; *Ward v. y*, 23 Miss. 410; *Foster, Adm'or, v. Means*, 42 Am. S. Car.) 332; *Anonymous*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 32; *nacher v. Nonnemacher*, 159 Pa. St. 634; *Lewis v.* 44 Minn. 124, 9 L. R. A. 505. Mere weakness of s not a sufficient ground for the annulment of a ge, unless it amounts to idiocy or insanity. *Svanda da, ante*, p. 404. The statutes of this state contain : defining the amount of mental weakness required ul a marriage contract, and we are therefore con- d to follow the rule of the common law as an- d by the foregoing authorities.

ay be said that the marriage of Jennie Belle Adams, considered as a question of eugenics, should have revented. However desirable it may be to prevent arriages, as the law now stands they are valid, and irts have no power to annul them.

judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, e action is dismissed.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

IE, C. J., LETTON and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

1, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

Gergens v. Gergens.

**APPALONIA GERGENS, APPELLEE, v. WILLIAM F. GERGENS,
APPELLANT.**

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,159.

Pleading: ANSWER: SUFFICIENCY. In an action for the recovery of money, an answer which clearly shows that the money sought to be recovered was not due and payable at the time the action was commenced is not vulnerable to a general demurrer.

APPEAL from the district court for Richardson county:
JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Reavis & Reavis, for appellant.

Edwin Falloon, S. P. Davidson and Roscoe Anderson,
contra.

BARNES, J.

Action to recover the purchase price of certain lots in the city of Humboldt, alleged to have been sold by plaintiff to the defendant. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor, the defendant has appealed.

The plaintiff, by her petition in the district court, alleged, in substance, that on or about the 12th day of September, 1906, she sold and conveyed to the defendant, at his request, and to that end made, executed and delivered to the defendant a warranty deed to lots 3 and 4, in block 19, in Tinker's and King's addition to the city of Humboldt, Richardson county, state of Nebraska, for and in consideration of \$500, no part of which has been paid; that there is now due from the defendant to plaintiff on said purchase price of the property above described the sum of \$500, for which, with interest from the 12th day of September, 1906, at the legal rate, she prayed judgment, together with the costs of this action. To this petition the defendant filed the following answer:

"Comes now the defendant, and for answer to the petition of plaintiff denies each and every allegation of fact

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ein contained, except as hereinafter specifically admitted. Defendant admits that plaintiff sold and conveyed to this defendant the land described in the petition to the plaintiff. Defendant further alleges the fact to be that he took said land and accepted the deed thereto at the special instance and request of said plaintiff for the consideration of \$500, but alleges the fact to be that, by virtue of an oral contract entered into between the parties for the sale of said land, the said \$500 was to be considered as an advancement to the defendant, who is a son of the plaintiff, out of her said estate, and that said \$500 was to be deducted from his share of said estate, without interest, upon the death of said plaintiff and the termination of said estate. The defendant denies that either by or by virtue of said contract there is anything due to the plaintiff on her action, and prays that he may be dismissed with his costs."

On this answer the plaintiff demurred upon the following grounds: First, a verbal agreement is incompetent and insufficient to establish an advancement. Second, the facts stated in the answer are insufficient to constitute a defense in this cause. The trial court sustained the demurrer upon the second ground, and rendered a judgment against the plaintiff for the amount claimed by her petition. The appellant contends, among other things, that the court was wrong in sustaining the demurrer to his answer. It is argued that the plaintiff's petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and, under the rule that a demurrer searches the entire record, it was the duty of the district court to dismiss the plaintiff's action upon the insufficiency of her petition. Counsel for the plaintiff admit the existence of the rule above stated, but insist that the petition was sufficient to resist a demurrer. We deem it unnecessary to determine that question; for, as we view the record, the appeal should be disposed of upon the defendant's contention that the answer was sufficient to constitute a defense to plaintiff's action. It is argued by counsel for the plaintiff that the facts alleged in the an-

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of the district, and the proposed removal, if unauthorized, would involve a waste and unwarrantable expenditure of public funds; and no other or greater interest need be shown. *McLain v. Maricle*, 60 Neb. 353.

2. ———: ———: ———: PLEADING: SUFFICIENCY. In such a case an allegation in the petition that the schoolhouse was built and is supported by taxes levied upon the taxable property of the school district sufficiently avers the ownership of the district.

APPEAL from the district court for Cedar county: GUY T. GRAVES, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Wilbur F. Bryant and R. J. Millard, for appellants.

B. Ready and P. F. O'Gara, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action in the district court for Cedar county, brought by a taxpayer, a resident of the school district, to restrain the members of the school board from removing the schoolhouse situated in the district to another location. A restraining order was granted by the county judge, and the defendants filed a motion asking the district court to set aside that order. The motion was overruled, and the defendants excepted. The cause was then tried on its merits. The plaintiff had the decree, and the defendants have appealed.

Appellants contend that the court erred in overruling their motion to dissolve the restraining order, and argue, in support of their contention, that the amended petition was insufficient to state a cause of action, in that it did not show that plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law; that it was not alleged that the defendants were insolvent and not able to respond in an action for damages, or that the bond of the treasurer of the district was insufficient. A like question was before this court in *Solomon v. Fleming*, 34 Neb. 40. It was there said: "A court of equity will, on the application of resident taxpayers, restrain public officers from doing an illegal act, where the effect of such act, if consummated, would be a waste of public

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funds raised by taxation." *McLain v. Maricle*, 60 Neb. 353, is a case directly in point. There it was attempted to remove the schoolhouse in a certain district to another location. An injunction was sought, and on appeal to this court it was said: "In an action by injunction, brought to restrain officers of a school district from removing to another location a schoolhouse situated in said district, the right of plaintiffs to maintain the action is established, if it appears that they are resident taxpayers of the district, and the proposed removal, if unauthorized, would involve a waste and an unwarranted expenditure of public funds; and no other or greater interest need be shown." The allegations of the petition in the instant case are sufficient to bring it within the rule above stated.

It is further contended that it was not alleged that the schoolhouse was the property of the district, and that, for all that appears upon the face of the petition, it might have been private property. From an examination of the petition we find that it was alleged that the schoolhouse (describing it) was built and is supported by taxes levied on the taxable property in said district; that the schoolhouse existed and has been standing for more than 20 years on its present site. It is argued that those allegations were not sufficient to establish, even *prima facie*, the ownership of the school district. An allegation that the schoolhouse was built and supported by taxes levied on the taxable property in the school district clearly shows that the district owned the schoolhouse at the time it was built, and it will be presumed that it remained the property of the school district until the contrary appears. Upon this point the petition should be held sufficient, and especially so when it is assailed after judgment.

It was stated on the argument that the case at this time presents a moot question, because, since the action was commenced, the schoolhouse has been removed to another site in compliance with a vote of the majority of the electors of the district. We have concluded, however, to determine the questions presented, for the reason that there remains the question of costs.

In re Estate of Hinrichs.

As we view the record, the judgment of the district court was right, and it is therefore

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., LETTON and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

IN RE ESTATE OF HARM HINRICH.

**D. VETTE, APPELLANT, V. ESTATE OF HARM HINRICH,
APPELLEE.**

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,166.

1. **Limitation of Actions: CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE.** In the fall of 1883 V. verbally assigned his crop of standing corn to H., who agreed to gather and market it, and out of the proceeds to pay certain of V.'s debts, the remainder thereof, if any, to be paid to V. H. gathered the corn, sold it in March, 1884, and paid the debts of V. specified in the agreement. V. made no demand for a settlement, and no claim that there was any balance due him from H. on account of the transaction, for more than 25 years. After the death of H., V. filed a claim against his estate for \$7,096. *Held*, That the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
2. **Executors and Administrators: REJECTION OF CLAIM: EVIDENCE.** Evidence examined, and *held* that, on its merits, the claim was properly rejected.

APPEAL from the district court for Otoe county:
HARVEY D. TRAVIS, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Andrew P. Moran, for appellant.

Paul Jessen, contra.

BARNES, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the district court for Otoe county disallowing a claim of the plaintiff against the estate of one Harm Hinrichs, deceased. It appears that the deceased departed this life in the year 1909, and on

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the 24th day of September of that year the appellant filed a claim against his estate in the county court of Otoe county for \$7,095. The claim was disallowed, and plaintiff appealed to the district court for that county, where the cause was tried and the claim was again rejected.

The appellant, as a basis of his claim, alleged that in the fall of 1883 he turned over to the deceased a certain crop of corn which he had raised that season, under an agreement with the deceased to husk and gather the corn and market it, and out of the proceeds to pay certain of appellant's debts, and to account to him for the remainder; that the deceased had failed to comply with the terms of his agreement; and that there was due appellant from his estate the sum above mentioned.

The defenses interposed were: First, the statute of limitations; and, second, that after applying the proceeds of the crops to the payment of appellant's debts there was nothing due to him from the deceased.

The record shows that the deceased sold the corn in question in February or March, 1884, and seasonably paid the appellant's debts as specified in the agreement. It follows that, if there was any surplus remaining in his hands, the appellant was then entitled to demand it; and, if payment was refused, he could have recovered a judgment therefor in an action at law for that purpose. It is not claimed that appellant ever made any demand for a settlement; that deceased ever acknowledged the indebtedness, or has at any time made any payment to be credited thereon. It follows that for more than 26 years before Hinrichs' death appellant could have maintained an action against him to recover any balance due on account of the transaction which is the basis of this claim. Therefore, the district court properly held that appellant's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Appellant contends that the agreement in question created a trust relation between himself and the deceased, and in such case the statute of limitations does not run in favor of the trustee. We think this contention is be-

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ark. By selling the appellant's corn and pay-
bts, deceased executed the trust, if any such
as created, and he was thereafter appellant's
he amount of the proceeds, if any, still in his
recover this sum appellant could have main-
ction against the deceased at any time for more
ars before his death.

s we view the record, it clearly shows that the
btained, in all, about 2,400 bushels of corn
agreement in question. Of this, 800 bushels
the owners of the land on which it was raised.
bout 1,600 bushels available for the payment of
debts. It is conceded that it cost 6 cents a
usk and market it, and it was sold for 26 cents
eaving the net price 20 cents a bushel. There-
mount realized by the deceased was \$312. Of
it appellant admits there was paid on his debts
ng a balance due, according to his own state-
nly \$24 from the deceased on account of the
i. It appears that other debts were paid; that,
thereto, deceased was compelled to pay for
e landlord's share of the corn; and that at the
he held appellant's notes in his favor amounting
an \$500.

ing the foregoing, and the further fact that
at no time during the life of the deceased made
against him on account of the transaction in
ve conclude that on the merits the appellant
itled to recover.

foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

AFFIRMED.

J. J., LETTON and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

AWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

LOUIS C. ROGERS V. STATE OF NEBRASKA.**FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,631.**

1. **Homicide: EVIDENCE.** The substance of the evidence stated in the opinion, and held sufficient to sustain the verdict.
2. **Criminal Law: MISCONDUCT OF OFFICERS: NEW TRIAL.** Alleged misconduct of the prosecuting attorney and the sheriff, in furnishing statements to newspaper reporters relating to the crime alleged to have been committed by the defendant, is not available as a ground for a new trial, unless it is shown that the news items published and complained of were read by or brought to the notice of some of the jurors before whom the defendant was tried, or that such publications resulted in some way to prevent him from having a fair trial.
3. ———: **INSTRUCTIONS.** If the record in a prosecution for murder contains no evidence which would justify a conviction for the lesser degree of manslaughter, the giving of an instruction by which that crime is not completely defined is not a sufficient ground for reversing a judgment of conviction for murder in the second degree.

ERROR to the district court for Dodge county: CONRAD HOLLENBECK, JUDGE. Affirmed.

F. Dolezal and F. W. Button, for plaintiff in error.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, Frank E. Edgerton and J. C. Cook, contra.

BARNES, J.

Louis C. Rogers, hereafter called the defendant, was tried in the district court for Dodge county on an information in which he and one Caroline Richter were charged with the murder of her infant child. Defendant had a separate trial, and the jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree. His motion for a new trial was overruled. He was sentenced to serve a term of 12 years in the state penitentiary, and has brought the case to this court by a petition in error.

Defendant contends, among other assignments of error, that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict for the following reasons: First, the venue was not established by sufficient evidence. Second, the *corpus delicti* was not established. Third, the defendant is not shown to have been connected with the commission of the crime. These questions will be considered and determined in the order above stated.

It appears from the record that Caroline Richter was the mother of seven children prior to the birth of the child in question. For some considerable time she had not been living with her husband, but had been traveling and cohabiting with the defendant since about the month of March, 1910. He was engaged in the theatrical business. Traveling with them was Gertrude, the 16-year-old daughter of Mrs. Richter. It appears that for several months during the year 1910 the defendant and Mrs. Richter lived in a flat conducted by a Mrs. Radier, at No. 45 Broadway street, in Detroit, Michigan. About the month of January, 1911, Mrs. Richter became aware that she was pregnant. The defendant insisted that she was not fit to raise a child for him, and he did not want her to have it. On August 1, 1911, Mrs. Richter and her three children left the defendant at Boone, Iowa, and started for the city of Omaha. They reached Omaha on that day, and after staying there two nights they went to Fremont, Nebraska, where they were joined by the defendant. The defendant and Mrs. Richter occupied the same room at the Albany hotel in Fremont, Dodge county, Nebraska, on Saturday night, the 5th day of August, 1911, and her children occupied another room in the hotel some distance therefrom. It appears that Mrs. Richter left her room and went to a drug store for whiskey and bromide at 2 o'clock on Saturday afternoon. She then returned to her room, which she occupied with the defendant, and did not leave it until the following day. She testified that she was pregnant when she came to Fremont; that she was sick that night, and was unconscious during her sick-

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ness; that when she awoke Sunday morning she found she had given birth to a child during the night. The defendant was in the room when she awoke. She cried, and asked him where her baby was, and he replied: "The baby is better off, and so are you." Without further comment, we think it sufficient to say that the testimony of Mrs. Richter and her 16-year-old daughter, with that of several disinterested witnesses, fully warranted the jury in finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the child was born at the time and place alleged in the information. There was some conflict in the evidence; but, the question of the venue having been submitted to the jury under instructions by which the rights of the defendant were carefully guarded, we find no warrant for setting aside the verdict so far as it relates to that question.

It is further contended that the evidence is not sufficient to establish the fact that the child in question was born alive; or ever had other than foetal life. When the body of the dead child was found in the box-car at Colon, there was a towel knotted so tightly about its throat that its neck was reduced to half the size of that of a normal infant. The body of the child was carefully examined by Doctor John Smith, a physician of learning and experience. His competency as an expert witness is not questioned. He testified that, in his opinion, the child had independent life before it died; that he made every examination possible, without performing an autopsy; that it was a full-time child, and every appearance of the body indicated death by strangulation, such as the protruding of the eyes, the swollen and distended tongue, the color of the child's face where the blood had stagnated, the arched chest, and all other signs spoke clearly of murder.

It is true that Doctors Haslum and Leak, as witnesses, testified for the defendant that, in their opinion, a conclusive judgment could not be reached on that question without an autopsy. But they admitted, however, that all of the indications as described by Doctor Smith were that the child had met with a violent death. The body of

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the child, as it was found in the box-car, was fully described by the coroner of Saunders county, and by Doctor Smith. No objections were made to the charge given by the court upon this particular question, which was fully and carefully presented to the jury. It was within their power to decide whether or not the child was born alive and then murdered. That was a fact to be determined by the jury in view of all of the circumstances of the case. Wharton, Homicide (3d ed.) sec. 374; *Hubbard v. State*. 72 Ala. 164. The question having thus been left to the jury under proper instructions, and they having resolved adversely to the defendant's contention, a court of review should not set aside the verdict.

It is further contended that the evidence was not sufficient to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. The fact that the defendant was the father of the child is not disputed. It is admitted that he had cohabited with Mrs. Richter for a year and a half previous to its death. They had traveled about the country together, and she testified that when she became aware of her condition she talked with the defendant at different times about the coming of the child. She further testified that he said to her that he did not want a baby; she was not fit to raise a child for him, and he did not want her to have it. The defendant himself stated to the officer before his trial that Mrs. Richter was anxious to have the child and raise it.

There is nothing else in the record which indicates in any way that either of the parties desired or sought to procure an abortion. As above stated, the evidence shows that the child was not born prior to the time of their arrival in Fremont; and, when her actions are considered, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the child was born in the room she occupied in the Albany hotel, on Saturday night, August 5, 1911. It is conceded that the defendant was with her in the room at the time. Again, the towel, which was tightly knotted about the neck of the child, had a laundry mark, to wit, "45 R." This

towel was fully identified as the proprietress of the rooming house in Detroit, Michigan. She was the defendant for two years and lived at her house in Detroit. She had a laundry mark for years and was positive that the defendant had taken away one of her towels. She found them in their suitcase and identified the towel that had been taken. She positively identified it.

It will be remembered that when she was awakened on the night of August 6, 1911, she covered the loss of her handkerchief. Her husband's reply was: "The handkerchief is gone." The testimony also shows that the defendant and Richter were both at the rooming house on August 6, 1911; that she was at the express office at Fremont and the string which was found. The testimony also shows that the cars in the Fremont street car which the child was in were on the night of August 6, 1911, and were unloaded on that night. The car was left standing just east of the blocks. The car left Fremont at 12:41, between 12 and 1 o'clock, and 2:30 and 2:40 o'clock. The car was in brown paper was delivered by an elevator firm at the depot. The testimony also shows that on Sunday, August 6, 1911, brown paper was noticed at the depot station. Mrs. Richter was at the depot at the time with her all of the time. She had clean clothes for the child and the north side of the depot. She did not wait in there.

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shows that the mother had expressed a desire to have the child and raise it; that it was a great shock when she learned that the baby was gone. He was the only person who had a motive for getting the child. He did not want to be bothered with the child. He stated that the woman was not the mother of his child. Of course, the direct evidence that the defendant tied the neck of the child and strangled it, but the facts are such that the jury could hardly reach a different conclusion. Every reasonable hypothesis, excepting guilt, seems to have been eliminated by the evidence. As we view the record, the jury were justified in finding that the child was born alive, in Freer's crime with which the defendant was connected, committed by him at the time and place as shown by the information.

The defendant contended that the prosecution was guilty of error and that it was entitled to a new trial. In its contention the attorneys for the defendant introduced the bill of exceptions news items published in the papers after defendant's arrest. It is contended that the items in question were furnished to the reporters by the county attorney and the clerk of the county. We find no showing in the record that any member of the jury ever read the articles or that any statement is made, or that they in any manner relied upon the newspaper articles in arriving at their verdict. The record shows that the newspaper reporters were successful in obtaining some of the facts relating to the crime which was the foundation for the prosecution of the defendant.

The defendant also contends that there was error in the giving of the instructions by the court. The instruction in question defined the crime as follows: "If any person shall unlawfully kill another without malice, either upon a sudden or upon a premeditation, while the slayer is in the com-

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mission of some unlawful act, every such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter." It will be observed that the defendant's criticism is directed to the omission of the verb "is." It may be conceded that the verb should have been inserted immediately after the word "slayer" in the third line of the instruction. This accidental omission, however, is not of sufficient importance to require us to set aside the verdict and grant the defendant a new trial. No person of common sense, possessed with a common understanding of our language, could be misled by this omission.

Finally, it is contended that the court erred in omitting the words, "while the slayer is in the commission of some unlawful act," in the fourteenth paragraph of the instructions, and it is argued that if this omission had not occurred the jury might have found the defendant guilty of the crime of manslaughter, instead of murder in the second degree. It appears that in other instructions the crime of manslaughter had been correctly defined, and we are unable to see how the jury could have been misled or confused by the omission in question, and from a careful reading of the record we are satisfied that such was not the result. The jury having found the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, it is apparent that they thoroughly understood the instructions as applied to the evidence. In fact, we are unable to see how the jury could have convicted the defendant, if at all, of any less crime than that of murder in the second degree. It appears beyond question that whoever knotted the towel about the neck of Caroline Richter's child did not perform that act unintentionally. It must have been intentionally and maliciously done. As we view the evidence, it contains no element of manslaughter, and the giving of the instruction, if erroneous, was error without prejudice.

After a careful examination of the record, we find that it contains no reversible error; that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict; and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED

ISABELLA JONES, APPELLANT, v. ARTHUR A. HUDSON ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,118.

SUBMISSION: SUBSEQUENT STIPULATION. On appeal, after a case has been fully argued and regularly submitted on its merits, the reviewing court may for good and sufficient reasons decline to render a decree conforming to a subsequent stipulation of the parties, where the effect will be to reverse the judgment of the district court.

Attorney and Client: DISCHARGE OF ATTORNEY: ACTS AS AMICUS CURIAE. After an attorney for a party to a pending action has been discharged by his client, and after the latter has stipulated in favor of his adversary for a decree disregarding the rights of minors who are not parties to the suit, the attorney, as a friend of the court, may properly suggest facts necessary to the protection of the rights of minors.

PROTECTION OF RIGHTS: EQUITY. A court of equity, if apprized of the necessary facts, should, on its own motion, protect the rights of minors, when involved in litigation to which they are not parties.

CONSTRUCTION. In ascertaining the intention of a testator, the entire will should be examined.

DISPOSITION OF ESTATE. In construing a will, it should be presumed that the testator intended to dispose of his entire estate, unless the contrary is apparent.

Appeal from the district court for Butler county:
F. CORCORAN, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Hastings, for appellant.

Skiles and F. H. Mizera, contra.

Roper, guardian *ad litem* for minors.

J.

Construction of the will of William T. Hudson of Dade County, Missouri, was the purpose of this suit. The will was executed June 29, 1906. Testator died June 25, 1907. At the time of his death he owned lands in Dade county,

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Missouri, and in Butler county, Nebraska. His will was probated in both counties. The devisees named in his will were his daughter, Allnora Isabella Hudson Jones, plaintiff, his widow Charlotte E. Hudson, his sons Artie A. Hudson and Allen P. Hudson, his granddaughter, Zelfhia Golden Hudson, and grandson, Charles Dewey Hudson, defendants. The grandchildren named are minors. Their father was a deceased son of testator. R. C. Roper is their guardian *ad litem*. The will provides:

"I will that, should I die before my wife, Charlotte E. Hudson, that after paying all my just debts, medical attendance of my last illness and funeral expenses, and the expenses of settling up my estate in accordance with the provisions of this will, that the residue of my estate, real, personal and mixed, be disposed of as follows: The personal property to be vested absolutely in my said wife, Charlotte E. Hudson, for her to use and dispose of and the same to be hers absolutely in her own right, hereby vesting title to the same in her. All the real property of which I may die seized to go to my said wife, Charlotte E. Hudson, in trust for her use and benefit, she to have control of and the benefit and profits derived therefrom.

"All the provisions hereinbefore set out are to be in force so long as my said wife, Charlotte E. Hudson, shall live or remain my widow. In case she should marry after my death, then she shall take of my estate, real, personal and mixed, that only which the laws of the state of Missouri provide she shall take as my widow, and no more. Should my wife, Charlotte E. Hudson, die before me, then at my death I will that all my debts be paid, the medical attendance of my last illness, my funeral expenses, including a granite tombstone to the grave of my said wife, Charlotte E. Hudson, and myself, which are not to cost more than seventy-five dollars each; also each of our said graves to be made with a brick and cement vault. Then after the fulfilment of the foregoing provisions and settlements, I will:

"First. That any goods or money or anything of value

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that I have heretofore given to any person or persons who are beneficiaries of this will shall not be accounted as an advancement by me to such person or persons, and they are not to be charged therewith as such.

"Second. I will and direct that should any person or persons, their heirs, administrators, lawful guardians, executors or assigns, undertake or attempt to set aside or defeat the provisions of this will, instituting any suit therefor, should they be beneficiaries under this will, then in that event, such persons or person to have five dollars each, and no more, out of my estate either real or personal."

Third. Under the clause, "I will and bequeath to my oldest son, Allen P. Hudson, his heirs or assigns, the following described real estate," testator disposed of several tracts of land. He also bequeathed to the same devisee \$5.

Fourth. After the clause, "I will and bequeath to my only daughter, Allnora Isabella Hudson Jones, and her heirs all of the following described real estate," several tracts of land were described. The sum of \$1,000 was bequeathed to the same devisee.

Fifth. Under the clause, "I will and bequeath to them jointly their heirs or assigns, the following described real estate," several tracts of land were devised to Zelphia Golden Hudson and Charles Dewey Hudson. They were also willed \$10. The widow of testator's deceased son was willed \$1.

Sixth. Under the clause, "I will and bequeath the following described land," several tracts were devised to Artie A. Hudson.

The will then proceeds: "And in addition to the above described land I will and bequeath to my said son Artie A. Hudson, five dollars in money. I also will and bequeath to my sons Allen P. Hudson and Artie A. Hudson, their heirs and assigns jointly the following described real estate, to wit: * * * I also will and bequeath to Allen P. Hudson and Allnora Isabella Hudson Jones and Artie A. Hudson and Zelphia Golden Hudson and Charles

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Dewey Hudson, or their bodily heirs, the residue of all my property I may die seized of, including real, personal and mixed, share and share alike, except Zelfhia Golden Hudson and Charles Dewey Hudson shall be entitled to a share jointly both of which shall make one share. I also will that at my death my said beneficiaries under this will divide equally among themselves all the household and kitchen furniture, any goods, beds, bedding, dishes, books and all things forming a part of the household furnishings and fixtures or belongings, useful and ornamental, except such articles as may have on them a name or mark which may be put there by me or my said wife, Charlotte E. Hudson; such articles so marked to go to the persons so designated by such mark or name so attached to such article.

"I will that the personal property of which I may die seized that remains undisposed of at the death of my wife Charlotte E. Hudson shall be disposed of as follows: My said children shall divide the household goods among themselves, and all the remainder of the personal property to be sold and the proceeds thereof divided equally among my said children after the payments of the legacies and bequests hereinbefore made. And if there be not sufficient money to pay the legacies and bequests hereinbefore made, then in such event the legacies to be paid *pro rata* on each dollar so bequeathed.

"Lastly, I appoint G. W. Wilson and my wife Charlotte E. Hudson executors of this my last will and testament, and they not to be required to give bond. In case of the death of either then the survivor to be executor; and in case both of the said executors above mentioned be dead then in that event I appoint B. F. Johnson as executor of this my last will and testament."

A codicil dated June 29, 1906, provides:

"First. I give and bequeath to my oldest son Allen P. Hudson, and his bodily heirs at his death and if he at the time of his death has no bodily heirs I bequeath to him the said Allen P. Hudson his lifetime and at his death

to Artie A. Hudson, the following described land in the county of Butler and in the state of Nebraska, as follows, to wit: * * * This same land above described in this codicil was bequeathed in my last will and testament to Allen P. Hudson in fee simple, but by this codicil I have entailed it as herein in this codicil above set forth.

"Second. I will and bequeath to my only daughter Allnora Isabella Hudson Jones and at her death her bodily heirs the following described real estate to wit: * * * The land above described in this codicil which I have and do hereby bequeath and give to my daughter Allnora Isabella Hudson Jones her lifetime and at her death to her bodily heirs was by me in my last will and testament of June 29, 1906, bequeathed in fee simple to Allnora Isabella Hudson Jones but by the will I have entailed it as herein in this codicil above set forth, and all said land being in Dade county, Missouri.

"Third. To my youngest son Artie A. Hudson I will and bequeath the following described real estate situated in Butler county, Nebraska, to wit: * * * This said land of one hundred acres above described which I bequeathed to Artie A. Hudson, I do hereby bequeath the same to Artie A. Hudson his lifetime and at his death to go to his bodily heirs. This land so bequeathed in this codicil to Artie A. Hudson his lifetime and at his death to go to his bodily heirs I did bequeath by my last will and testament of the date of June 29, 1906, to Artie A. Hudson in fee simple but by this codicil I have entailed it as herein in this codicil above set forth.

"This codicil to not change, alter or affect any other bequests made in my last will and testament of June 29, 1906, made to the beneficiaries named in this codicil, other than the real estate in this codicil described."

Plaintiff and the grandchildren, if correctly understood, took the position that testator gave the real estate to his widow for life, if she remained single; that the other devises of real estate were contingent upon testator surviving his wife, and were for that reason inoperative,

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since he died first; that by the law of descent each of testator's children was entitled to one-fourth of the real estate, and the two children of the deceased son to the same share, upon the termination of the widow's life estate. The trial court rejected this construction of the will, and, as modified by the codicil, directed the enforcement of the specific devises of real estate to the three children and to the two minors named. Plaintiff and the minor defendants appeal.

After the cause was regularly argued here on its merits and taken under advisement, but before an opinion had been prepared, plaintiff, the two sons of testator and the two minor defendants, by their guardian *ad litem*, filed a stipulation providing that plaintiff's construction of the will should be adopted, that testator's real estate should be distributed accordingly, and that the decree of the district court should be reversed. This course will not be adopted for the following reasons: After a cause has been fully argued and regularly submitted on its merits, the reviewing court may for good and sufficient reasons decline to render a decree conforming to a stipulation of the parties, where the effect will be to reverse a judgment of the district court. The stipulation was made without the consent of appellees' counsel, who, as a friend of the court, asserts that the devisee, Artie A. Hudson, has minor children for whom no guardian *ad litem* has been appointed. They are not parties to the suit. If the trial court properly construed the will, they will be entitled to a portion of testator's realty in fee upon the termination of the life estate of their grandmother and of their father. This remainder would not be protected by a decree conforming to the stipulation. A court of equity, if cognizant of the facts, should, on its own motion, protect the rights of minors, when involved in litigation to which they are not parties. The stipulation, therefore, will be disregarded in the determination of the appeal.

Is the construction of the trial court erroneous? Though the will is unreasonably long, somewhat ambigu-

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ous, and in a few minor respects inconsistent, the construction for which plaintiff contends, when applied to the real estate, seems to disregard the familiar principles that the entire will should be examined to ascertain the intention of the testator, and that it will be presumed the testator intended to dispose of his entire estate, unless the contrary is apparent. When the entire will is considered, the clause, "should my wife, Charlotte E. Hudson, die before me," qualifies the provisions to which it is directly attached, and does not extend to the devises which follow it. This is not only the fair import of the context, but it is the construction adopted by testator himself in his codicil, where he recognizes his former devises in fee, without the contingency upon which plaintiff relies. If testator intended to give his widow a life estate, and if, upon the termination thereof, the fee should descend to his heirs under the intestate laws, the will as a whole does not indicate it. This is the view taken by the trial court, and the decree below is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

LETTON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. 1 OF OTOE AND JOHNSON COUNTIES,
APPELLEE, v. MARTHA L. WILKINS ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,119.

1. **Drainage Districts: ORGANIZATION: PLEADING.** For the purpose of organizing a drainage district, properly verified articles, conforming to statutory requirements and containing a prayer for incorporation, and proper objections by interested landowners may take the place of formal pleadings in a summary proceeding under the drainage law of 1905. Comp. St. 1909, ch. 89, art. IV.
2. ———: ———. The existence of swamp or overflowed lands and a purpose to drain them by means of a feasible drainage system are necessary to the legal organization of a drainage district under the act of 1905. Comp. St. 1909, ch. 89, art. IV.

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3. ———: ———: **ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION: CORRECTION OF DEFECTS.** In articles for the incorporation of a drainage district, defects in statements which the statute does not require to be inserted in such articles may be corrected by averments in objections filed in the summary proceeding authorized by the drainage act of 1905. Comp. St. 1909, ch. 89, art. IV.

APPEAL from the district court for Otoe county: **JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE.** *Affirmed.*

S. P. Davidson, W. F. Moran and D. P. West, for appellants.

George H. Heinke, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is an application to the district court for Otoe county to find the facts necessary to the incorporation of a drainage district including lands in Otoe and Johnson counties. The proceeding was commenced January 29, 1910, under the drainage act of 1905 and the amendments thereof. Comp. St. 1909, ch. 89, art. IV. Articles of incorporation were filed in the office of the clerk of the district court, and interested landowners who did not sign them were served with summons in the manner required by statute. Some of those thus notified of the proceeding filed objections to the incorporation of the district and to the including of their lands therein. The district court excluded portions of the lands described in the proposed articles of incorporation, and overruled the objections made by the owners of other lands. With a few tracts of land excluded in the manner indicated, the drainage district was found to be a public corporation under the drainage law cited, and those who were unsuccessful in urging their objections have appealed.

Appellants insist that a formal petition or application was necessary to the organization of the drainage district, that no such pleading or application was filed in the office of the clerk of the district court, and that therefore the

findings below are unauthorized. This position is too technical and narrow to conform to either the spirit or the letter of the statute. Articles of incorporation, if properly drawn, may take the place of a petition or application. What they shall contain is pointed out by statute. Comp. St. 1909, ch. 89, art. IV, sec. 1. The articles contain the information required by the act. They are signed by the incorporators, and one of them makes oath that "the facts and allegations therein contained are true, as he verily believes." If a formal application is necessary, it is found in the prayer for incorporation. Each of the appellants appeared in response to a summons and filed objections under the terms of the statute. For the purpose of organizing a drainage district, properly verified articles, conforming to statutory requirements and containing a prayer for incorporation, and objections by interested landowners may take the place of formal pleadings in a summary proceeding under the drainage law of 1905. Comp. St. 1909, ch. 89, art. IV. "All such objections," says the act, "shall be heard by the court in a summary manner, without any unnecessary delay, and, in case such objections are overruled, the district court shall, by its order duly entered of record, duly declare said drainage district a public corporation of this state. The fact that said district shall contain 160 acres or more of wet, overflowed, or submerged lands shall be sufficient cause for declaring the public utility of said improvements, and shall be sufficient grounds for declaring said organization a public corporation of this state. And in case any owner of said real estate shall satisfy the court that his real estate, or a part thereof, has been wrongfully included in said district, and will not be benefited thereby, then the court may exclude such real estate as will not be benefited, and declare the remainder a district as prayed for." Comp. St. 1909, ch. 89, art. IV, sec. 3. The rights of all of the parties to the proceeding were asserted by them and were considered by the trial court. In form, therefore, the articles, for the purposes

of incorporation and of a hearing on the objections, comply with the statute and are sufficient.

It is further asserted that there is no allegation in any pleading, nor in the articles of incorporation, that the lands sought to be included in the drainage district are swamp or overflowed lands, or that the purpose of the drainage district is to reclaim and protect such lands from the effects of water, and that therefore the decree is erroneous. It is true the drainage act is introduced by the following language: "A majority in interest of the owners in any contiguous body of swamp or overflowed lands in this state, situated in one or more counties in this state, may form a drainage district for the purpose of having such land reclaimed and protected from the effects of water, by drainage or otherwise." Comp. St. 1909, ch. 89, art. IV, sec. 1. The act as a whole makes it clear that the existence of swamp or overflowed lands and a purpose to drain them by means of a feasible drainage system are necessary to the legal organization of a drainage district. Comp. St. 1909, ch. 89, art. IV. The argument, however, is untenable for the following reasons: The drainage act is by construction a part of the articles. They contain the statements enumerated in the statute. They fairly show that the necessary amount of land within the district is subject to overflow, and a feasible system of drainage is proposed. The streams and lands in the course of drainage are described in articles declaring a purpose "to reclaim said lands from overflows and floodwaters from said streams;" but, if there is anything wanting in this respect, it is supplied by the objections. Issues involving the feasibility of the proposed drainage system, the overflowing of the lands of appellants, and the benefits to such lands were submitted to the trial court by the articles and the objections. On the issues thus raised several volumes of testimony are found in the bill of exceptions. The parties understood and tried those issues. The facts which the court must find necessary to the existence of a drainage district were raised in the manner

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mplated by statute. The result of the trial would been the same, had pleadings conforming in every ct to the technical views of appellants been con- ed.

e sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings is also urged as a ground of reversal, but, for the use of organization, the district court properly found each appellant has an interest in overflowed land a may be benefited by the proposed drainage. In and other respects the proofs meet the requirements e statute. There is no error in the proceedings.

AFFIRMED.

ESB, C. J., BARNES and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

DGWICK, LETTON and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

A. E. GREEN, APPELLANT, v. H. G. HOOPS, APPELLEE.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,120.

APPEAL: DOCKETING APPEAL: DUTY OF CLERK. It is the duty of the clerk of the district court, upon receiving in due time a proper ranscript of the proceedings of the county court in an action etermined therein, to file the transcript and docket the appeal.

—: —: **JURISDICTION: FEES.** Where the clerk of the dis- rict court in due time receives and retains without objection a roper transcript of the proceedings of the county court in an ction determined therein, and files the same in his office, he annot defeat the jurisdiction of the district court by refusing to ocket the appeal, on the sole ground that part of the fees re- mains unpaid, no demand for the balance having been made.

PEAL from the district court for Buffalo county:
JO O. HOSTETLER, JUDGE. Affirmed.

ank E. Beeman, for appellant.

A. Brubaker, contra.

ROSE, J.

The action was commenced in the county court of Buffalo county to recover a bill of \$80.25 for rejected nursery goods. Plaintiff prevailed. Defendant appealed to the district court, where plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had not been docketed within the statutory period of 30 days after rendition of judgment. The motion was overruled. Plaintiff stood upon his motion, refused to plead further, and the district court dismissed his suit. From the judgment of dismissal, plaintiff has appealed.

Should the motion have been sustained? No other question is presented. The judgment of the county court was rendered May 10, 1910. The following is found among the appearance docket entries of the case in the office of the clerk of the district court: "Case not docketed until September 26, 1910, on account of appellant not paying fees." Notwithstanding this memorandum, it is shown without contradiction that the clerk received and retained the transcript, as well as the original papers, and \$2.50 in fees June 8, 1910, and that he filed the transcript in his office the same day. There is nothing to show that he demanded more fees or that appellant knew of a purpose on his part to refuse to docket the case. His duties are prescribed by statute as follows: "The clerk, on receiving such transcript and other papers as aforesaid, shall file the same and docket the appeal." Code, sec. 1009. The clerk's duty to docket the appeal was the same as his duty to file the papers. By neglecting his duty and by making a docket entry to that effect, he did not prevent the district court from acquiring jurisdiction. Error does not appear in the record.

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

LETTON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

BRADFORD LUMBER COMPANY, APPELLEE, v. MINNIE C. CREEL, APPELLANT.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,124.

mech's Lien: FORECLOSURE: NONRESIDENCE OF DEFENDANT: QUESTION OF FACT. In a suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien, nonresidence of a defendant, upon whom plaintiff attempted to make notice by publication, is a question of fact, when put in issue by the pleadings.

: SUBCONTRACTORS. A subcontractor who furnished at different times materials for a house, pursuant to a continuous course of dealing under a single contract, is entitled to a mechanic's lien for the balance due him, where he filed a proper statement in the register of deeds within the statutory period.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county: **JUDGE C. TROUP, JUDGE.** *Affirmed.*

Sam Baird & Sons, for appellant.

Montgomery, Hall & Young, contra.

J.

This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien on a lot and two lots in Omaha. Plaintiff, as a subcontractor, furnished material for the house, and filed a lien for \$6.39, the balance claimed to be due. George Dunham is the contractor. When the materials were furnished, Minnie C. Creel owned the lots, but before this suit was instituted she and her husband sold them to Andrew Dunham, the transfer having been made January 15, 1909, plaintiff's petition having been filed August 17, 1909. Dunham and wife, Sohler and wife, and Dunham are defendants. From a decree foreclosing plaintiff's lien defendant Minnie C. Creel, has appealed.

For reason for reversing the decree of foreclosure, it is held: "The action is barred, as the same was not commenced as to the owner of the real estate within two years of the filing of the lien." The lien was filed De-

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cember 12, 1907, and personal service of summons was not made upon Sohler until January 6, 1910. Proof of service by publication, however, had been filed November 2, 1909, and this was within the statutory period of two years, but defendant asserts it was void. Constructive service was based on an affidavit that Sohler was a non-resident, upon whom personal service could not be made in Nebraska. Nonresidence was a controverted issue of fact, with evidence on both sides. The trial court found that Sohler was a resident of Iowa, and the more convincing proofs sustain that conclusion. It is therefore adopted as correct, and prevents a reversal on this ground.

Defendant also argues the following proposition: "Plaintiff's material was furnished under at least three distinct contracts, and, at the date of filing the lien, the time for filing the same had expired as to all of the contracts and the materials covered by the same, except as to its last set of items, totaling \$86.14, and these items were paid for on November 13, 1907."

The evidence indicates a continuous course of dealing under one contract, and plaintiff was entitled to the balance due for material furnished thereunder. The trial court properly so found, and that conclusion defeats this defense. No error has been found, and the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

LETTON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

HARRY FORBES ET AL. V. STATE OF NEBRASKA.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,457.

1. Criminal Law: INSTRUCTIONS: MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL: REVIEW.

The appellate court may decline to review an instruction not challenged as erroneous in the motion for a new trial in the district court.

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2. *Quaere.* Whether the indeterminate sentence law of Nebraska requires the maximum sentence provided by law is an undetermined question.
3. **Criminal Law: INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW: RETROACTION.** The indeterminate sentence law is prospective in its operation, and does not apply to felonies committed before it went into effect.
4. ———: ———: **REPEALS.** The indeterminate sentence law does not repeal or change the statutes defining crimes and prescribing penalties.
5. ———: **SENTENCE.** Defendants, who committed burglary before the indeterminate sentence law went into effect, but who were convicted afterward, were properly sentenced under the criminal code as it existed when the crime was committed.

ERROR to the district court for Hamilton county:
GEORGE F. CORCORAN, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Charles L. Whitney, J. L. Caldwell and Walter L. Pope,
for plaintiffs in error.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, and Frank E.
Edgerton, contra.

ROSE, J.

In a prosecution by the state in the district court for Hamilton county, Harry Forbes, John Evans, and Charles Taylor were convicted of burglary with explosives. The charge was that they blew open and robbed a safe in the Citizens Bank of Giltner. Each was sentenced to serve a term of 28 years in the penitentiary. As plaintiffs in error, defendants Forbes and Evans now present for review the record of their conviction.

In the first assignment of error the correctness of an instruction submitting to the jury two forms for a verdict is challenged. In the motion for a new trial the court below was not asked to set aside the verdict on that ground. A salutary rule of appellate procedure does not require the review of questions not presented to the trial court. *Lukehart v. State*, 91 Neb. 219.

The principal assignment is that the trial court erred

in sentencing defendants to serve a term of 28 years in the penitentiary. Under this head it is argued that the indeterminate sentence law was applicable to the conviction of defendants; that it prohibited the trial court from fixing the "limit or duration of the sentence;" that it was violated by the sentence imposed; that it was *ex post facto* as to the offense charged. Some of the pertinent facts are: The felony was committed April 25, 1911. The trial commenced August 16, 1911, and defendants were sentenced August 21, 1911. The indeterminate sentence law went into effect July 7, 1911. It thus appears that the information was filed before the indeterminate sentence law became effective, and that defendants were tried and sentenced afterward. That part of the indeterminate sentence law relating to the sentence provides: "The court imposing such sentence shall not fix the limit or duration of the sentence, but the term of imprisonment of any person so convicted shall not exceed the maximum nor be less than the minimum term provided by law." Criminal code, sec. 502a.

The argument of defendants may be summarized thus: The following provision of the indeterminate sentence law applies, by its own terms, to the present case: "Every person over the age of eighteen years, convicted of a felony or other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, excepting murder, treason, rape and kidnapping, if judgment be not suspended or a new trial granted, shall be sentenced to the penitentiary." Criminal code, sec. 502a. The indeterminate sentence law, as interpreted by this court, required the trial court to impose a life sentence, since the lawful sentence is the maximum, which, for burglary by explosives, is imprisonment for life. Criminal code, sec. 50b; *Wallace v. State*, 91 Neb. 158; *Williams v. State*, 91 Neb. 605. Under the statutes, as they existed before the indeterminate sentence law went into effect, the trial court was at liberty to impose a sentence of not more than 20 years, while the new act made a life sentence imperative. The indeterminate sentence

law, therefore, altered the situation of defendants to their disadvantage after they were accused of burglary with explosives, and the enactment is for that reason *ex post facto* as to that offense. *State v. McCoy*, 87 Neb. 385; *Marion v. State*, 16 Neb. 349. The old method of imposing sentence had been superseded by the new, when the jury found defendants guilty, and, there being at that time no statute under which they could be sentenced, they must necessarily be discharged. Those are the principal reasons urged for a reversal on this ground.

While the argument is ingenious and formidable, critical analysis discloses fallacies which prevent its adoption. *Wallace v. State*, 91 Neb. 158, and *Williams v. State*, 91 Neb. 605, do not commit this court to the doctrine that the indeterminate sentence law requires the maximum sentence prescribed by law. That question was not necessarily involved in those cases. An expression of the supreme court of Illinois, that the indeterminate sentence law requires the maximum sentence, is quoted in the opinion in the earlier case, with other language used by that court, to show that the statute of this state is not vulnerable to attack on the ground that an indeterminate sentence is too indefinite to meet constitutional requirements. The language quoted by this court from the supreme court of Illinois applies to the constitutionality of the act of this state, but did not commit this court to a statutory construction in regard to the sentence. The later case also left that question open. In the different states the statutes relating to indeterminate sentences vary in phraseology. The opinions on this subject have often come from divided courts. The reviewing courts of the country are not in harmony. As to the nature of the sentence required by the indeterminate sentence law of Nebraska, this court, therefore, is not committed to the construction adopted by the supreme court of Illinois.

In another respect the argument of defendants is fallacious. The indeterminate sentence law did not alter

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the statute defining the crime of burglary with explosives. It remains exactly as it was before. The penalty was not changed. It was, and is: "Any person duly convicted of burglary with explosives shall be sentenced to the penitentiary for life or for any term not less than twenty years." Criminal code, sec. 50b. The sentence pronounced conformed to that act. The question then is: Did the indeterminate sentence law take from the district court the power to impose the sentence of which defendants complain? "Every person over the age of eighteen years, convicted of a felony or other crime," says the indeterminate sentence law, "shall be sentenced to the penitentiary." It seems clear that the legislature never intended this language, in its proper connection with the whole act, to apply to crimes committed before the enactment went into effect. The lawmakers legislated for the future, not for the past. An eminent text-writer has wisely said: "It is a sound rule of construction that a statute should have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively." Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.) p. 529.

Under a proper construction of the indeterminate sentence law, it does not apply to the felony committed by defendants, or to their sentence. *In re Lambrecht*, 137 Mich. 450; *Murphy v. Commonwealth*, 172 Mass. 264.

Insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is another ground urged for a reversal of the judgment, but the opinion is unanimous that the ruling should be adverse to defendants on this assignment of error.

AFFIRMED.

**NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v.
JAMES H. MALLORY, APPELLEE; J. O. MILLIGAN, AP-
PELLANT.**

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,137.

1. **Appeal: EQUITY: ISSUES REVIEWABLE.** When a suit in equity, involving several separate and distinct issues, is appealed to this court upon part of such issues only, we are not required by the statute to try the whole case *de novo*. We are simply required to try and independently decide such issues in the case, and such only, as are presented by the appeal.
2. **Mortgages: FORECLOSURE: SALE: DISTRIBUTION: LIMITATIONS.** M. and wife executed a mortgage upon the separate estate of the latter, to secure a loan by a bank to the former. Thereafter the wife died, leaving children surviving her. After her death a decree was entered in favor of the bank in a suit to foreclose its mortgage. Before sale under the decree the husband sold and conveyed his curtesy interest in the land to a codefendant in the suit. *Held:* First. That the purchaser of the curtesy interest was chargeable with knowledge that all he could take under his deed was such interest as his grantor should be found, upon the final order of confirmation and distribution, to have had at the time of the entry of the decree. Second. That the amount required to pay said mortgage should be deducted from such curtesy interest. Third. That, as between the husband and wife and the bank, the husband was the principal debtor and the wife a surety, and that the relation of debtor and creditor did not arise between them until the sale of the property under the decree; until which time the statute of limitations would not begin to run in favor of the husband.

APPEAL from the district court for Dixon county: GUY T. GRAVES, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

J. J. McCarthy and Paul Hatfield, for appellant.

John D. Wore and J. M. Paul, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

James H. Mallory and Mary E. Mallory were husband and wife. In 1903 Mr. Mallory owned some land in South Dakota, and one White owned a quarter section in Dixon

county, this state. Appellee's brief states: "Mr. Mallory made this proposition to Mr. White, that he would exchange his equity in his Dakota farm and pay him \$1,200 in cash if he would convey to his wife, Mary E. Mallory, the land involved in this action. This was agreed to and the transfer took place; but Mr. Mallory, in order to pay the \$1,200 in cash to Mr. White, was compelled to borrow said money from the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company; and to secure the payment of said \$1,200 to said insurance company he asked his wife, Mary E. Mallory, to join him in giving to the insurance company a mortgage on said property. The mortgage then given is the one which the court in this action decreed to be a first lien on said property." On February 15, 1904, Mr. and Mrs. Mallory executed a second mortgage upon the Dixon county land to the Farmers & Traders Bank of Wakefield, Nebraska, for \$725. We think the evidence establishes appellee's claim that this money was used by Mr. Mallory in his own business at Council Bluffs, Iowa. This mortgage was decreed to be a second lien. A third mortgage was given by Mr. Mallory alone to John D. Haskell and D. Matthewson for a small amount, which was decreed to be a lien against the curtesy estate of Mr. Mallory. Suit was instituted May 24, 1909, by the insurance company upon the \$1,200 mortgage above referred to, and the holders of the second and third mortgages filed answers and cross-petitions praying a foreclosure of their respective mortgages. A decree of foreclosure was entered December 1, 1909. In June or July of 1906 Mrs. Mallory died. On March 30, 1910, Mr. Mallory conveyed his curtesy estate to defendant Milligan. The property was sold under the decree of foreclosure November 22, 1910. The controversy here is over the distribution of the surplus, after the payment of the mortgages to the insurance company and the bank. September 26, 1910, the guardian *ad litem* of the minor children of Mrs. Mallory filed a paper, which he denominated a petition, but which the trial court treated as a motion, in which the court was asked to direct

the interest of Mr. Mallory, if he is entitled to any, to be applied to the payment of the liens of the insurance company and the bank, together with the costs of it, and that the interests of the minors be not applied to the payment of any part of the claim of Haskell and Matthewson, and that all of the surplus left, after payment of such liens as the court should determine to be due upon the interests of the minors, be by the court ordered to be paid over to the minors in equal shares. The decree after confirming the sale, recites: "And this cause being brought on further to be heard on the motion of the guardian *ad litem* for an order of distribution, and the evidence, submitted to the court." The court then found that the premises sold for \$9,000; that the costs were \$198.15, leaving a balance of \$8,801.85 to be distributed; found the amount due to the insurance company to be \$1,539.12, to the bank \$1,001.26, to Haskell and Matthewson \$66.61; found the curtesy estate of Mr. Mallory to be of the value \$797.54, and that the same had been duly conveyed to defendant Milligan. Allowed the guardian *ad litem* \$100, taxed as costs, and then ordered that the clerk pay to the insurance company the amount found due to it; to the guardian of the minor heirs \$5,364.29; to the bank the amount due to it, "out of the curtesy estate of the said J. O. Mallory, now owned by J. O. Milligan," and also the amount due Haskell and Matthewson, "out of the said curtesy estate;" the balance of \$729.67 to be paid to defendant Milligan. From this decree defendant Milligan appeals.

Appellee now urges that the case is here for trial *de novo* and asks us to review that part of the decree which ordered the payment of the amount due the insurance company out of the general fund arising from the sale. We cannot do. None of the parties has appealed from that part of the decree. Where a decree in a suit in which it is disposed of more than one distinct and separate issue is litigated in the court below, and an appeal is prosecuted by one of the parties as to one of such issues only,

and no cross-appeal is prosecuted by any of the other parties, the only issue which will be considered in this court is the one presented by the appeal. The rule is stated in the second paragraph of the syllabus in the late case of *Tate v. Kloke*, ante, p. 382: "The issues presented by appeal to this court in a suit in equity must be tried *de novo*, and a proper decree entered or directed." In other words, when a suit in equity is appealed to this court we are not required by the statute to try the whole case *de novo*. We are simply required to try and independently decide such issues in the case, and such only, as are presented by the appeal. This rule will not work any hardship upon appellee in the present case, for if we were to re-examine the question the decree of the district court upon that point would have to be affirmed. Conceding that, in procuring the conveyance of the Dixon county land to Mrs. Mallory, the husband was making a gift to her, that gift was diminished, at the moment it was made, by the \$1,200 mortgage which had to be given in order that the husband could raise the money which would enable him to make the gift. The giving of the mortgage and the execution of the deed from White to Mrs. Mallory constituted one transaction, and what Mrs. Mallory received was what remained after that transaction was completed.

Appellee also urges that as no answer was filed to the petition of the guardian *ad litem* filed September 26, 1910, appellant Milligan was not entitled to offer any evidence in opposition thereto. Counsel contends that there are two methods, either of which might have been pursued by the guardian *ad litem*, viz., by petition or motion; that, having chosen to pursue the former, the hearing should have been controlled by the general rules as to pleadings. All persons claiming any interest were already before the court. No new parties were attempted to be brought in. The pleading was not verified, nor was any order for making up issues made by the court, or requested by the guardian *ad litem*. Aside from the name which the guard-

ian *ad litem* gave it, the paper was in all essential respects a motion, and the trial court properly so treated it.

The only question we are called upon to decide is as to the money ordered to be paid to the bank. Upon this point the appellant Milligan contends that he purchased the curtesy estate from Mr. Mallory March 30, 1910, for an adequate consideration and without notice of appellee's claim. At the time he purchased the curtesy estate the decree of foreclosure had been entered. Mr. Mallory was a party to the suit. The order of distribution had not yet been made. Milligan knew, at the time he made the purchase, that the title to the land was in Mrs. Mallory at the time of her death, and hence was then in her legal heirs, the minor defendants, and that Mallory had only a curtesy interest therein, and we think he should be held to have had full knowledge that all he could take under his purchase was such interest as Mr. Mallory should be found, upon the final order of confirmation and distribution, to have had at the time of the entry of the decree.

His second contention is that Mallory was not indebted to the estate. It is true that at that time he was not, strictly speaking, indebted to the estate, but he was the principal debtor to the bank upon the note secured by the mortgage of his wife. Their relations then were: Mallory was indebted to the bank, and the estate was surety upon that indebtedness. Until the property was sold by reason of Mallory's failure to pay his obligation, the relation of debtor and creditor did not exist, but as soon as the sale was made that relation arose, and he then became such debtor.

His third contention is that, if the money was given or loaned to Mallory or mingled with his funds, it was afterwards expended by him in making permanent improvements upon the premises. This contention is not sustained by the evidence.

His fourth contention is that more than four years had elapsed since the money was given or loaned, if given or loaned at all, to Mallory, and hence was barred by the

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statute of limitations. This contention must fail for the reasons above given in answer to his second contention.

A careful examination of the record fails to disclose any error, and the judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and ROSE, JJ., concur.

LETTON, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

MATTIE M. MACKEY, APPELLEE, v. JOHN N. FRENZER,
APPELLANT.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,141.

Divorce: CUSTODY OF CHILDREN: EVIDENCE: REVIEW. This appeal presents only the question of fact as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the decree, and upon consideration of the evidence the order of the district court is affirmed.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
GEORGE A. DAY, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Will H. Thompson, for appellant.

John C. Cowin and M. O. Cunningham, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

In December, 1904, the plaintiff obtained a divorce from defendant by the decree of the district court for Douglas county. There were three children, a girl four or five years old at that time, and two boys a little older. By the decree the custody of the girl was given to the plaintiff, and the boys were confided to the care of the defendant. The plaintiff afterwards married Hiram B. Mackey, and removed from Omaha to Minneapolis, Minnesota. She took the girl with her, and afterwards it seems that the

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boys left their father and were with her at Minneapolis. There has been continual disagreement between the plaintiff and defendant since long before they were divorced. This plaintiff began these supplementary proceedings in the district court for Douglas county to obtain the custody of the boys also. The defendant answered, and made a cross-application for the custody of the girl. Afterwards, and before the hearing, the plaintiff dismissed her application for the custody of the boys, and the matter was heard before the district court upon the defendant's application for the custody of the girl.

The ground for this application relied upon by defendant appears to be that the plaintiff has taken the girl out of the jurisdiction of the court, and that the plaintiff's present husband, Mr. Mackey, has such a bad character and reputation that the plaintiff's home is an unfit place for the girl. Mr. Mackey formerly resided at Minden, in this state, and several witnesses who knew him some five or ten years ago testified that he was addicted to the use of intoxicating drinks, and accustomed to bad associations, and the use of vile and profane language. The plaintiff admits that there was some ground for complaint of Mr. Mackey formerly, and testifies, and the evidence tends to show, that Mr. Mackey for several years has been an industrious and quiet man. The plaintiff appears to be well situated in her present home, and the girl has suitable surroundings and is well cared for. The district court found that it was not in the interest of the girl to take her from the custody of her mother under the existing conditions and circumstances, and that the father was not so well situated to care for her as is a mother, and confirmed the former order of the court confiding the custody of the girl to the mother. We are satisfied that the evidence justifies this conclusion, and the order of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and LETTON, JJ., concur.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

BUFFALO COUNTY, APPELLEE, v. JOEL HULL, APPELLANT.**FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,148.****Counties: BRIDGES: LIABILITY OF ADJOINING COUNTIES FOR REPAIRS.**

The liability of adjoining counties for repairs of a bridge over a stream between them is fixed by statute, and it is within the power of the legislature to alter or amend the statute in that regard. The conditions and extent of the liability depend upon the statute in force when such repairs are made and the liability incurred.

APPEAL from the district court for Kearney county:
HARRY S. DUNGAN, JUDGE. Affirmed.

Joel Hull and Brown, Baxter & Van Dusen, for appellant.

E. B. McDermott, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

The bridge in question was built in 1874. In 1881, in an action between these two counties pending in this court upon appeal, this court decided: "That the bridge being constructed by Buffalo county alone, Kearney county could not be compelled to aid in keeping it in repair." *State v. Kearney County*, 12 Neb. 6. The court in the opinion recited the statute of 1879, which appears to contemplate that the adjoining counties should be equally liable for repairs, whether the bridge was built by them jointly or not, which statute was in force at the time the bridge was built, and then refers to the amendment of 1881, "limiting its application to bridges which have been built, or may hereafter be built by co-operation of two counties separated by a stream." It was held that this amendment, although enacted after the bridge was built, was applicable. Afterwards the statute was again amended, and, as construed by this court, makes the adjoining counties equally liable for repairs, whether the

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It by them jointly or not. *Cass County v.* 63 Neb. 813, 66 Neb. 476, 72 Neb. 93; *Iske v. Iske*, 278; *Saline County v. Gage County*, 66 Neb. 70; *Lincoln County v. Saunders County*, 77 Neb. 787. The decisions and the decision in *State v. Kearney County* made these counties jointly liable for this bridge by this last amendment of the 1894 Buffalo county made repairs to the bridge complying with the last stated amendment to the act amended that Kearney county contribute the expenses, which that county refused to do. The decision obtained in the district court for Kearney county upon appeal to this court was affirmed, and that Kearney county was liable to Buffalo county for half of the repairs made by Buffalo county. *Buffalo County v. Kearney County*, 83 Neb. 550. After the commissioners of Kearney county levied a tax to the extent of the judgment, and after the money was collected for that purpose this plaintiff county refused to comply with the request with the board of supervisors of Buffalo county for the issuance of the warrant upon the judgment. "This defendant, Joel Hull, appears to have rested from the first in preventing the collection from Kearney county of any part of the expenses for this bridge, and appears from the pleading in this case to still contend that Kearney county is liable therefor. The petition in this case sets out the said claim is still pending before the said board of supervisors of said Kearney county for its action in refusing to issue a warrant drawn upon said judgment and the amount thereof; * * * that said Joel Hull, defendant, is awaiting the action of said board of supervisors and threatens to appeal from said action." The plaintiff asks for a temporary injunction "restraining Joel Hull, his agents, employees, attorneys and others from attempting to perfect an appeal from the action of said board in ordering said warrant

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drawn as aforesaid." Upon trial in the district court the injunction was granted as prayed, and the defendant has appealed to this court.

We have concluded to waive the question whether any injunction was necessary to prevent the defendant from taking an appeal, or whether the county board should order the warrant drawn without regard to any action that might be taken by the defendant, and determine the matter upon the contentions of the defendant in the brief. It seems to be contended that the first decision of this court in *State v. Kearney County*, 12 Neb. 6, became *res adjudicata* of the whole matter, and that therefore the petition in the subsequent action, in which judgment was rendered in favor of Buffalo county, and affirmed in *Buffalo County v. Kearney County*, 83 Neb. 550, stated no cause of action, and that it follows that the judgment of the district court in favor of Buffalo county and of this court in affirming that judgment are void, and the defendant, as a taxpayer of Kearney county, should prevent the payment by that county for any such repairs. His zeal is commendable, but his reasoning is unsound. If the legislature could not amend the statute so as to change the liability for repairs incurred subsequent to such change, then the act of 1879, which was in force when the bridge was built, would control, and under that act, as said in the case relied upon by defendant, the liability for repairs would be the same as it has since been held to be under the present statute. The liability of adjoining counties for repairs of a bridge over a stream between them is fixed by statute, and it is within the power of the legislature to alter or amend the statute in that regard. The conditions and extent of the liability depend upon the statute in force when such repairs are made and the liability incurred. A consideration of the foregoing facts and the present condition of the statute, as construed by the later decisions of this court above cited, is, we think, sufficient reason for concluding that the contention of the defendant is unsound.

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judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

SE, C. J., BARNES and LETTON, JJ., concur.

E, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

IN H. MURTEN, APPELLEE, V. ALBERT F. GARBE,
APPELLANT.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,157.

Trial: TIME FOR FILING MOTION: AFFIDAVIT. The motion for a new trial in district court must be filed before the adjournment of the term at which the verdict was rendered, unless unavoidably prevented. An affidavit stating generally that the defendant had reason to believe, and did believe, that the term would continue longer, without stating the conditions and circumstances leading to such belief, will not justify delay in filing the motion.

and Slander: PLEADING: EVIDENCE. The defendant in an action for slander cannot, in mitigation of damages, give evidence tending to prove the truth of the alleged defamatory charge under a general denial. Such facts must be alleged in the answer.

APPEAL from the district court for Fillmore county:
G. HURD, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Edon & Peterson and H. P. Wilson, for appellant.

Attorneys H. Sloan, Frank W. Sloan and J. J. Burke,

NEWICK, J.

The plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment against the defendant for \$1,000 damages in the district court for Fillmore county in an action for slander. The slanderous words used, as alleged in the petition, were, "He stole my horse" and in the second count, "Murten stole 700 bushels

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of corn." The answer was a general denial. Two questions are presented by this appeal.

1. The motion for new trial was filed after the adjournment of the term, but within three days after the verdict was rendered. The motion was stricken from the files, and the defendant urges this ruling as the first ground for reversal. Section 316 of the code is as follows: "The application for a new trial must be made at the term the verdict, report, or decision is rendered, and, except for the cause of newly discovered evidence material for the party applying, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, shall be within three days after the verdict or decision was rendered, unless unavoidably prevented." One of the attorneys for the defendant filed his affidavit at the hearing, in which he testified that the court adjourned *sine die* on the 15th day of December, 1910, and that on the next day the defendant filed his motion for a new trial. The verdict was rendered in the afternoon of the 14th day of December. That neither the affiant nor either of the attorneys for defendant were in the courtroom at the time the verdict was rendered, but the affiant was informed of the nature and effect of the verdict during the afternoon of the day it was rendered, and then notified the court that he would prepare and file a motion for a new trial; that the other attorney for the defendant "returned to Lincoln the morning of December 14;" that other matters kept affiant busy for a time, and, during the latter part of the afternoon and evening, he prepared the motion for a new trial, which was later filed; that he had reason to think, and did think, that the court would be in session December 14 and 15 from the apparent amount of business in sight. His affidavit continues: "That when I had finished the preparation of said motion for new trial, it was past the closing hour for the office of the clerk of this said court, and that said office was closed; that I was called out of town during said night, leaving Fillmore county about 3 o'clock A. M. Dec. 15, and did not return

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and Geneva until between 8 and 9 P. M. of 1 day; that on the morning of Dec. 16, 1910, office of said clerk of this court to file said w trial, and there and then learned for the t this honorable court had adjourned *sine* 910; that I thereupon filed said motion for support of which this affidavit is made and he said motion was made in good faith. believed, and from the amount of business fore the court I had reason to believe, that old still be in session December 16, 1910; less that I was called out of the county on of great importance and necessitated im- tion, and that I returned by the first train it was attended to." The words of the ess unavoidably prevented," undoubtedly requirements of the section, and the question nder this evidence, the defendant was un- vented from filing his motion before the ad- the term. The intention of the statute is ordinary circumstances, a cause shall be ined at the term at which it is tried. If made for another trial, the requirement is mptly done, and this is a matter of impor- ent unnecessary delay, especially in counties o short terms are held in each year. If the heard until a subsequent term, six months added to the law's delay. It appears from 's evidence that the motion was prepared m adjourned. The defendant's attorney says reason to believe, and did believe, that the continue for two days. He does not state ons were for so believing, nor does he show or any of its officers were of that opinion. very reluctant to deprive a litigant of a hear- merits of his case, but unless the provisions , which are intended to prevent unnecessary dministration of justice, are enforced by the

court, it will be within the power of any litigant to continue the litigation almost without end. If the defendant's motion could have been filed before the adjournment by the exercise of ordinary care and caution, it could not be said that he was unavoidably prevented. The trial court knew the existing conditions, which are not disclosed in this affidavit, and we cannot say that it erred in striking this motion from the files.

2. The defendant's brief is devoted principally to the discussion of the ruling of the trial court in excluding testimony offered by defendant in mitigation of damages. The question is so well presented, and is of so much importance, that we have considered it, although it is not a matter that could be presented to this court on appeal in the absence of a motion for new trial. The answer, as we have already stated, was a general denial. There was no allegation of the truth of the matters charged as slanderous. The defendant offered to prove that the plaintiff was his tenant, and as such had farmed the defendant's land; that some controversy had arisen between them as to the proper division of the crops, and that they had compromised that controversy by making an actual division upon the ground, and that afterwards the plaintiff had taken a part of the corn belonging to the defendant under that agreement. Section 124b of the criminal code provides: "If any tenant or lessee shall without the consent of his landlord take, embezzle, dispose of or convert to his own use the share or portion or any part thereof of the crop or products belonging to his landlord, with intent to defraud the landlord thereof, such person or persons shall be punished in the manner prescribed by law for feloniously stealing property of the value of the article or articles so embezzled, taken, disposed of or so converted." If the defendant could prove that the plaintiff had been guilty under this section of the statute, the truth of the alleged slanderous charge would be established. It is conceded that the truth of the matter charged as defamatory cannot be proved as a complete defense under a

general denial, but it is insisted that the same facts may be proved as mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages. It appears that the rule at common law was that under a general denial, and without the plea of justification, evidence might be received in mitigation of damages, unless it tended to prove the truth of the slanderous words. The defendant was not allowed to prove the truth of the slanderous words without pleading it, because that would operate as a surprise to the plaintiff, and so it was generally held that evidence which tended to prove the truth of the slanderous words could not be admitted under a general denial. Other evidence in mitigation of damages was allowed under a general denial, but all evidence which tended to prove the truth of the alleged slanderous words was excluded, unless the answer alleged the truth of the charge and offered the evidence in support of that allegation. From these rules the technical holding was derived that the defendant must admit uttering the slanderous words of and concerning the plaintiff, and allege the truth as a defense, or he was not allowed to introduce any evidence tending to prove the truth of the defamatory charge. These rules of common law in protecting the plaintiff against surprise placed a hardship upon the defendant. If the defendant admitted that he spoke the alleged slanderous words, there was but one defense open to him—he must allege and prove that the words spoken were true of the plaintiff. Under the code the defendant is better protected. He may admit the speaking of the alleged slanderous words and that they are not true of the plaintiff, and yet he may prove in mitigation of damages facts and circumstances tending to show that the alleged slanderous words were true, and that he acted in good faith upon the honest belief that they were true. So far we fully agree with the contentions of the defendant. The question still remains: Is the defendant entitled to make such defense without pleading it in his answer? Can he make such defense under a general denial? Sections 131 and 132 of the code are as

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follows: "Section 131. In an action for a libel or slander, it shall be sufficient to state, generally, that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of the plaintiff, and if the allegation be denied, the plaintiff must prove on the trial the facts, showing that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of him. Section 132. In the actions mentioned in the last section, the defendant may allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and may prove the same, and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, or he may prove either." In New York and other code states the language of the statute is a little more definite than our section 132. "The defendant may, in his answer, allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and any mitigating circumstances, to reduce the amount of damages." N. Y. Code (Rev. ed. 1869) sec. 165. The section of our code provides that he "may allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and may prove the same, and any mitigating circumstances." Under the language of the New York statute, it would appear that there could be no doubt that it would be necessary to plead the mitigating circumstances, and we think that, considering the conditions that existed, and the evil that it was proposed to remedy, the language of our code must have the same construction. It follows that if the defendant, in mitigation of damages, intended to rely upon circumstances which led him to believe that the plaintiff was guilty of the matter charged, he should plead those facts and circumstances, and such evidence cannot be admitted under a general denial. There was no offer to amend the answer, and the trial court was right in excluding the evidence.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and LETTON, JJ., concur.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

Wilder v. Millard.

DANIEL W. WILDER ET AL., APPELLEES, V. R. J. MILLARD,
APPELLANT.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 17,164.

1. **Accord and Satisfaction: PLEADING AND PROOF.** The defense of accord and satisfaction is not sustained, without allegations and proof that there was a substantial difference between the parties as to the amount due, and that the accord and satisfaction was in settlement thereof.
2. **Money Received: MISAPPLICATION OF FUNDS BY ATTORNEY.** If money is paid to an attorney at law upon a claim of a third party, and the attorney so receives and receipts for the same, he cannot withhold the money from the creditor upon whose claim it was paid, upon the ground that he is also a creditor of the person paying the money.
3. ———: ———: **ESTOPPEL.** If oral evidence is received, without objection, that the plaintiffs were acting as executors of the will of a deceased person, and as such had possession of a note payable to the decedent as a part of her estate, and placed the same in the hands of the defendant, such evidence shows a *prima facie* right in the plaintiffs to the proceeds of the note, and the defendant cannot resist their right on the ground that their letters testamentary are not properly sealed.

APPEAL from the district court for Cedar county: GUY
T. GRAVES, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Wilbur F. Bryant and H. E. Burkett, for appellant.

J. C. Robinson and George W. Wiltse, contra.

SEDGWICK, -J.

Samuel Wilder was engaged in the mercantile business in the town of Hartington, and became financially embarrassed and assigned his property to trustees for the benefit of his creditors. He was indebted to Mrs. Erwin upon his promissory note. The trustees reduced the assets to money and applied it *pro rata* upon the liabilities of Mr. Wilder. Mrs. Erwin was formerly a resident of Kansas, and had died there, and the executors of her will had placed her note in the hands of an attorney at

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Hiawatha, Kansas. The trustees of Mr. Wilder requested this attorney to forward the note to a bank, or to this defendant, so that the trustees might inspect the same before making payment. Pursuant to that request, the note was forwarded to the defendant, and one of the trustees, after inspecting the note, paid to the defendant in two several payments the amount applicable upon the Erwin note. The defendant paid over to the attorney of the executors a part of the money, and retained \$500 thereof. This action was brought in the district court for Cedar county to recover this \$500. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant has appealed.

The defendant's answer in the case apparently fails to state any defense. He admits the receipt of the note as belonging to the executors, and also the receipt of the money thereon, and alleges that the amount which he paid to the attorney for the executors was received as a full settlement between them and himself. He does not allege any indebtedness to him of the executors or of the estate which they represented, or any facts from which such indebtedness, or claim of indebtedness, or any other indebtedness could be found. The answer fails to show any ground for any accord and satisfaction, or compromise. This objection to the answer does not seem to have been insisted upon, and the evidence of both parties was taken in full. This evidence entirely fails to make any defense to the plaintiff's action. It is not denied that the note was received by the defendant solely for the purpose of allowing the trustees to inspect the same. There is no evidence that the executors or the estate which they represented were indebted in any amount to this defendant. The defendant offered to prove that Wilder was indebted to him, but this evidence was properly excluded by the court. The defendant's receipts to the trustees recite that the money was paid by the trustees upon the Erwin claim, and the defendant, having so received it, could not of course apply it upon his own claim against the same debtor.

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The objection that the letters testamentary of the plaintiffs which were offered in evidence do not show the impression of the seal of the court appointing them is without merit. The defendant is not in a good position to take advantage of any such irregularity, having received the note from them in their official capacity, and not having made any such objection until this suit was brought. The executors (so called in the letters testamentary and other papers) were husband and wife, and one of them testified that she had the note in question as executrix of the will of the deceased, to whom it was payable, and held the same as part of her estate. In that capacity she caused the note to be placed in the hands of the defendant, and, for the purpose of this action, no other evidence of the right of these plaintiffs to represent the estate of the deceased was necessary. The district court could have instructed the jury to find a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and did substantially do so, if the instructions are rightly construed.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and LETTON, JJ., concur.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

JOSEPH ALTER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. W. C. SKILES,
APPELLEE.

FILED APRIL 17, 1913. No. 16,868.

Jury, Actions Triable by. A law action is not triable without a jury because there are issues incidental to, or elemental of, the main one which are equitable in their nature. *Lett v. Hammond*, 59 Neb. 339.

Appeal: TRIAL BY JURY: WAIVER. Where the defendant alleged by way of answer that there was a mistake in giving the note sued on because it included a larger amount than was due, plaintiffs

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and defendant each had a right to have the question of the mistake submitted to the court and tried by the court without a jury, but, if they waived such right by actually trying the facts to a jury and by requesting the court to submit such fact to the jury, it is too late to complain after the verdict is rendered.

APPEAL from the district court for Harlan county:
HARRY S. DUNGAN, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Thomas & Shelburn, for appellants.

John Everson, contra.

HAMER, J.

The original action was brought in the county court of Harlan county. The plaintiffs, who are appellants in this court, sued upon two causes of action; the first cause being upon a note for \$188.60, bearing date May 5, 1904, drawing interest at 10 per cent. from date, and amounting, with interest, at the time of the trial to about \$300. For a second cause of action the plaintiffs declared upon an account for goods sold and delivered, and amounting to \$41.85.

The defendant by his answer admits the execution and delivery of the note sued on, and admits that at the time of the execution of the note he was indebted to the plaintiffs upon an old note for \$61 and for certain merchandise, and alleges a statement of the account between the plaintiffs and himself, including the old note. The items of charges against the defendant, according to his own statement, cover the note of \$61 and interest on the same, certain amounts for a cultivator, a disc, a scoopboard, some fence, and some posts, and a lumber bill for a barn, making a total of \$272.23 charges against the defendant, according to his own account. Also, the defendant then claimed credit for cash paid on the account, \$5; for an old wagon sold to plaintiffs, and which should be credited on the account, \$15; for cash paid on the account, \$50; for the third payment of cash, \$30; and for a fourth cash payment, \$50. On the account to the plaintiffs the defendant

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claimed an indebtedness to the plaintiffs on several items amounting, when taken together, to \$19.40. He claimed a total indebtedness to the plaintiffs of \$291.63, and that he should be credited with \$150, leaving a balance unpaid of \$141.63. While the answer admits that the defendant executed and delivered the note described in the first cause of action, it says that at the time of signing the note defendant was unable to read or write, and so relied upon the representations of the plaintiff Joseph Alter, as to the correctness of the amount; that at the time he was owing said plaintiffs upon said old note, which was then past due, and for certain merchandise; that Alter wrote up the note sued on and presented it to the defendant for his approval, and that the defendant was unable to compute the amount due; and that the defendant informed plaintiff Joseph Alter that the amount stated in the note was incorrect, and that Alter agreed that, if it was incorrect, he was willing to correct it, and was willing to correct any error that might be made in the computation, and thereupon the defendant permitted his signature to be attached to the note; that said note was in excess of the amount due "to the extent of \$85, or more;" that it (the note) also included certain items which the defendant was informed and believed belonged to D. A. McCulloch, who was a former partner of said Joseph Alter. Also, for answer to the second cause of action, the defendant admits purchasing and receiving from the plaintiffs the items set forth in a certain schedule, marked exhibit "A"; and alleged payment on the schedule to the amount of \$150; and claimed that the plaintiffs had failed to give credit therefor upon the indebtedness due to the plaintiffs. It may not be very clearly stated, but a liberal and reasonable interpretation of the first clause of the answer would seem to be that there was a mistake made in giving the note, and that it was given for a greater sum than the amount actually due.

The prayer of the plaintiffs was for a judgment for \$341.96. The reply to the defendant's answer was a

general denial. It was not alleged in the reply that there was any bar to proving the new matter because to do so was an attempt to controvert a written contract with oral evidence, but the defendant had notice, by the reply filed by the plaintiffs, that when he attempted to prove the things set up in his answer he would be met with evidence that the alleged facts contained in the answer were untrue. Upon a trial to a jury, a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for \$215.10, and judgment was rendered on the verdict.

It is contended by the plaintiffs that they should have recovered on their first cause of action the full amount claimed by them, and that the evidence is insufficient to prevent a complete recovery upon the note; also, that the parties had a series of transactions prior to the date of the note, and that the giving of the note merged all of the indebtedness of the defendant to the plaintiffs into the one note; that the defense is, in effect, a statement of the account, including the old note and various articles of merchandise, and that, as it fails to allege fraud, duress or mistake, the defendant is estopped to deny the terms of the note. The plaintiffs cite *Delaney v. Linder*, 22 Neb. 280.

In a trial of the case, while there was at first an effort upon the part of the plaintiffs to exclude the evidence offered on behalf of the defendant, finally the parties seem by mutual agreement to have gone behind the note and to have made inquiry concerning the correctness of the amount that was due at the time the note was given and for which it was given.

It is contended now that the district court erred in admitting evidence, over the objections of the plaintiffs, tending to alter or vary the terms of the note sued upon; but this cannot be correct, if the answer quoted sets forth that there was a mistake in the amount for which the note was given, and we think that it does. There is therefore in this case no effort to dispute a contract in writing with oral evidence, and the contention of plaintiffs is not applicable to the case which they present.

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ne of the plaintiffs, Mr. Alter, testified directly that computed the amount due from the defendant and on notes which he held which were then past due. The defendant objected and excepted. As long as the plaintiff went into the general account of the amount due to the defendant to the plaintiffs, including the note, he had no right to object because the defendant went into the same thing. The plaintiff Joseph Alter gave it in his opinion that one note, "I think a part of two notes more (were) taken into this note." Mr. Joseph Alter testified that, if it was not figured up right, he wanted to make it right. This was a proper sentiment, but it shows that they (the plaintiffs and the defendant) were not attempting to stand strictly upon the rule contended for by the plaintiffs. The case seems to have proceeded, upon both sides, upon the theory that the consideration of the case was to be looked into and considered and that the question was to be determined as to whether the note had been given for too much.

An examination of the defendant's evidence will show that the defendant went into the question as to what was actually due on the note at the time it was given. They (the plaintiff Joseph Alter and the defendant) seem to have gone over to the plaintiffs' office, where it is claimed that the defendant that the plaintiff Joseph Alter told him (the defendant): "You have got to pay \$80 for Frank." Frank was the defendant's brother. The defendant was asked, and answered, without objection, that the note sued on included the \$61 note which it was to renew. The defendant also testified that he let Joe Alter have an old wagon, for which he was to have credit, and that he never received it. The defendant also testified that he paid cash some time to the plaintiffs, \$5, and at another he delivered to the plaintiffs an old wagon worth \$15, for which he was to have credit, and that he never received the same; also, that he paid \$130 on the lumber bill; also, that he got him certain articles, including twine. Also, he was asked to testify whether the plaintiffs had any other note than the

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\$61 note at the time the note in suit was given. On cross-examination by counsel for the plaintiffs, the defendant testified that he did not look at the account or note on the day the note sued on was given. It seems to be clearly apparent that at the time the note was given, upon which suit was brought, there was a controversy as to the amount due; that the defendant always questioned whether there was the amount due on the note for which it was given. It appeared also that there was more paid on the lumber account than was claimed to be due. There was a sharp conflict in the testimony, and therefore the case was a proper one for a jury. The plaintiff Joseph Alter testified, denying that he told the defendant that he would have to pay \$80 for Frank Skiles. He said: "He is certainly mistaken about that; that is all news to me."

The third paragraph in the first instruction, an instruction given at the request of the plaintiffs, reads: "In answer to the petition of the plaintiffs, you are instructed that the defendant admits that he executed and delivered the note described in the first cause of action of the plaintiffs' petition, but that the defendant claims that at the time of signing said note he was unable to read or write, and relied wholly upon the computations, representations, and agreements of the plaintiff Joseph Alter. The defendant admits that at the time of giving said note he was owing said plaintiff a certain sum of money upon an old note then past due, and for certain other merchandise. That the defendant was unable to compute the amount then due, but that he informed the plaintiff that the amount in said note was incorrect, and that the plaintiff agreed to correct any error or mistake in computation, if any should, at any time, be found. The defendant claims that said note is in excess of the true amount due the plaintiff, at the time of the giving thereof, to the extent of \$85, and that said note also includes items which the defendant claims belongs to D. A. McCulloch, and the interest thereon."

The second instruction was also given at the request

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intiffs. It contains, among other things: "It evolve upon the plaintiffs to introduce evidence execution or delivery of said note; and, unless plaintiff establishes by fair preponderance of the weight that there was a mistake in the computation of the amount due from the defendant to the plaintiffs for the note given in settlement, you should find in favor of the plaintiffs for the full amount of said note, with

a recognition by the plaintiffs of the fact that the issue was whether there was a mistake when the note was given. If the plaintiffs treat the case as one where the pleadings are sufficient to sustain testimony that there was a mistake, they are in no condition to object to the sufficiency of the pleadings touching the allegation that there was a mistake. Counsel on both sides seem to have agreed on the merits of the case as to whether the note was given for a proper amount; that is, as to whether there was a mistake. As there was a conflict in the evidence, it would seem that the verdict of the jury should stand. It may be said that a law action is maintainable without a jury because there are issues in fact, or elemental of, the main one which are equitable in their nature. *Lett v. Hammond*, 59 Neb. 339; *Exchange Nat. Bank*, 52 Neb. 321. The defendant here had a right to allege the mistake in giving the note although the action was a law action. While the plaintiff and defendant had a right to have the question of mistake submitted to the jury, if they were permitted to submit it to the court and tried by the court without a jury because of its equitable nature, if they were to do so by actually trying the facts to a jury, as they have done in this case, both in the way the testimony was taken and by the instructions requested by the plaintiff, it is too late to complain after the verdict is rendered.

Judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

MR. JUSTICE K. J., concurs only in the conclusion.

ELEONORE BUTSCHKOWSKI, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM
BRECKS, APPELLEE.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 16,632.

APPEAL from the district court for Frontier county:
ROBERT C. ORR, JUDGE. *Motion to revive sustained.*

S. L. Geisthardt, for appellant.

W. S. Morlan and Lambe & Butler, contra.

PER CURIAM.

A, a citizen of the United States and resident of this state, died intestate, being the owner of real estate and personal property therein. He left no wife nor child, father nor mother, surviving him. His only near relatives at the time of his decease was a brother, also a citizen and resident of this state, and a married sister in Germany, who had no children. Administration was granted upon the estate of A in Frontier county. The sister brought suit in the county, where the real estate of deceased was situated, for a partition thereof, alleging her heirship equally with the surviving brother. He answered, admitting the relationship, but denying her right to inherit the land, as she was a nonresident alien. The cause was submitted to the district court upon the pleadings, when a judgment was rendered in favor of defendant, plaintiff's petition dismissed, and defendant's title to the whole of the land quieted. She appealed to this court. Pending the appeal here she died. Some time prior to her decease she is alleged to have entered into a written agreement with her husband, providing that, in case of her decease, leaving him surviving, he should become the owner of all her property. He now moves the court for an order of revivor, substituting himself as plaintiff and appellant in place and stead of his deceased wife. It is ordered that he be so substituted, but that this order shall

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in no sense be an adjudication of the rights of any one, but that the whole question of his rights, or the absence thereof, be reserved to the final decision of the cause.

The motion to revive is, to that extent, sustained.

MOTION SUSTAINED.

WILSON T. GRAHAM, APPELLANT, v. ROBERT HANSON ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,110.

OPINION on motion for rehearing of case reported ante, p. 394. *Rehearing denied.*

PER CURIAM.

This action involved only the right to a comparatively small deposit, and the action was brought by one who was not a party to the original transaction, but claims that one of the parties to the transaction has assigned to him an interest in the deposit. It seems so clear that the main action, which involved the rights of the parties to the transaction, should be first tried that the court, as a whole, did not give that attention to the sufficiency of the evidence that it otherwise would have given. Our attention has again been called to the record by an able brief upon the motion for rehearing, and we are satisfied that some of the findings of fact stated in the opinion are incorrect, and we therefore withdraw from the opinion all such conclusions of fact as will be involved in the trial of the principal case, the intention being that the principal case shall be tried upon its merits as though there had been no hearing upon this ancillary proceeding.

The motion for rehearing is

OVERRULED.

Sanderson v. Everson.

**PETER A. SANDERSON, APPELLER, V. ALEX C. EVERSON ET
AL., APPELLANTS.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,163.

1. **Joint Tenancy: RIGHT TO CREATE.** The right to create title in real estate by joint tenancy, with right of survivorship, when clearly and definitely expressed in the conveyance, has never been abridged in this state.
2. **Deeds: CONSTRUCTION: JOINT TENANCY.** Where a deed was made to husband and wife as "joint tenants with right of survivorship," this is held to clearly express the intention of the parties to the conveyance to create a joint tenancy, the survivor to take the full title conveyed upon the death of the other.
3. ———: ———: ———. While as between joint tenancies and tenancies in common the law prefers the latter, yet, if the purpose to create a joint tenancy is clearly expressed in a deed of conveyance of real estate, the law will permit the intention of the parties to control, and a joint tenancy with right of survivorship will be created.

APPEAL from the district court for Buffalo county:
BRUNO O. HOSTETLER, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Thomas F. Hamer, for appellants.

H. M. Sinclair and Willis D. Oldham, contra.

REESE, C. J.

The defendants Alex C. Everson and Canzada Everson, husband and wife, were the owners of lots 1, 2 and 3, in block 18, of the Kearney Land & Investment Company's Choice addition to the city of Kearney, in Buffalo county, and occupied the property as a family homestead; the apparent title to the property being held by the wife, Canzada Everson. On the 21st of May, 1910, the husband sold the property to plaintiff, Peter A. Sanderson, the agreed price being \$4,000. Plaintiff paid the sum of \$500, when defendant Alex C. Everson executed to him the following receipt: "Kearney, Nebr., May 21, 1910. Re-

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f P. A. Sanderson, five hundred dolls. as the first lot on the lots 1 & 2 & 3 in Bk. 18, Kearney Land & Rent Choice Add. to Kearney, price to be \$4,000. to Mrs. A. C. Everson approval of sale. A. C. .” The sale was approved by Mrs. Everson, and a deed of the title to the property was furnished to her, who submitted it to an attorney for investigation. The attorney questioned the title; his principal reason being that within the chain of title there was a reference to “Lewis P. Main and Edith E. Main, husband and wife, joint tenants with right of survivorship,” and as Mrs. Main having died, the property was conveyed to the next purchaser by Lewis P. Main in his own right. It was shown by the evidence that there was one child born to Lewis P. Main and Mrs. Main, who is now living, and at the time of the sale was between 17 and 18 years of age. The title was rejected by the attorney on the ground that the law in this state does not recognize joint tenancy with the right of survivorship does not exist in this state.

Plaintiff, Sanderson, then brought suit for the return of the \$500 paid on the purchase price, alleging that defendant Alex C. Everson had no title to the property and that his wife, Canzada Everson, had but an undivided half title, at least doubtful, to the undivided half interest and that, upon the discovery of the defect in the title, plaintiff had informed defendants that he would go forward with the purchase, and demanded the return of the \$500 paid, which was refused. The defendants defended, in effect denying the right of plaintiff to rescind the sale, the specific performance of the contract, or, in case of his failure to perform the same, that the property be sold as upon foreclosure and the proceeds applied to the payment of the amount found due, with judgment for any deficiency which might remain. A judgment was had to the court; the result being a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Alex C. Everson for \$500, with interest and costs; that there was no

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cause of action against Canzada Everson. The cross-petition of defendants was dismissed; the court holding that "the doctrine of joint tenancies with its incidents at common law never did apply to the tenures existing between husband and wife, but estates between them that partook of this nature were confined to entireties; and, furthermore, that such tenancies, whether between husband and wife, or between other parties, are not applicable to our laws, and are 'repugnant to our institutions and the American sense of justice to the heirs,' and that such estates do not exist in this state." Defendants appeal.

The possession of the property was never changed, but, so far as is shown by this record, is still with defendants. There is no evidence that a deed was ever tendered by defendants to plaintiff. As the case is presented here there are but two questions submitted for decision: First, does the law of joint tenancies, with survivorship, exist in this state; and, second, if so, can it be applied to a conveyance to the husband and wife where an effort is made to create such tenancy?

As to the conveyance to husband and wife, we are persuaded that such fact can have no influence on the result, for, in so far as their dealings, whether with others or between themselves, are concerned, they are no longer one in the sense used in the common law. They can hold title to property separately or jointly, in all respects the same as unmarried persons. This fact furnished the basis for the decision in *Kerner v. McDonald*, 60 Neb. 663, 83 Am. St. Rep. 550, where it was held that the law of title by entireties does not exist in this state. The rule of entireties does not depend upon and is not created by contract. It is a fiction of the common law, having its origin in the feudal system, that, where land was conveyed to the husband and wife jointly, the title by entireties was created in them by act of law, and neither could dispose of the property without the consent of the other; each owned the *entire* title. Joint tenancies are created by contract, and, if not so created, they do not exist. True, they are not

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ed, and, if not expressly created by contract, the law presumes the tenancy is in common, and that upon the death of one of the holders of the title his or her interest passes to his or her heirs. But this is not true of joint tenancies. It is true that, in order to create a joint tenancy, the purpose must be clearly expressed, otherwise the tenancy will be held to be in common. But no one will contend that it is not competent for the parties to contract by deed to two or more persons, whether husband and wife or not, that the conveyance is to the one for life and the others in remainders in fee. Such is the effect of a conveyance to both as joint tenant with the right of survivorship. It is a clear matter of contract, and the intention of the parties must govern.

As provided in section 53, ch. 73, Comp. St. 1911: "In the construction of every instrument creating or conveying or authorizing or requiring the creation or conveyance of any real estate, or interest therein, it shall be the duty of the courts of justice to carry into effect the true intent (intent) of the parties, so far as such intent can be ascertained from the whole instrument, and so far as such intent is consistent with the rules of law." There can be no doubt but that it was the intention of the parties to the deed under consideration to create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship; that is, upon the death of one of the survivors should take the whole title. Such intention was not inconsistent with the rules of law as expressed in our statute.

2 Reeves, Real Property, sec. 688, after a discussion of the law of tenancy by the entirety, the author says: "If a co-ownership by them be not desired, according to the preponderance of the decisions, they may be made joint tenants, or tenants in common, by an express statement to that effect in the instrument of transfer." See, also, *Hubert v. Wiggins*, 135 Ind. 178; *Fladung v. Rose*, 58 Ill. 13; *Mette v. Feltgen*, 148 Ill. 357. In *Redemptorist Sisters v. Lawler*, 205 Pa. St. 24, it was held that, notwithstanding the legislature had abolished the right of

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survivorship as an incident to joint tenancy, and provided that. "whatever kind the estate or thing holden be, the parts of those who die first * * * shall be considered * * * in the same manner as if such deceased joint tenants had been tenants in common," yet it was competent for the parties to a conveyance to contract for survivorship, and a deed containing the provision that the grantees should hold "as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common," would be upheld as the clear intent of the grantor "not to follow the statute, but to convey an estate subject to the right of survivorship, the distinguishing incident of joint tenancy at common law."

Being unable to find any provision of our statute which can be construed as rendering the contract of the parties to the conveyance under consideration unlawful, we hold that a joint tenancy was created by the deed to Lewis P. Main and Edith E. Main, and that upon the decease of Edith, without having broken the tenancy in any way, her title became vested in the husband, and he could transfer the property.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

BARNES, LETTON and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

WILHELM FLEGE V. STATE OF NEBRASKA.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,608.

1. **Criminal Law: APPOINTMENT OF ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR.** Where, in a criminal prosecution, an application is made to the district court for the appointment of an assistant prosecutor, if the court finds that such an appointment should be made, no attorney should be appointed who is known to be a partisan as against the accused, and who has theretofore been employed and paid by

ERROR to the district court for Thurston county: GUY T. GRAVES, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

J. J. McCarthy and Berry & Berry, for plaintiff in error.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, Frank E. Edgerton and C. A. Kingsbury, contra.

REESE, C. J.

This is the second time this case has been presented to this court. The opinion upon the former hearing is reported in 90 Neb. 390, where the material facts presented by the evidence on the part of the state are quite fully stated, and need not be here repeated. After the cause was remanded to the district court, the venue was changed to Thurston county, where a trial was had, and the cause submitted to the jury on practically the same evidence on the part of the state as at the former trial. The jury returned a verdict finding plaintiff in error, who will hereafter be referred to as defendant, guilty of manslaughter, when the indeterminate sentence of the law was pronounced against him. He brings error to this court, assigning 290 alleged errors of the district court in connection with the proceedings and trial. The assignments are specific, and many are well founded, but it will be impossible for us to discuss them without extending this opinion to an unnecessary and unreasonable length. Particular attention can be given to comparatively few of them.

It appears from the record, and, as shown by our former opinion, that the principal witness on the part of the state, one Albert Eichtencamp, who testified to having seen defendant kill his sister, Louise Flege, had testified to a different state of facts at the coroner's inquest, the effect of which was the complete exoneration of defendant. While the witness was never arrested nor charged in any legal proceeding with the commission of the crime, there appears to have arisen a known suspicion on the part of

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to leave no room for doubt as to the entire impartial attitude of a prosecutor, so as to leave no room for question upon this point. In *Liniger v. State*, 85 Neb. 98, we said: "Public prosecutors and peace officers owe no greater obligation to the public than to a defendant charged with crime, and they should as zealously protect the one as the other." This being true and maintained by all courts, it must appear to the mind at once that the appointment of a partisan special prosecutor was not in the interest of the fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the constitution. The obligation of an attorney to his client, when once employed in a particular case or matter, can never be shaken off. It is a perpetual obligation which abides to the end of life, unless, in a proper case, waived by the client. With this obligation resting upon the memory of a conscientious lawyer, as the appointee, no doubt, was and is, it would be impossible for him to forget his sworn duty to his former client, and there would be a constant inclination to ask of himself, "What effect will this evidence, or argument, have upon the rights of my first client, to whom I am still bound by every principle of law and honor? I should be faithful to my trust and protect Eichtencamp in every way possible. If defendant is convicted, Eichtencamp is forever cleared of the suspicion resting against him." We are forced to the conclusion that no honest and conscientious attorney could be able, nor should he, if he could, withstand such an appeal.

Error is assigned upon the ruling of the court wherein certain jurors were challenged for cause while being examined upon their *voir dire* as to their competency and qualification as such jurors. John D. Girardot was called as a proposed juror. His examination is of too great length to be set out in full. He testified that he had read of the case from the time of the murder to the time of being called as a juror, and had in the meantime conversed with his family and others about it; that he was "real certain" that he had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant; that probably it was more of

an impression than an opinion; that, if selected as a juror, he would try to give the defendant a fair and impartial trial; that the reports which he read in the newspapers published the testimony of the witnesses, all of which he read, consisting of a couple of columns each day, and upon which he formed an opinion, which he yet retained, and which would take strong evidence to remove; that he could not lay aside that opinion without some reason for it and evidence to cause the change; that he was afraid he could not lay that opinion aside until he had some evidence to change it. "Q. You think evidence might change it, do you? A. Yes; good, strong evidence I reckon would change it." The juror was challenged for cause, the challenge overruled, and the juror excused on defendant's peremptory challenge.

August Lindgrand, another proposed juror, testified that he had read the published testimony of the witnesses who were examined at the former trial "from beginning to the end," and upon that evidence he formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant; that he had never changed that opinion; that it would take considerable evidence to change it, as it was a fixed opinion; that he would have to have "a pretty good reason" for changing his mind. He was challenged for cause, the challenge overruled, and the juror excused on a peremptory challenge.

J. W. Twyford, another proposed juror, testified that he read the Sioux City Journal, which published daily reports of the evidence and the testimony of the witnesses at the former trial, which he read, and upon which he formed an opinion of the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and which he would not change until he had some reason for changing it. He was challenged for cause by the defendant, the challenge overruled, and the juror excused on defendant's peremptory challenge.

Wilson W. Waters, upon his examination, testified that he had read the reports of the former trial and the testimony of the witnesses in the Sioux City Journal, on which

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he formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant; that he retained that opinion, could not change it without having some reason to change it, certainly would not; that in his present state of mind, if retained as a juror, if no evidence was introduced his verdict would be guilty, resting upon the opinion which he then had, and would continue to believe him guilty until he had sufficient evidence to change his mind, which he could not do until he had evidence to cause the change. The defendant's challenge for cause was overruled, the juror retained, and he signed the verdict of the jury as foreman.

Thomas Conley, examined on his *voir dire*, testified that during the former trial the testimony of the witnesses was published in the papers, and that he read the testimony, and upon that he formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, deciding the case in his own mind; that he had never had any occasion to change his mind since that time, and had that opinion still; that it was a definite opinion to a certain extent; that he could not lay that opinion aside before hearing the evidence; that it would be impossible to divest himself of that opinion without hearing the evidence; that, if accepted as a juror, he would enter upon his duties with that opinion in his mind, and it would require evidence to remove it. The juror was challenged for cause, the challenge overruled, and he was excused on defendant's peremptory challenge.

Exceptions were taken to the ruling in each case. Counsel for the state examined each juror at length, as also did the court, when they testified that they thought they could render a fair and impartial verdict without reference to the opinion thus formed. The defendant exhausted all his peremptory challenges, being required to deplete the number to which he was entitled by law by challenging the incompetent jurors. The jurors seemed to be candid and conscientious in their answers; but the fact that they so answered was not enough to render them competent.

It is provided in section 468 of the criminal code: "The

shall be good causes for challenge to any person a juror on the trial of any indictment: * * * he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the innocence of the accused; provided, that if a juror shall state that he has formed, or expressed, an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the court shall thereupon proceed to examine, on oath, such juror on the ground of such opinion; and if it shall appear to have been founded upon reading newspapers, communications, comments, or reports, or upon hearsay, and not upon conversations with witnesses of the transactions, or reading reports of their testimony, or hearing them testify, and the juror shall swear on oath, that he feels able notwithstanding such opinion to render an impartial verdict upon the law and the facts, the court, if satisfied that said juror is impaneled and will render such verdict, may, in its discretion, accept of such juror as competent to serve in such case." It is readily seen that, where the opinion is formed upon reading reports of their (the witnesses) testimony, it does not come within the proviso, and is incompetent without reference to what he may say as to his ability to render an impartial verdict, or what influence preconceived opinions might have upon his judgment in weighing the evidence.

In *Roll v. State*, 5 Neb. 31, we held that, if it appears that a juror has formed an opinion from reading and hearing testimony of witnesses, he is incompetent, although he may be willing to swear that, notwithstanding such opinion, he feels able to render an impartial verdict, and his judgment was reversed solely upon the one ground of incompetency to but one juror.

In *Gray v. State*, 4 Neb. 545, it is said: "We think it is clear that where the ground of challenge is the formation or expression, of an opinion by the juror, before the trial, the court exercises any discretion as to his retention upon the jury, it must be shown by an examination of the juror on his oath, not only that his opinion was formed

solely in the manner stated in this proviso, but, in addition to this, the juror must swear unequivocally" to his ability to render a fair and impartial verdict upon the law and evidence. As an opinion formed from reading the report of the testimony of the witnesses is excluded from the proviso, it is as clear as the English language can make it that the district court had no discretion in the matter whatsoever, but its plain duty was to sustain the challenge. The jurors were wholly incompetent. Such has been the plain provision of the statute since the early days of the judicial history of the state, and the courts have recognized its binding force. Why the statute was ignored is not a question with which we have to deal. The constitution guarantees to every man a fair trial by an impartial jury. That a juror could be considered impartial, who had read the evidence of the witnesses on a former trial, and formed an abiding opinion thereon, and could by any effort on his part disrobe himself of that opinion, is not within the reach of human nature, and hence the statute absolutely disqualifies him. See *Smith v. State*, 5 Neb. 181.

The defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges, and therefore did not waive his constitutional and statutory rights. *Thurman v. State*, 27 Neb. 628; *Kennison v. State*, 83 Neb. 391; *Brinegar v. State*, 82 Neb. 558; *State v. Brown*, 15 Kan. 400.

During the introduction of the testimony, the state offered in evidence the clothing worn by the decedent at the time of her death, consisting of her dress, chemise, sun-bonnet and apron, in their soiled, burnt and bloody condition. Those exhibits were objected to by the defense as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, not tending to establish any issue or fact in the case, nor tending to prove defendant's guilt, but only for the purpose of inflaming the jury. The objection was overruled, the garments, admitted in evidence over defendant's exceptions, were displayed and held up before the jury. Error is assigned upon this ruling. There are, no doubt, many in-

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ances in which there is no error in the admission of such articles in evidence. Sometimes it becomes necessary for the state to prove the proximity of the firearm to the wound made by the ball, and this may be done by showing the burnt condition of, or powder stains upon, the clothing. In other cases it may be necessary to prove the relative locations of the victim and person using the firearm. This may often be shown by the range and course of the ball in passing into or through the clothing and body of the decedent. It is also permissible if it tends to prove the identity of the person killed, or of the slayer. But the necessity for this class of evidence should appear to justify its admission. This involves the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court. There is nothing in the record showing that the exhibition of the bloody and burnt garments was a proper, or necessary, part of the state's case. The court adheres to the holding in *McNay v. State*, 90 Neb. 63, 91 Neb. 281, that if it appears that the introduction of the blood-stained garments was for the purpose of arousing the passions of the jury, and that means securing a conviction, the practice should be condemned and a judgment of conviction reversed. Unless it appears that the offered evidence would be material to some inquiry in the case on trial, such exhibits should be excluded. See *Cole v. State*, 45 Tex. Cr. Rep. 5, 75 S. W. 527; *Christian v. State*, 46 Tex. Cr. Rep. 47, 75 S. W. 562; *Melton v. State*, 47 Tex. Cr. Rep. 451, 83 S. W. 822; *Williams v. State*, 61 Tex. Cr. Rep. 356, 362, 83 S. W. 771; *Lucas v. State*, 50 Tex. Cr. Rep. 219, 95 S. W. 1055. In 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (10th ed.) § 941, it is said: "As clothing is in the nature of demonstrative evidence, it has a strong tendency to arouse feelings of prejudice or passion, and unless the articles so introduced serve the purpose of identifying the deceased, or of honestly explaining the transaction, the introduction is irrelevant, and constitutes prejudicial error; and particularly is this true when it is displayed in such manner to arouse prejudice and passion."

On the part of the defense, Dr. Meis, of Sioux City, Iowa, Professor Walter S. Haines, of Rush Medical College, Chicago, and Professor Ludvig Hektoen, of the same place, were called as expert witnesses. It is shown beyond dispute or contradiction that, at or about 12 o'clock on the day of the homicide, the decedent ate her usually hearty dinner, consisting of a variety of food. If the testimony of Eichtencamp is true, she was slain about one hour thereafter, or about 1 o'clock P. M. A post mortem examination was had some time that evening or early the next morning. The body was embalmed and buried. Some considerable time thereafter, a number of months, the body was exhumed and found to be in a good state of preservation, the stomach removed, and the contents sent to Professor Haines for analysis. It was agreed by all that the wound in the head would, and did, produce instantaneous death. The experts testified that at death all digestion of food taken into the stomach immediately ceased. The analysis disclosed that the contents of the stomach were quite thoroughly digested, and it was shown that digestion would scarcely be commenced within one hour after eating, that it could not be advanced to the extent shown short of two and one-half to three hours thereafter, and therefore it was insisted that it was impossible that decedent could have been killed within one hour after eating the noon meal. The testimony of all the witnesses on that part of the case agrees that, about 1 o'clock on the day of the homicide, the defendant left his home, and did not return until late in the afternoon, and after the discovery of the body of the decedent. After a somewhat careful examination by questions and answers, certain hypothetical questions were asked and answered by which the testimony of the experts was further elucidated. We have examined the evidence with care, and are unable to discover where the hypothetical questions varied in any material degree from the testimony, and especially from the evidence and theory of the defense. The experts were men of high standing in their profession

and of known probity of character. In instructing the jury, the court gave the fifteenth instruction, as follows:

"You are not to take for granted that the statements contained in the hypothetical questions which have been propounded to the witnesses are true. Upon the contrary, you are to carefully scrutinize the evidence, and from that determine what, if any, of the averments are true, and what, if any, are not true. Should you find from the evidence that some of the material statements therein contained are not true, and that they are of such character as to entirely destroy the reliability of the opinions based upon the hypothesis stated, you may attach no weight whatever to the opinions based thereon. You are to determine from all the evidence what the real facts are, and whether they are correctly or not stated in the hypothetical question or questions. I need hardly remind you that an opinion based upon a hypothesis wholly incorrectly assumed, or incorrect in its material facts, and to such an extent as to impair the value of the opinion, is of little or no weight. Upon the matters stated in these hypothetical questions, and which are involved in this investigation, you are to give the defendant the benefit of all reasonable doubt, if any there should be, and where there is a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any one of the material facts stated, resolve it in the defendant's favor."

As an abstract proposition of law, this instruction may be, in the main, unobjectionable, and might be properly given in a case to which it should be applied, but we are unable to see where or how it could have any just application to this case. As a general rule the principle involved in this instruction is recognized as applying to the testimony of experts upon questions in which most people have what might be denominated common knowledge, and when such testimony is presented to the jury, or other trier of fact, who may have opinions of their own derived from common experience and observation; and, if an expert gives an opinion which is at variance with that common knowledge or ex-

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perience, the juror is allowed to make use of his own knowledge, intelligence and judgment in weighing the testimony of the expert. But this rule does not apply in its entirety where the substance of the testimony is upon a subject not understood or known by the layman, and the testimony is confined to purely scientific investigations and close application with which others than those making the investigations have no knowledge. As said by Judge Taft in *Ewing v. Goode*, 78 Fed. 442: "In many cases, expert evidence, though all tending one way, is not conclusive upon the court and jury, but the latter, as men of affairs, may draw their own inferences from the facts, and accept or reject the statements of experts; but such cases are when the subject of discussion is on the border line between the domain of general and expert knowledge, as, for instance, where the value of land is involved, or where the value of professional services is in dispute. There the mode of reaching conclusions from the facts when stated is not so different from the inferences of common knowledge that expert testimony can be anything more than a mere guide. But when a case concerns the highly specialized art of treating an eye for cataract, or for the mysterious and dread disease glaucoma, with respect to which a layman can have no knowledge at all, the court and jury must depend on expert evidence. There can be no other guide."

It cannot be denied that the question of post mortem digestion is one upon which the great majority of people have never thought and have no information whatever. This want of knowledge is not confined to laymen. It involves long, careful, patient and persistent investigation, and comparatively few have given the subject sufficient thought or investigation to enable them to speak with anything like exact knowledge thereon. As said in the quotation above given, there can be no other guide than the knowledge of those who have made the subject a matter of special study. True, the jury may bring to their aid such knowledge and experience as they may have

n hand, but, in the absence thereof, they ified in ignoring the testimony of fully

The subject is one which the layman, lge, and even the physician, is not called te as fitting him for his profession or t is safe to say that not one person in ven the subject any investigation or and jurors are usually totally in the l must depend upon the researches of ade the subject one of special investiga- hich they are qualified to give correct pert witnesses were men of known com- ling in their profession, and upon such o a great extent, depend for their guid- ering questions of the kind under con- ist also be observed that, as shown by ions, much the greater portion of the xperts was not given upon hypothetical n direct questions containing no state- pothetical or otherwise, to which they statement of facts resulting from their vestigations. The instruction is almost ne given in the trial of *Quetig v. State*, ein the instruction was approved. In tion of the insanity of the accused pre- al defense. The difference in the quality nder investigation must be apparent to nd. On the question of the sanity of an pury is not limited to the testimony of but the nonexpert, who has observed the tuct and bearing of the accused, is as ify as the expert. This cannot be true of post mortem digestion. Upon this t the expert is qualified to testify at all. on, Expert and Opinion Evidence (2d safer, on the whole, to trust to the judg- en, acquired by study, observation and imperfect deductions of jurors, hastily

derived from readings not familiar to them, unassisted by study, examination and comparison of kindred subjects.

* * * Great respect should be accorded to the views of such a class of witnesses." It must appear to any thinking mind that the instruction was too general, as applying to all cases, and a regard to the due administration of justice would require greater care and discrimination in an instruction upon a question of this kind.

By the sixteenth instruction the jury are permitted to "accept or reject such opinions, as you may accept as true, or reject as false, any other facts in the case. The jury are instructed that the opinions of the witnesses as experts are merely advisory and are not binding on the jury, and the jury should accord to them such weight as they believe, from the facts and circumstances in evidence, the same are entitled to receive." The testimony of the experts explained to the jury the process of digestion, the combination of gases and acids which entered into the process, the necessity for vital action in order that the fluids be secreted by the stomach, but which instantly ceased upon death. All this was carefully stated and explained, without contradiction or dispute, and which the very nature of the testimony would naturally convince the minds of the jury of its truth, yet the jury were informed that they might ignore it all, without a syllable of evidence calling it in question, and, necessarily, without any knowledge or experience on their part by which it might be compared or tested. The jury evidently took the court at its word and arbitrarily cast the proof aside as not worthy of belief.

In the twenty-third instruction the jury were informed that defendant denies the killing of the decedent, and claims that she was not killed until after he left his home on the day of the homicide; "and, if you believe the defendant not guilty, and that he did not shoot and kill the said Louise Flege, as alleged in the information, or in the event that the evidence introduced in the case is so evenly balanced that you cannot tell whether defendant or some

on shot and killed the deceased, as alleged, then acquit the defendant, or if you entertain any doubt of the guilt of the accused of the crime the information then you should give the defendant benefit of such doubt and acquit him." This is objectionable in several particulars: First, believe the defendant not guilty, they should acquit; second, if they believe he did not shoot and kill the decedent, they should acquit him; third, if the evidence is evenly balanced, they should acquit; fourth, if it does not tell whether defendant or some other person committed the crime, they should acquit; or fifth, if they entertain a reasonable doubt of his guilt, they should acquit. There is no rule of law that requires the jury to "believe the defendant not guilty," or that he "did not shoot and kill the decedent, before they could acquit. The burden is on the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and this part of the instruction, as well as the first, except the last clause, should not have been given. It only confuse the jury, and possibly cause them to believe that they must "believe" him "not guilty," and "did not shoot and kill" decedent, before they can acquit it.

In the twenty-sixth instruction the jury were again instructed that "if you find that he did not shoot the said decedent, or entertain a reasonable doubt of his guilt, you should acquit him." Here is a repetition of the same instruction as not necessary that the jury should find that the defendant committed the deed. The question to be decided is whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime?

No criticism is made against the conduct of counsel for the state in the closing argument to the jury, but, if the attorney for the defense will appear no further in the case, the question need not be further considered. There is also no criticism as to the conduct of other counsel for the state. It is hardly probable that the objectionable language, if not specified, need not specify, will be repeated on another day.

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trial, it is thought that it need not be further noticed. Prosecuting officers should always remember that it is not so much their duty to secure convictions as to present the truth without indulging in crimination or recrimination or personal abuse of an accused. If unjust practice is indulged in, the court should repress all such efforts with a firm hand. The constitution and laws guarantee to every person a fair trial. It is the duty of the courts to see that this guaranty is fulfilled. *People v. Davenport*, 13 Cal. App. 632, 110 Pac. 318; 12 Cyc. 571; *McKay v. State*, 90 Neb. 63, 74; *Nickolizack v. State*, 75 Neb. 27, 32; *Wilson v. State*, 87 Neb. 638, 649; *Leahy v. State*, 31 Neb. 566; *State v. Irwin*, 9 Idaho 35, 60 L. R. A. 716; *Bailey v. People*, 130 Pac. (Colo.) 832.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded.

REVERSED.

ROSE, J., dissenting.

The state in employing counsel in criminal cases will be unnecessarily and injuriously hampered by the rules announced. The successful prosecution of a guilty defendant in a contested case depends in a large measure upon the learning, skill and energy of prosecuting attorneys. A county cannot be expected to elect a prosecutor prepared at all times, without assistance, for every legal combat. Many eminent courts hold that the power to employ attorneys to prosecute persons charged with felonies is inherent in sovereignty. 30 Cent. L. J. 344. In the employment of counsel the county attorney, with the consent of the court, acts for the state. The trial judge, who is impartial in the contest, is acquainted with local attorneys and can readily acquaint himself with the character of the services demanded in each particular case. Accused was defended by gifted lawyers. They are capable of emotional advocacy. They are not strangers to science or philosophy. They brought to their client not only their own zeal and accomplishments, but they searched the

rious processes of nature in his behalf, and enlisted the services of a chemical analyst possessing perhaps the highest possible degree of human skill. Their conduct is commendable, and accused, in being thus fortified, is strictly within his rights. In the presence of such an array is the sovereign obliged to employ impartial counsel who will confront them in obsequious humility? If the case might as well have been dismissed at the trial, I believe in the doctrine that "the forensic contest should be fought with something like a just equality of opposing forces." 30 Cent. L. J. 344. Any capable, up-to-date lawyer who will conduct himself properly under the directions of the court may properly be called to assist in the prosecution. Counsel for defendant are partisans, and the judge must be unprejudiced and impartial, but disinterested complacency should not be expected of counsel for the state. Both the trial and the reviewing court should, in the midst of the legal storm, administer rulings and enforce the law unaffected by sentimentality, but the prosecutor should not be required to conform to that standard of official conduct. Reviewable error must be predicated upon a ruling of the trial court. If the assistant prosecutor was guilty of some prejudicial act during the trial, no possible harm resulted from the order overruling the objections to his employment. A erroneous and prejudicial ruling in regard to a spect of misconduct is essential to a reversal on that point. Such a ruling has not been specifically pointed out by the majority. The criticism of the trial court and the assistant prosecutor in this respect is, in my opinion, unmerited.

An attorney is not bound by any duty to advocate the conviction of the innocent for the purpose of shielding his client. No lawyer worthy of his profession ever justified such a tie, either before or after employment. Unfortunately, the thirst of religious bigots and of political parties for human blood has not crept into our institutions. The fears formerly inspired by such abominations

are not bound by any duty to advocate the conviction of the innocent for the purpose of shielding his client. No lawyer worthy of his profession ever justified such a tie, either before or after employment. Unfortunately, the thirst of religious bigots and of political parties for human blood has not crept into our institutions.

The fears formerly inspired by such abominations

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should therefore be laid to rest with the odious conditions under which they were begotten. Owing to human frailties, juries, prosecuting attorneys and trial courts may err, but the present record does not show any disposition on the part of those who participated in this trial to shed innocent blood under the forms of the law. The duty of the trial court is not confined to enforcing the right of defendant to a fair and impartial trial. There is an equal duty to see that the state has a lawful opportunity to establish its charge against accused. The violation of one duty wrongs the individual. The violation of the other wrongs society as a whole. The district judge is appointed by the constitution to be the arbiter between the individual and society collectively. In a criminal prosecution he sees the conditions as they arise. Any rule which improperly interferes with his discretion weakens his power and impairs the efficiency of the tribunal over which he presides. Rulings which have an unnecessary tendency to discourage and humiliate prosecuting officers in the performance of their duties, to weaken the power of the state, and to lessen respect for criminal tribunals, should be avoided.

I adhere to my dissent from the bloody-garment rule announced in *McKay v. State*, 90 Neb. 63, 91 Neb. 281, and followed in this case. It attaches too much importance to shadow, and too little to substance. The passions of sensible men who sit on juries play too tragic a part in records for review.

In my opinion the effect of the expert testimony, under all the circumstances of the case, was a question for the jury. It is not conclusively established by the evidence that decedent's stomach went into the hands of the analyst as nature left it. It had previously been opened and examined. It may fairly be inferred from the evidence that part of the contents was missing. That part analyzed may have been eaten in the forenoon. The report of the analyst, therefore, does not annihilate the direct evidence of defendant's guilt. If Science is to pronounce the decree

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of Omnipotence in a criminal prosecution, the hypotheses adopted by the scientist should be free from infirmities like those mentioned.

LETTON, J., dissenting.

I cannot agree with the opinion on the following points:

1. The scorched and burned garments directly corroborated the testimony of Eichtencamp, and, therefore, tested by the very rule announced in the opinion, were properly admitted in evidence.

2. As pointed out by Judge ROSE, the expert evidence, under the circumstances in this case, was not conclusive as to the length of time that elapsed after the deceased ate a meal and before her death. While the principle of law quoted from Judge Taft is correct, it is not strictly applicable here.

CLARA RATHJEN, APPELLEE, V. WOODMEN ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION, APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,160.

1. **Appeal: VERDICT: CONFLICTING EVIDENCE.** In an action on a policy of accident insurance, where the question of the cause of the death of the assured is submitted to the jury on conflicting evidence, a reviewing court will not set aside the verdict unless it is shown to be clearly wrong.
2. ———: **WITNESSES: OPINION OF EXPERT.** Where the physician and surgeon who treated the assured for his accidental injury has shown himself competent to testify as a medical expert, has fully and clearly described the nature of the injury and its effect, together with the condition and symptoms of his patient, it is not reversible error to permit him to state what, in his opinion, caused the death of the assured.
3. **Instructions examined, and found to be without reversible error.**

APPEAL from the district court for Webster county:
HARRY S. DUNGAN, JUDGE. Affirmed.

Hainer & Craft, for appellant.

Bernard McNeny, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action on a policy of accident insurance issued by the Woodmen Accident Association, a domestic corporation, to Henry J. Rathjen, by which it was provided that, in case of his death "caused directly and exclusively by bodily injury effected by external, violent and accidental means," the association would pay to his beneficiary, Clara Rathjen, the sum of \$1,000. A trial in the district court for Webster county resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant has appealed.

It is strenuously contended that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, in this, that it was not shown that Rathjen's death was caused directly and exclusively by bodily injury effected by accidental means. The record discloses that the assured was a man 33 years of age, 6 feet in height, who weighed about 180 pounds. He was a farmer, and engaged in that occupation on the 27th day of June, 1910, and was apparently in good health. On that day, while working with a team and cultivator in his cornfield, he was accidentally struck on this right knee by the iron lever of his cultivator; the knee commenced to swell, and the swelling continued until July 3, when he obtained treatment for his injury from Doctor Cook, who relieved the injured part by removing an effusion of water and serum, and bandaged the patient's leg. Not obtaining satisfactory relief from the treatment of Doctor Cook, the assured, on the 10th day of July, employed Doctor Moranville, who removed the bandage and applied a milder dressing. Doctor Moranville testified that at that time Rathjen had a high temperature or fever; that two days thereafter he became confined to his bed, from which he never arose, and died on the following 12th day of August, 1910.

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The foregoing facts are undisputed. It is claimed, however, by the defendant, that Rathjen's death was caused by what is known as "Bright's disease," or to use the words of Doctor Raines, "chronic interstitial nephritis." On this question the evidence was conflicting. Doctor Moranville, a physician of more than 35 years' experience and practice, who appeared from his evidence on both his direct and cross-examination to have been familiar with cases of a like nature, and who treated the assured from about the 10th day of July until death ensued, testified that in his opinion Rathjen's death was the result of blood-poisoning, caused by the injury to his right knee which was sustained by the accident of June 27, 1910. For the defendant, Doctor Raines, who was called to see the patient about the 31st of July, testified, in substance, that in his opinion Rathjen's death was caused by chronic interstitial nephritis, or what is commonly called "Bright's disease." Of the two physicians Doctor Moranville seems to have had the best opportunity to ascertain the cause of Rathjen's death, and, without doubt, the jury were more impressed by his evidence than that given by Doctor Raines. Doctor Cook, who appeared to be a competent and unprejudiced witness, gave testimony, which, to some extent, strengthened the evidence of Doctor Moranville. It is true that Doctor Cook testified that about a year before the accident occurred he treated Rathjen for stomach and kidney trouble, but he also testified that the trouble disappeared as the result of his treatment. Doctor Creighton testified, in answer to a hypothetical question, that the death of Rathjen might be attributed to Bright's disease, while Doctor Cook admitted that Rathjen's death could have arisen from blood-poisoning as a result of his accidental injury. As indicating the real nature of the disease, the testimony shows that at its earliest stages the injured knee was swollen; but it appears from the evidence of the physicians that, if there had been a dropsical condition resulting from Bright's disease, both of the patient's legs would probably have been swollen. The

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testimony of Rathjen's father was to the effect that the injured knee was the only one that was swollen, and there was no swelling of the left limb. Like testimony was given by a Mr. McIntyre, a neighbor, who helped to take care of Rathjen during his illness. Rathjen's wife testified, in substance, that he had never had any serious illness, and up to the time of his injury he was in good health and able to pursue his ordinary work.

In *Caldwell v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n*, 136 N. W. (Ia.) 678, it was said: "Where death results from erysipelas, which follows as a natural, though not as a necessary, consequence of an accidental wound upon the cheek, it may be deemed the proximate result of the wound, and not of the disease, within the requirements of an accident policy, that death must result solely by accidental means."

In *Western Commercial Travelers Ass'n v. Smith*, 85 Fed. 401, 40 L. R. A. 653, Judge Sanborn of the United States court of appeals used the following language: "If the death was caused by a disease which was not the result of any bodily infirmity or disease in existence at the time of the accident, but which was itself caused by the external, violent, and accidental means which produced the bodily injury, the association was equally liable to pay the indemnity. In such a case, the disease is an effect of the accident, the incidental means produced and used by the original moving cause to bring about its fatal effect, a mere link in the chain of causation between the accident and the death, and the death is attributable, not to the disease, but to the *causa causans*, to the accident alone." This rule is supported by *Delancy v. Modern Accident Club*, 121 Ia. 528; *Ward v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.*, 82 Neb. 499; *Schumacher v. Great Eastern Casualty & Indemnity Co.*, 197 N. Y. 58, 27 L. R. A. n. s. 480; *Cary v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co.*, 127 Wis. 67, 5 L. R. A. n. s. 928; *Western Travelers Accident Ins. Ass'n v. Munson*, 73 Neb. 858.

In the light of these authorities, and in view of the

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ny, we feel unable to say that the evidence does support the verdict.

strenuously contended that the district court erred in giving the testimony of Doctor Moranville over the defendant's objection. That objection seems to have been based on the competency of the witness. It is in the following words: "Objected to by defendant as incompetent, the witness not shown to be competent." As above stated, the testimony of Doctor Moranville settled the question of his competency as an expert witness beyond question. He was skilfully cross-examined at great length by counsel for the defendant, and acquitted himself in an admirable manner. It was shown that he had been engaged in the active practice of his profession for more than 35 years; that he had had cases of a like nature and evidently knew the truth of the facts to which he testified. It should also be observed that after having observed his treatment of the assured, and all of the conditions and symptoms in the case, including a test of the assured's urine, he gave his opinion as to what caused the assured's death, and, as we view the case, the reception of his testimony was not reversible error.

The defendant further contended that instruction No. 9 is inconsistent with the instructions given by the court at the request of the defendant. We have examined the instructions, and, as we view them, they are not inconsistent. In instructing the jury on the defendant's theory of defence, the court, by the ninth paragraph of the instructions, gave plaintiff's theory of the case, and concluded as follows: "If, on the other hand, you find from the evidence that the said Henry J. Rathjen received a serious injury through external, violent and accidental means, and that a disease, commonly known as 'Bright's disease,' or blood-poisoning, resulted and was brought on by the injury, and that said disease so resulting from the injury, if you find it did so result, contributed to or caused the death of said Henry J. Rathjen, that would be such a disease or bodily infirmity as would prevent

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recovery of the plaintiff in this case, as defined in these instructions." We think the part of the instruction quoted is in line with the rule laid down in the authorities above cited, and was supported by the testimony of the medical experts.

As we view the record, it contains no reversible error, and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., LETTON and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

IDA L. CADY, APPELLEE, v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,202.

1. **Insurance: ACTION ON POLICY: WAIVER: EVIDENCE.** Where the question of a waiver of the conditions of a policy of life insurance by letters notifying the assured of a default in the payment of a past-due premium is submitted to the jury, the insurer is entitled to introduce in evidence the whole of the correspondence between the parties, and it is error to exclude any part of it which shows the construction of the policy agreed upon by both parties to the contract.
2. **Contracts: CONSTRUCTION: INTERPRETATION BY PARTIES.** The practical interpretation given their contracts by the parties to them while they are engaged in their performance, and before any controversy has arisen concerning them, is one of the best indications of their true intent, and the courts will ordinarily enforce such construction.
3. **Insurance: PREMIUMS: NOTICE OF DEFAULT: EFFECT.** A notice sent by an agent of a life insurance company to the assured that the premium on his policy of insurance is past due and unpaid, with a request for its payment, without more, payment being refused, did not change the terms of the contract with respect to the date of its conversion into a paid-up policy of term insurance.
4. ———: **LAPSE OF POLICY.** Where the contract for paid-up term insurance is plain and unambiguous, and the parties have agreed

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the date when the policy will lapse, if the death of the assured occurs subsequent to that date no recovery can be had under the policy.

REFUSAL TO DIRECT VERDICT. Where, under the law and the facts, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, it is error for the trial court to refuse to direct a verdict for the defendant.

from the district court for Douglas county:
SEARS, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

Breckenridge, for appellant.

Money and Gurley & Woodrough, contra.

J.

On a policy of life insurance. A trial in the district court for Douglas county resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant has ap-

pealed. It is shown that, by the policy in question, defendant issued a policy of life insurance on the life of Henry F. Cady for the sum of \$25,000, payable on his death to his wife, who brings this action. The policy was issued on the 24th day of April, 1893, for consideration of the application and the payment of premium of \$465.25, payable in advance on the 1st day of April of each year during the life of the assured. The contract was not to take effect until and unless the first premium was paid while the assured was living. The policy further provided that, in case of default in the payment of a premium, after the third, the policy should remain in force for the terms specified in the table of paid-up term insurance, indorsed thereon. It was also given the assured the option, upon certain conditions, to take the paid-up value of the policy in cash or to have it added to him at the time of the default, or to consider the policy converted into paid-up term insurance for the term designated in the table above mentioned. All of the facts of the policy which are not involved in this appeal are omitted from this opinion. It is agreed

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by the parties that the assured paid nine annual premiums, and then declined to make any further payments; that he failed and refused to pay the premium due on the 21st day of April, 1902, and by the terms of the policy he was then entitled to a paid-up term of insurance for seven years and eight months from the date of his default, and if he should thereafter make no other payments upon the policy his term insurance would lapse on the 21st day of December, 1909. The assured refused to make any additional payments, and departed this life on the 24th day of January, 1910. Suit was brought on the policy by the beneficiary, on the theory that the defendant, by sending certain notices to the assured that he was in default of the payment of his annual premium, due April 21, 1902, and requesting its payment, extended the life provision of the policy to June 23, 1902, at which time the term insurance began to run, and therefore the death of Henry F. Cady occurred before, and not after, his term insurance had expired. The trial court adopted the plaintiff's theory of the case, instructed the jury accordingly, and the plaintiff had the verdict and judgment.

Defendant assigns error for excluding from the evidence the letters of the assured in which he notified the defendant of his refusal to pay the premium due on the 21st day of April, 1902, and in which he declared his option to claim paid-up term insurance for seven years and eight months from that date, as indicating the construction of the contract by both the assured and the defendant; and for the refusal of the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant. The foregoing assignments present the only questions which are necessary for us to determine upon this appeal.

1. In disposing of defendant's first contention, it is sufficient to say that it appears that the trial court received in evidence the letters of the defendant company by which the assured was notified of his default in the payment of his annual premium due on the 21st day of April, 1902, and in which its payment was requested, but excluded the

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ter of the assured by which he expressly refused to make the payment, notified defendant of his election to consider his policy converted into term insurance, and stated his understanding of the contract to be that he was entitled to paid-up insurance for a term of seven years and eight months from April 21, 1902. It appears that in reply to this letter defendant assented to that arrangement, and informed the assured that his understanding of the contract was correct. If the effect of this correspondence was to be submitted to the jury as showing a waiver of the terms of the policy, it was error to exclude any part of it. In *Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Wright*, 126 Fed. 82, the court said: "The practical interpretation given to their contracts by the parties to them while they are engaged in their performance, and before any controversy has arisen concerning them, is one of the best indications of their true intent, and courts that adopt and enforce such a construction are not likely to commit serious error." This rule was followed in *Johnson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.*, 143 Fed. 950. The rule seems to be well settled that where the parties have acted upon and construed a contract, in the absence of any mistake or misunderstanding between them, the court will enforce such contract as so interpreted. *Jobst Hayden Bros.*, 84 Neb. 735. To our minds it seems clear that, if the plaintiff was to rely upon any part of the correspondence between the assured and the defendant, then the jury should have been given the whole of that correspondence, and this assignment of error is well founded.

2. As we view the record, there is no dispute in relation to the facts of this case, therefore the court should determine the main question, and finally dispose of this action, thus preventing further litigation.

It is plaintiff's contention that the defendant waived the conditions of the contract, extended the time for payment, and thereby changed the time from that fixed by the terms of the policy itself to another date at which the term insurance in question commenced to run, by the no-

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tices of default and request for payment of the past-due premium above mentioned.

In *Parker v. Knights Templars & Masons Life Indemnity Co.*, 70 Neb. 268, it was held: "A permanent waiver of a condition in a policy of insurance would not be inferred from occasional indulgences shown a policy holder. No implication of a waiver of the terms of a contract can arise from acts which may be construed as a compliance with such terms."

In *Driscoll v. Modern Brotherhood of America*, 77 Neb. 282, it was said: "A waiver of a condition will not be implied from an act not inconsistent with an intention to insist upon performance."

In *Sharpe v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, 5 Neb. (Unof.) 278, it was held that the giving of a note extending the time for the payment of a past-due premium, which contained an agreement providing for the forfeiture of the rights of the assured if the note was not paid at maturity, default having been made in such payment, did not operate as a waiver of the terms of the policy providing for forfeiture in case of nonpayment of premiums. We think this rule is sustained by the great weight of authority in this country. *Thompson v. Insurance Co.*, 104 U. S. 252; *Nederland Life Ins. Co. v. Meinert*, 199 U. S. 171.

In *Stephenson v. Empire Life Ins. Co.*, 76 S. E. (Ga.) 592, the question of the effect of a request for the payment of a past-due premium was before the court. In that case the life insurance policy contained a stipulation that if any premium is not paid on or before the day it is due, or if any note or obligation that may be accepted by the company for the whole or any part of the first or any subsequent premium, or any other payment under this policy, be dishonored or not paid, on or before the day when due, this policy shall, without any affirmative act on the part of the company, or any of its officers or agents, be annulled and void, except as herein provided. It was held that a failure to pay a note for a portion of the first annual premium when the note became due worked a for-

of the policy, and that the condition of the policy was waived by a demand made by the insured after payment of the note for its payment, the assured having made such payment.

On this question we are not without authority of our own state. In *Swett v. Antelope County Farmers Mutual Ins. Co.*, 561, it was held that making a demand for a payment by a mutual insurance company of an assessment on a policy of insurance, subsequent to a loss under the policy, will not be held to be a waiver of its terms, in the absence of a plea and proof of payment by the assured of the assessment.

In *Edging v. Northern Assurance Co.*, 170 Mich. 528, it was held where an insured, upon giving his notes for his premium when it became due, was granted an extension of several months, and then failed to pay the notes at maturity. His policy lapsed and became void at once. The statute provided that every insurance policy should contain a provision giving the insured one month of grace for payment of every premium after the first year, and the policy conformed to the statute. It was held that the extension in connection with the statute did not entitle the insured to two periods of grace.

In view of the facts of this case, the defendant's request for payment of the past-due premium, not complied with, on the other hand, which was positively refused,

will not have the effect to change the conditions of the policy and the term insurance provided for thereby commenced to run on the 21st day of April, 1902, and expired at the end of time on the 21st day of December, 1909. *Johnston v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.*, 143 Fed. 950; *Roehner v. Kerbocker Life Ins. Co.*, 63 N. Y. 167; *Wilkie v. New York Mutual Life Ins. Co.*, 146 N. Car. 513, 60 S. Car. 101; *Grattan v. Prudential Ins. Co.*, 98 Minn. 491; *New York Life Ins. Co.*, 88 Neb. 707; *McLaughlin v. National Life Assurance Society*, 38 Neb. 725.

The plaintiff contended, however, that the understanding and intention of the assured and the defendant could not in any

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manner affect the rights of the plaintiff, who was the beneficiary named in the policy, which had become fixed by the terms of the contract. As we view the record, this contention is without merit. Under the terms of the contract itself, the assured was entitled to paid-up term insurance for seven years and eight months, in consideration of the premiums that had been paid by him before his default occurred, and the beneficiary was entitled to the same and no greater right. We have seen that the notification that the assured was in default of payment of the premium due on the 21st day of April, 1902, and the request for payment did not change the terms of the policy. Its terms were plain and unambiguous, and were understood alike by both the defendant and the assured. By no act of the defendant or of the assured were the rights of the beneficiary changed; and, the term insurance to which they were alike entitled having lapsed before the death of the assured, there was, at his death, nothing due to his beneficiary.

As we view the case, we are constrained by the authorities to hold that it was error for the district court to refuse the defendant's request for a directed verdict.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed; and, as there can be no recovery in this case, the plaintiff's action is dismissed.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

HAMER, J., not sitting.

IN RE ESTATE OF FREDERICK A. SASSE.

WILLIAM SASSE ET AL., APPELLEES, V. MARIE SASSE,
APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,215.

1. **Executors and Administrators: PAYMENT OF DEBTS: SALE OF REALTY.** If there are collectible personal assets belonging to the estate of a deceased person sufficient to pay all of his debts, the

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district court has no authority to order the sale of any portion of real estate for that purpose.

: CONSTRUCTION: PAYMENT OF DEBTS. Will of the decedent mined and construed, certain of its provisions set out in the opinion, and held to create a fund, available to the executors, of more than a sufficient amount to pay all of the debts of the decedent.

APPEAL from the district court for Stanton county:
 . GRAVES, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed.*

V. Young and G. A. Eberly, for appellant.

hardt & Horton and A. R. Olson, contra.

MR. JUSTICE, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court for Stanton county, granting to the executors of the will of Frederick A. Sasse, deceased, a license to sell certain real estate, of which he died seized, for the payment of his

appears, without dispute, that on the 7th day of November, 1894, Frederick A. Sasse made a will, wherein he devised certain land to his three sons, and the residue of his estate he devised and bequeathed to his several children, share and share alike. On the 18th day of August, 1895, Sasse executed conveyances to his three sons for the land which he had devised to them by will, and took from them certain contracts by which they each agreed to pay him the sum of \$1,200, to be distributed according to his will in case he died testate, but, in case he should die intestate, the money which they were to pay his estate was to be distributed "to his present heirs and their legal representatives." No other will was made by him. On the 10th day of June, 1908, Sasse died, and the will above mentioned was presented for probate. The will was conveyed by his widow, a second wife, whom he had married in 1902. His will was executed. On appeal to the district court the will was admitted to probate, subject to the

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statutory property rights of the widow. During the year in which the contest proceedings were pending, there was no administrator or executor appointed, and the estate so remained until the 7th day of August, 1909, when the present executors were appointed and qualified. During the time of the contest, the real estate involved in this proceeding was in the possession of Gustav Sasse, one of the sons of the deceased, who had been the tenant thereon for a number of years, and who claimed he was authorized to make certain improvements on the premises and apply the same in payment for the rent. He continued as tenant after the death of his father, and remained such until March 1, 1910. He now claims that he expended the sum of \$400 for improvements on the premises, which he insists he has the right to set off against the rent due the estate.

At the time of the death of Frederick A. Sasse he was the owner of a farm consisting of 120 acres of land situated in Stanton county, together with lots 1, 2 and 3, in block 48 of the original town of Stanton, on which was situated a dwelling-house, occupied at that time as a homestead, which property was not disposed of by his will. The farm land above mentioned was incumbered by a mortgage of \$800, bearing interest at 5 per cent. from July 1, 1908, payable semi-annually. It appears that the amount due on the mortgage was not filed as a claim against the estate. The town property was clear of incumbrance, and has been occupied since the death of the testator by his widow as her homestead. The farm was rented for the year ending March 1, 1909, to Gustav Sasse, from whom there was a balance of \$40 due as rent, and which has never been paid. The farm was rented for the year ending March 1, 1910, at a rental value of \$360. For the year ending March 1, 1911, it was occupied by Herman Sasse at an agreed rental value of \$360, and at the time of the commencement of this proceeding it was still occupied by him as a tenant, for the year ending March 1, 1912, at an agreed rental value of \$360, and no part of the rents above mentioned have been paid.

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rs that the executors have made no effort to rent, and it is contended by the appellant that lone, which should have been collected, amount In addition to the rent due the estate, Herman um Sasse, the executors, and their brother re each indebted to the estate in the sum of h interest at the rate of 7 per cent. from June eured by mortgages, according to the contracts een them and their deceased father, as above o attempt whatever has been made by the ex- collect the amounts so due on said contracts, y portion thereof been paid. Under these cir- the executors of the will applied for, and re- cense from the judge of the district court for unty to sell that portion of the real estate, des- the 120-acre farm, for the alleged purpose of debts of the deceased, which amount to about om the order of the district court granting the ve mentioned, the widow has appealed.

ow contends that the money due from Gustav, id Ernest Sasse belongs to the estate of her isband, and so much thereof as may be neces-

be used for the payment of his debts; that the who are the sons of the deceased, are unlaw- eding to sell the land in question for the pur- riving her of her share of the estate, and are thus increase their own distributive portions hile the executors claim that the money due ons of the testator belongs to and should be

them. The determination of this question re- nstruction of a portion of the will, and it is y all parties that if the sums of money above elong to the estate, and are available for the the debts of the testator, the judgment of the rt should be reversed and the proceeding dis- r the first clause of the will it is provided: "I my funeral charges, the expense of administer- te, and all of my debts be paid out of my per-

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sonal property. If this be insufficient, I authorize my executors hereinafter named to sell so much of my real estate as may be necessary for that purpose." By the third clause of the will it is provided: "I give and bequeath to my son, William Frederick August Sasse, the following described real estate, to wit: The south half of the northeast quarter and the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter and the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter all in section seven in township number twenty-two north, range number three east in Stanton county, Nebraska, and the said William Frederick August Sasse is to be charged with the sum of one thousand eight hundred dollars, and after deducting from said sum the amount due him under the general distribution as hereinafter set forth, the balance, if there be any, shall be paid by him to my executors within a reasonable time after the amount is ascertained and determined." The other subdivisions of the will, devising certain lands to Herman and Gustav, the other sons of the deceased, are the same, in substance, as the one above quoted. By the seventh clause of the will it is provided: "I give and bequeath all the residue of my estate, real and personal, to my children, William Frederick August Sasse, Herman Sasse, Ernest Sasse, Gustav Sasse, Amelia Sasse, and Minnie Mason, share and share alike as tenants in common to be to them as herein directed. In case any of my children shall die in my lifetime leaving issue or descendants, I direct that his or her share shall not lapse, but shall be paid to such descendants in equal proportions." By the eighth clause of the will it was further provided: "The amount due to my sons hereinbefore mentioned shall be deducted from the amount due for the lands hereinbefore bequeathed, and the sum due to Amelia Sasse shall be paid to her within a reasonable time after my decease, and for the welfare and protection of my daughter, Minnie Mason, I direct that her share in my estate shall be placed in the hands of a trustee to be appointed by the county court of Stanton county, who shall give a good and suffi-

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cient bond for the custody and investment of the funds, and the interest shall be paid to her as long as she shall live as the wife of her present husband, A. C. Mason. In case of the death of her said husband, then and in that case, the entire sum shall be paid to her, and in case of her death occurring prior to that of her husband, then the said sum or share shall remain in trust for her children, if they shall survive her."

Construing the portions of the will above quoted, with all of its other provisions, we are of opinion that, by the payment of the sums of money due from his three sons, it was the intention of the testator to create a fund available to his executors for the payment of his funeral charges, his debts, and the expense of administering his estate. The remainder of the funds, together with his property undisposed of at the time of his death, was to be divided equally between his children share and share alike. Any other construction of the will would deprive the daughters of the testator of any considerable portion of his estate. It evidently was his intention to require the sons to pay over to the executors so much of the money secured by their contracts as would be necessary to pay his funeral charges, his debts, and the expense of administration, and the distributive share belonging to his two daughters. Each of the sons was to be allowed to retain such remainder of the fund, if any, as would amount to his distributive share of the estate. By adopting this construction of the will, it appears that there was available to the executors a fund amounting to about \$4,500 for the payment of the debts of the testator, which it is conceded were only about \$1,200 at the time the district court made the order to sell the farm belonging to his estate.

It follows that the order for the sale of the land in question should not have been granted. The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and the proceeding is dismissed.

REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

REESE, C. J., FAWCETT and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

LETTON, ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

ROBERT COULTER, APPELLANT, v. MARION T. CUMMINGS,
APPELLEE.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,240.

1. **Conversion.** An action for conversion will not lie for the disposition of property which the plaintiff has authorized. If he has an action, it is for the price or value of the property.
2. ———: **PROOF.** In such a case, in order to recover the value of the property, the plaintiff is required to prove that defendant expressly or impliedly agreed to pay him the purchase price, or the market value thereof.
3. **Trial: DIRECTING VERDICT.** Where the evidence will not sustain a verdict for the plaintiff, it is the duty of the trial court to direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.

APPEAL from the district court for Gage county:
LEANDER M. PEMBERTON, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

E. O. Kretsinger and Ernest L. Kretsinger, for appellant.

Hugh J. Dobbs, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action commenced in the district court for Gage county to recover a sum of money alleged to be due plaintiff from the defendant for the sale or conversion of certain capital stock of a corporation, known as the "M. T. Cummings Milling Company." At the conclusion of the trial the court below directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.

It appears, without dispute, that in the month of October, 1901, the plaintiff and the defendant, together with certain other persons, organized a corporation, under the laws of this state, for the purpose of purchasing a mill and water-power at Blue Rapids, Kansas, to be operated in manufacturing corn products. It was provided by the articles of incorporation that the capital stock of the

company should be \$30,000, divided into equal shares of \$100 each, of which one-fourth was required to be issued and fully paid up at the time the business was commenced. It was also provided that all of the stock should be common stock, nonassessable, and transferable on the books of the company. Subsequent to organization, and at the date when the company began active operations as a manufacturing concern, the amount of \$16,500 of stock had been issued and paid for at par. Of this stock the plaintiff became the owner of 10 shares of \$100 each. From the proceeds of the sale of the stock, the milling company, in 1902, purchased a mill site, mill house, water-power and power-rights at Blue Rapids, Kansas, repaired and remodeled the mill house, flume, sea walls, and other appurtenances to said property, and installed new milling machinery necessary for their purposes, of the latest and best type. This was connected up to the power, and in the autumn of 1902 the mill was put into successful operation as a manufacturing plant. The power for the operation of the mill, as well as for the operation of a number of other milling and manufacturing plants, was supplied by a large and well-constructed stone dam across the Blue river, which had been in successful operation for more than 35 years. Thus the venture of the milling company appeared to lack no essential element of complete success.

It further appears that during the first week of June, 1903, there occurred a great flood, which inundated the entire valley of the Big Blue river from its source to its mouth. In volume of water, duration, force, and destructiveness, this flood was unparalleled in the known history of that country. It practically destroyed the property of the milling company. It washed out and destroyed the switch track connecting the property with the Union Pacific railroad, nearly a mile away, and the railroad company refused to rebuild the switch. This required the milling company to depend upon wagons for the transportation of its products and all other freight to and from the railway station, a distance of three-fourths of a mile.

In addition, the country road leading to the mill was destroyed, making access to the property difficult to the farming community. Great damage was wrought to the mill house, the flume, and machinery, and, in addition, a large amount of grain in bins and manufactured products on hand were lost and damaged or totally destroyed. At the time of this disaster the milling company was indebted to the First National Bank of Beatrice on its promissory note, which, with interest, amounted to something over \$5,500, an indebtedness which had been incurred by the company to enable it to operate its mill. It further appears that the effect of the flood was to cut a new channel for the river some distance up the stream from the point where the company's property was situated, and above the stone dam, leaving that structure high and dry without water, so that the power by which the mill had been operated was completely destroyed. The milling company was thus left without assets of any kind to meet its indebtedness, except such as could be realized out of the wreck of its property. Soon after this disaster the defendant, as the principal stockholder, president of the board of trustees, and manager of the property, endeavored to sell it for a sum sufficient to discharge the company's debt to the bank. For over a year the proposition to sell the property was extensively advertised in various milling journals, and by other means, all of which resulted in a failure to make such a sale. Finally, the defendant took up the matter of adjusting the debt in some way with the other stockholders of the company, and on or about the 23d day of August, 1904, he wrote to the members of the company, including the plaintiff, advising them of the necessity of devising some means of paying the debt. Amongst the plans suggested was a surrender to him of the stock in consideration of his assuming and paying the debts of the company. Some time in the year 1904 the township in which the city of Blue Rapids is situated voted to issue its bonds in the sum of \$20,000, and use the proceeds thereof in an effort to redivert the Blue river to

ancient channel, and thereby retrieve, to some extent, misfortune which the whole community and surrounding country, equally with the milling company, had suffered from the flood. The work was put under way in 1904, and completed in 1905, with a fair prospect that diversion of the power to the stone dam would be effective and permanent. Under these circumstances the defendant was able to interest Mr. F. B. Draper and Mr. W. Bryson, of Adams, Nebraska, in his milling company, finally reached an agreement by which they were to assist him in taking over all of the stock of the company on the basis of the assumption and payment of the indebtedness of the old company above described.

On June 8, 1905, defendant wrote, addressed and mailed letter to the plaintiff, advising him of this arrangement, stating, among other things, that all the stockholders had assigned their stock to him, or were willing to do so, on condition that he pay the company's debt to the bank, and renewing his request for the assignment of plaintiff's stock on those conditions. Plaintiff thereafter delivered his stock to the defendant. The new company was organized, and the mill was repaired and put in operation. The property was leased to one Ed S. Miller, and in May, 1906, the mill house, with its contents, was totally destroyed by fire.

The plaintiff, by his amended petition, sought to recover the value of the stock which he delivered to the defendant, on the theory that the defendant wrongfully converted it to his use, or agreed to pay the plaintiff his money therefor as soon as the mill was put in operation. The defendant demurred to the amended petition on the ground that the facts stated did not constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled, and the objection sustained was kept good at all stages of the trial. The answer was, in effect, a general denial.

Several reasons are assigned for a reversal of the judgment of the district court. A consideration of the assignment that the court erred in directing the jury to return

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a verdict for the defendant is sufficient to dispose of the case without passing upon the other question presented by the record.

The bill of exceptions shows that plaintiff gave no testimony showing, or tending to show, that his stock was obtained from him by any false pretext, but that it was obtained by defendant for the purpose of organizing a new corporation, and that it was used for that purpose. His testimony, in part, is: "He (meaning the defendant) requested me, and asked me, if I would be willing to turn it (the stock) over to him if he got a couple of men to go in with him and start the mill again, that was after it was flooded, you know, and I consented to it. * * * Well, he asked me if I would be willing to let him have it in his possession so he could start the new mill, and I consented to it rather than leaving the mill standing idle. I gave the stock to him on these grounds. He was to have it in his possession until he started the new mill, and I expected the money out of it then. * * * Well, he requested me to bring the stock when I came up town, and I brought the certificates and handed them to him, with the understanding—I had the understanding—I was to get my money out of them. Q. Mr. Coulter, when you took the stock to Mr. Cummings, what did Mr. Cummings say about the stock? A. When I handed it to him? Q. Yes. A. Well, he thanked me for it. I said, I expected to get my money for it when he got to running the mill. * * * He said it would be doubtful. He said, if there was any money to be got out of a water-mill, he had yet to see it."

As we view the plaintiff's own evidence, he failed to make out a case against the defendant for the conversion of stock. To maintain an action for conversion of chattels, a party must have actual possession of the property, or the right to immediate possession. Code, sec. 182; *Raymond Bros. & Co. v. Miller*, 50 Neb. 506; *Hill v. Campbell Commission Co.*, 54 Neb. 59; *Thompson & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Nicholls*, 52 Neb. 312. Plaintiff failed to

testify that he was entitled to the possession of the stock in question at the time the action was begun. He produced no evidence that he ever demanded possession of the stock, or requested the defendant to pay him anything as the purchase price thereof. His testimony, and the allegation of his petition, contradict and refute the theory of a wrongful conversion of his stock by the defendant. Conversion in law is unauthorized dealing with the goods of another by one in possession, whereby the nature or quality of the goods is essentially altered, or by which one having the right of possession is deprived of all substantial use of his goods, temporarily or permanently. *Herrick v. Humphrey Hardware Co.*, 73 Neb. 809; *Aylesbury Mercantile Co. v. Fitch*, 22 Okla. 475, 23 L. R. A. n. s. 573. It follows that the authorized use of the property by the defendant in this case will not support an action for conversion. In *Carlson v. Jordan*, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 359, it was said: "No action for conversion will lie on account of a disposition of property which plaintiff admits authorizing. If he has an action, it is for the price of the property."

Again, in order for the plaintiff to recover the value of his stock, it was necessary for him to show, by some competent evidence, that the defendant had promised to pay him its value when the mill was again in operation. The evidence contains no such promise. Plaintiff did not testify that the defendant ever agreed to pay him the value of the stock. He testified that, in answer to his assumption that he was to receive the money for his stock, the defendant said: "It would be doubtful * * * if there was any money to be got out of a water-mill." It seems idle to assert that this amounted to a promise to pay the plaintiff anything whatever for his stock. Again, we find no testimony in the record from which the value of the stock, if it had any value whatsoever, can be ascertained. On the other hand, it seems clear from the undisputed facts contained in the record that plaintiff's stock has no value whatever.

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As we view the record, no other verdict than the one which was returned under the direction of the court could have been sustained, and therefore the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., FAWCETT and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

LETTON, ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

CHARLES F. JOHNSON ET AL., APPELLEES, V. PAYNE INVESTMENT COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,250.

1. **Brokers: ACTION FOR COMMISSION: BURDEN OF PROOF.** In an action on a contract between real estate brokers for a division of commissions on the sale of real estate, jointly listed by both parties, by which it was provided that, if sale is made by the second party without the aid of the first party, the second party shall have all of the commission, it being conceded that the sale on which the first party claims to be entitled to a division of the commission was in fact made by the second party, the burden is on the first party to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the sale was made by or with its aid or assistance.
2. ———: ———: **EVIDENCE: SUFFICIENCY.** Evidence examined, its substance set forth in the opinion, and *held* insufficient to require a division of the commission.

APPEAL from the district court for Scott's Bluff county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. Affirmed.

Wright & Duffie, for appellant.

Morrow & Morrow, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action to recover commissions on the sale of certain lands, jointly listed for sale by the plaintiffs and the de-

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in directing the verdict, and insists that, under the evidence, the question of the defendant's right to recover should have been submitted to the jury. A determination of that question will dispose of all of the questions presented by the record.

It appears from the evidence that, under their contract, the plaintiffs and the defendant had listed for sale jointly the northwest quarter of section 10, township 22 north of range 56, which was sold to one George W. Andrus. The defendant admits that the plaintiffs made the sale, and by the terms of the contract defendant was not entitled to any part of the commissions, unless it or its subagents assisted in, or contributed to, the making of the sale. It appears from the evidence that a concern called the Deutch Land Company had a contract similar to the one between plaintiffs and defendant, which, however, did not include the quarter section of land above described. It also appears that the purchaser of the tract of land in question came to Scott's Bluff on or about the 17th day of June, 1909. When he arrived there he had some talk with the Deutch Land Company, and was shown several pieces of land which it had for sale. They also told him that the plaintiffs and the defendant had the land in question listed jointly, that they did not have the right to sell it, and that he had better see the plaintiffs. On the following day Andrus went to a Mr. Barber, who was his brother-in-law, to look at the lands in that vicinity; and, after looking over various tracts, they went to Mitchell, where the plaintiffs had their office, who took Andrus out to view the land, and afterwards sold it to him.

One Beach Coleman, who was associated with the Deutch Land Company, and who was called as a witness for the defendant, testified, in substance, that he first met Andrus in his office in Scott's Bluff; that his company was working at that time for the Payne Investment Company; that Andrus was looking for some irrigated land, and desired something rather choice. He said: "I suggested that I show him a piece of land or two. I told him at the

time that probably our lands were not quite such land as he had in mind. As a matter of fact I was trying to tie him to us as well as I could in the short time I was with him. I took him out north of town and showed him a piece of land. The land I showed him at that time was listed with us and with the Payne Investment Company. He did not go all the way out with me. When we got near the street east of Mr. Barber's place, he said he would get out there and go to Mr. Barber's place and stay all night. I saw him again the next morning in my office. I told him that the Payne Investment Company's train would be in the next day, and I invited him to get on that train and go up to the headgate, but he did not get in in time to do that. About the time the train came back he came into the office again. I said to him that they were ready to go out and look over the country, and that it would probably give him a good idea as to the country if he would get in and go along. I was careful that he should get into the car that Mr. Deutch was in. I did not go on that trip, but turned him over to Mr. Deutch. I next saw him that evening. He came into our office with Mr. Barber. I had been talking with him about a quarter section over there, which, I think, had 104 acres. A quarter section north of that, an 80, and a piece of land belonging to Thompson and Gilmore, which was the northwest quarter of section 10, township 22 north of range 56. We told him that, from his description of the land he wanted, this land would certainly please him. I explained to him that it was a piece of land which we did not have personally listed with the Payne Investment Company, but that Johnson & Whitman (plaintiffs) at Mitchell had the piece of land listed with the Payne investment people, and that he would have to buy it there. He then left our office, and gave us the impression that he was going to look at this piece of land with Mr. Barber. I understood he made arrangements to buy it that same day." He further testified: "I do not remember of having had any further conversation with Mr. Andrus after Mr. Barber

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took him out to look at the land. I told Mr. Andrus that Johnson & Whitman had this land for sale. I knew this, because I tried to get it on our list, and the Payne people told us they had it. I directed Mr. Andrus to Johnson & Whitman because we were interested in the sale. I did not have the right to sell this land, as we did not have it listed. The Payne Investment Company and Johnson had that together. All subagents of the Payne Investment Company tried to furnish buyers for all lands so listed, no matter by what subagent it was listed; that was what we were trying to do. The reason we directed this party to Johnson & Whitman was because if we directed him to the Payne Investment Company, or whoever had this land listed, we would jointly get the commissions. Mr. Barber was present when we directed Mr. Andrus to Johnson & Whitman, and heard part of the conversation. I told him to make it plain to Johnson & Whitman, that we sent him to them, and he said he would do it. I think the first conversation I had with Johnson & Whitman was by telephone, the evening after the sale was consummated. I did not demand any of the commission from the Deutch Land Company, because I did not think they were in a position to pay it. I think Mr. Whitman stated in that conversation that he did not know anything about our having had a talk with Mr. Andrus. I think Johnson told me the same thing. They stated they had no knowledge that we ever had anything to do with this deal. I did not say anything about the Payne Investment Company's commission. I was not looking after their commission. I did not close the contract for the sale of this land for two reasons: In the first place, at that time, Andrus had not decided to buy; in the second place, we had not the land listed with us and the Payne Investment Company, so we had to send him to them and take a smaller commission."

Theodore D. Deutch was called as a witness for the defendant, and testified, in substance, that he was a partner in the firm of the Deutch Land Company. "I met Mr. Andrus in the town of Scott's Bluff, I think it was about the

After we got through showing him the Trive told him we would be glad to show him anyd on the list. The next morning Mr. Barberirus came into our office. We had nothing to aging Mr. Andrus into the country. I told d was for sale by Johnson & Whitman on the

have not seen Mr. Andrus since he left the saw him the next morning after the sale, and rsation with him after he bought the land. I w whether Mr. Barber or Mr. Andrus told Whitman that we had pointed out this land do not know anything about what they said use I was not with them. Mr. Andrus called and asked for a map so they could designate or sale. We marked all the land we had l, and that we had the right to sell. We exist of Johnson & Whitman and the Payne Impany."

not attempted to give the testimony in detail. space we have only given the substance of it. of the evidence the plaintiffs moved to strike imony, for the reason that it was not shown 1 & Whitman had any knowledge whatever of ransactions, nor is it shown that the alleged were in any sense the moving cause of the us. The motion was sustained, and, as above rdict was directed.

5 of the written contract between the plain- e defendant provided: "In case the land is er of the parties hereto, the commissions or be divided as above, except where second sale without aid of first party, in which case shall have all the commission." In the con- aintiffs were designated as the second party, clear that, in order to recover anything on claim or set-off, the burden of proof was on it to show that it contributed to or aided in e sale of the land in question to Andrus. As

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we view the testimony, the defendant failed to make such proof, and therefore the district court did not err in directing a verdict for the plaintiffs.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., FAWCETT and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

LETTON, ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

**NIMROD W. NORRIS, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF LINCOLN,
APPELLEE.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,253.

1. **Licenses: OCCUPATION TAX: CONSTITUTIONALITY.** It is not the purpose of the fourteenth amendment to prevent the states from classifying the subjects of legislation and making different regulations as to the property of different individuals differently situated. The provision of the federal constitution is satisfied if all persons similarly situated are treated alike in privileges conferred or liabilities imposed. *Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.*, 194 U. S. 618.
2. ———: ———: ———. The provision of section 1, art. IX of the constitution of this state, authorizing the taxation of persons engaged in certain occupations, in such a manner as the legislature shall direct by general law uniform as to the classes upon which it operates, forbids partiality and favoritism, and makes equality before the law a rule of legislative action. It does not, however, forbid reasonable classification of persons for the purpose of taxation. *Rosenbloom v. State*, 64 Neb. 342.
3. ———: ———: **CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS: POWER OF MUNICIPALITIES.** When a city charter authorizes a municipality to require by ordinance a license tax of persons engaged in any occupation, trade, or business carried on within the corporate limits of the city, the municipal authorities may by ordinance classify the different occupations for taxation, and impose different taxation in different amounts upon the different classes; and a classification made by such authorities will not be interfered with by the courts, unless it manifestly appears that it is unreasonable and arbitrary.

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4. ———: ———: CITY ORDINANCE: VALIDITY. The classification of persons lending money upon chattel security in a different class from chartered banks, negotiators of loans on realty, real estate agents, and dealers in bonds and stocks, and the imposition of a tax differing in amount upon such money-lenders from that imposed upon such other classes, is not so wanting in reason that the ordinance providing for such classification will be declared void as being entirely arbitrary.
5. ———: ———: ———: ———. An ordinance providing a fine and imprisonment as a means of enforcing a license tax does not trench upon the constitution of this state. *Rosenbloom v. State*, 64 Neb. 342.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
WILLARD E. STEWART, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Burr, Greene & Greene, for appellant.

Fred C. Foster and D. H. McClenahan, contra.

BARNES, J.

This is a suit in equity brought by Nimrod W. Norris, a citizen of the United States, a citizen and taxpayer of this state, and of the city of Lincoln, on behalf of himself, William M. Dennis, the Lincoln Loan Company, and the National Loan Company, other taxpayers similarly situated, against the city of Lincoln to enjoin the collection of an occupation tax of \$50 a year on the business or occupation of loaning money on chattel security. A restraining order was granted, but on the trial of the cause the order was vacated, the plaintiff's action was dismissed, and from that judgment he brought the case to this court. After the cause was docketed here the plaintiff departed this life, and William M. Dennis, one of the parties in interest, was allowed to prosecute the appeal.

Many reasons are assigned for a reversal of the judgment of the district court, but only three of them are argued in the brief of the appellant. Assignments of error not mentioned in the plaintiff's brief will be treated as waived, and will not be considered by the court.

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There is no dispute about the facts of this case. It appears by the stipulation, found in the bill of exceptions, that by section 9 of the general occupation tax ordinance of the city of Lincoln it was provided as follows: "Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of loaning money upon chattel security shall pay an occupation tax of \$50 per year." It was further stipulated that the school and sanitary districts, the county of Lancaster, and the state of Nebraska have assessed taxes against the property of the plaintiff proportionately to the taxes assessed against the property of others, in addition to the tax provided for by the general tax ordinance, and the city of Lincoln has not assumed nor attempted in any manner to regulate the business of loaning money upon chattel security otherwise than requiring an occupation tax of those engaged in that business. It is alleged in the plaintiff's petition that the ordinances of the defendant city provide for the collection of the occupation tax in question by a civil suit in any court of competent jurisdiction, and, further, that any person refusing to pay the tax shall be liable to a fine and imprisonment. We find no evidence in the record tending to support the last mentioned allegation. The record contains some evidence, however, tending to support the allegation that the city is threatening to and is about to collect the tax in question.

1. Appellant assails the validity of the ordinance in question as violative of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, which provides: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." It is argued that the business in question is not such as the legislature might prohibit outright, because detrimental to the public interests, or against the public health or public morals, but is lawful in itself. It is further stated that the legislation is not directed against all engaged in the business of loaning money, is not directed against those loaning money for hire, but is directed arbitrarily and without reason against those engaged in the business of

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less it manifestly appears that the classification is unreasonable and arbitrary." It was further said: "The classification of persons lending money upon personal property or personal security in a different class from chartered banks, negotiators of loans on realty, real estate agents, and dealers in bonds and stocks, and the imposition of a tax differing in amount upon such money-lenders from that imposed upon such other classes, is not so wanting in reason that the ordinance providing for such classification will be declared void as being entirely arbitrary." We find that the rule above stated is supported by *Cowart v. City Council of Greenville*, 67 S. Car. 35, 45 S. E. 122; *State v. Wickenhoefer*, 6 Del. 120; *Bradley & Co. v. City of Richmond*, 110 Va. 521, 66 S. E. 872; *Dewey v. Richardson*, 206 Mass. 430; *Sanning v. City of Cincinnati*, 81 Ohio St. 142.

The supreme court of the United States in *Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.*, 194 U. S. 618, said: "It is not the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, as has been frequently held, to prevent the states from classifying the subjects of legislation and making different regulations as to the property of different individuals differently situated. The provision of the federal constitution is satisfied if all persons similarly situated are treated alike in privileges conferred or liabilities imposed." *Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases*, 115 U. S. 321; *Hayes v. State of Missouri*, 120 U. S. 68; *Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank*, 170 U. S. 283; *Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis*, 165 U. S. 150; *In re Home Discount Co.*, 147 Fed. 538.

Adopting the views expressed by the foregoing authorities, we are of opinion that the ordinance in question is not violative of the fourteenth amendment.

2. It is next contended that the ordinance is violative of the constitution of this state, in that it contravenes section 3, art I of that instrument, which provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." This contention seems to have been conclusively answered in *Rosenbloom v. State*,

64 Neb. 342, wherein *State v. Green*, 27 Neb. 64, *Magneau v. City of Fremont*, 30 Neb. 843, and *Templeton v. City of Tekamah*, 32 Neb. 542 (cases cited by counsel for the appellant) are expressly overruled. In that case the court said: "The argument is that the law taxing peddlers trenches in various ways upon the constitution, and is therefore void. It is said in the first place that the object of the legislation is to raise county revenue, and that revenue measures cannot, in this state, be enforced by the infliction of fines or penalties. We agree with counsel in the view that the primary and paramount, if not the only, object of the law is to raise revenue by imposing a tax upon the business of peddling. The only thing the peddler is required to do is to pay his tax, and exhibit the appropriate evidence of payment to any person who may wish to see it. The only thing he is forbidden to do is to pursue his calling without having first paid the tax. No police inspection or supervision is provided for. If the things commanded and forbidden are to be regarded as features of regulation or repression, they are not, to say the least, so pronounced or conspicuous as to suggest the idea that the law is referable to the police power, rather than to the power of taxation. But granting the contention of counsel for defendant that the statute is a revenue measure, pure and simple, we are not able to discover any valid objection to the enforcement of it in the manner provided by the legislature."

In *Village of Dodge v. Guidinger*, 87 Neb. 349, it appears that the trustees of the village, for the purpose of raising revenue, passed an ordinance levying a tax upon the occupation of practicing medicine within the village limits. The validity of this ordinance was challenged; and, upon an appeal to this court, it was said: "The defendant argues that the plaintiff may only license such vocations as it may regulate in the exercise of the police power, and that the practice of medicine is not subject to such regulations. The statute authorizes the imposition of occupation taxes for the purpose of raising revenue.

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The taxing power, therefore, is the source of the plaintiff's authority to demand from the defendant the tax in question. The power of the legislature to raise revenue by levying a license tax upon occupations is elaborately discussed and definitely determined in *Rosenbloom v. State*, 64 Neb. 342. See, also, *State v. Boyd*, 63 Neb. 829. The question is no longer an open one in this state. The ordinance imposes a uniform tax upon the occupation of practicing medicine in the village of Dodge. There is no suggestion that the amount is excessive, nor would the record support that contention if made."

In the case at bar the city, by the ordinance complained of, imposed an occupation tax of \$50 a year upon any person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of loaning money upon chattel security. It is not claimed by the appellant that this tax is excessive, and it is apparent that it applies equally and without discrimination to all persons, firms or corporations engaged in that particular occupation. Therefore, it is not objectionable on the ground of being class legislation. *Trainor v. Maverick Loan & Trust Co.*, 80 Neb. 626; *Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Omaha*, 72 Neb. 518; *Nebraska Telephone Co. v. City of Lincoln*, 82 Neb. 59. Neither is the ordinance vulnerable to the objection that it imposes double taxation. *Mercantile Incorporating Co. v. Junkin*, 85 Neb. 561; *Nebraska Telephone Co. v. City of Lincoln*, *supra*; *City of York v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 56 Neb. 572.

From a consideration of the foregoing authorities, we are of opinion that the demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence was properly sustained, and the trial court did not err in setting aside the temporary restraining order, and dismissing the plaintiff's action. The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., FAWCETT and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

LETTON, ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

WILLIAM H. LANNING ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. CITY OF
HASTINGS ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,818.

Legal Corporations: STREET IMPROVEMENTS: PAVEMENT. In a city of the first class having more than 5,000 and less than 25,000 inhabitants, a three-fifths majority of the owners of the footage abutting on a street in a paving district may determine the material to be used for paving; but, aside from that limitation, all details of construction are left to the city council, and are not made a basis of the consent of the property owners.

: ———: ASSESSMENT: BOARD OF EQUALIZATION: NOTICE: PUBLICATION. A notice of the time and place of the meeting of the city council as a board of equalization to equalize special assessments to pay for street paving, published in a newspaper of general circulation within the city from the 17th to the 27th of the month, inclusive, is a substantial compliance with the provisions of section 83, art. III, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1911, which prescribes for giving such a notice.

APPEAL from the district court for Adams county:
B. PERRY, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

J. James, for appellants.

*Leary & Danley, John M. Ragan, M. A. Hartigan,
Fouts and Strode & Root, contra.*

OPINIONS, J.

Presented by William H. Lanning and five other resident property owners and taxpayers of the city of Hastings to prevent the collection of certain paving taxes assessed and levied against their lots abutting on Hastings avenue in Hastings, Mo., and embraced in what is designated as paving district No. 12. A trial in the district court for Adams county resulted in a judgment for the defendants, and the appellants have appealed.

The appellants strenuously contend that the paving tax levied should have been declared void, because of a

modification of the contract made by the city council before the paving in question was completed. It is conceded by all of the parties to the action that a proper petition was filed with the city council of the defendant city, who, acting thereon, created a paving district designated as district No. 12, which included the property of the plaintiffs; that the subsequent proceedings relating to the paving of the street called Hastings avenue, up to and including the letting of the contract for that purpose, were regular and valid in all respects. It appears that, when the work was nearly completed, it was interrupted by the inability of the contractor to procure the kind of material theretofore used, and thereupon a petition of the owners of more than three-fifths of the foot-frontage of the lots abutting on the avenue was presented to the city council, asking a modification of the contract, and a substitution of another kind of material of equally good quality. After a hearing on the petition the city council modified the contract to the extent of authorizing the contractor to complete the work by using paving bricks made by a firm of brickmakers carrying on their business in the city of Hastings, instead of another make which had theretofore been used for that purpose.

It is argued that, by the modification in question, the contract was abrogated, and, as a matter of law, was rendered void; that, because of that fact, the collection of the special taxes assessed against the property of the plaintiffs to pay for the paving in question should have been enjoined. It is conceded that brick was the material chosen by the lot-owners, and it appears that the only change or modification of the contract was to substitute another make of the same kind of material for the one that had theretofore been used by the contractor. The record contains no evidence showing, or in any way tending to show, that the material substituted was in any way different or inferior to that which the contractor had been using up to the time of the modification of which complaint is made. It also appears that, by using the substituted material, the

completion of the work was hastened, and there was a slight saving in the cost of construction, which inured to the benefit of all of the lot-owners, including the plaintiffs. No fraud in the transaction was shown, and the contract was substantially performed.

In *Weston v. Syracuse*, 158 N. Y. 274, 70 Am. St. Rep. 472, the city council modified a contract for the construction of a certain sewer in that city. The resolution modifying the contract waived performance, so far as the work done was not in conformity with the plans and specifications, and provided that the work should be completed in conformity with that already done. The work was substantially performed according to the terms of the contract. In an action to recover the contract price, the court said: "The result of our examination of the charter of the city of Syracuse leads us to the conclusion that it does not place any limitations upon the powers of the common council in respect to such acts as the common council undertook to perform by means of the resolution in question. Aside from certain limitations that we need not specify, all details are left to the common council, and not made the basis of the consent of the property owners. The modification attempted, therefore, was within the power of the common council under the ruling of this court in *Meech v. City of Buffalo*, 29 N. Y. 198; *Moore v. City of Albany*, 98 N. Y. 396; and *Voght v. City of Buffalo*, 133 N. Y. 463."

Subdivision 55, sec. 48, art. III, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1911, which constitutes the charter of the city of Hastings, provides: "Whenever the owner of lots or lands abutting upon the streets, or alleys, within any paving district, representing a three-fifths of the feet-frontage thereon, shall petition the council to pave, repave, or macadamize such streets or alleys, it shall be the duty of the mayor and council to pave, repave, or macadamize the same, and in all cases of paving, or repaving or macadamizing, there shall be used such material as a majority of the owners shall determine upon; provided, the council shall be noti-

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fied, in writing, by said owner, of such determination within thirty (30) days next after the passage and approval of the ordinance ordering such paving, repaving or macadamizing. In case such owners fail to designate the material they desire used in such paving, repaving, or macadamizing in the manner and within the time above provided, the mayor and council shall determine upon the material to be used."

With the exception of this provision, all details of the work are left to the city council, and are not made the basis of the consent of the property owners. It is true that the property owners petitioned the council to use brick as the material for paving the street in question. The prayer of the petition was granted, and brick was the material which was contracted for and used. By the modification complained of, there was no change of material. That substituted seems to have been equal in all respects to the kind of brick used up to the time the work was interrupted. As above stated, no fraud is alleged or proved in the transaction, but, on the contrary, it was shown that the change was a benefit to the plaintiffs in the way of lessening the cost of the construction. As we view the charter, it was within the power of the city council, when acting in good faith, and for the best interest of the taxpayers, to make the modification in question.

2. After the contract was completed, and the work was examined and accepted by the city council, a notice was given of the time and place of the meeting of the council as a board of equalization to equalize the special assessments, and levy a tax upon the property within the paving district to pay for the paving in question. The plaintiffs contend that this notice was insufficient and void, and did not authorize the board of equalization to make the assessments of which they complain. It is strenuously argued that the notice was not published for the length of time provided by the city charter. It appears that the notice was regular in form, and was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city of Hastings, the

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publication being on the 17th day of November, 1911, the last publication on the 27th of that month. The of the meeting of the board was fixed at 7:30 P. M. the last day of the published notice.

Section 83, art. III, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1911, provides for sitting of the council as a board of equalization to ~~line~~ all special assessments, upon the giving of notice by such sitting at least ten days prior thereto by publication in a newspaper having general circulation in the

The general rule for computing time in such a case exclude the first day and include the last day of publication. The first publication of the notice in question on the 17th day of November, and excluding that day counting the 18th day of the month as the first publication, and including the last day thereof, it appears that notice was published for ten days before the meeting of the board of equalization, and there is no merit in this contention.

Finally, it is contended that the assessment in question was not made according to benefits, for the reason the assessments were the same throughout the entire length of the paving district. There is no testimony in the record showing, or tending to show, that this course resulted in an improper assessment.

As we view the record, it contains no reversible error, and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

BESE, C. J., FAWCETT and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

MITTON, ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

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EDWIN L. MACRILL, APPELLEE, v. CITY OF HARTINGTON,
APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,130.

- 1 **Pleading: DEMURRER ORE TENUS.** Where the objection that the petition does not state a cause of action is made by demurrer *ore tenus* after the commencement of the trial, the allegations of the pleading will be liberally construed, and, if possible, sustained.
2. **Appeal: OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE.** A judgment will not be reversed for error in sustaining an objection to the evidence of a witness upon a point which is otherwise well established by the testimony.
3. **Municipal Corporations: ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES: ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.** Where, in an action for personal injuries, the evidence shows that the plaintiff's leg was dislocated, and that as a result of the injury his right leg is one inch shorter than the other, and that its movement is attended with pain and difficulty, and that this condition is permanent, it is not prejudicially erroneous to admit the Carlisle table of expectancy in evidence.

APPEAL from the district court for Cedar county: GUY T. GRAVES, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

B. Ready, for appellant.

H. E. Burkett, contra.

LETTON, J.

This is an action to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff by reason of falling upon a sidewalk in a street of the defendant city. The negligence charged is "that on the 22d day of January, 1910, and for a long time prior thereto, through the carelessness and negligence of defendant, snow and ice had been allowed to accumulate and remain upon the aforesaid sidewalk, and through the carelessness and negligence of the defendant the said accumulation of snow and ice was allowed to remain upon said sidewalk for such a length of

to such an extent that the same formed an
and nuisance there, and rendered travel over
walk dangerous and hazardous." It is also
at, without any fault on his part, plaintiff
fell on the snow and ice, dislocating his right

The defense is a general denial and a plea of
negligence.

Plaintiff is a rural mail carrier, about 48 years of
age. He testified that, while going from his home to the
school, his usual route was to cross the street to the
public school, there being no walk on the
side where he lived; that on the day alleged it was rather
late in the evening it started to freeze; that there
was more or less snow on the sidewalk until Christ-
mas from that time on up to the day he fell, when it
was hard and ice packed; that it was about 6:20 P. M.

when he slipped; that the place where he slipped
was a trifle north of a tree which was about midway
across the walk north and south; that the greater portion
of the walk north of the tree was covered with ice and
for 12 to 15 feet south of the tree; that a part
of the walk was free of ice, but the remainder was covered
with snow and ice frozen together, and it was about six
feet thick where he fell. On cross-examination he tes-
tified for some time he did not walk upon the side-
walk because there was too much snow on it, and not until
children made a path; that the ice extended the
width of the walk towards the tree, which stood higher
than the walk.

Witness Whitney testified that from probably ten
feet south of the tree, and running practically to the
corner of the block, there was snow, ice and
frozen snow on the walk; that directly east of the tree
there was three, four or five inches in depth frozen. On
cross-examination he testified that he saw the walk the
day after plaintiff fell; had not noticed it before;
that there was ice and snow up to the school ground, but
that it was not in the same condition as on the walk, for

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the reason that the walk had been traveled on and packed down more.

The janitor of the schoolhouse testified that he thought there was snow and ice on the sidewalk during all of the month of January; would not say it was there all the month; that he could not tell how long it had been on the walk just east of the tree on the day plaintiff fell; that he first noticed snow and ice on the walk about a week before the accident; that he noticed the walk the next morning after it started to thaw, and he thought the ice was not over two inches thick and ran off to one-quarter of an inch, coming from the snow drifts east of the building across the walk.

The witness Davis testified that the ice and snow on the sidewalk on the 22d day of January east of the tree was from two to four inches deep. On cross-examination he said that he was over the walk almost every day during the week before the accident; that the snow was from six to eighteen inches thick and it was deeper in some places than in others; that children stepped in the slush and made tracks, and it had frozen after that.

J. A. Olsen testified that he was on the walk the next evening after the accident; that along the upper edge of the walk nearest the schoolhouse it was two inches thick, and gradually tapered off to the east; that the school grounds were higher than the walk, and water from the melting snow there would run across the walk.

Mr. Stephenson testified that the ice was less than three inches thick where Mr. Macrill fell. On cross-examination he said that there was slush, snow and ice combined and frozen on the walk. There was other testimony practically to the same effect.

Appellant first urges that the court should have sustained defendant's demurrer *ore tenus* to the petition on the ground that the allegations therein as to notice are insufficient. Where no attack is made on the petition until a jury is impaneled, it will be liberally construed. Surprises and traps are not to be favored by the courts. *Chi-*

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cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Spirk, 51 Neb. 167. We think the allegations, "that on the 22d day of January, 1910, and for a long time prior thereto, * * * snow and ice had been allowed to accumulate and remain" on the walk, and the further allegation that this was permitted "for such a length of time and to such an extent that the same formed an obstruction and nuisance there," were sufficient as against such a demurrer. A motion might have been made to make these allegations as to constructive notice more specific and definite, but this was not done.

It is next urged that the court erred in excluding the testimony of the witness Alvin Olsen that water from the melting snow banks on the school grounds appeared to have run across the walk and caused the slippery and icy condition at the place where plaintiff fell. This witness had already testified there was a snow drift on the school grounds on the east side of the schoolhouse; that the ice was two inches thick on the west side of the walk, and tapered to the east side; and that water had run from the bank. It would have been just as well to allow the witness to answer as to where the water ran, but taking the whole testimony of this witness, together with that of other witnesses for the defendant, it is shown without dispute that there was snow east of the schoolhouse, which had melted, and part of the water therefrom had run across the walk. This fact appears so clearly that we think no prejudicial error occurred by sustaining the objection to the question.

The remaining contentions of plaintiff relate principally to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. We think the evidence shows that snow and ice, and, when the weather was warm, slush, had been permitted to remain upon the walk, at and near where the plaintiff fell, for at least three weeks before the time of the accident, and that the fact that water from melting snow flowed to and across the sidewalk, at a point where snow or ice had been permitted to accumulate for some time before, would only add another element to the dan-

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gerous condition, and would in nowise relieve the defendant from its duty to use reasonable care to keep its sidewalks in proper condition. The question of whether reasonable care had been used was left to the jury. That body thought the evidence was sufficient, and we think its conclusion is justified.

The complaint that it was error to admit the Carlisle table in evidence, we think, is also without merit. The evidence shows that the plaintiff's right leg is one inch shorter than the other; that its movement is attended with difficulty and some pain, and that this condition is permanent. Complaint is also made of several instructions of the court. Taking the whole charge together, including the instructions given at the request of defendant, and applying it to the evidence, we are convinced that the defendant was in nowise prejudiced. The case seems to have been carefully and impartially tried.

Having reached these conclusions, the judgment of the district court must be, and is,

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and SEDGWICK, JJ., concur.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

KATZ-CRAIG CONTRACTING COMPANY, APPELLEE, v. CHICAGO, ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS & OMAHA RAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,156.

Carriers: FREIGHT RATES: ACTION FOR OVERCHARGE. Section 5, ch. 90, laws 1907, made it the duty of all common carriers to file with the state railway commission, within 30 days after the act took effect, "all freight and passenger schedules, classifications, rates, tariffs and charges used by said common carriers and in effect on January 1st, 1907." Subdivision c, sec. 15, of the act prohibits changes being made in "any rate, schedule or classification until

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ation has been made to the railway commission and person had for that purpose." In this case it appears that the actually charged and received for the transportation of crushed stone from Omaha to Florence for several years was \$5 a car-load, which is a just and remunerative rate, while the published schedule rate was 2 cents per cwt., which the railway commission held to be excessive and discriminatory. There is no notice of a change in either the published or the actual rate on January 1, 1907, or by the railway commission before the stone was shipped. The plaintiff was charged at the higher rate.

That the actual rate used and in effect on and prior to January 1, 1907, was the rate which should have been charged, and that the shipper is entitled to recover the overcharge.

Order from the district court for Douglas county:
KENNEDY, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

*J. Wright, B. H. Dunham, A. A. McLaughlin and
J. H. Gaines & Smith, for appellant.*

vs. S. Elgutter, contra.

N, J.

to recover overcharge for shipment of freight.
recovered, and defendant appeals.

Plaintiff alleges that the plaintiff is an engineering contracting company. Between May 1, 1907, and May 1, 1909, plaintiff shipped 462 car-loads of crushed stone from Omaha to Florence over defendant's railroad in the construction of macadam roads. For five years prior to January 1, 1907, the defendant published, charged and collected a freight rate from Omaha to Florence of \$5 a car-load on coal, ice, crushed stone, and other commodities, and this rate was continued and such was carried thereunder until March 15, 1907, when it was, suddenly, and without notice to plaintiff, raised the rate for crushed rock, stone and sand to the rate of 2 cents per cwt. at the same time maintaining the rate of \$5 a car-load on coal and ice between the same points. Plaintiff appealed, in order to fulfil its contracts, to ship stone over defendant's railway, it being the only rail-

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road between these points, and to pay the sum of \$7,120 as freight at the rate of 2 cents per cwt. It is alleged that the rate of 2 cents per cwt. is unreasonable and extortionate, and that a reasonable and lawful rate is the sum of 1 cent per cwt. for such service. It is also alleged that on June 23, 1908, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Nebraska State Railway Commission complaining against the excessive rates, and praying for the naming of a reasonable rate; that a hearing was had and evidence taken, and on June 2, 1909, an opinion was filed and an order made by the commission finding that the rate charged was excessive, unreasonable, and discriminatory, and that the rate of 1 cent per cwt., or a minimum rate of \$5 a car, is a reasonable rate, and that since this order was made the rate of 1 cent per cwt. has been in force. The prayer is to recover the \$3,560 overcharge, with interest.

In the answer the defendant admits that prior to January 1, 1907, certain commodity rates had been annually fixed for the movement of car-loads of coal, ice, crushed rock, sand and the like, at a rate of \$5 a car-load, and that up to said date of January 1, 1907, various commodities had been hauled between Omaha and Florence at said rate, but denies that said tariff was ever a part of the published tariff of defendant railroad; alleges that this rate expired on December 31, 1906; that the published tariffs in effect on January 1, 1907, provided for a rate of 2 cents per cwt. for crushed rock, and that if any charge for less than that amount was collected after January 1, 1907, the same was collected in error; denies that the rate was unreasonable, extortionate or discriminatory; pleads that the rate had been duly filed with and approved by the Nebraska State Railway Commission, and thereby became the only lawful and legal rate which defendant was required under a heavy penalty to collect. It also admits the proceedings before the railway commission and its order reducing the rate. A reply was filed denying the affirmative matter in the answer.

Omitting objections and exceptions, the record shows

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at at the trial it was stipulated that \$7,120 was paid for the shipments at the rate of 2 cents per cwt. according to the tariff of the defendant and the amendments thereto filed February 18, 1907, which took effect March 26, 1907, and was filed with the Nebraska State Railway Commission April 27, 1907. That said rates remained in effect according to the published tariffs of the defendant company until modified by the order of the Nebraska State Railway Commission, as set forth in plaintiff's petition. The pleadings and the opinion and judgment in the case before the railway commission were then received in evidence, over defendant's objections, and the plaintiff rested.

Defendant then called Lyman Sholes, who testified as follows: "Q. Mr. Sholes, under what class in the classification in force during 1907 and 1908 did crushed stone move? A. Class E. Q. Now, Mr. Sholes, do you know whether on January 1st, 1907, the same rate on Class E stuff from Omaha to Florence was in force and shown by the published tariffs that was shown in the published tariff which is mentioned in the stipulation agreed to before, which is issued February 18th, 1907? A. The rates were the same. Q. Do you know? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, then, what is the fact as to whether the rates on January 1st, 1907, as shown by the tariffs, was the same as the rate on crushed stone from Omaha to Florence as shown by the tariff issued February 18th, 1907, and referred to in the stipulation introduced by the plaintiff? A. There was no change in the rate. The tariffs were both identical. Q. I will ask you whether exhibit 5 is the same tariff of the defendant company issued February 18th, 1907, to which reference was made in the stipulation? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, examine exhibit 6. Is that the tariff which was in force on the defendant road, in relation to these rates in question, on January 1st, 1907? A. Yes, sir."

So much of the tariff as refers to the rate on Class E stuff from Omaha to Florence, in exhibit 5, was read into the record. Under the column headed: "Between Omaha,

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Nebraska, and also Council Bluffs and Missouri Valley, Iowa, as per note below," and "Florence," and, under that heading the word "Florence," and, under the heading "car-loads," and "Class E," the rate "2 cents per cwt." From exhibit 6 was read into the record, under the heading "Between Omaha, Nebraska, and Florence, * * * Car-load rates under Class E, 2 cents per hundred pounds." Both parties then rested. Aside from the admissions in the respective answers of the defendant, this is all the evidence in the case.

In its answer before the railway commission, the defendant admits that, prior to January 1, 1907, its charges for transporting sand and stone from Omaha to Florence was the sum of \$5 a car, when cars were not loaded in excess of their marked capacity, and further admits that, during the year 1907, it transported for said complainants between said points several cars of soft coal, and charged and collected the rate of \$5 a car.

A portion of defendant's argument, as set forth in its brief, is based upon the provisions of the act of 1907, known as the "Aldrich Act," which applies only to the transportation of certain specified classes of freight. At the time of the collection of the freight, defendant took the position that crushed stone was not "building material," and therefore did not come within the provisions of that act, and for that reason collected what it claimed to be the full tariff rate, and not 85 per cent. thereof. At the oral argument it still took this ground. For the purposes of this case, and without examining into what perhaps may be a debatable question, we are willing to take the appellant at its word. It cannot, therefore, claim immunity under any of the provisions of that act.

Defendant relies upon the proposition that the railway commission act made it the duty of the company to file with the railway commission all schedules in effect on January 1, 1907, under a severe penalty for failure to do so, and that the carrier was prohibited from charging less than the schedule rates, and from changing any rate,

schedule or classification; that the rate, according to the published schedules of January 1, 1907, was 2 cents per cwt. on crushed stone, and that this was the legal rate which remained in force until altered by the order of the commission.

On the other hand, plaintiff insists that the actual rate in effect on January 1, 1907, was \$5 a car-load; that this rate had been in effect for years before, and was collected and charged afterwards; that it was never legally changed; and that the higher rate was illegally charged and collected from the plaintiff until the railway commission act restored the former rate, after finding the changed rate to be, as plaintiff alleges it is, unreasonable, extortionate and discriminatory.

By section 5, art. VIII, ch. 72, Comp. St. 1911 (laws 1907, ch. 90), commonly known as the "Railway Commission Act," it was made the duty of all common carriers within the state to file with the state railway commission, within 30 days after the act took effect (which was on March 27, 1907), "all freight and passenger schedules, classifications, rates, tariffs and charges used by said common carriers and in effect on January 1st, 1907," under a severe penalty for a failure to do so. This section further provides that the railway commission shall fix, as soon as practicable thereafter, a schedule and classification of rates and charges for the transportation of freights upon a notice to the carrier and a hearing, and that the rates thus fixed "are *prima facie* just and reasonable." It also provides for the filing of complaints against the rates thus fixed, for a hearing thereon and for a decision by the commission, and for appeal to the supreme court, and that a decision made by the commission upon any complaint, which changes or modifies any schedule of rates, shall also be *prima facie* evidence that the rates fixed thereby are just and reasonable. By subdivision a, sec. 14, unjust discriminations are prohibited under penalties, and it is provided that if any railroad company "subjects any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable

prejudice, delay or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever, the same shall constitute an unjust discrimination, which is hereby prohibited." By subdivision c, sec. 15: "It is hereby declared to be unlawful for any railway company or common carrier to change any rate, schedule or classification until application has been made to the railway commission and permission had for that purpose." At the time the freight was consigned, no action had been taken by the railway commission fixing the proper rates, as the statute directs, nor had any change in the January 1, 1907, rate been authorized by that body.

While a number of other questions are raised, the determination of this case rests mainly upon the question whether the rate to which the statute refers, which the carrier and its agents are forbidden to change, is the rate which was "used" and "in effect" on January 1, 1907, and which had been charged and collected for years, or whether it was the rate named in the printed schedule rate under Class E. Defendant admits that prior to January 1, 1907, the charges for transporting crushed stone was \$5 a car-load. It has not established the fact by any competent testimony that this rate of \$5 a car-load expired by limitation on December 31, 1906, or that the rate was ever changed upon crushed stone before the freight at the rate of 2 cents per cwt. was collected from the plaintiff. In the absence of any evidence that the \$5 rate was changed on or before January 1, 1907, the presumption of continuance applies. It is true that the printed schedules fixed the rate under classification E at 2 cents per cwt. both before and after January 1, 1907, but for years prior to that date the actual rate charged and collected had been \$5 a car, while the printed rate was 2 cents per cwt. The statute does not apply alone to schedules. The railway company is required to file all "schedules, classifications, rates, tariffs and charges used * * * and in effect on January 1st, 1907," and by subdivision c, sec. 15, it is declared unlawful to change "any rate, schedule or classification until application has been

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the railway commission and permission had for pose."

ate v. Pacific Express Co., 80 Neb. 823, 837, it is making of the act relating to express companies, usage of which is much more restricted than that act, in that such companies are prohibited from more than a certain proportion "of the rate as by the schedule," while this act prohibits a charge of "the rates used * * * and in effect": "It is reasonably contended that it was the intention of the legislature that the rates set forth in the written schedule filed should be taken as the basis, or as anything in evidence of the rate which was actually charged on January 1. If, by mistake, the schedule filed showed a rate higher than that actually charged, it would be unreasonable to say that a rate 'as shown by the schedule' should be taken as the basis, as a narrow and literal reading of the act would require, and not the rate which was actually charged and in force on the 1st day of January. It could never have been the intention of the legislature that, where a paper rate was in existence which had been used for years, while at the same time an actual rate was in force, which was properly remunerative, non-discriminatory and excessive paper or schedule rate should be made the legal rate, and not the rate which was actually being charged, and which was reasonable and

fair. However, while the defendant has pleaded that the rate of 1 cent per cwt. was approved by the railway commission, there is absolutely no proof of this allegation. On the contrary, the direct proof is that, as soon as the matter was called to the attention of that body, it found that the rates then being charged and collected by the defendant were excessive and discriminatory," and it further found that a rate of 1 cent a hundred pounds or \$5 a car-load was a reasonable rate for such transportation. Defendant offered no proof that the rate of 1 cent per cwt. is

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not sufficiently remunerative, or that the rate of 2 cents per cwt. is not unjust and discriminatory. It seems clear that there is no substantial difference in the transportation of brick, sand, crushed rock, coal or ice. The opinion of the railway commission is clear, positive and emphatic upon this point, and the action of the railway company itself for a series of years inevitably leads to this conclusion. The evidence satisfies us that the commodity rate which was fixed by the defendant, which had been in effect so many years, which there is no evidence to show was changed on or before January 1, 1907, and which was afterwards found by the railway commission to be the just and reasonable rate, is the rate which should have been charged, and was the legal rate at the time the money was collected from plaintiff.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

ROSE, FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

MARTHA M. BROOKS, APPELLANT, v. AARON KAUFFMAN,
APPELLEE.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,171.

Negligence: ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES: EVIDENCE. Unless the evidence shows that, within the owner's knowledge, a team of horses, or one of the horses composing the team, is of such a propensity or disposition that it may reasonably be foreseen or expected that a runaway will occur when the team is driven in a careful manner upon the public highway, the owner is not liable for damages to others occurring by the team running away without his fault.

APPEAL from the district court for Dawson county:
BRUNO O. HOSTETLER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

H. D. Rhea, for appellant.

E. A. Cook, contra.

ETTON, J.

his is an action to recover for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff, which, she alleges, occurred by reason of vehicle in which she was riding upon a public highway being struck by a runaway team belonging to defendant, on account of his negligent and careless manner of driving. It is charged that the team which defendant was driving was spirited, fractious, vicious, uncontrollable, unmanageable, and had run away several times. At conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, defendant moved for instructed verdict, which motion was sustained. From judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.

The evidence shows that the defendant was driving his team at a walk along the public highway; that the plaintiff's team and a number of other teams were traveling in the same direction; that shortly before the accident a team went by that of defendant, and that almost immediately afterwards the plaintiff drove her team past him at a trot; that shortly afterwards her vehicle was run into by the defendant's team, and she was thrown out, and suffered injuries, of which she complains. The only evidence in the case as to the vicious, uncontrollable and runaway character of defendant's team is that of two witnesses, one of whom was the plaintiff's husband. He testified that the defendant was driving a bay horse, about 15 years old, and a black mare, about 9 years old; that at the time, when the bay horse was about 3 years old, it came to his place with a harness on it, and that Mr. Kauffman came after it, and said that it had run away; there was no other horse with it. He also testified that about 7 years ago he saw the same bay horse run away while Kauffman was in the field husking corn; that it was then checked up with a black, but not with the black that was with it on the day of the accident; that he had never seen the bay horse run away. Mr. Miller testified that some time ago, he thinks about two years, the bay horse ran away from a corn field, while Mr. Kauffman was husking corn, and

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went home; that he saw another one of Kauffman's teams with a bay horse and a black one run away in a corn field with a cultivator about 3 years ago, but upon cross-examination he said this was the same black, but a different bay, horse.

We think this proof is entirely insufficient to establish the fact that the team or the bay horse was of such a disposition as to render it negligence on the part of defendant to drive the team upon the highway. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence, either by driving in a careless and negligent manner, or using a team which to his knowledge was, from its vicious or spirited disposition, unsafe to drive upon the public roads. There is no proof that the horses had ever shown a vicious or dangerous disposition, or that they had ever run away when hitched to a wagon or buggy, or on the highway. The mere facts that more than 7 years before one of the horses had run away in a corn field, and that he had escaped or gotten away from his owner when a mere colt and gone to another farm, fails to show that his owner was negligent in driving him in a careful manner upon the road. Of course, if the allegations of the petition had been proved, a different question would be presented and a recovery would be possible; but, as the evidence stood, no case was made on this point.

It is also complained that there was evidence that, if the defendant had been driving carefully, he might have driven his team into an irrigation ditch, instead of across the bridge, and thus have avoided striking the plaintiff's vehicle. The evidence shows that it was a very cold day, the road was rough and frozen, two teams driving at a trot, one with a noisy, rattling farm wagon, had just passed defendant's team, which was being driven at a walk; that the team was within a short distance of the bridge when it started to run, and that just about the time it reached the bridge defendant was thrown out of the wagon. Under these circumstances, there could have been no time for him to balance probabilities in his mind,

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...e whether to essay the passage of the
...he risk of trying to drive down into the
...ence, therefore, fails to show actionable
...this ground also.

...no dispute but that the law is in accord-
...ntention of plaintiff. It is therefore, un-
...nsider the authorities cited. The only
...recovery in this case is the lack of evi-

...district court properly directed a verdict
...t. Its judgment is therefore

AFFIRMED.

...LOSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

...VICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

**GRANT, APPELLANT, V. NATIONAL FIDELITY &
CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLEE.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,178.

NOTICE: Proof of the delivery of a written
commencement of sickness to an agent of a health
company, and of its having been sent by him to the
the company and there received within the time
sufficient compliance with a provision of a policy re-
quirement to "be mailed to the secretary of the com-

REPORTS OF PHYSICIAN: PROOF. Requirements in a
life insurance that, "If the insured is disabled by in-
firmity for more than 30 days, he or his representative
before action precedent to recovery hereunder, furnish the
within 30 days, with a report in writing from his attend-
ing physician, fully stating the condition of the insured
and the duration of disability," and that "affirmative
evidence by physician, must be filed with the company at
death, or loss, within one month from date of death, or loss,
or termination of disability, otherwise all claims

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hereunder shall be forfeited to the company," are not unreasonable. Such proofs, unless waived by the insurer, or unless it is estopped by reason of facts in evidence from insisting upon their being furnished, are essential to recovery in a suit on the policy.

3 ———: ———: EVIDENCE: DIRECTING VERDICT. Evidence examined, and held to be so defective as to justify the district court in directing a verdict for the defendant.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
WILLARD E. STEWART, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

George W. Berge, for appellant.

A. A. Heacock, E. C. Strode and M. V. Beghtol, contra.

LETTON, J.

Plaintiff sued to recover \$90 which he alleged was due him under a policy of health insurance issued by the defendant company for two months' disability by sickness from October 20, 1909, on the basis of \$45 a month. He alleges defendant was duly notified of plaintiff's illness as the policy provides. Defendant by its answer admits the existence of the contract, and pleads the failure of plaintiff to comply with the provisions of the policy with respect to notice and proofs. The policy requires that written notice of the commencement of sickness "must be mailed to the secretary of the company at Omaha, Nebraska, and failure to give such written notice within ten days after the date of such injury, or commencement of illness, shall invalidate any and all claims under this policy." It also provides that "affirmative proof, verified by physician, must be filed with the company at Omaha, Nebraska, within one month from date of death, or loss of limb or sight, or termination of disability, otherwise all claims hereunder shall be forfeited to the company," and further provides, "if the insured is disabled by injury or illness for more than 30 days, he or his representative shall, as a condition precedent to recovery hereunder, furnish the company, every 30 days, with a report in writ-

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from his attending physician or surgeon, fully stating condition of the insured and the probable duration of disability." The evidence shows that in the latter part of October, 1909, plaintiff was attacked by illness. He called a physician, who at first diagnosed the case as la grippe. He also notified one Marstellar, the company's agent at Lincoln, who is vested with power to appoint subagents, solicit new business, make collections, and sign receipts. He received from Mr. Marstellar or from Mr. Bigley, an agent acting under Marstellar, a printed blank furnished by the defendant company for the purpose of giving notice of illness. This was filled out by him and by his attending physician, Dr. Ballard, apparently in conformity with the requirements of the company. It was delivered to Marstellar by the plaintiff, and was forwarded by him to the home office at Omaha. It bears upon its face a stamped imprint, "Received October 29th, 1909, N. F. C. Co., Omaha, Neb." Since written notice on the blank furnished by the company's agent was delivered to him within the time specified, and by him mailed at once to Omaha, no defense can be predicated upon the provisions of the policy requiring written notice in ten days after illness.

As to the requirement of notice of a disability by illness for more than 30 days, the testimony shows that Dr. Ballard made out another notice on November 10 or 15 not upon a blank of the company. Plaintiff testified that after the first report was made he was requested by Marstellar to make out another, which was done, and in the latter report he stated the time he had been sick, that he gave it to Marstellar in his office at Lincoln, and that he also left with Marstellar a notice made out by Dr. Jonas of Omaha; that no request was made for a further report or proof. Bigley testified that he helped plaintiff fill out the first notice, and that he was instructed by Marstellar and Mr. Wolfe, the assistant secretary of the company, to leave proofs of injury and of recovery with Mr. Marstellar, and that Blunt knew this. He also testified that Blunt showed him a second notice. Marstellar testified that

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Blunt left the first notice with him, and that he sent it direct to the company at Omaha; that he did not remember that any other notice was given him by Blunt, but that he sent to Omaha whatever was given him. It is neither pleaded nor proved that the requirements of the policy as to final proof of termination of disability were ever complied with. The above sets forth the gist of the testimony with respect to the notice of illness. After the plaintiff rested, the defendant requested a peremptory instruction in its favor, for the reason that there was no testimony with reference to the furnishing of proof of loss, verified by a physician, having been furnished to the company in compliance with the terms of the policy, or that the same was waived by the company. This motion was sustained, the jury were instructed accordingly, and judgment of dismissal entered upon the verdict. Appellant insists that this was error, because sufficient notice was given when the notices were left with Marstellar, and also because before the suit a different reason for the non-payment of the policy was given by the company in a letter to the insurance deputy, and that, since the non-liability was then placed upon other grounds than insufficiency of notice, this amounted to a waiver of proofs of loss.

There is no competent proof in the record that the two notices necessary to comply with the terms of the policy, other than the preliminary notice, were ever given. It may be that the requisite notices were given, and that they are now in the hands of the defendant. If so, plaintiff is provided by the statute with the means to obtain the evidence, or, if unattainable, to supply the same by secondary proof. The requirements of the policy are not unreasonable, and it is not unjust nor unfair to the policyholder to require that information be communicated to the insurer at stated intervals as to the progress of the disability for which it will later be called upon to indemnify him, and that proof of the time of termination of his disability be furnished, so that the insurer may inquire

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if it so desires. The evidence as to the papers which plaintiff's testimony shows Marstellar, even if such evidence were come, uncertain and indefinite. Legal proof within reach, but was not furnished, nor is any laid for secondary proof of the contents.

There is no proof of knowledge of Marstellar's illness, or that any knowledge was communicated to the company.

Second point urged by appellant, based upon the letter to the insurance deputy by the defendant referred to is as follows: "Omaha, Neb., 1910. Mr. C. E. Pierce, Insurance Deputy, Omaha. Dear Sir: Referring to your communication of the 18th inst., in re Newton E. Blunt, the fact that Mr. Blunt's claim was not allowed was that, in his own and his doctor's statements, he had not notified this company. Very truly yours, National Fidelity & Casualty Co. George W. Wolfe, Manager."

Received Jan. 22, 1910, Insurance Deputy, Omaha, Nebr." There is no proof that this letter was sent to Mr. Blunt's suggestion, or that its contents were communicated to him, or that he knew of the fact of liability until after the time for filing a claim had expired. Of course, under these circumstances no proofs of loss can be predicated on this

one of the authorities cited by appellant are the facts in this case, save as to the first delivery, and we agree with his contention on these facts.

error in the record, and the judgment of the court is

AFFIRMED.

MR. JUSTICE ROSE and MR. JUSTICE FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

MR. JUSTICE DUNBAR and MR. JUSTICE HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

Burt County v. Lewis.

**BURT COUNTY, APPELLER, v. JOHN LEWIS ET AL.,
APPELLANTS.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,188.

1. **Contracts: CONSTRUCTION.** A contract for the excavation of a ditch, at a certain price per cubic yard of dirt, provided, "when one-fourth of the work provided for in this contract is completed according to the terms hereof, and to the satisfaction of the engineer in charge," the engineer should make an estimate and 75 per cent. of the price fixed per cubic yard should be paid. The ditch was not excavated to the bottom by the contractor, but as the work progressed estimates were made and 75 per cent. of the contract price per yard excavated was paid. *Held.* Under such a provision in the contract, the completion of one-fourth of the work does not mean the actual completion to the bottom of the ditch of one-fourth of its lineal distance without regard to the quantity of dirt removed, but means one-fourth of the work of removing and placing the dirt, as directed by the plans and specifications, and, there being nothing in the contract or bond to forbid, the county had the right to pay as it did.
2. **Principal and Surety: LIABILITY OF SURETY.** Where a party to a contract with a county board makes a written request for an extension of time, and the board grants the extension, making the proceedings a matter of record, and indorsing the extension on a written request, sureties upon the bond of the contractor, which bond provides that any departure from the strict terms of the contract "which is made under a written agreement of both parties to said contract shall not invalidate this undertaking nor release the sureties," have no cause for complaint, and are not released.

APPEAL from the district court for Burt county: **ABRAHAM L. SUTTON, JUDGE.** *Affirmed.*

Thomas R. Ashley and Brome, Ellick & Brome, for appellants.

James A. Clark, contra.

LETON, J.

In 1905 the county board of Burt county entered into a contract with defendant Lewis for the excavation of a

ditch. The work was let in four separate contracts providing that the portion of the work in-
herein should be paid for at 9 cents per cubic yard
ation; the other contracts being alike in all re-
cept as to location of the work and price per
rd. Defendants Griffin, Byram and Watson be-
eties upon the bond given by Lewis to the county
faithful performance of the work. Lewis began
of construction, but, being unable to complete
the time fixed in the contract, requested the
board for an extension of time to January 1, 1906,
as granted. On December 16, 1905, Lewis re-
another extension until November 1, 1906, which
granted. The request of Lewis was made in
and the action of the county authorities granting
it is shown by the papers on file in the office of
ty clerk and by the record of the proceedings of
l. This extension to November 1, 1906, was the
ension allowed by the county authorities. A
olution of the board declaring the contract for-
as passed on June 23, 1908. Lewis excavated
cubic yards of dirt under the four contracts, and
therefor the sum of \$4,405.79. There were still
cubic yards of earth remaining to be excavated.
ty, after having complied with the requirements
statutes as to advertising, etc., entered into a new
with another person to finish the work at an in-
cost over the contract price. The additional cost
enses, after applying the money retained under
s of the contract as found by the district court,
sum of \$794.45. Judgment for this sum was ren-
against the principal and sureties, upon the bond,
sureties appeal.

ly errors assigned are that the finding and judg-
contrary to the evidence, not sustained thereby,
rary to law.

contract provides that, when a part not less than
h of the portion included in any contract is com-

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pleted according to the specifications, he (the engineer) shall give the contractor a certificate thereof showing the proportionate amount which the contractor is entitled to be paid according to the terms of the contract, and the county clerk shall, upon presentation of such certificate, draw his warrant upon the treasurer for 75 per cent. of said amount, and the treasurer will pay the same. The ditch contracted for in the four contracts was over three miles in length. At the time the contract was canceled and the work relet only about 1,100 lineal feet had been fully completed.

The appellants contend that the language of the contract prohibits the payment of any money until one-fourth of the ditch had been wholly completed, and does not mean when one-fourth of the excavation had been made; that, since it costs more to remove the lower strata of dirt from the excavation than the top layers, the county had no right to pay full price for the dirt excavated from the top. The evidence shows that it is more costly to remove the lower portion of the excavation than the upper with the appliances that this contractor was using, but it is also shown that by using a dredge the cost of the entire excavation would be about the same without reference to the depth; that the use of a dredge was practicable, and that one was used in finishing the work. Even if it were true that it cost more to remove the lower strata than the upper, since the contract makes no distinction as to price in this respect, the estimate by yardage without reference to depth could not be a breach thereof, and the sureties cannot complain. The "work" mentioned in the contract is evidently the work of excavation. The whole work to be done was of this nature, and it seems to have been quite uniform in character. Any other interpretation of the meaning of the contract might lead to a result more detrimental to the sureties than the one adopted. If lineal distance of the completed ditch were to be taken as the test, the money might be payable when but a comparatively insignificant portion of the whole excavation had

been made. Under this theory the Panama canal might be said to be one-fourth completed when the level lands were excavated and while the shovels had barely scratched the surface of the Culebra hills. We think the estimate was properly made.

Appellants also contend there was a material variation in the contract, because it was extended without their knowledge or consent. The statute allows extensions to be made by agreement not to exceed two years. The bond itself provides that any departure from the strict terms of the contract made under a written agreement of the parties shall not release the sureties. The extension was made by a written request and a written consent to the same, hence it was within the terms of the bond. The last extension of the contract expired on November 1, 1906, and the rights and liabilities of the sureties became fixed. The county, therefore, could not increase the liability of the sureties by any interference with the work to their detriment. Nor did it do so. The evidence shows that further work was performed by the contractor, 75 per cent. of which was paid for at the contract price. This was for the direct benefit of the sureties, since the cost per cubic yard of completing the unfinished work under the new contract was in excess of the original price. The cases cited by appellant, *Brennan v. Clark*, 29 Neb. 385, *Gallagher v. St. Patrick's Church*, 45 Neb. 535, and *Bell v. Paul*, 35 Neb. 240, are not strictly in point, since no infringement of or material change in the terms of the contract has been shown, while such was the fact in the cases mentioned.

We find no error in the record. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., ROSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

Meadows v. Bradley & Co.

**MARSHALL P. MEADOWS, APPELLEE, v. DAVID BRADLEY &
COMPANY, APPELLANT.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,196.

- 1. Appeal: INSTRUCTIONS: EXCEPTIONS.** Ordinarily a party who fails to call the attention of the trial court to alleged errors in instructions by taking exception at the time of trial is not entitled to a review of the same in this court.
- 2 Evidence on the part of plaintiff examined, and held to support the verdict.**

**APPEAL from the district court for Saline county:
LESLIE G. HURD, JUDGE. *Affirmed.***

*Hastings & Ireland, Harl & Tinley and Grimm & Grimm,
for appellant.*

Brown & Venrick, contra.

LETTON, J.

Action to recover damages for breach of contract, and for the reasonable value of labor and material furnished defendant. Plaintiff's petition alleges that defendant agreed to sell him a second-hand threshing outfit; that the outfit was to be made capable of doing as good work as new; that it was to have a new weigher, a new blower, and a new feeder attached; and defendant was to transfer to him a number of threshing contracts for work to be done for certain farmers with the machine. He alleges that the defendant shipped a machine worthless for threshing purposes, and without the new appliances mentioned; that immediately upon its arrival he refused to accept the same until the defective parts were remedied and the machine proved capable of doing good work, and that this was never done. It is also alleged that at the request of defendant he accompanied the threshing outfit to the farms of those with whom the defendant held the contracts, and

furnished labor and materials to aid in the work, amounting in all to \$70.80. He prays judgment for damages by loss of profit on the contracts in the sum of \$225, and for the amount mentioned for labor and material.

The defendant answered, setting up a general denial, and also pleading that the contract was in writing, and contained a number of conditions and warranties, which provide for the giving of notice of defects to the company by registered mail stating wherein the machinery fails to fill the warranty, and providing special remedies for the purchaser.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff had been negotiating with one Pine, who was selling machines for the defendant, for the purchase of a second-hand machine, and that they went to Council Bluffs together to look at the outfit; that an agreement was made, and the machinery was shipped to plaintiff in care of Pine at Hoag, Nebraska. Pine paid the freight. Plaintiff complained of the condition of the machine as soon as he saw it, and refused to accept it until it was shown that it was capable of doing the work for which it was purchased, and the new parts furnished. It is also shown that the labor and materials sued for were furnished by him at Pine's request after he had refused to accept the machine. Defendant's employees worked with the machine for some time, and the defendant collected the money for the threshing that was done by the machine while plaintiff was helping.

The errors which the trial court are alleged to have committed are not clearly pointed out in the brief, but we understand the argument to be, first, that the court erred in its instructions given upon its own motion; and, second, that the evidence does not support the verdict. The court eliminated any recovery for damages for breach of contract, and submitted only the question as to the reasonable value of plaintiff's services performed under a contract of employment made by defendant through Pine. No exceptions were taken to the charge of the court.

Under the settled rule, appellant cannot now complain

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of error therein. We have read the instructions, however, and believe they clearly and fairly stated the issues. It is complained that the evidence did not justify the submission to the jury of the question of whether Pine was the defendant's agent. At the trial defendant took another view of this point. In an instruction given at its request, it stated: "Among the other allegations set forth is the allegation that Pine was the agent of the defendant, and some testimony has been introduced tending to establish that fact. It is for the plaintiff to establish that fact by a preponderance of the evidence," etc. We are of the opinion there was not only "some evidence," but enough evidence to warrant this question being left to the jury to settle.

It is argued that plaintiff did not comply with the conditions and terms set forth in the written order. This is true; but the machine was second-hand, and the contract expressly provides "the above warranties and conditions shall not refer to second-hand engines and machinery," hence he was not required to do so.

The evidence, while conflicting, seems to be sufficient to warrant the verdict, both on the score of the agency of Pine and the work and material furnished, as well as on the point of there being no settlement made between plaintiff and defendant's agent, Noonan, who, it is asserted, settled the account when he took over for defendant the remainder of the machine oil on hand.

We find no prejudicial error in the record, and the judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., ROSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

**MAY BULGER, APPELLEE, v. LOUIS W. PRENICA ET AL.,
APPELLANTS.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,193.

1. **Appeal: REJECTION OF EVIDENCE: HARMLESS ERROR.** In this an action upon a saloon-keeper's bond for damages for loss of support by causing the plaintiff's husband to become an habitual drunkard, on cross-examination objection to certain questions with reference to his habits prior to the time of sale of the liquor was sustained. There being other testimony in the record on this point, practically undisputed, *held*, not prejudicial error.
2. **Witnesses: EXPERT: CROSS-EXAMINATION: REVIEW.** By supplemental allegations in the petition, it is charged that plaintiff's husband died, after this action was begun, as a result of the habitual drunkenness caused by the defendants. A medical witness was permitted to testify as an expert to the effect of the excessive use of intoxicants upon the human system, more especially with reference to its tendency to impair vitality and lessen the resistant power to disease. He testified to his personal knowledge of the impaired physical condition of the deceased due to excessive drinking; he having been acquainted with the deceased for years, and having examined him. *Held*, Under the issues, this evidence was properly received.
3. **Estoppel: PRINCIPAL AND SURETY: LIABILITY OF SURETY: LIQUOR LICENSE.** Where a surety company has entered into the bond which is necessary to procure a saloon license, and the principal has received the license and become liable for damages to individuals by reason of the traffic, the surety is estopped to plead that there was no valid ordinance in force at the time the license was issued.
4. **Evidence: BONDS: CERTIFIED COPIES.** A properly authenticated copy of a liquor dealer's bond is sufficient *prima facie* proof of the existence of the bond and of its proper execution. *Gran v. Houston*, 45 Neb. 813.
5. **Appeal: MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.** An assignment that the verdict is excessive, not made in the motion for a new trial and called to the attention of the trial court, will not be considered in this court.
6. **Intoxicating Liquors: ACTION: DAMAGES.** Persons engaged in selling intoxicating liquors, under licenses obtained pursuant to the laws of this state, are liable in damages for all the legitimate and proximate consequences of their traffic, and, if they have induced

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habitual drunkenness in a previously sober and industrious man, they are liable for a consequent thriftless and dissipated career, followed by him, after they have ceased to furnish him with liquors. *Stahnka v. Kreitle*, 66 Neb. 829.

7. ———: "SLOCUMB LAW": CONSTITUTIONALITY. The question as to the constitutionality of chapter 61, laws 1881, known as the "Slocumb Law," has been repeatedly decided by this court, and will not be re-examined.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
LINCOLN FROST, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

*Brome, Ellick & Brome, I. J. Dunn, D. W. Livingston
and Morning & Leditth, for appellants.*

A. P. Moran and W. B. Comstock, contra.

LETTON, J.

This is an action against two saloon-keepers and the sureties upon their respective bonds to recover damages for loss of support and means of subsistence occasioned, as alleged, by reason of Charles Bulger, the plaintiff's husband, having been rendered an habitual drunkard by liquor sold to him by each of the defendant liquor dealers. The answer of the principals amounts to a general denial. The surety companies each admits its qualifications to execute the bonds, and deny generally the allegations of the petition. The Bankers Surety Company also alleged that there was no valid ordinance in force in Nebraska City authorizing the issuance of the liquor license of Prenica. Afterwards the plaintiff was granted leave to amend her petition by attaching supplementary allegations setting forth that on December 19, 1910, Bulger died; that his death was caused and contributed to by the habitual drunkenness caused, and excessive use of intoxicating liquors furnished, by the defendants to him, as alleged in the petition. The reply pleads that the facts with regard to the issuance of the licenses estop the sureties from denying the existence of a valid ordinance. The

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Bulger v. P

: for the plaintiff in the sum of
udgment the defendants have ap-

that Bulger was a man about 40
and decorator, and a skilled work-
ried, at the time of his death, for
were four children in the family,
years of age, the oldest being a
not a party to the suit. Mrs. Bul-
bulger supported the family until
ember, 1907, or the early part of
l the oldest boy have practically
ever since that time; that up to
tributed \$8 or \$10 a week to the
paid the bills and the house rent,
r, 1907, to his death in December,
y about \$60 to the family support;
use of liquor and neglect of work
r 1907; that prior to that time he
re or six months and not touch
at he was drunk most of the time.
ther's funeral, he was taken sick,
at her home in Missouri in Decem-
other witnesses, who were familiar
so testified. It seems clearly estab-
er was what is usually termed a
he would occasionally, prior to
ig bouts of several days, he would
metimes for months; but that from
til October before his death, his
worse, and the evidences of habit-
vious. Several witnesses testified
liquor from one of the defendants,
acts and circumstances which war-
ving that he was furnished intoxi-
he other liquor dealer. The testi-
witnesses was of such a character
I have rejected it entirely if other

facts had not furnished corroboration. One witness, at least, seems to have been pretty successfully impeached. But there was sufficient evidence of the sales, if the jury believed the testimony, to support the verdict.

A large number of assignments of error are made. Some appear to be as to matters not prejudicial, which will not be noticed, others may be grouped, since the proper limits of this opinion will not permit of all being spoken of.

1. On cross-examination Mrs. Bulger was asked whether her husband indulged in intoxicating liquors at the time of his marriage. An objection to this question was sustained as immaterial, and this is the first point upon which error is assigned. We think the court was right. There was no dispute but that he was an occasional drinker up to the time when it is charged the defendants caused him to become an habitual drunkard. For nearly 20 years he had supported his family, and they had no cause for complaint on this score until the latter years of his life. The question and answer could throw no new light upon the issues.

2. A question as to Bulger's habits prior to 1907 was excluded, probably as not proper cross-examination, and this is complained of. It was not strictly within the limits of the direct examination. It might have been just as well to allow it to be answered, but, since the record is full of the history of Bulger's habits, its exclusion was not prejudicial.

3. Over the objection of defendant, Dr. Carriker was permitted to tell, as a medical expert, the effect of the excessive use of liquor upon the human system. He testified that he knew and had examined Bulger, and that after 1907 he was always under the influence of liquor. He was then inquired of as to the power of Bulger to resist disease after that time, and testified that his vitality was impaired to an extent that he could not resist disease to any considerable degree, and especially to resist pneumonia. Objections were made that these inquiries had no bearing upon any issue in the case, and sought, with-

t any foundation, to connect the death of Bulger with the use of intoxicating liquors. These objections were all overruled, and defendants excepted. On cross-examination this witness testified, as to his knowledge and acquaintance with Bulger's condition from 1905, that his condition was worse in 1908 than it was in the fall of 1907, and in September, 1908, than it was in May.

Twelve of the assignments of error refer to the evidence of Dr. Carriker and of Mrs. Bulger as to the nature of her husband's illness and the cause of his death; the gist of the complaint being that it was not shown that the furnishing of liquor and the death of Bulger had the relation of cause and effect. A number of cases from this and other courts are cited to establish the proposition that, while it is not essential that the furnishing of the liquor must be the sole, immediate cause of the injury, yet it must have contributed in an appreciable degree. The petition prays damages for loss of means of support. If the deceased was in such a feeble and physically impaired condition, caused by habitual drunkenness induced by the acts of the defendants, that he was unable to resist the inroads of disease, this would be as much a result of the traffic as would be his inability to perform manual labor on account of physical weakness produced by the excessive use of intoxicants. In the latter case, no court would deny the right to recover. *Acken v. Tinglehoff*, 83 Neb. 296; *Selders v. Brothers*, 88 Neb. 61. In this case, the physical condition of the deceased was such that, even if the element of death had not entered into consideration at all, the verdict did no more than respond to the damages prayed. In *Acken v. Tinglehoff*, *supra*, although the husband was still living, his ability to resist the vicious appetite had been so destroyed, and his physical ability to earn a livelihood so impaired, that the court allowed a recovery on the theory that the man was a wreck, so far as the support of his family was concerned, his usefulness gone, and his wife might as well have been his widow. The habit of excessive drinking and appetite for liquor

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created in Bulger was so strong that a few months before his death the deprivation of the stimulant resulted in hallucinations. His condition was such that a verdict for the same amount would not have been held excessive by this court on the evidence produced. Under these circumstances we deem it unnecessary to enter into extended dialectics as to remote and proximate cause, and as to whether the drunkenness or the disease was the causative force or agency in producing the death. Whether the actual death was the result of the disease or not, the condition of Bulger in his latter days was such as to justify the verdict, and, hence, proof of his death could not be prejudicial, even if erroneous, as to which we express no opinion.

4. Instruction No. 12 is attacked because it withdrew from the jury the evidence that had been received as to whether there was a valid ordinance in force at the time the licenses were issued. We are of opinion that, when a surety company has entered into the bond which is necessary to procure a saloon license for its principal, and the principal has received the license and become liable for damages to individuals by reason of the traffic, the surety is estopped to plead that there was no valid ordinance in force at the time the license was issued. If such were the fact, the sureties should have ascertained it before their undertaking put the principal in a position to engage in the traffic and cause the damages complained of.

5. In the same instruction the jury were told that they should consider the bonds as valid and binding for the period covered. In this connection the defendants complain that there was no evidence of the execution of the bonds, and that the instruction was erroneous. The original bonds were not introduced in evidence, but certified copies of the originals on file in the office of the city clerk were offered, and received, over the objection of the sureties that they were incompetent, and no proper foundation laid for their admission. The legislature, by section 15, ch. 61, laws 1881 (Ann. St. 1911, sec. 7165) has made a

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properly authenticated copy of the bond evidence of its execution. This is *prima facie* evidence, and is sufficient, in the absence of opposing testimony. The statute merely gives effect to the presumption of regularity, and changes the burden of proof. This the legislature has power to do. *Fran v. Houston*, 45 Neb. 813, 834.

6. The assignment that the verdict of the jury is excessive appears for the first time in the briefs in this court, and does not appear in any of the motions filed by any of the defendants for a new trial. We have repeatedly held that such questions will not be reviewed in this court if they have not been first called to the attention of the trial court, and an adverse ruling made thereon. This assignment, therefore, cannot be considered.

7. Defendants complain that their demurrers on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action should have been sustained, and that defendants, although they answered over, have preserved the point by setting it up in the answer. The petition charged that the damages were caused and contributed to by sales of liquor furnished by these defendants between December 1, 1907, and May 1, 1908. It is said that neither Prenica nor Schneider, nor their sureties, would be liable for sales in Schneider's saloon after May 1, 1908; yet, the petition charged that Bulger became intoxicated in Schneider's saloon in November, 1909. Prenica was not in business after May 1, 1908, nor was he same surety on Schneider's bond after that date. The petition, however, fairly construed, pleads that Prenica and Schneider, by sales between December 1, 1907, and May 1, 1908, caused Bulger to become an habitual drunkard, and that he continued from about December 1, 1907, to drink and become intoxicated, and on the 22d of November, 1909, became drunk in Schneider's saloon. If defendants "induced drunkenness in a previously sober and industrious man, they are liable for a consequent thriftless and dissipated career, followed by him, after they have ceased to furnish him with liquors." *Stahnka v. Kreitle*, 16 Neb. 829.

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8. Complaint is made as to the giving of certain instructions, and as to the refusal to give others. The law in such cases is well settled in this state. Taking the charge of the court as a whole, we find it not to be subject to misapprehension, and can find nothing in it of which defendants are entitled to complain.

9. An attack is again made on the constitutionality of the act of 1881, known as the "Slocumb Law." We have repeatedly held that this statute is not unconstitutional, and decline to consider the question again.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

HAMER, J., not sitting.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. CITY
OF FRANKLIN ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,205.

1. **Licenses: OCCUPATION TAX: PENALTY: VALIDITY.** The penal provisions of an occupation tax ordinance, which provides for the enforcement and collection of the tax by the imposition of a penalty or fine, are valid and enforceable. *Rosenbloom v. State*, 64 Neb. 342.
2. ———: ———: ———: **ENFORCEMENT.** Where a city ordinance provides that a refusal or neglect to pay an occupation tax shall render the person or corporation in default liable to a fine, and provides, further, that the suit shall be brought in the name of the state, "and may be commenced by a warrant and arrest of the person or persons against whom the suit is brought, or may be commenced by a common summons," the police court of the city has jurisdiction to render judgment for the fine or penalty, whether the defendant is brought into court by warrant and arrest or by the service of summons.

APPEAL from the district court for Franklin county:
HARRY S. DUNGAN, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

W. C. Dorsey, for appellant.

C. C. Flansburg, L. A. Flansburg and H. Whitmore,
contra.

LEITON, J.

In 1909 the city of Franklin adopted an ordinance levying an occupation tax of \$10 a year upon each telegraph company transacting intrastate business within the limits of the city. Plaintiff refused to pay the tax. The city then brought an action in police court in the name of the state of Nebraska for the city of Franklin, as plaintiff, and against the plaintiff herein, for the recovery of \$10 for the tax and for a penalty of \$50 for neglect to pay the same. The defendant in that case made a special appearance objecting to the jurisdiction of the police court, which was overruled, and on the same day, after taking testimony, a judgment was rendered as prayed. Defendant attempted to appeal to the district court, but the appeal was dismissed on the motion of the city, on the ground that the appeal was not properly taken. An action against the principal and surety upon the appeal bond was then brought by the city in justice court.

The present action was brought to restrain the maintenance of that action and the enforcement of the judgment, on the ground that it was void for want of jurisdiction, that the city is harassing and annoying defendant with a multiplicity of suits, and that plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Issues were made up, the city pleading the validity of all proceedings. A motion for judgment on the pleading made by defendant was sustained and the cause dismissed. Plaintiff appeals.

The principal point argued by the appellant is that the police judge had no jurisdiction to render the judgment complained of, for the reason that his jurisdiction is purely criminal in its nature, the statute providing that he shall have jurisdiction of "offenses against the ordinances of the city." The case of *German-American Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Minden*, 51 Neb. 870, is cited as authority for the proposition that an attempt to fix a criminal penalty for failure to pay an occupation tax is void, and collection can only be made by civil suit. Section 6 of the city ordinance

provides that any person, corporation, etc., who shall refuse or neglect to pay the tax, shall be liable to a fine of not less than \$5 nor more than \$100. and the court may commit to the county jail or to the city jail any person or persons against whom such fine shall be assessed until the fine shall be paid. It also provides: "Every suit brought under this section shall be in the name of the State of Nebraska, and may be commenced by a warrant and arrest of the person or persons against whom the suit is brought or may be commenced by a common summons." The doctrine of the case relied upon, and of the cases of *State v. Green*, 27 Neb. 64, *Magneau v. City of Fremont*, 30 Neb. 843, and *Templeton v. City of Tekamah*, 32 Neb. 542, upon which the decision in the *Minden* case was based, holding that an occupation tax could not be collected by fine and imprisonment, was reconsidered and overruled in *Rosenbloom v. State*, 64 Neb. 342, in which it was held that the provisions of section 154, ch. 77, art. I, Comp. St. 1901. authorizing fine and imprisonment as a means of enforcing the payment of a tax on occupations, are valid. This case seems to be in line with the weight of authority. *Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co.*, 34 Utah 38, 95 Pac. 523, 17 L. R. A. n. s. 898. The police judge, under the charter, has the power to punish the violation of city ordinances. The ordinance itself provides that the proceedings may be commenced either by warrant and arrest or by common summons. We have held that proceedings before a police judge to recover penalties for violation of city ordinances, which are not violative of the criminal laws of the state, while criminal in form, are of the nature of civil suits. *Peterson v. State*, 79 Neb. 132; *Pulver v. State*, 83 Neb. 446; *Clearer v. Jenkins*, 84 Neb. 565. It seems clear that the police judge had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and of the subject matter, and, even if erroneous, his proceedings were not void and the judgment subject to collateral attack.

As to plaintiff's contention that it was denied the right of appeal on account of the court striking the appeal bond

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the files, if there was error in making this ruling, tiff had a complete and adequate remedy by appeal in court. Plaintiff has not stated facts which permit resort to equity for relief against the maintenance of the writ or the enforcement of the judgment. The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

ROSE, C. J., ROSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

ARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

FARMERS & MERCHANTS STATE BANK, APPELLEE, v. JOHN
SUTHERLIN, APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,211.

chattel Mortgages: DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY. A description in a chattel mortgage which will enable a third person, aided by inquiries which the instrument itself suggests, to identify the property is sufficiently definite.

—: **RECORDING: REMOVAL OF PROPERTY.** Where a mortgagor removes property from another state into this state, without the consent of the mortgagee, which has been incumbered by a mortgage duly recorded and valid under the laws of the former state, such removal does not invalidate the recording of such mortgage, nor necessitate the recording of it again in the county in this state to which the mortgagor has removed with the property.

APPEAL from the district court for Gage county: LEAN-
M. PEMBERTON, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

D. McCandless, for appellant.

N. Kauffmann, contra.

PEMBERTON, J.

This is an action in replevin to recover possession of a horse. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appeals.

The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts, which shows that on the 11th day of October, 1909, M. M. O'Leary and I. F. Reed executed and delivered to the plaintiff at its bank in Greenleaf, Kansas, a mortgage note for the sum of \$375, due in one year from that date, and pledged as security for the debt: "One span of bay geldings, 7 and 8 years of age, weight about 2,500 lbs., named 'Charlie and John.' One 1½ work harness. One 3¼ lumber wagon. All property this day bought of Guy Scott." The mortgage was filed for record on the 12th day of October, 1909, in the office of the register of deeds of Washington county, Kansas, and duly recorded in book 31 of chattel mortgage records of said county, as required by the laws of Kansas. The mortgage was never at any time filed or recorded in Gage county, nor in any other county in Nebraska. About May 1, 1910, O'Leary being then in Wyoming, Nebraska, and having one of the horses in his possession, sold the same to the defendant, John Sutherlin. Sutherlin had no actual notice of the fact that the horse was mortgaged, and acted in good faith. It is admitted that the debt secured by the note had not been paid at the time this suit was commenced, and that the horse was taken from Washington county, Kansas, without the consent of the mortgagee.

Appellant contends, first, that the mortgage is void for uncertainty in the description; second, that the filing or recording of a chattel mortgage in Kansas is not constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser in good faith in Nebraska.

1. The rule adopted in Kansas as to the sufficiency of a description in a chattel mortgage is that "a description which will enable a third person, aided by inquiries which the instrument itself suggests, to identify the property is sufficient." *Mills v. Kansas Lumber Co.*, 26 Kan. 574. *Griffiths v. Wheeler & Barber*, 31 Kan. 17; *Inter-State Galloway Cattle Co. v. McLain*, 42 Kan. 680. The mortgage, therefore, was not void as indefinite in that state. The rule in Nebraska is identical. *Rawlins v. Kennard & Son*,

26 Neb. 181; *Union State Bank v. Hutton*, 61 Neb. 571. We conclude, therefore, that the description is sufficiently definite.

2. The most important point is whether the mortgage is valid in this state against an innocent purchaser of the property from the mortgagor, the mortgage not having been filed in the office of the county clerk in any county in this state. This seems to be a new question in this court. The general rule, as stated in Jones, *Chattel Mortgages* (5th ed.) sec. 299, is as follows: "The law of the place of contract, when this is also the place where the property is, governs as to the nature, validity, construction, and effect of a mortgage, which will be enforced in another state as a matter of comity, although not executed or recorded according to the requirement of the law of the latter state." In support of this general principle, cases are cited from Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah and Wyoming.

A different rule prevails in those states which have not substituted the filing or recording of chattel mortgages for the delivery of possession of the property pledged, as is required at common law, and also in such states as require by statute the refiling or re-recording of mortgages on property brought from other states. Jones, *Chattel Mortgages* (5th ed.), sec. 300.

In *Corbett v. Littlefield*, 84 Mich. 30, the supreme court of Michigan refused to enforce a chattel mortgage given in Nebraska, and duly filed in this state, from one citizen of this state to another on property within the state which was taken to Michigan without the consent of the mortgagee. This holding is an exception to the general rules of comity prevailing between the states, and is in conflict with that of the majority of courts in this country.

This court has heretofore held, on the authority of *Snyder v. Yates*, 112 Tenn. 309, 64 L. R. A. 353, that a chattel mortgage duly recorded in one state will not, under

the doctrine of comity, be given priority by the courts of another state to which the chattels are removed, with the consent of the mortgagee, over local attaching creditors who had no actual notice of the mortgage. *Pennington County Bank v. Bauman*, 87 Neb. 25. The decision in the latter case seems to have been mainly based upon another ground. In any event, it would seem that there is a distinction between a case where a mortgagee voluntarily permits the mortgagor to remove the same into another state, there to become subject to the laws of that state, and a case where the property is moved without his consent and regardless of the rights secured to him by the mortgage. In the one case, he is willing to place his security in a position where his rights may come in conflict with those of the citizens of the state to which the property is removed, and he has no right to complain if the courts of that state hold that he has waived his right of priority by failing to take possession, and that his claims are subsequent to that of its own citizens. In the other case, his property has been taken away in despite of him and without his consent, and he must rely upon the comity of the state to which it has been taken to enforce the validity of the contract and protect his rights.

The states of Kansas and Nebraska are divided by an imaginary line over 300 miles long. So far as commercial transactions of the border counties are concerned they practically constitute one commonwealth. We believe that considerations of comity and of the value of active commercial intercourse require the enforcement of the rights of the mortgagee, even as we would enforce the rights of a citizen of this state, holding a duly filed chattel mortgage, against a purchaser of property living in a county of this state hundreds of miles removed from the place of contract, and without actual notice of the existence of the mortgage.

In *Handley v. Harris*, 48 Kan. 606, the facts were that certain personal property was mortgaged in Nebraska, the mortgage duly filed and recorded here, and the property

State & Merchants State Bank v. Sutherland.

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AFFIRMED.

OSE and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

ICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

CHARLES W. EDWARDS ET AL., APPELLEES, V. EDWARD A.
HATFIELD ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,026.

1. **Partnership: TRANSFER OF STOCK TO TRUSTEES: ACTION FOR CONVERSION.** Where partners engaged in mercantile business transfer their stock to a committee of their creditors under a contract authorizing the committee to conduct the business, and requiring a return of the remainder of the property whenever all claims are paid in full, the members of the committee are trustees for both creditors and partners, and the latter alone, before the claims have been paid in full, cannot maintain an action at law against the members of the committee for the conversion of stock sold by them in bulk in violation of their duties as trustees.
2. ———: ———: ———. In an action by partners for the conversion of partnership property, there can be no recovery by individual partners to the exclusion of others.

APPEAL from the district court for Scott's Bluff county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

John L. Webster, Francis A. Brogan and William Mitchell, for appellants.

Wilcox, Halligan & Mothersead and F. A. Wright, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is an action to recover \$27,700 for the conversion of partnership property consisting of merchandise, book accounts, bills receivable and the good-will of a mercantile business. From the judgment on a verdict in favor of plaintiffs for \$6,000, defendants have appealed.

For the purposes of review, the consideration of one question only is necessary. Are plaintiffs entitled to relief in an action at law for conversion? Plaintiffs, Charles W. Edwards, Edgar North and Jess B. Edwards, were conducting a hardware and implement business at Minatare, January 29, 1908, as partners under the firm name

of North & Company. They were then unable to meet their obligations, and so notified their creditors, giving their liabilities as \$11,733.83 and their assets as \$17,549.44, and asking time for adjustment. A creditors' committee, composed of Edward A. Hatfield, C. A. Newberry and C. O. Aspinwall, met plaintiffs at Minatare, February 12, 1908. As a result, the partnership property and the real estate of individual members of the firm were transferred to the creditors' committee by a bill of sale, containing, among other provisions, the following:

"North & Company are entirely solvent, but on account of their inability to collect their accounts due them and realize upon their assets, by reason of the slow sale thereof, they are unable, at the present time, to promptly liquidate their indebtedness, and have requested their said creditors to postpone the maturity of their indebtedness until the 1st day of November, 1908.

"This assignment is made for the purpose of enabling the said creditors' committee, upon obtaining the consent of the creditors to such postponement of the maturity of their claims, to cause the said assets to be sold, and the business to be conducted and the proceeds to be applied, from time to time, to the payment of the said indebtedness *pro rata* in proportion to the amounts thereof.

"Immediately after the execution and delivery of this assignment, the said North & Company and the said creditors' committee shall together take an inventory of all the assets hereby transferred, and make an estimate of the present value thereof, and thereupon the said committee shall authorize the said Jess B. Edwards and Edgar North as their agents to proceed to sell the said merchandise at retail, and to collect the said notes and accounts, and remit the proceeds of all sales and collections to the chairman of the said committee.

"The said committee shall be authorized to make such purchases only as may be absolutely necessary to keep the said stock in a condition to carry on the business, and shall also be authorized to meet the necessary expenses

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thereof. All other funds realized by them from sales and collections shall be distributed ratably among all the creditors in proportion to the amounts of their claims.

"Whenever the claims of all the creditors of the said firm of North & Company have been fully paid and satisfied, and all expenses incurred in this liquidation shall have been fully paid, any balance of property or money remaining in the hands of the committee shall be returned to the said North & Company, their successors and assigns."

To this arrangement all of the creditors agreed. The creditors' committee, with plaintiffs Edgar North and Jess B. Edwards in charge, conducted the business until March 3, 1908, when the following paper was executed:

"Know all men by these presents: That we, the undersigned, North & Company, do hereby authorize E. A. Hatfield, C. O. Aspinwall and C. A. Newberry, of the creditors' committee holding the stock of goods of North & Company under the bill of sale of February 12, 1908, to sell the said stock of goods described in the said bill of sale, in bulk, at private sale, upon such terms as the said committee may deem advisable, and apply the proceeds of such sale in the manner provided in the said bill of sale. Dated at Minatare, Nebraska, this 3d day of March, 1908. North & Company, by Edgar North. Witness: C. O. Aspinwall, R. G. Mitchell."

Newberry, a member of the creditors' committee, offered for the stock 80 per cent. of its value as inventoried, intending, as he says, to conduct the business in the name of the Minatare Hardware Company. This offer the creditors' committee accepted, and the following bill of sale was executed:

"Know all men by these presents: That we, the undersigned, North & Company, a copartnership, in consideration of the sum of one dollar to us in hand paid by North & Company, have bargained and sold, and do hereby bargain, sell, assign, transfer and set over to the said Minatare Hardware Company all that stock of merchandise,

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hardware, farming implements, buggies, wagons and all the stock of goods now kept and maintained in and at the store building of North & Company, in the town of Minatare, Scott's Bluff county, Nebraska, as more fully described in an inventory which is hereto attached and identified by the signature of the parties, and made part hereof. In witness whereof the said North & Company has caused this bill of sale to be executed in its partnership name this 24th day of March, 1908. North & Company, by Edgar North. We join in the above bill of sale. Creditors' Committee: E. A. Hatfield, C. O. Aspinwall, C. A. Newberry. Witness: Clyde Spanogle."

A month later Newberry, the purchaser, a member of the creditors' committee and a trustee, sold the business to H. A. Lotspeich at a large profit, receiving \$4,000 in cash and six notes for \$1,000 each. It is for the conversion of property, valued at \$17,700, and for the loss of goodwill, alleged to be worth \$10,000, that judgment was demanded, the members of the creditors' committee and Lotspeich being named as defendants.

Plaintiffs alleged, and offered proof tending to show, that the bill of sale to the creditors' committee was executed with the understanding that the business should be restored to the partnership November 1, 1908. The bill of sale, however, is pleaded in the petition. It does not so provide, and there is no attempt to reform or to rescind it. By its terms "any balance of property or money remaining in the hands of the committee" shall be returned to plaintiffs, whenever the claims of all creditors "have been fully paid and satisfied." Only 70 per cent. of the claims of creditors has been paid, and the time for turning back the business is not fixed by written contract. The bill of sale shows on its face that the members of the creditors' committee are not only plaintiffs' trustees, but that they are trustees for creditors other than themselves. For the faithful execution of their trust, they are accountable to such other creditors as well as to plaintiffs. This action at law was commenced before they had ac-

counted in equity to either class of beneficiaries. Have the trustees made an unlawful profit by abuse of trust? Have they converted trust property to their own use? From which of the two classes of beneficiaries did the trustees illegally take trust property? In equity, did plaintiffs own the property, including the good-will of the firm, while the trust was being administered and while the assets were being managed by trustees under a common agreement made for the benefit of both debtors and creditors? The members of the committee were themselves creditors, it is true, but they were also trustees for other creditors who are not parties to this suit—an action at law wherein the petition shows abuse of the fiduciary relation between the trustees and beneficiaries in both classes. If the judgment in favor of plaintiffs for the full value of the converted property, including good-will, can be sustained, what is the measure of accountability of the trustees for abusing the confidence of the absent creditors? Are the latter deprived of their remedy in equity? Could the absent creditors adopt the remedy selected by plaintiffs and recover a second judgment for the conversion of the same property? Their claims are not paid in full. They were parties to the contract creating the trust for the benefit of both debtors and creditors, and if they seek further redress they must go to the forum where trustees are required to account according to the principles of equity. Plaintiffs should have taken that course.

For another reason, plaintiffs should seek relief in equity. While they assert that the transfer of the stock in bulk was unauthorized and void, North, one of the partners, authorized the transfer in writing and executed the bill of sale to the Minatare Hardware Company, using in both instances the firm name of "North & Company, by Edgar North." He advised the subsequent purchaser, Lotspeich, that it would be safe to purchase the stock, and he worked in the store for each transferee after there had been a change in ownership. If the transfers in bulk under the circumstances narrated were unauthorized and

void as to the other partners, a question not decided, North was nevertheless bound by his individual acts, unless the same were induced by fraud or undue means, which is not shown. *Reed v. Gould*, 105 Mich. 368; *Church v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago*, 87 Ill. 68; *Kingsbury v. Tharp*, 61 Mich. 216; *Blaker v. Sands*, 29 Kan. 551. North joined his partners as a plaintiff, though he is bound by the transfers. He is therefore in the attitude of demanding damages* for a conversion in which he was an active participant. This is an anomaly not sanctioned by the law. He is not entitled to damages for conversion. Since North cannot recover, his partners have mistaken their remedy, and, under their present petition, are defeated by the familiar doctrine that, in an action by partners for the conversion of partnership property, there can be no recovery by individual partners to the exclusion of others. To state the rule in a different form: "Conversion will not lie on behalf of an individual partner to recover partnership property from one holding title through another partner." *Andrews v. Clark*, 5 Neb. (Unof.) 361; *Estabrook v. Mcssersmith*, 18 Wis. *545; *Reed v. Gould*, 105 Mich. 368; *Farley v. Lovell*, 103 Mass. 387; *Sindelare v. Walker*, 137 Ill. 43; *Homer v. Wood*, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 62; *Church v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago*, 87 Ill. 68.

The facts narrated are presented by the pleadings and evidence, and they show conclusively that plaintiffs have mistaken their remedy, and that they are not entitled to relief in an action at law for conversion. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings, with permission to plaintiffs, or any of them, if so advised, to amend their pleadings and to bring in any other parties deemed to be necessary to an adjudication of the matters in controversy.

REVERSED.

FAWCETT, J., not sitting.

STEPHEN SCHULTZ, APPELLEE, v. WILLIAM C. WISE ET AL.,
APPELLANTS.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,088.

1. **Pleading: DEMURRER.** Where misjoinder of causes of action is apparent on the face of a petition, the infirmity may be challenged by demurrer.
2. **Guaranty: LIABILITY OF GUARANTOR.** The liability of a guarantor does not extend beyond the terms of his guaranty.
3. **Principal and Agent: CONTRACT: GUARANTY OF PERFORMANCE.** An agent who binds himself by a contract containing the terms of his agency and specifying his duties and obligations does not increase his liability by signing a mere guaranty of performance on his part, after it has been executed by a third person.
4. **Guaranty: LAW GOVERNING.** Guaranties of performance and of payment are controlled by the same principles of law.
5. **Action: JOINDER.** A contract of agency and a third person's guaranty of performance on part of the agent are separate contracts, and causes of action thereon cannot be joined.
6. **Equity: SUITS IN EQUITY.** In a suit wherein the claim in litigation is purely equitable in its nature, the case should be determined according to the rules regulating the procedure and the practice in equity.
7. **Principal and Agent: ACCOUNTING.** A principal cannot deprive an agent of his right to an accounting in equity by the misjoinder of a cause of action on the contract of agency with a cause of action on a third person's guaranty of performance on part of the agent.

APPEAL from the district court for Kearney county:
HARRY S. DUNGAN, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

J. L. McPheely, for appellants.

Adams & Adams, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is an action against an agent and his guarantor on the contract of agency and on the guaranty to recover an alleged balance of \$5,039.91, due to the principal on all

transactions of the agent during the time he acted in that capacity, a period lasting about a year. Defendants, among other defenses, separately denied the existence of any indebtedness to plaintiff. A jury was impaneled, to whom were submitted testimony covering 365 pages of type-written matter, a great many exhibits, the contents of several books of account, a complicated petition pleading two contracts and containing plaintiff's statement of a complex and voluminous account, two answers in equity, two technical replies, and 12 pages of the trial court's instructions. Upon a joint verdict against both defendants for the exact amount of plaintiff's claim as pleaded, defendants appeal separately.

By contract in writing, executed January 29, 1909, Stephen Schultz, plaintiff, appointed defendant William C. Wise agent for the remainder of the year to sell farm implements, vehicles and harness at Heartwell. The terms of the agency and the duties and obligations of the agent were formally recited in the contract. It was signed by the principal and the agent, but not by defendant Albert Abrams, the guarantor. Among other stipulations, it was provided that the "agent shall receive one-half of the net profits of the business as he shall conduct it, the net profits to be that amount that represents the difference between the cost of the goods and that amount received from them as sold, less the expense of conducting the business." The following guaranty was indorsed on the back of the contract of agency:

"In consideration of the appointment of W. C. Wise as selling agent for Stephen Schultz, for the year 1909, ending January 1, 1910, we, the undersigned, hereby guarantee unto Stephen Schultz the fulfilment of every part of this contract, by W. C. Wise, that all money and notes received from the sale of goods will be turned over to Stephen Schultz, except that which rightfully belongs to W. C. Wise, that is his one-half the commission on sales made. Should W. C. Wise fail to properly turn over to Stephen Schultz or his assigns all notes and money re-

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ceived for the sale of goods, less one-half the commission. we do hereby agree and bind *myself* to make good unto Stephen Schultz such shortage. Signed this 1st day of February, 1909. Albert Abrams, W. C. Wise."

In a petition designating the agent and his guarantor as joint defendants, plaintiff pleaded both contracts, alleged facts showing the amount due from the agent to plaintiff under the terms of the contract of agency, averred that guarantor was liable therefor, and prayed for a joint judgment against defendants for the agent's indebtedness. Defendants filed separate demurrers, each assailing the petition on the ground, among others, "that several causes of action are improperly joined." If misjoinder is apparent on the face of the petition, the infirmity was properly challenged by demurrer. *Porter v. Sherman County Banking Co.*, 36 Neb. 271. The trial court overruled the demurrers, but the rights asserted by defendants were preserved in the answers, and were presented to the trial court at every appropriate stage in the proceedings.

Guarantor did not sign the contract of agency. His liability was limited to his guaranty. The agent, by signing the guaranty, did not increase his liability nor make guarantor a party to the original contract. The paper signed by Abrams is a technical guaranty. He did not agree to perform the obligations imposed by the terms of the agency, but guaranteed, to the extent of his separate contract, that the agent would do so. The distinction between such contracts should always be recognized in enforcing them, where the guarantor asserts his legal rights. "Guaranties of performance and of payment," said the supreme court of Wisconsin, "are placed upon the same ground." *Hubbard v. Haley*, 96 Wis. 578. Guarantor's contract being a guaranty of performance, his obligations must be determined according to the principles applicable to the enforcement of a guaranty of payment. In the early history of this court the rights asserted by defendants in their demurrers were explained as follows: "A contract of guaranty is not a primary obligation to pay,

is an undertaking that the debtor shall pay. The contract of the maker and sureties upon a promissory note is to pay the same. The guarantor is not a promisor with the maker. How, then, can he be sued with the maker of a promissory note upon an obligation to which he is not a party? The contract of guaranty is a separate and pendant contract, and the liability of the guarantor is governed by the express terms of his contract. He cannot be joined in an action against the maker of a note, not being liable as maker." *Mowery v. Mast & Co.*, 9 Neb. 445. These principles have been consistently followed ever since they were first announced. *Barry v. Shosky*, 57 Neb. 534; *Ayres v. West*, 86 Neb. 297.

Both the petition of the principal and the answer of the agent show that the latter was entitled to a hearing in accounting in equity. This right would not have been questioned, except for the erroneous misjoinder of the two causes of action. In *Wilcox v. Saunders*, 4 Neb. 569, 581, it was said: "When the claim is one purely of an equitable nature, the action must be determined according to the rules regulating proceedings and practice in equity."

The trial court, by overruling the demurrer of the agent and by forcing him into a trial before a jury, deprived him of substantial rights. Guarantor pleaded, and adduced testimony tending to prove, that he was drunk when he signed his name. He interposed other separate defenses. Instructions relating thereto were mingled with instructions applicable alone to the cause of action for an accounting. The agent is entitled to findings and a decree in a court of equity, and to a trial *de novo* in the appellate court, in case of an adverse decision below.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

EDGWICK, J., dissenting.

The opinion holds that the defendants, Wise and Adams, could not be joined as defendants in the same

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action because the two contracts upon which they are liable are separate and distinct contracts, Abrams' contract being purely a contract of guaranty. The case was begun, it appears from the opinion, as an action at law, but the opinion rightly says that, under the conditions and considering the matters in litigation, both the petition and answer show that it is in fact an action in equity. In actions in equity all parties directly and indirectly interested should be made parties to the action, and the court should do complete equity to all parties, settling all questions that arise between them, growing out of the subject matter in litigation. Abrams is not liable unless Wise is, and, on the other hand, if Wise is liable, then Abrams is. There is no distinction between them in that respect. In an action against Abrams upon this claim, the evidence upon both sides would be precisely the same as it would be in an action against Wise. There is, then, so far as I can see, no reason under our code practice for not uniting them in this action in equity and settling the whole controversy at once, instead of making two suits, one against Wise, and then a suit against Abrams, in which, if there was already a judgment against Wise, Abrams could make no possible defense.

WILLIAM D. ARMSTRONG, APPELLANT, v. WILL N. RANDALL
ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,139.

Deeds: CANCELATION: FRAUD. A deed to valuable land, if procured for an insignificant consideration by fraudulent misstatements of facts and by concealment of conditions on the part of the grantee, may be canceled in equity, where the circumstances were such that grantor was justified in relying on the acts constituting the fraud, and did so in good faith.

APPEAL from the district court for Scott's Bluff county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Affirmed as modified.*

en G. Fisher, William P. Rooney and Andrew M. ssey, for appellant.

A. Wright, J. G. Mothersead, William Milchrist and Joseph, contra.

MR. J.

intiff began the suit to quiet title to a quarter-section of land in Scott's Bluff county. George B. Siemer upped the land, lived on it a short time, and obtained ent for it in 1891. Shortly afterward he moved to eastern part of the state, and later to Iowa. Through l from him, procured for \$25 August 23, 1909, plain- aims title. Defendants pleaded title or liens through d tax foreclosure sale. Siemer intervened, and d for a cancelation of his deed on account of fraud e part of plaintiff in procuring it. The differences en defendants and intervener were amicably ad- l, leaving the charge of fraud the only controverted ion. On this issue the trial court permitted inter- to refund the consideration of \$25, canceled his and quieted in him the title to the land. Plaintiff ppealed, asserting that the decree is not supported by vidence.

e land was of little value when intervener left it y after receiving his patent. It was arid land with- ater or canals for purposes of irrigation. It was 35 from a railroad. When plaintiff procured the deed and was irrigable by means of a government canal. own of Scott's Bluff on a railway system had sprung ithin three or four miles, and the land was worth, ps, \$6,000. It may fairly be inferred from the evi- that plaintiff knew the changed condition, and that venger did not. Plaintiff was expeditious and pains- g in procuring his deed, in having it recorded, and in ing suit. All was accomplished within a few days. venger was sought out in Iowa, where he transferred tle and accepted \$25 for interests of great value.

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These circumstances alone raise strong inferences that plaintiff knew existing conditions, and that intervener did not, but there is other proof of those facts. There is direct evidence that plaintiff misrepresented conditions, concealed facts when he should have spoken, and made misstatements preventing an inquiry which would have disclosed material circumstances and conditions unknown to intervener. While the evidence in many respects is conflicting, the findings of the trial court, when the entire case is considered, seem to be not only correct, but to be in harmony with the principles of justice and equity. In addition to the return of the consideration as provided by the decree below, intervener, however, is required to pay to plaintiff, on account of taxes paid by him, \$10.35, with interest. As thus modified, the judgment is affirmed, plaintiff to pay the costs.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

ISAAC N. MORELAND ET AL., APPELLEES, V. WILLIAM BERGER ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,172.

Quieting Title: OCCUPYING CLAIMANT. In a suit by the owners of the fee to quiet their title to land, a defendant who transferred all his interests in both the land and the improvements and surrendered possession to his grantee before the action was commenced is not entitled to relief under the occupying claimants' act.

APPEAL from the district court for Dawson county:
BRUNO O. HOSTETLER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

H. D. Rhea, for appellants.

E. A. Cook and *Warrington & Stewart*, *contra*.

SE, J.

plaintiffs began this suit to quiet their title to a lot in
enburg. They acquired the fee by descent from their
r, subject to the life estate of a widow, who died after
g attempted to convey the entire estate to William
er, relying on a void decree rendered by the county
under an unconstitutional act of the legislature.
er improved the lot and sold it to William H. Bedell,
took possession and paid the entire purchase price
50, except \$52, which he offered to pay upon receiving
per conveyance. Afterward Bedell sold the lot to
as Lemmon. Berger and wife, Bedell and wife, and
non and wife are defendants. After the suit was
uted, and before the case was decided, Bedell bought
ee from plaintiffs and transferred it to Lemmon, his
er grantee. Berger makes no claim to title, and it
properly quieted in Lemmon through Bedell. Berger,
ver, had made a demand under the occupying claim-
act for the value of his permanent improvements,
from an adverse judgment on this branch of the case
id his wife have appealed.

the judgment erroneous? Berger never owned the
If he owned the improvements or interests therein,
id transferred them to Bedell, and had received the
id price of both the improvements and the lot, except
which had been tendered to him upon compliance
his contract. Long before this suit was commenced
id parted with his interests in the improvements and
surrendered possession to his grantee. Not being in
ssion of the lot, and not having any interest in the
ovements, he is not entitled to relief under the
ying claimants' act. *La Bonty v. Lundgren*, 58 Neb.

AFFIRMED.

ARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

**LYSLIE I. ABBOTT ET AL., APPELLEES, V. IDA N. JOHNSTON,
EXECUTRIX, ET AL., APPELLANTS.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,181.

1. **Judgment: VACATING: CONCURRENT REMEDIES.** The provisions of section 602 of the code, enumerating grounds under which judgments may be set aside after expiration of the term at which they were rendered, are concurrent with independent equity jurisdiction.
2. **Dismissal of Action: RELIEF IN EQUITY.** The dismissal of an action for want of prosecution, on motion of defendant without notice to plaintiff, may, after expiration of the term at which the order was rendered, be set aside by a court of equity having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of the suit, where the circumstances call for equitable relief.

**APPEAL from the district court for Saline county:
LESLIE G. HURD, JUDGE. *Reversed.***

A. J. Sawyer, for appellants.

Ray J. Abbott, contra.

ROSE, J.

Plaintiff began a suit in 1909 to cancel a mortgage on a number of lots in Crete, on the ground that enforcement of the lien had been barred by the statute of limitations. The mortgage was given to secure a note for \$2,780, dated May 17, 1888, and payable May 17, 1890. Guy L. Abbott and Elizabeth Abbott were mortgagors, and Johnston, Foss & Stevens were mortgagees. Plaintiff asserted title to the mortgaged lots through mortgagors, and undertook to sue the heirs and legal representatives of a purchaser of the mortgage. Plaintiff did not plead payment or offer to pay the debt. His action was dismissed for want of equity. In a cross-petition it was pleaded that a suit to foreclose the mortgage had been instituted March 17, 1893, and that it had been wrongfully dismissed and stricken

from the docket November 12, 1907, for want of prosecution. The equity powers of the court are invoked by cross-petitioners for the purpose of reinstating the foreclosure suit. By demurrer the cross-petition was attacked on two grounds: (1) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (2) The facts pleaded are insufficient to state a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained, and, cross-petitioners refusing to plead further, the cross-action was dismissed, and they have appealed.

1. Was the district court without jurisdiction to reinstate the dismissed foreclosure suit? The term at which the dismissal was entered had long since passed, and cross-petitioners did not seek redress under section 602 of the code, enumerating grounds under which judgments may be set aside after expiration of the term at which they were rendered. The code, however, does not provide the exclusive remedy. Its provisions are concurrent with independent equity jurisdiction. *Spence v. Miner*, 90 Neb. 108; *Hitchcock County v. Cole*, 87 Neb. 43; *Wirth v. Weigand*, 85 Neb. 115; *State v. Merchants Bank*, 81 Neb. 704; *Williams v. Miles*, 73 Neb. 193; *Sherman County v. Nichols*, 65 Neb. 250; *Meyers v. Smith*, 59 Neb. 30; *Munro v. Callahan*, 55 Neb. 75; *Radzuweit v. Watkins*, 53 Neb. 412; *MacCall v. Looney*, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 715; *Edney v. Baum*, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 173. Under the cross-petition in equity to which plaintiff appeared, the trial court, therefore, had jurisdiction. It follows that the first ground of demurrer was not well taken.

2. Do the facts pleaded by cross-petitioners state grounds for equitable relief? The pleading is long and complicated, but the following, in substance, appear among the alleged facts: The mortgage was duly executed, delivered and recorded. No action at law to recover the debt, which is due and unpaid, has been commenced. Mortgagees assigned the paper to the State Bank of Crete, November 22, 1888, and afterward the receiver of that bank sold it to John R. Johnston, who died March 12, 1908. His heirs and legal representatives are the cross-petitioners. When

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Johnston became the owner of the note and mortgage, he committed them to the control of Frank H. Connor as trustee with power to collect the debt and release the lien. Connor, pursuant to his trust, began a foreclosure suit March 17, 1893. With Charles Offutt as his sole attorney, he filed therein, September 16, 1893, in his own name as trustee, and in the name of the beneficiary, an amended petition in due form praying for the foreclosure of the mortgage. A copy of that petition is inserted in the cross-petition. Mortgagors appeared in the foreclosure suit. While it was pending Offutt died. Johnston was in feeble health, and moved to California, supposing the case would receive the attention of his attorney or his trustee or of some one for them. He did not give the matter his personal attention. Under direction of his physician, he went to Europe in 1907, but returned shortly to California, where he died. The trustee also moved from Nebraska while the suit was pending. Not knowing of Offutt's death, and being absent from Nebraska, the trustee gave no attention to the prosecution of the foreclosure suit. Under the circumstances outlined, the action was pending from March 17, 1893, until November 12, 1907. On the latter date, the attorney for mortgagors, who became plaintiff in the suit to cancel the mortgage, taking advantage of the death of Offutt, and of the removal of Johnston and Connor from the state, filed a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit and to strike the case from the docket for want of prosecution. Of this motion no notice of any kind was given, nor did any person having an interest in the security or in the prosecution have any knowledge of the motion. The order of the court was made without knowledge of the circumstances stated. It was made when there was no one present to represent the owner of the note and mortgage. Neither Johnston nor any one else interested in prosecuting the foreclosure suit had any knowledge of the dismissal until June 20, 1908, when a request was made for a release of the mortgage. Negotiations between the proper parties for such a release

promptly followed, and resulted in an agreement for an amicable adjustment, which mortgagors and their attorney repudiated. Afterward, the action to cancel the mortgage was instituted. The negotiations and the adjustment are pleaded as an excuse for the delay in asking for the reinstatement of the foreclosure suit. The foregoing facts and others are pleaded in greater detail than is necessary on this inquiry.

Is the petition demurrable? Are facts entitling cross-petitioners to relief pleaded? The circumstances under which the foreclosure suit was dismissed without notice appeal strongly to a court of equity. Upon default in payment of the debt, the proper action was promptly commenced in the usual manner. There is nothing to show that it was ever set down for trial, or that a hearing was ever postponed by the lienors. For anything appearing in the pleadings, mortgagors may have caused the delay. It is admitted by demurrer that they had not paid their debt. The record contains nothing to show that there is any valid defense to the original suit. The present owner of the incumbered lots began an action to cancel the lien without alleging that the debt had been paid or that he was willing to pay any part of it. His only ground of relief was the statute of limitations, which could be available only through the advantage obtained by the dismissal procured without notice under the circumstances already outlined. The precautions which a plaintiff ordinarily takes to protect his rights had been taken. The trustee had engaged an attorney to prosecute the suit. The trustee and the beneficiary moved away and the attorney died while the action was pending. Though it is the duty of a plaintiff to be diligent in asserting his rights and in observing what is done in the litigation, the legislature has recognized the justice of granting relief from a judgment obtained without actual notice. Provision has been made by statute for opening a judgment within five years, where, after published notice only, it was rendered against a party having no knowledge or actual notice.

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Code, sec. 82. "Irregularity in obtaining a judgment" is ground for setting it aside after the term. Code, sec. 602. In *Berggren v. Berggren*, 24 Neb. 764, it is said: "Where it is sought to dismiss an action for want of prosecution, the party filing the motion must serve a notice of the same upon the adverse party. This is necessary in order to enable the party against whom the motion is filed to show some valid reason for his default."

Failure to give notice is clearly an irregularity apparent on the face of the record. The order was not a dismissal entered by the court on its own motion. Mortgagees were the moving parties. According to the petition, the court was not advised of the circumstances which accounted for the delay in prosecution. When the apparent irregularity described is considered with the death of the attorney, with the absence of both the real plaintiff and his trustee, and with other facts mentioned, relief in some forum should be granted under the liberal practice permitting reinstatement of cases dismissed through laches of attorneys or misunderstanding of parties, where no consideration has passed. *Steinkamp v. Gaebel*, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 480. Should that relief be granted in this case upon proof of the facts pleaded? The alleged owner of the land brought the owners of the mortgage into a court of equity for the purpose of canceling the apparent lien. The court of equity had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, and should retain it for the purpose of determining the question presented by cross-petitioners. For these reasons, the cross-petition is not demurrable.

The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

**BENJAMIN H. COOPER, APPELLEE, V. ELIA A. HICKMAN,
APPELLANT.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,207.

1. **Appeal From County Court: FAILURE TO FILE TRANSCRIPT: RIGHTS OF APPELLEE.** Under section 1011 of the code, providing that an appellee in a suit before a justice of the peace or a county court may file a transcript in the district court and there obtain a dismissal of the appeal or a judgment similar to that rendered in the inferior court, if the appellant fails to perfect his appeal within 30 days, the appellee by merely invoking the statutory remedies described does not do so at the peril of waiving appellant's delay and of opening litigation otherwise settled.
2. ———: ———: **NEGLECT OF APPELLANT.** A district court does not err in declining to entertain an appeal from the county court, where failure to file a transcript within 30 days from the rendition of judgment was due to the mistake or neglect of appellant's attorney in acting under the misapprehension that he had 30 days from the filing of the appeal bond to perfect an appeal.

**APPEAL from the district court for Antelope county:
ANSON A. WELCH, JUDGE. Affirmed.**

O. A. Williams and H. Halderson, for appellant.

Charles H. Kelsey, contra.

ROSE, J.

This is an appeal from an order overruling a motion by defendant to docket in the district court an appeal from the county court and to open a judgment rendered against her in the district court, under section 1011 of the code, providing that an appellee in a suit before a justice of the peace or a county court may file a transcript in the district court and there obtain a dismissal of the appeal or a judgment similar to that rendered in the inferior court, if the appellant fails to perfect his appeal within the statutory period of 30 days.

Did the district court err in overruling defendant's

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motion? In the county court plaintiff sued defendant on a promissory note for \$480, dated August 31, 1909, and payable January 1, 1910. Judgment was rendered against defendant August 4, 1910, for the full amount of plaintiff's claim. A proper appeal bond was executed and filed by defendant August 15, 1910. In due time a transcript of the proceedings of the county court was ordered and prepared, but was not filed in the office of the clerk of the district court until after the time for perfecting an appeal had expired. Plaintiff, however, November 22, 1910, presented to the district court a transcript and a motion for judgment similar to that entered in the county court. This motion was sustained the same day. Defendant applied to the district court December 14, 1910, for an order setting aside the judgment against her and permitting her to docket her appeal. It is from the judgment overruling her application that she has appealed.

Defendant asks for a reversal on two grounds: (1) By presenting to the district court a transcript of the proceedings of the county court and by demanding a judgment similar to the one therein rendered, plaintiff entered a general appearance in the district court and waived the delay on part of defendant in perfecting her appeal. (2) The failure of defendant to file her transcript in time resulted from a misunderstanding between attorneys or to negligence not attributable to her, and she was not responsible for the delay in any event.

1. The record of the county court shows that a proper appeal bond had been given. The county judge prepared the transcript in time. After the statutory period had expired, plaintiff presented a transcript to the district court and demanded a judgment similar to that of the county court. He asked only for relief grantable under the specific terms of the code. He did not appear for the purpose of opening a controversy settled by a judgment and the lapse of time. The legislature, in providing for a dismissal of the appeal or for re-entry of judgment in the appellate court, did not intend that those remedies

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the peril of opening a controversy been settled. The appearance for was not a waiver of defendant's de-
script. *Schoonover v. Saunders*, 48

on an affidavit to show that her
nscript within 30 days was due en-
standing between attorneys or to
l that she was in nowise responsible
fect her appeal in time. Her appli-
of fact as to the cause of the delay.
both sides. The evidence is sufficient
that an attorney regularly employed
appeal ordered the transcript, think-
ing he had 30 days from the filing of the appeal bond to
deposit the transcript with the clerk of the district court,
and that this was the cause of the delay. The excuse is
not sufficient. The evidence sustains the judgment.

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., LETTON and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

**ESTERLINE BEELS, APPELLEE, V. GLOBE LAND & INVEST-
MENT COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,175.

1. **Appeal: MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL: REVIEW.** To obtain a review in the supreme court of alleged errors in an action at law, the record must show that the error was presented to the trial court in a motion for a new trial, and a ruling had thereon.
2. ———; ———; ———. In a case submitted upon abstracts, an alleged error of the trial court in overruling a supplemental motion for a new trial will not be considered, unless the abstract contains the substance of the motion and of the affidavit in support thereof.

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3. ———: VERDICT: REVIEW. "A verdict, supported by competent evidence, will not be set aside simply because it does not comport with the conclusion which this court, as triers of fact, might have reached." *German-American Bank v. Stickle*, 59 Neb. 321.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
WILLIAM A. REDICK, JUDGE. *Affirmed*.

A. P. Lillis, H. P. Leavitt and Charles E. Foster. for appellants.

Henry E. Maricell and George L. Davis, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

Plaintiff brought suit in the district court for Douglas county against the Globe Land & Investment Company, a corporation engaged in the business of buying, selling and exchanging land for itself and as agent for others, and John L. Maurer and William J. Hartman, its president and secretary, respectively, to recover damages arising out of an exchange of real estate between plaintiff and one C. A. Campbell, which was alleged to have been caused by the false and fraudulent representations of President Maurer and Secretary Hartman, while acting for their company. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the sum of \$3,000, and from a judgment thereon defendants appeal.

By their eighth assignment defendants allege error in a number of instructions given by the court on its own motion; but, as this assignment is not discussed in the brief, it must be treated as waived. The eighteenth assignment, that the verdict is excessive, was not presented in the motion for a new trial, and cannot be considered. It is urged in the tenth assignment that a new trial should have been granted upon defendants' supplemental motion for a new trial. Neither the supplemental motion nor the affidavit in support thereof appears in the abstract, and cannot be considered.

We have carefully read the abstract and additional

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abstract, and are unable to find any errors in the admission or rejection of evidence. The case was submitted to the jury upon instructions which respond to the pleadings and the evidence. The whole case turned upon the credibility of the witnesses. Plaintiff and her husband testified to facts and circumstances, and statements made by Maurer and Hartman to them, which, if true, justify the verdict returned by the jury. Their testimony is squarely controverted at every point by defendants Maurer and Hartman. Outside of these four parties, very few witnesses were introduced on either side, none of whom was present at the time when plaintiff and her husband say the fraudulent representations were made to them by Maurer and Hartman. On some of the collateral points the testimony of these witnesses corroborates to some extent the testimony of plaintiff and her husband, and to some extent that of defendants Maurer and Hartman, the corroboration of the latter being rather stronger than of the former. From this statement it will be seen that the testimony was conflicting upon every material point. The weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses were for the jury, as the jury were properly told by the trial court. Under the well-settled rule, we cannot, under such circumstances, disturb the verdict. Nothing would be gained by setting out the testimony of the witnesses in detail.

Finding no errors of law in the record, and there being sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury, the judgment of the district court must be affirmed, even though, if we had been sitting as triers of fact, we might have found the other way.

AFFIRMED.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

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JOHN M. WHITE, APPELLEE, v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON &
QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,182.

1. **Railroads: NEGLIGENCE.** It is not negligence for a railway company to operate a passenger train at the rate of 50 miles an hour, during a clear day, in the open country, where there are no obscure crossings.
2. ———: ———: **KILLING LIVE STOCK.** The mere fact that an animal is killed upon the public highway at a railroad crossing is no evidence of negligence on the part of those in charge of the train.
3. ———: ———: **EVIDENCE.** Nor can negligence be established by inference or conjecture in contradiction to the testimony of a competent and unimpeached eye-witness.
4. ———: ———: **DUTY OF EMPLOYEES.** The duty of an engineer and fireman of a locomotive, to keep a lookout for animals on the track, is not their sole duty, but is such as is consistent with their other duties.

APPEAL from the district court for Furnas county:
ROBERT C. ORR, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Byron Clark and Arthur R. Wells, for appellant.

John Stevens, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

From a judgment in the district court for Furnas county, in favor of plaintiff, for the value of a horse killed by one of defendant's passenger trains, defendant appeals.

The petition alleges that on April 27, 1907, a horse belonging to plaintiff, of the value of \$100, "went upon the railroad track of the defendant, at a point where the right of way of the defendant was fenced, and not within the corporate limits of any city or village, the same being in Furnas county, Nebraska, and the said defendant, in the operation of one of its trains on said railroad, negligently and wilfully struck and killed said horse; that said kill-

urred in the daytime, at a time and place where sons in charge of said train had a clear and un-
ted view of said track, and the engineer in charge
train, by the exercise of ordinary care and cau-
uld have prevented such collision, but the said
r negligently and wilfully failed to use any care
aution to prevent said collision." The answer ad-
at the location described in plaintiff's petition is
hin the corporate limits of any city or village, and
e right of way is fenced; denies all allegations not
ally admitted; and pleads contributory negligence
part of plaintiff. The reply is a general denial.

evidence shows that the crossing where the animal
ured is in the open country and can be seen for a
rable distance in the direction from which the
as approaching. The train was running 50 miles
r. Plaintiff testified that he was at his home, a
ss than half a mile from the crossing; that he saw
in go by, but did not see it hit the horse; that his
ce is near enough to the track so that he can always
e signals made by the engine, such as the ringing
ell or the blowing of the whistle; that it was about
k in the morning. Over the objection of defendant,
permitted to testify that the engine on the train in
n did not whistle for the crossing, "only just when
t amongst the horses. They seemed to give us a
ort screech or two, as they usually do when they
anything," and the bell was not sounded; that it
ice, bright morning, with no fog.

Stout, examined as a witness in behalf of plaintiff,
l that at the time the train passed he was at the
t a Mr. Schondler, whose house is about 20 rods from
the horse was struck; that he noticed the train as
ed; that he saw the horses (five in number) "on
th side of the track, probably ten or fifteen rods."
d their horses, and as they were going in to break-
saw that the horses were still on the north side of
ck, "and we came up the walk, and I saw where

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the horses were at, and we saw the train coming, and it was coming awful fast. We thought the horses would not go on the track, so we went back to the house. I did not see the engine strike the horse." About five minutes afterwards he went up to the crossing and saw the horse. At that time two of the horses were on the south side and two still on the north side of the track. The injured horse was on its front feet, and seemed to be struck on the right hip. It was then more than 100 feet east of the cattle-guards.

H. O. Beatty, the engineer, was introduced as a witness by plaintiff, and testified that, if he had seen any horse on the track within any reasonable distance, he had means of stopping the train; that the train and engine were equipped with automatic, quick-action air brakes, in working order, which can be applied instantly, and the instant it is applied it diminishes the speed of the train. Upon being examined by defendant, he testified that he remembered hitting the horse that day; that the first he knew of the horse was when the engine struck him; that he felt the jar; that he was going east, and his seat was on the right-hand side of the engine, so that he was on the south side. "Q. When did you say you first knew of this horse being on the track, or near the track, or coming to the track? A. The horse was not on the track. If he had been on the track, I probably would have seen him; that is, if he would have been right on the track." He further testified that the engine was equipped with an automatic bell, and that "I am satisfied the bell was ringing when I passed that crossing. I sounded the whistle at the post. I have no distinct recollection of it any more than it is our general work. We always aim to follow our rules, and we did on that morning. I was attending to the duties of engineer, watching the machinery of my engine, and the crossing and the track ahead. My attention was first called to this horse about the time it was struck, and we were then going at least 50 miles an hour. It would not have been possible after seeing this horse to have stopped

before he was struck." No other witnesses were examined as to the collision.

At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for an instructed verdict. The motion was overruled, and that ruling is the error principally relied upon on this appeal. The motion should have been sustained. In the open country, outside of cities, villages and towns, where there are no obscure crossings, negligence cannot be imputed to a railroad company solely by reason of the speed of its train. *Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Talbot*, 48 Neb. 627; *Brown v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 88 Neb. 604. The mere fact that an animal is killed upon the public highway at a railroad crossing is no evidence of negligence on the part of those in charge of the train. *Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Wendt*, 12 Neb. 76; *Starke v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 82 Neb. 800; *Cox v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.*, 87 Neb. 136; *Kennedy v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, 80 Neb. 267. Nor can negligence be established by inference or conjecture in contradiction to the testimony of a competent and unimpeached eye-witness. *Kennedy v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*, *supra*. The duty of an engineer and fireman of a locomotive, to keep a lookout for animals on the track, is not their sole duty, but is such as is consistent with their other duties.

Applying the rules announced in the foregoing cases, we do not see how defendant can ever be held liable for the injury to plaintiff's horse. The only witness who saw the horses prior to the collision locates them 10 or 15 rods from the track. He thought about the train, but he also "thought the horses would not go on the track." At that time the train was coming, and, to use the language of the witness, "was coming awful fast." Had the engineer seen the horses at that time, we think he would have been warranted in thinking, just as Mr. Stout thought, that the horses would not go upon the track. Even if it were established that the whistle was not blown or the bell rung, we do not see how that could make any difference, for it is evident from the testimony of Mr. Stout that the

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noise of the train itself was sufficient to start the horses in motion. They evidently tried to run across the track ahead of the engine. Two of them got across, the third was struck, and the other two remained on the side where Stout saw them. The one that was struck, according to the testimony of the engineer, was not upon the track. He evidently was trying to get across, but was struck before he really got upon the track. Treating the petition as having stated a cause of action for negligence, which is, to say the least, construing it very liberally, we are compelled to hold that no negligence is shown.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, J.J., not sitting.

OMAHA FOLDING MACHINE COMPANY, APPELLANT, v.
HENRY E. STRIPLIN, APPELLEE.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,184.

Appeal: EVIDENCE: SUFFICIENCY. The evidence examined and set out in the opinion, *held* insufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
LINCOLN FROST, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

Mockett & Peterson, for appellant.

Guile & Guile, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

In 1908 plaintiff, a copartnership composed of Clark A. Sigafos and Henry Haubens, commenced the manufacture of a newspaper folding machine. Mr. Haubens was apparently financing the enterprise and Mr. Sigafos conducting the business. Plaintiff alleges that defendant

red its employ about July 1, 1908. Defendant fixes date as March 19. After entering its employ defendant continued to work for it until some time in December following. This action was commenced by plaintiff in justice court, in Lancaster county, to recover the sum of \$23, which plaintiff claimed to have advanced to defendant for expenses and to apply on salary not earned the time defendant quit his employment with it. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim, in which he admitted being indebted to plaintiff, and claimed that plaintiff owed him \$331 as salary earned, for which he had not been paid; and, in order to bring his claim within jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, he remitted in excess of \$200. The justice of the peace found against the plaintiff on its cause of action, and against defendant on his counterclaim, and dismissed the action at plaintiff's cost. Plaintiff appealed to the district court, where upon a trial to a jury there was a verdict against plaintiff upon its cause of action, and in favor of defendant for the full amount claimed in his cross-petition. From a judgment upon the verdict plaintiff appeals.

There are no questions of law involved which require consideration. The case turns entirely upon the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and judgment. It is undisputed that when defendant commenced working for the company it was for a compensation of \$15 a week. Mr. Sigafos testifies that there was never any agreement for any different compensation during the time defendant continued in its employ. A transcript of the day-book of plaintiff, appearing in the record, the accuracy of which is not questioned, covers the period of time from July 6 to December 19, 1908. It shows that all money paid to defendant for salary during the entire period of time was at the rate of \$15 a week. Defendant does not testify to having at any time received salary at any greater rate, notwithstanding the fact that he bases his claim upon an allegation that from July 1,

1908, his salary should have been at the rate of \$125 a month. During the period of time covered by the transcript from the day-book above referred to, plaintiff paid defendant on salary \$315, and for expenses \$209.77.

We think the evidence fully sustains the jury in finding against the plaintiff on its alleged cause of action; but we are compelled to hold that the verdict in favor of defendant upon his counterclaim cannot be sustained, even on the testimony of defendant himself.

Defendant testified that Mr. Sigafoos met him in Lincoln, "and asked me to come and help him, saying that he had a couple of machines partly finished and would like to get them out, and thought he could get them out within a couple of weeks, and asked me to come up and help him out with those machines. Q. What, if anything, was said with reference to salary at that time? A. Well, he said to me that we are just starting up and I can't afford to pay you over \$15 a week until we get those machines out and get started, and get squared up. He said he had been quite a little while on the machines, getting them ready to go. Q. Sigafoos was the man that was pushing this invention? A. Yes; the promoter. * * * He was the promoter of this machine and the manager. Q. When was the next conversation you had with Mr. Sigafoos, state as near as you can remember, in reference to the salary? A. In reference to salary, was not many—we completed those two machines. Instead of getting them out within a couple of weeks, we did not get them out until about the first days of May—went out and put them up. And I think as we came back on the train we were talking with regard to the salary, and I said to him, 'Sig, I am not making enough out of this to pay my expenses, my home expenses, and keep up,' and he says, 'Well, I will tell you what I am doing,' he says, 'I am just taking enough out of the concern to live with,' he says, 'We are not making anything, not taking anything yet,' and he says, 'We will just aim to take enough to do each of us to meet our home expenses until we get the

thing up to where it is right and good,' he says, 'and when we get started on the road—goods started—the job is worth then to you \$125 a month; we can afford to pay you \$125 a month when we get started up and straightened up on our feet.' And he says, 'It might get better eventually according to how the machine comes along, how it develops.' Q. And you continued to work for them from that time on until January, about the 1st of January, wasn't it? A. No; it was the latter part of December, the 29th of December, I think it was, the 29th day of December. * * * I went on the road about along the 1st of July, 1908. I was on the road off and on from that time until I left there; I think I was at Red Oak three or four weeks or such a matter, two or three or four weeks or such a matter in the shop, and then was in the shop a few days at Omaha. They had a shop in Red Oak, and in August and September I was there, part of the time during August and September, and I think in and out on the road, two or three trips or such a matter, while I was at Red Oak. I was hurt in a railroad wreck on October 26, and didn't go back to work until November 24. Q. What else did Mr. Sigafos say, if anything, with reference to salary in your conversation you have just told about? A. Well, I don't know that there was anything else said at that time. Q. Or at any other time? A. Not that I know of, no, sir; not that I can remember of any other time."

The only other evidence offered by defendant is the testimony of Mr. H. B. Berggren, who testifies that he is in the transfer business in Lincoln; that in the latter part of July or first part of August he had a conversation with Sigafos; that he asked Sigafos where Striplin was, whether he was working for him or not; that he answered he was; that witness' reason for asking him was that he was figuring on Mr. Striplin to go into business with him. He then states: "And he said he was traveling for him on the road, and, of course, he had just started up and was making machines, improving them, or something

more than I can repeat, and I don't just remember word for word. Q. Well, just in your own way tell the jury; was anything said about the salary of Striplin? A. There was. Q. What, if anything? A. Why, I said to Mr. Sigafos that I would like to have Mr. Striplin with us, and he says, well, he says, he is getting a good salary with us now, he says, he is getting a hundred and a quarter a month, but how long I don't know; he just said he was getting a hundred and a quarter a month at that time, and he was traveling on the road for them."

Mr. Sigafos testified: "Q. You heard the testimony of Mr. Berggren when he said that you told him that Mr. Striplin was receiving \$125? A. Yes; I heard that. Q. Is that a fact, or not? A. No, sir." He further testified: "Q. Just state to the jury what was said by Mr. Berggren and what was said by you. A. Berggren and I were visiting in his office; he said to me, they tell me you are—no, I think he said Strip tells me—at any rate he, or somebody else, tells me that you are paying Strip \$125 a month. I knew they were figuring with Striplin at that time, and, not wishing to disrupt what figures might be going on between them, I said \$125 is a pretty nice salary, Henry. Yes; he says, it is. I presume that left the inference with Berggren that I did do that."

This version of the interview between Sigafos and Berggren was not called to the attention of or contradicted by the latter. Defendant, on recall, was again interrogated *in re* the talk on the train in May. He then testified that, after telling Mr. Sigafos that he was not getting enough money to keep up his home expenses, Mr. Sigafos said: "I am just taking enough out to meet my expenses and go along and keep up with, and he says I will see that you shall do the same, and he says while we are new, just starting up, and have been to a big expense, I don't feel like that I could draw on the old gentleman (referring to Mr. Haubens) for any more money, seeing I have him considerable in debt, with no income. And I think from that on then I got a little bit more money; I

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got six or eight dollars a week more money from that time on. I had been paying my own expenses, board and room up until that time, and from that on then I drew enough to meet my expenses while I was in Omaha. While I was in Red Oak my expenses were paid." He then explains his reason for quitting and returning to Lincoln, by stating that his son was taken sick; that he came home and found the boy in bad shape; that he died on the 3d day of February following; and that he subsequently received a letter from Mr. Sigafos that he had an overdraft. "Q. That is the first you ever knew that they claimed an overdraft? A. Yes; that he claimed an overdraft against me. Q. And you had been going on the presumption that they owed you all the time? A. Yes; with the understanding that when the machine got up to where it could, and brought money enough in, that I should have my pay as we had talked."

There is an entire absence of any evidence in the record even tending to show that the business had ever, up to the time he quit work, reached the point or was in any condition to justify defendant in claiming the increased salary referred to. He never at any time during his employment with plaintiff made any such claim, nor, according to his own testimony, was the question ever again talked of between them, after the conversation on the train in May. A claim for such a substantial advance in salary should be supported by some tangible proof. No such proof was furnished.

For the insufficiency of the evidence upon this important point, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

LAWRENCE E. MCNEER ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. ROBERT
PATRICK ET AL., APPELLEES.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,187.

1. **Trust Deed: CONSTRUCTION.** P., a resident of the state of Kentucky, conveyed land in that state to I. as trustee for L., the recently married daughter of P. The conveyance to I. recited that it was in trust for the sole and exclusive use and benefit of L. and her heirs forever. *Held.* That the placing of the title in I. for the benefit of L. was for the sole purpose of protecting her against her husband and his creditors, and did not vest any estate in L.'s children; the words, "her heirs," being technical words of inheritance merely, and not words of purchase.
2. ———: ———: **LAW GOVERNING.** And the lands in controversy, situated in this state, having been purchased with the proceeds derived from the sale of the Kentucky land, in accordance with the terms of the deed from P. to I. as trustee for L., the rights of L., under her deed to the Nebraska land, must be determined by the laws of Kentucky, and the decisions of the supreme court of that state construing the same, at the time the deed from P. was executed.
3. ———: ———: **TERMINATION OF TRUST.** And L. having subsequently become discoverd by the divorce of herself and husband, the reason for the trust no longer existed, and the trust estate terminated; and, no other trustee having been appointed for her, thenceforward she was vested with the fee simple title to the lands so conveyed, with full power to sell and convey the same.

APPEAL from the district court for Pawnee county:
JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

George J. Humbert, J. C. Dort and Tibbets, Morey & Fuller, for appellants.

Story & Story and Burkett, Wilson & Brown, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

This suit was instituted in the district court for Pawnee county by the sons and only heirs at law of Lavinia W. McNeer, deceased, to establish their title to and to re-

the possession of the north half of the southeast r and the south half of the northeast quarter of . 34, township 2, range 11, in said county. From re dismissing their action and cross-action, they ute this appeal.

controlling question in the case is the construction iven to a deed executed by Watts Parker, the father inia (Mrs. McNeer), August 30, 1872, to lands in te of Kentucky. Lavinia had become the wife of McNeer seven months prior to the execution of the y her father. The deed was as follows:

s indenture, made this 30th day of August, 1872, n Watts Parker of Jefferson county, Kentucky, of st part, Reuben E. Parker of county and state id, of the second part, and John Q. Irwin of county lard and state aforesaid of the third part, trustee avinia W. McNeair (wife of A. D. McNeair) of on county, Kentucky, witnesseth, that the said

Parker for and in consideration of the sum of thousand five hundred dollars in hand paid to him ows, viz., five thousand dollars by the said Reuben ker and three thousand five hundred dollars by the avinia W. McNeair the receipt of all of which is acknowledged by the said Watts Parker, hath and hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said . and third parties (certain lands therein described), e and to hold the said three tracts or parcels of o said Reuben E. Parker and John Q. Irwin in the ing proportions and conditions, namely, to the said n E. Parker 7-12ths thereof for himself, his heirs ssigns forever, and the remaining 5-12ths thereof is red to said John Q. Irwin in trust for the sole and ive use and benefit of the aforesaid Lavinia W. air and her heirs forever.

is expressly understood that the said Lavinia shall id occupy said five-twelfths of said land hereby in- l to be conveyed to her and said Reuben E. Parker ants in common in the proportions aforesaid; that

is, 7-12ths to said Reuben E. and 5-12ths to Lavinia W., and should she and her said trustee, John Q. Irwin, at any time think it would be to the interest and benefit of the said Lavinia W. to sell her interests in the above described three tracts of land they, the said John Q. and Lavinia, shall have the same to the purchaser or purchasers, provided nevertheless that the purchase money received therefor shall be reinvested in real estate such as said John Q. and Lavinia W. may select, and the land so purchased shall be conveyed to and held by a trustee for the use and benefit of said Lavinia on the same terms and conditions that the land herein and hereby conveyed to John Q. as trustee is held, to have and to hold the same in the proportions aforesaid; that is, 7-12ths to the said Reuben E. and 5-12ths to John Q., trustee, as aforesaid, as tenants in common with covenants of general warranty."

Subsequently, by deeds from each to the other, the regularity of which is not questioned, the lands covered by the deed of Mr. Parker were partitioned. Thereafter, in accordance with the provisions of the deed for sale and reinvestment, Lavinia and her husband, Andrew, acting as her trustee (Mr. Irwin being then deceased), sold her interest in the Kentucky land and reinvested the proceeds in the Pawnee county land. The Pawnee county land was conveyed to Andrew McNeer, husband of Lavinia, as trustee, by a deed containing the terms and conditions of the original deed from Mr. Parker. In 1886 Lavinia and Andrew McNeer were divorced, and a few months later Andrew married another woman. On October 16, 1888, Lavinia sold and conveyed the land to one Miller, from whom it passed by mesne conveyances to defendant Robert Patrick. On June 28, 1908, Lavinia died without having remarried.

The decision of this case rests upon the construction to be given to the deed of Mr. Parker in 1872, the question being: By that deed, did Lavinia take a life estate only, with remainder to her children, or did she take an

estate in fee simple? That is to say, did the language of the deed, "for the sole and exclusive use and benefit of the aforesaid Lavinia W. McNeair and her heirs forever," give her children a vested interest in remainder in the property conveyed? The district court held that the terms of the deed to Irwin in trust for the sole and exclusive use and benefit of Lavinia and her heirs forever, and the subsequent deed of partition from Reuben, "created a trust estate for the sole and separate use and benefit of Lavinia W. McNeer, and that she became the *cestui que trust* to the fee simple title, and that the word 'heirs' as used in the deeds was merely a technical word of inheritance, and not a word of purchase, as to said Kentucky lands." The court made the same finding as to the word "heirs" in the deed to the Pawnee county land, and further found that the deed from Lavinia to Miller, made in October, 1888, after she had been divorced from her husband, conveyed a fee simple title to Miller; and that the subsequent deed from Miller to McAllister and from McAllister to defendant Patrick conveyed to the latter a fee simple title. In accordance with the findings, the decree dismissed the action of plaintiff and the cross-action of his two brothers at their cost.

The lands in controversy having been purchased with the proceeds derived from the sale of the Kentucky land, under the terms of the deed from her father, we think the rights of Mrs. McNeer, under her deed to the Pawnee county land, must be determined by the laws of Kentucky, and the decisions of the supreme court of that state construing the same, at the time the deed from Mr. Parker was executed. Upon the trial certain sections of the statutes of Kentucky of 1873, and a number of decisions from the supreme court of that state, were introduced in evidence. Section 1, art. II, ch. 52, p. 518, provides: "Marriage shall give to the husband, during the life of the wife, no estate or interest in her real estate, including chattels real, owned at the time, or acquired by her after marriage, except the use thereof, with power to

rent the real estate for not more than three years at a time, and receive the rent." Section 17, art. IV, ch. 52, p. 532, provides: "Separate estates and trust estates conveyed or devised to married women, may be sold and conveyed in the same manner as if such estates had been conveyed or devised absolutely, if there be nothing in the deed or will under which they are held forbidding the same, and if the trustee and husband unite with the wife in the conveyance. But her interest shall be the same in the proceeds as it was in the estate." Section 7, art. I, ch. 63, p. 585, provides: "Unless a different purpose appear by express words or necessary inference, every estate in land created by deed or will, without words of inheritance, shall be deemed a fee simple, or such other estate as the grantor or testator had power to dispose of." Section 8, art. I, ch. 63, p. 585, provides: "All estates heretofore or hereafter created, which, in former times, would have been deemed estates in tail, shall henceforth be held to be estates in fee simple; and every limitation on such an estate shall be held valid, if the same would be valid when limited upon an estate in fee simple."

Appellants contend that the word "heirs" in the Parker deed should be construed as a word of purchase, because it is the only word in the deed to show where the grantor intended the fee to go after the life use of Lavinia McNeer should have terminated; that effect must be given to the intention of the grantor. The trouble with appellants' contention is, there is nothing whatever in the deed under consideration which in any manner limits the use of Mrs. McNeer to the term of her life. Those words, or words akin to them, are not to be found in the deed. The deed recites that it is an indenture between the grantor, of the first part, the son Reuben, of the second part, and John Q. Irwin, of the third part, "trustee for Lavinia W. McNeair (wife of A. D. McNeair)." The habendum recites that Reuben and Irwin are to have and to hold in the proportion of seven-twelfths and five-twelfths; that the five-twelfths is conveyed to Irwin "in trust for the sole and

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Lavinia and her husband. The deed conveyed Lavinia's life. The donor understood that Lavinia was to have the use of said land "hereafter" and that said Reuben E. Patrick was to have the portions aforesaid."

to convey the five acres to Lavinia as a tenant in common with the donor. It gives Lavinia and the donor the right to

think it would be to the interest of the donor to have an interest in the land. The donor had an interest in the land estate, which he conveyed to and held for the use of said Lavinia," and the donor imposed by the deed the words, "ever," instead of "to a life estate, with the right to her an absolute right of inheritance."

It is conceded that the donor intended to convey the land to the daughter. The relation of the parties is shown by the deed quoted, it is apparent that the land was conveyed to Lavinia as a married woman. The deed was made to a purpose of giving Lavinia the land. She would have the free and sole use of the land. If the deed were made to a purpose also of enabling Lavinia to pay her acts or debts. The deed was made to a purpose of giving Lavinia the land.

sh (Ky.) 288, it is held that a married woman can receive the land held by a husband and the wife. In

it is said: "The object of such a conveyance, as in this case, was to preserve the use to the wife from the control of her husband, or the interference of his creditors." In *Lane v. Lane*, 106 Ky. 530, the parties to the deed were stated to be John L. Lane, party of the first part, "and Daniel Lane and his heirs after him, party of the second part." The deed further recited: And the grantor "does hereby sell and convey to the party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, the following property (etc.), to have and to hold unto the party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, forever." The court said that they regarded the word "heirs," in the clause where it first occurs, as a word of limitation merely, "denoting the inheritable quality of the estate conveyed, and not the particular persons who were to take the estate." In *True v. Nicholls*, 2 Duval (Ky.) 547, it is held: "A father conveyed land to his daughter 'and her bodily heirs.' As the deed contained nothing from which it could be inferred that the words were used in a sense different from their technical import, the grantee acquired the fee." In the opinion it is said that, upon examination of the deed, the court found that it contained nothing from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the words were used in a sense different from their legal and technical signification, and that the grantee therein did not take a life estate, but acquired the fee in the land. In *Pritchard v. James*, 93 Ky. 306, the deed named "Julia James and her heirs" as the parties of the second part, and the granting clause recited that the party of the first part "hath granted, bargained and sold unto the said Julia A. James and her heirs" the land described. The habendum was: "To have and to hold unto the said Julia A. James and her heirs and assigns forever." The court held that Julia took a fee simple title, and that her children took no interest, the word "heirs" being used as a word of limitation, and not as synonymous with the word "children." In *Lanham v. Wilson*, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 109, the syllabus holds: "The grantor in a deed conveyed a tract of land

to his daughter and her 'bodily heirs.' *Held*, That the intention of the grantor, as shown from the deed, was to use the words *bodily heirs* as words of limitation, and not of purchase." In *Chenault v. Chenault*, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 122, the deed recited that it was made and entered into by and between C. P. Chenault, party of the first part, and Mary H. Chenault, party of the second part; that the party of the first part "has bargained and sold, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell and convey the following real estate, * * * in consideration of \$1 in hand paid, and the further consideration of the love and affection first party has for second party, who is his wife, and the further consideration of the love and affection first party has for his infant child, James Hazelrigg Chenault, this property is sold and conveyed to second party in order that she and her infant child may enjoy and receive the benefit during second party's natural life, and that she may know that her infant child will receive said property at her death; to have and to hold the same unto the party of the second part, her heirs and assigns forever, with covenant of seizin and general warranty." The court say: "It will be noticed that nowhere in the deed does the grantor use words of conveyance or grant with respect to the infant child. The sale, conveyance and grant are to the wife alone. When he comes to give the reason he conveys the land to his wife, the grantor refers to his love and affection for his son, and recites, in effect, that he conveys the land to second party, the wife alone, because she may then know she and the son will receive the benefits of the grant during her natural life, and at her death the son may receive them. Nothing is, in terms or by necessary implication, given the son, but the mother is given the property for certain reasons which the grantor deems proper to state. The habendum clause likewise fails to make the son a grantee, the words, 'heirs and assigns forever,' being merely words of inheritance."

The trust in this case being for a married woman and designed for the protection of the estate from the husband

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during coverture, the trust estate terminated when the estate was freed from any liability or control on the part of the husband by the divorce of the parties. 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.) 947. In *Roberts v. Moseley*, 51 Mo. 282, it is held: "When land is conveyed to a trustee for the sole use and benefit of a married woman, upon his death, the use is immediately executed in her, and if she be dead, then in her legal heirs." In that case George W. Moseley conveyed the premises in question by deed to one Armstrong in trust for the use and benefit of his wife, "Ann M. Moseley, and her heirs forever." In the opinion, on page 286, it is said: "Where a trustee is appointed to hold the estate of a married woman, to protect it from the husband, and the marriage relation comes to an end, his estate at once becomes executed in the person who is to take it, the wife, if living, or if she is dead, her heirs at law." In *Steacy v. Rice*, 27 Pa. St. 75, it is held: "A trust for a married woman is a *special trust*, and such are not within the statute of uses. But when she becomes discoverd, the special trust for her separate use ceases and the legal estate vests fully in her." In *Bush's Appeal*, 33 Pa. St. 85, the syllabus reads: "A testator, by his will, gave a part of his estate to his daughter, a married woman; and in another part of his will, in order to secure it to her, he appointed a trustee for her share, directing him to invest the same at interest, to pay her the interest yearly during her life, and at her death to pay the principal to her heirs in equal parts: *Held*, That, on becoming discoverd, the legacy vested in the daughter, discharged of the trust; and that she was entitled to have it paid over to her by the trustee." In the opinion, on page 87, the court say: "The creation of the trust was not to lessen her interest in it, but to 'secure' it to her. He was providing against her husband, in the usual form of a trust, and not providing a protection for his daughter's heirs against their mother. Now that the husband is dead, the trust is without purpose, and she may claim an account and payment of the legacy; and this

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as very often been decided." The court then proceeds to say that, without regard to any express intention of the testator concerning the purpose of the trust, the legacy to Mrs. Snyder is absolutely, because it was given "to her and her heirs; to her for life, and then to her heirs. The trust, if valid, does not affect the real title. The quitclaim form does not at all obscure the substantial title.

"To devise to one for life, with remainder to his heirs, or to the heirs of his body, in legal or equitable form, gives a fee simple or fee tail in land."

Cases similar to the above might be multiplied, but we deem further citation unnecessary. The purpose of the deed from Watts Parker to a trustee for the sole use and benefit of Lavinia was for the sole purpose of protecting her against her husband and his creditors. It was not intended to and did not vest any estate in her children. The words, "her heirs," were technical words of inheritance merely, and not words of purchase. When Lavinia became divorced by the divorce of herself and husband, the reason for the trust no longer existed, and the trust estate immediately terminated; and no other trustee having been appointed for her, thenceforward she was vested with the fee simple title to the land, with full power to convey the same, and her deed to Miller passed the full and complete title to the land in controversy. The title having been subsequently conveyed to defendant Patrick, he likewise took and holds a full title in fee simple. It might be said in closing that this holding does full justice in this case, as Miller and his grantees paid full consideration for the land, and had been in actual possession of the same for about 21 years at the time of the commencement of this suit.

The above holding renders a consideration of the other questions raised upon the trial and discussed in the briefs immaterial.

AFFIRMED.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

ALLIE CLUTE, APPELLANT, V. OSCAR CLUTE, APPELLEE.**FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,197.**

Divorce: REVIEW: PROPERTY RIGHTS: ADJUSTMENT. Record examined and held: (1) The evidence is not of such a character as to justify a review of the decree of divorce. (2) In equity and good conscience, the property of the parties, accumulated by their joint efforts during a long period of years, should be treated as joint property in equal shares. (3) The joint possession and use of the property having by the decree been terminated by reason of the wrong-doing of the defendant, in whom the title rests, he should account to the plaintiff for the reasonable value of her share. (4) Land in another state, recently inherited by plaintiff from her father, should not be included in the accounting.

APPEAL from the district court for Furnas county:
ROBERT C. ORR, JUDGE. *Affirmed as modified.*

Lambe & Butler, for appellant.

W. S. Morlan, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

Plaintiff brought suit in the district court for Furnas county for a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, and for alimony, suit money and attorney's fees. The answer denied the cruelty, and controverted plaintiff's allegations as to the value of the property, the title to which was in defendant. The court found generally in favor of the plaintiff on the question of cruelty, and awarded her a divorce; allowed her \$3,100 permanent alimony, and denied her application for attorney's fees and suit money. From all of the decree, except as to the granting of the divorce, plaintiff has appealed.

The evidence shows a condition of affairs in this family which perhaps would have justified the court in refusing relief to either party. The language used by defendant to plaintiff, both when they were alone and in the presence of third parties, and the contents of a letter written by him

to her a few years before the separation, are too degrading to be permitted to disgrace the pages of our published reports. We turn from them with disgust. The conduct of plaintiff, judging from her admissions upon cross-examination, was evidently little better. It is true, she testified that her conduct in the premises was in resistance to his. The letter above referred to was written to her while she was absent in Wisconsin. When asked if she remonstrated with him for the way he had written, she answered, "No, I didn't. I said I would settle that when I seen him." She was then asked, "Did you?" To which she answered, "Sure, I did." She also admitted that she wrote just as bad letters to him as he did to her, and that whenever he was abusing her she "tried to keep even with him." The record also shows that, while they were living together, plaintiff's brother, a man over 40 years of age, was permitted to bring to their home a "lady friend" and live with her there as if they were husband and wife, although plaintiff admits they knew that the brother and his "friend" were not married. It is evident that these parties have little conception, and certainly no appreciation, of the sanctity of the marriage relation. They lived a cat and dog life, and disregarded all ideas of morality and decency to such an extent that they invited their son and his wife and child to a Sunday dinner, at which plaintiff's brother and his "friend" were present. These things were permitted, not only by plaintiff, but by defendant as well, who, if he had possessed any of the instincts of true manhood, would, as the head of the family, have banished the brother-in-law and his adulterous friend from the home. Under these circumstances, as said in *Arthur v. Israel*, 15 Colo. 147, the parties "cannot complain if we insist upon treating the present controversy as one relating solely to property rights, unaffected by those legal considerations which give to marriage and the family their peculiar status, with accompanying special privileges and protection." The doctrine of that case is considered and fully affirmed in *Marvin v. Foster*, 61 Minn. 154. We

therefore decline to review the record as to the granting of the divorce, and will consider only the property rights of the parties.

The record shows that about 34 years before the filing of the petition in this case the parties, then recently married, settled in Furnas county. That county was then a part of the western frontier. Neither had any money nor property at that time. The privations and hardships which they must have endured during the succeeding 34 years, in sustaining life, establishing a home, and raising a family of three children to manhood and womanhood and until they were married and settled in homes of their own, must have been great. During all of those years plaintiff was faithful in the performance of her full share of the work. She did all the housework, milked the cows, fed the calves and pigs, raised chickens, made butter, and with the butter and eggs contributed largely to the support of the family, thus materially aiding in the accumulation of their property. During the last 15 years it is undisputed that defendant led an intemperate life. While the plaintiff was at home doing the chores and looking after things generally, he would be in town on drunken sprees, from which he would return sullen, cross and quarrelsome. The last four or five years of their married life his sprees were not so frequent, but they were not entirely discontinued. Two or three times each year he would indulge his propensity in that direction. Under these circumstances, we think that, in determining the question we are now considering, these parties should not be considered as a husband and wife. They have no appreciation of that relationship. It would be more consonant with their true relations to consider them simply as a man and women engaged in the business of earning a living and accumulating property—a sort of copartnership, so to speak.

Conceding that defendant did his part, which, under the evidence, is treating him very liberally, their interests in the property should be treated as equal, undivided in-

terests, and, their joint use and possession having by the court been dissolved by reason of the wrong-doing of the defendant, he should now be required to account to the plaintiff for her full share in the joint assets. The property consists of 240 acres of land, upon which there was a mortgage for \$300. The record is not entirely clear as to whether this mortgage has been paid off. We are inclined to think it has been paid, but will permit defendant to have the benefit of the doubt, and will give him credit for that amount. Plaintiff testified that the land was worth \$60 an acre. A neighbor placed the value at \$42.50 an acre, but upon cross-examination he varied so much that it is hard to tell what his estimate is. Defendant himself testified that it is worth from \$30 to \$35 an acre. We are satisfied that plaintiff's estimate is too high, and are inclined to think that that of defendant is too low. Here again we have concluded to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt, and will take his highest estimate of \$35 an acre as the value of the land. This would make the land worth \$8,400, from which we deduct the \$300 mortgage, leaving the net value \$8,100. At the time of the trial defendant had in his hands personal property which he concedes to be of the value of \$1,460. Plaintiff contends that it was about \$1,200 more than that sum, but we are unable from the record to verify her figures, and therefore take the figures of defendant. This makes the net value of the estate at the time of the divorce \$9,560. This sum divided by two shows the interest of each in the joint assets to be \$4,780. If that sum be allowed plaintiff, she will then be obtaining her full interest in the property, and should not be allowed anything else in the way of suit money or attorney's fees. Each party, receiving one-half of the assets, should pay his or her expenses in the litigation.

It appears that, at the time of trial below, plaintiff had become the owner, by inheritance from her father, of 120 acres of land in Wisconsin, the value of which she places at \$2,500. Defendant insists that the value of that prop-

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erty should be taken into account in fixing the amount of plaintiff's allowance in this case. While the rule contended for might be sound under some circumstances, which we do not decide, it cannot be applied here. We are disposing of the property rights of the parties under the general rules of equity as to an accounting between joint owners of property, who are unable to agree upon a division of the same after their joint possession and use has been terminated. In such a case, where the parties have contributed equally to the joint fund, they are entitled to an equal division thereof, without reference to property which either may own individually, and to the acquirement of which the other did not contribute.

On June 22, 1911, we entered an order allowing plaintiff \$100 as suit money, \$100 attorney's fees, and \$25 monthly as temporary alimony from July 1, 1911, until the further order of the court. Defendant having refused to pay this allowance, an execution was issued, which has been returned unsatisfied. It appears, therefore, that nothing has ever been paid under that order.

The judgment of the district court is modified and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree in favor of plaintiff for \$4,780, and with the further direction that if it is made to appear that defendant has paid plaintiff any sum whatever under our order of June 22, 1911. above set out, such sum be deducted from said sum of \$4,780. If defendant so elects, he may, in lieu of the specific judgment awarded, pay to plaintiff \$730, being one-half of the personal property, and have an equal partition of the real estate under the direction of the district court. The decree as to the divorce is affirmed.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

E. A. BULLOCK, APPELLANT, v. E. H. BUETTNER, APPELLEE.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,200.

Appeal: AFFIRMANCE. Record examined, and found not to contain any reversible error.

APPEAL from the district court for Boyd county:
JAMES J. HARRINGTON, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

R. R. Hazen, for appellant.

D. A. Harrington, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

This action was instituted in the county court of Boyd county, to recover the consideration for an alleged sale of a feeder for a threshing machine. There was a trial and judgment for defendant, from which plaintiff appealed. The trial in the district court resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendant, and plaintiff now appeals to this court.

The questions presented are: A ruling of the court permitting an amendment to the answer; the sufficiency of the evidence; and exceptions to instructions. Upon the first point it is sufficient to say that, in order to obtain a review of a ruling of the district court permitting an amendment to a pleading in a case appealed from an inferior court, upon the ground that the amendment changes the issues tried below, the record in this court must show the change in such issues. We have carefully examined the record as to the other two points, and find that it contains no reversible error. The evidence appears to us to be sufficient to sustain the verdict, and no questions of law are discussed, which have not been repeatedly decided by this court. Neither the parties to the action nor the profession would derive any benefit from an extended discussion of the case.

The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

STATE, EX REL. DANIEL BALLMER, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM
STREVER, APPELLEE.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,209.

Municipal Corporations: TREASURER: REMOVAL FROM OFFICE: PROCEDURE. The power given the city council of a city of the second class, under section 8905, Ann. St. 1911, to remove a city treasurer for any of the reasons therein set out, cannot be exercised until there has been preferred against such treasurer some specific charge, of which he shall have notice and an opportunity to be heard in his defense.

APPEAL from the district court for Dawson county:
BRUNO O. HOSTETLER, JUDGE. *Reversed with directions.*

Niles E. Olson, for appellant.

E. A. Cook and W. A. Stewart, contra.

FAWCETT, J.

On April 15, 1910, relator was elected city treasurer of the city of Cozad for the ensuing municipal year. He duly qualified and entered upon the discharge of the duties of his office. On November 3, following, the city council, without notice to relator, and without any complaint having been filed against him, by resolution declared his office vacant, for the reason, as alleged in the resolution, that he had failed and neglected to render his account at the end of each month after his election, had failed and neglected to file warrants paid and redeemed by him, and had "failed and neglected to comply with the conditions of section 8905 of Cobbey's Annotated Statutes of the State of Nebraska, and of ordinance No. 5 of the city of Cozad, Nebraska, and said Daniel Ballmer has not given or offered any reason for such failure, and more than ten days have elapsed since said failure." Ordinance No. 5 is substantially the same as section 8905 of the statutes, referred to in the resolution. On the next day the council again met, and elected the respondent as relator's suc-

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cessor, and on the next day respondent filed his bond in the sum of \$5,000, which was approved by the council, and since that time he has been assuming to discharge the duties and receive the emoluments of the office. This action was begun in the district court for Dawson county to oust respondent from the office and reinstate relator therein. There was a trial to the court and judgment in favor of the respondent. Relator appeals.

We deem it unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of this case. Under the authority of *State v. Smith*, 35 Neb. 13, and *State v. Hay*, 45 Neb. 321, relator having been elected for a definite term, the power of removal could not be exercised by the city council until there had been preferred against him specific charges, of which he should have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard in his defense.

The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, with directions to enter judgment of ouster in favor of relator as prayed in his petition.

REVERSED.

BARNES, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

FETZER & COMPANY, APPELLEES, v. JOHNSON & NELSON,
APPELLANTS.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,146.

1. **Sales: ACTION FOR PRICE: DEFENSES: PLEADING.** The consideration for the contract of a vendee to pay for goods sold and delivered is the goods themselves. If failure of warranty of the goods is not sufficiently pleaded and proved, it cannot be relied upon as a defense of failure of consideration.
2. **Contracts: ACTION: FRAUD: PLEADING.** To avoid a contract on the ground of fraud in procuring it, the facts constituting the fraud must be pleaded and proved.
3. **Sales: ACTION FOR PRICE: EVIDENCE.** If a machine is purchased under a written warranty that it is made of good materials and

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with good workmanship, and there is no evidence of a failure thereof in those particulars, evidence that it was tried and failed to do good work is not sufficient proof that it was not intended nor adapted to do the work for which it was sold.

4. ———: ———: DAMAGES: ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. If a party to an action is not entitled to recover or recoup damages, evidence as to his alleged damages is properly excluded.

APPEAL from the district court for Madison county:
ANSON A. WELCH, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

H. Halderson, for appellants.

Willis E. Reed, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

This action was brought in the district court for Madison county to recover \$623.20, the purchase price of 10 disc and shoe drills, manufactured by the plaintiffs. The case was tried by the court without a jury, and there were findings and judgment for the plaintiffs for the amount claimed. The defendants have appealed.

The plaintiffs are manufacturers and wholesale dealers of farm machinery, and the defendants are retail dealers therein. The contract of sale was in writing, and contained this clause: "We refuse to give any warranty on goods of our manufacture other than that of good material and workmanship, refusing absolutely to sell any such goods on trial with the privilege of returning if not satisfactory."

The defendants in their brief say that they set up five defenses: Want and failure of consideration; fraud and deceit; breach of warranty and counterclaim for same; counterclaim for damages necessarily arising from the failure of the above farming implements to work; and general denial. They answered quite at large. The answer covers more than six pages of the closely printed abstract. It admits the purchase of the goods, and the written contract, and the delivery of the goods thereunder.

The first count in the answer appears to be an attempt to allege the failure of the consideration for the contract. It contained the following allegation, which illustrates the defendants' apparent idea of failure of consideration: "The defendants allege that the said drills, and each of them, were and are defective in mechanical construction to a degree that the operation of same, and each of said drills, involves the contravention of natural law; that the said drills are not made of good material, but of cheap, defective and inferior material; that the design and make-up of said drills are purely experimental, and upon fair and exhaustive trial said drills, and each of them, have proven to be complete failures in this agricultural section, and are complete failures; that said drills, with proper management, adjustment and power, will not and cannot do good work, and the work which said drills were warranted to do and intended for." And the count closes with the allegation: "And, by reason thereof, there is and was a total failure of consideration for the making of the said contract, and that there was no consideration moving to any third party with the defendants' consent." The defense of want of consideration is based upon the claim "that the drills would not do work, were utterly worthless, of no value." This, of course, is virtually a defense of breach of warranty. The goods were the consideration for the contract made by the defendants; and, if failure of warranty of the goods is not sufficiently pleaded and proved, it cannot be relied upon as a defense of failure of consideration. The defendants cited numerous authorities holding that, as between the original parties to an agreement, oral evidence is admissible to show want or failure of consideration. There is no doubt of this proposition, but these authorities are not applicable to this case. This contract was not *nudum pactum*.

The next contention is that "the defense of fraud may be shown by parol, not to contradict but to destroy the effect of a written contract." Of course, it is always competent to show that any contract was procured by fraud,

and fraud vitiates all contracts. The defendants in this case, however, failed to either allege or prove that this contract was procured by fraud. The allegations of the attempt in that regard are that the plaintiffs' agent who procured the contract "did then and there, at the time of the signing of said contract exhibit A, state, represent and say, that the said ten disc and shoe drills described in said exhibit A, and each of them, were constructed and made in a manner identical with and similar to the Superior Press Drill handled and sold by the Kingman Implement Company; that they were made of material of same weight and quality; that they were mechanically constructed, and operated and worked in the same manner as the said Superior drills, and would do as good work; that said representations and statements were false; the plaintiffs knew they were false, but made the same with the intention to defraud and deceive these defendants, who relied on said representations of fact, and signed the said contract by virtue and under authority of which said disc and shoe drills described in exhibit A were delivered to the defendants." If we consider that these statements of the agent would be sufficient in any event upon which to predicate fraud in procuring the contract, the allegation is still insufficient for that purpose. There is a general statement that the representations and statements were false, but it is not alleged which of the statements were false, nor in what particular. There is no allegation of fact inconsistent with the alleged statement of the agent. So far as the allegation goes, the falsity of the agent's statement may have consisted wholly in the statement that the drills would do as good work as the Superior drills, and this is a mere matter of warranty covered by the written contract between the parties. The evidence offered to support the allegations fails to show that the contract was procured by fraud. The offer of proof was in the same words as those contained in the answer. There was no offer to prove that the defendants relied upon the statements, nor in what respect the alleged statements were false.

The principal contention in the brief appears to be that the defendants should have been allowed to prove that the machines did not perform the work for which they were intended. It is said that, whether or not the goods sold are especially warranted, there is an implied warranty that they are suitable to "do the work for which it was made. The plaintiff in the case at bar being a manufacturer of the drills sold, it is in law bound to furnish a drill that will sow and cover up grain." The pleadings and evidence and the defendants' offer of proof did not present such a case as the defendants seems to have in mind. The quotations already made from the answer will show the nature of that pleading. One of the defendants testified: "We tried the drill, used four horses; with the press wheel attachment, the dirt and trash would check and stop the wheels on account of the double drawbar, and grain for that reason left on top of the ground; seed would come from spout, but would not be covered up; we then took the press wheel attachment off, and put on the chain cover attachment; scraper on convex side of disc and scraper on shoe on concave side of each disc are fixed and nonadjustable, so that straw, dirt and trash would lodge on both sides of each disc and stop them; would not seed nor cover up grain." It had already been testified that these machines were in general use for which they were intended. There was evidence tending to show that the ground was very wet and weedy, too foul and muddy to operate any seeder. We do not find that the defendants offered any evidence tending to prove that the drills were not intended nor adapted "to sow and cover up grain."

The defendants asked the witnesses on the stand: "What is the value of the drills you bought, in controversy here?" This was objected to as immaterial, and the objection was sustained. The defendants then offered to prove that the drills are of no value. This was excluded. And then various offers were made relating to the defendants' damages by the supposed failure of the machines, which were, of course, excluded. The brief discusses the

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measure of damages in breach of warranty; but, as no breach of warranty was shown, this evidence was properly excluded. There was evidence tending to show that the drills were of good material and workmanship as warranted, and there is no evidence to the contrary.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

LETTON, ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

IN RE ESTATE OF WILLIAM D. LYLE.

ISABELLA LYALL SCOTT ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. JOSEPH J. O'ROURKE, ADMINISTRATOR, APPELLEE.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,208.

1. **Witnesses: COMPETENCY.** Witnesses who know the fact whether boys of a certain age were at a stated time admitted into the British army are competent to testify as to such fact, although they are not familiar with the law so as to be able to say whether such boys were legally admitted.
2. **Evidence: OBJECTIONS: DEPOSITIONS.** Objection may be made to the competency and materiality of evidence contained in a deposition without filing objection thereto in writing under section 390 of the code.
3. ———: **EXCLUSION.** Evidence stated in the opinion *held* to have been improperly excluded.
4. ———: ———. A document, reciting that it is an "extract entry of birth," and signed "Hugh Pearce, Registrar," but without any other authentication or explanation, was properly excluded.
5. ———: **DECLARATIONS: QUESTION FOR COURT.** The question of the competency of the declarations of a deceased ancestor as to family pedigree and history is for the court, and not for the jury, to determine.
6. **Heirs: EVIDENCE: TRIAL: INSTRUCTIONS.** Declarations as to pedigree and history must relate to family relatives of the decedent.

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When, in determining the next of kin of a deceased person, the question is as to the identity of the decedent with one who is shown to be a member of the family of those claiming heirship, it is erroneous to instruct the jury that such identity must be established before such declarations as to the family relative can be considered.

7. ———: ———: ———: ———. In such case, it is misleading and erroneous to instruct the jury that the petitioners claiming heirship must prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that they are the next of kin, blood relatives, of the said William D. Lyle, deceased, and that they are the only next of kin and blood relatives living" of decedent, the only question being as to the identity of the decedent with the relative whose heirs they are.

APPEAL from the district court for Lincoln county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

William E. Shuman and Cook & Gossett, for appellants.

Wilcox & Halligan and James G. Mothersead, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

William D. Lyle died in Lincoln county, in this state, in March, 1905. He left some property and no will, and an administrator was duly appointed. He left no heirs in this country, and these petitioners, who are residents of Scotland, filed their petition in the county court of Lincoln county, asking that they be declared to be the next of kin and heirs of the decedent. The county court denied their petition, and they appealed to the district court. Upon trial in that court with a jury, there was a verdict and judgment against them, and they have appealed to this court.

1. The evidence shows that one Robert Lyall of Dundee, Scotland, was the father of three sons, James, William and David Lyall. These petitioners are the lineal descendants of William. David left a son, William D. Lyall. The petitioners attempt to identify this William D. Lyall as the deceased William D. Lyle, who died in Lincoln

county. The petitioners produced evidence tending to show that their relative, William D. Lyall, when a very young boy, 13 or 14 years of age, enlisted in the British army, and afterwards deserted and came to this country, and became a soldier in the Union army in the civil war. Three several witnesses, residents of Scotland, testified by deposition that boys of 13 years of age were allowed to enlist in the British army, but when the petitioners offered this part of the depositions in evidence it was excluded, and this ruling is now assigned as error.

The theory of the petitioners is that the fact that decedent deserted from the British army is an important matter in this case as furnishing a reason for his reticence as to the place of his birth and his relatives, and that this fact also explains statements by decedent as to his former home and relatives, which statements would seem to be inconsistent with some of the evidence produced by petitioners. The petitioners testified that their relative, William D. Lyall, did enlist in the British army, and deserted and left the country. The evidence offered would tend to corroborate them, and could not prejudice the administrator in any way. The objection to the evidence was that it was an attempt to prove the law of a foreign country by witnesses not shown to be familiar with that law. It does not seem to relate so much to the question of the legal right of boys to enlist as to the fact that they were allowed to do so. These witnesses testified to their knowledge of the fact that boys of that age were then received in the army for certain purposes.

2. Some time before the trial the administrator filed in the district court objections to these depositions, on the ground that they are "incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant, and not the best evidence, and no foundation laid." When the case was called for trial, the court did not determine this objection before the trial as required by section 391 of the code, and the petitioners now insist that the evidence could not be excluded for that reason. This evidence was excluded on the ground that it was incompetent

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relevant. Therefore section 390 of the code has no relation.

The petitioners offered in evidence a photograph that identified as that of William Lyall, who was the ancestor of these petitioners, and the nephew of David Lyall, son the petitioners were seeking to identify as the ancestor. This photograph was excluded, and the petitioners urge this ruling as reversible error. The photograph bore the stamp, "J. Roger, South Tay St., Dundee." The same stamp was on a photograph found among the papers of the decedent after his death, and there was evidence tending to show that at the time William D. Lyall of Dundee, according to the theory of the petitioners, was a photographer of that name doing business in Dundee. We do not see how this evidence could improperly prejudiced the administrator in any way, and together with other circumstances in the case, might have been of some assistance in determining the issue presented to the jury. We think the evidence should have been received.

A document attached to the deposition of Helen Lyall, called an "extract entry of birth," was properly excluded by the court as not sufficiently authenticated.

The court instructed the jury: "The jury are instructed that, before you can consider the declarations made by William Lyall, you must find by the testimony in this case, other than the declarations of William Lyall, that he said William Lyall was a relative of William D. Lyall, deceased, who died in Lincoln county about March, 1870." This instruction was erroneous. The evidence established beyond any question that the petitioners were the son and grandchildren of William Lyall, whose declarations were referred to in this instruction, and that that William Lyall was also the cousin of William D. Lyall, who was the relative of these petitioners, and who resided in Scotland as testified to by them. His declarations related entirely to William D. Lyall, whom he had personally known as his cousin, and were competent to

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show transactions and relations existing between the cousins. It was not necessary that the identity of the cousin, in regard to whom these declarations were made, with this decedent should be established before the declarations in regard to the conduct and habits of his cousin could be received in evidence. Whether these facts showed that the cousin became a soldier in our federal army, and afterwards located in Nebraska, and showed or indicated where he lived in Nebraska were all questions for the jury in determining whether or not this cousin was in fact the decedent, William D. Lyle. The question of the competency of such declarations is a question of law for the court, and should not be submitted to the jury.

6. The court instructed the jury: "The jury are instructed that the sole and only question for you to decide under the evidence in this case is, have the petitioners shown by the evidence that they are the only living blood relatives of William D. Lyle, deceased. * * * That William D. Lyle died in this county during the month of March, 1905, is undisputed. The jury are instructed that the burden of proof rests upon the petitioners to show by a preponderance of the testimony that they are the next of kin, blood relatives, of the said William D. Lyle, deceased, and that they are the only next of kin and blood relatives living of the said William D. Lyle, deceased." These instructions are complained of by the petitioners, and we think justly so. There was but one substantial question to be determined by the jury, and that was whether the William D. Lyall who was the relative of these petitioners, and who left Dundee, Scotland, many years ago, was the same person as the decedent, William D. Lyle. The petitioners established satisfactorily that their relative, William D. Lyall, left Scotland and came to this country about the time of the commencement of our civil war, and that they are his next of kin and would be entitled to inherit his property upon his decease. The evidence shows that the Lyall family of Dundee, Scotland, were not particular as to the spelling of their family name,

vidence that it was sometimes spelled Lyall, le and sometimes Lyel, and that, even in the 'you can see the name spelled there different race of Lyalls.' It was sufficient if the shown by a preponderance of the evidence e the only next of kin to the decedent; and em, in addition to that, to prove that they blood relatives living was erroneous. The for the jury was whether the decedent was m D. Lyall, shown by the evidence to be the e petitioners.

inistrator contends that under the evidence o other verdict could be sustained than the red. The evidence is without contradic-

tion that these petitioners are next of kin to William D. Lyall, formerly of Dundee, Scotland; that he left no other heirs to inherit his property to the exclusion of the petitioners; that as a boy he joined the British army, and that he probably deserted and came to this country. It remained for the petitioners to prove his identity with this decedent. This seems to be the only question that the court should have submitted to the jury. If the decedent was in fact the William D. Lyall described in these depositions, the petitioners are his next of kin and entitled to inherit his property. The difference in the spelling of the name, and the statements of decedent as to the place of his birth, and as to his relatives, would, of course, be considered by the jury, but these facts should be considered in the light of the circumstances that the name was written in different ways by the Dundee family, and that the evidence tends to show that the decedent had a motive for concealing his identity, as well as other circumstances disclosed by the evidence. The photograph found among the personal effects of decedent was found by Mr. Christie to be the photograph of William D. Lyall of Dundee, with whom the witness had played in his boyhood and with whom he was very familiar. This witness also identified positively the two other persons shown in the photograph.

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The photograph bore an imprint which showed that it was made in Dundee, Scotland, at the gallery where other photographs of the Lyall family were made, and the evidence shows that it must have been made many years ago. There are other circumstances in the case tending to show the identity of the decedent as the William D. Lyall of the photograph. The petitioners insist that the evidence of identity is so strong that we ought to dispose of the matter by directing a judgment in their favor. The trial court excluded important evidence, and we do not feel justified in disposing of the case upon the evidence before us.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

HAMER, J., not sitting.

FROTUNATO ZANCANELLA, APPELLEE, V. OMAHA & COUNCIL
BLUFFS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,213.

1. **Street Railways: ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY: ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE.** The plaintiff testified that, as he attempted to cross the track of the street car, he was struck and knocked down by a passing car; he did not see the car until it struck him; while the car was passing he could see that it was running at from 25 to 35 miles an hour. *Held*, That, while his evidence was not competent for the purpose of determining the exact speed of the car, it was properly admitted as tending to support the allegation that the person in charge of the approaching car failed to reduce its speed and advance slowly while passing another car.
2. ———: ———: ———: **PHOTOGRAPHS.** Photographs showing the location of the alleged accident and the condition of the street and surroundings are not necessarily to be excluded from the evidence merely because the situation is capable of verbal description.
3. ———: ———: **NEGLIGENCE: INSTRUCTIONS.** The plaintiff testified that after he had alighted at a street crossing on the west side of the south-bound street car, intending to go west on the street,

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he changed his mind, and started to go east across the parallel track, and was struck by a passing car. *Held.* That it was erroneous to submit to the jury the question whether the conductor was negligent in not warning him of danger in crossing the parallel track, there being no evidence that the conductor knew that he intended to cross the track, or knew before he alighted from the car that another car was approaching.

4. ———: ———: ———: EVIDENCE. Under such circumstances, the testimony of the plaintiff that he did not see or hear the approaching car is not sufficient to prove the allegation of his petition that there was no headlight on the approaching car, nor any bell sounded as it approached.
5. **Appeal:** INSTRUCTIONS. It is erroneous to submit to the jury issues upon which there is no evidence.

APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county:
HOWARD KENNEDY, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

John Lee Webster and W. J. Connell, for appellant.

George W. Cooper and T. W. Blackburn, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

Between 10 and 11 o'clock on the evening of July 14, 1909, the plaintiff became a passenger on one of the defendant's cars at Farnam street in Omaha. He informed the conductor that he wanted to leave the car at G street in South Omaha. When they reached G street, the conductor notified him, and he left the car. Early the next morning he was found unconscious some distance beyond the crossing at G street. His foot was crushed so that his left leg was necessarily amputated below the knee, and he had suffered other injuries. He brought this action against the defendant in the district court for Douglas county, alleging that the defendant's negligence was the cause of his injuries. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in his favor, and the defendant has appealed.

The defendant contends that the evidence is entirely insufficient to support the verdict; that there was failure of evidence to show negligence on the part of the defendant; that the evidence does not satisfactorily show that

the injury was caused by the defendant's car, and, if it was so caused, it was occasioned by the plaintiff's own negligence; and that the court erred in submitting various questions to the jury of which there was no evidence, and in refusing instructions offered by the defendant. The plaintiff's case depends almost entirely upon his own evidence. He testified that he was going to South Omaha to spend the night with his friend, Jim Canadella; his friend lived on G street, west from the street car track about two blocks; that he and his friend are Austrians, and the plaintiff is unfamiliar with the English language. He appears in that respect to be somewhat embarrassed in giving his testimony. He says that, when the conductor stopped the car at G street, he got off from the car, and passed towards the back end of the car, and the car went on. It was a very dark and stormy night, and there were no lights there, and he had forgotten the street number of his friend's residence, and, seeing a light at some distance to the east, he started at once across the parallel track; that he looked both north and south, and saw nothing, and just as he stepped upon the other track a north-bound car struck him, knocked him down and passed over his foot. He then saw by the light in the car that the car was running at from 25 to 35 miles an hour. The defendant objected to this testimony in regard to the speed of the car, and there is much discussion of this objection in the briefs upon the part of both the plaintiff and defendant.

It seems clear that the plaintiff did not show himself competent, under the circumstances, to testify with any degree of accuracy as to the rate of speed of the car. He did not see the car until after he was hurt, and was then lying upon the ground in his injured condition, and but a few feet from the car that was passing. The evidence, however, shows that there is a wholesome and necessary rule of the company that, when a car is approaching another car of the company that has come from an opposite direction and stopped to receive or land a passenger, the speed of the approaching car must be reduced, and such

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must advance slowly until it has passed, and ready to stop immediately if necessary to avoid injuring any person getting off or on, or persons or vehicles who may be crossing the street. If this rule was violated the company is negligent; and, while the evidence of the plaintiff was wholly inadequate to establish to any degree of accuracy the exact rate of speed of the approaching car, yet it is so clear that the jury might not find from this evidence that the person in control of this car failed to reduce speed and advance slowly ready to stop immediately if necessary, as the rule required. It is true that the conductor of the car which the plaintiff had left testified that another car was passing at the time, and there are circumstances that seem to corroborate this testimony of the conductor; but we cannot see that the court erred in submitting the consideration of this conflicting evidence to the jury. This evidence, then, was competent for the purposes indicated, and the court did not err in so receiving it.

The petition contained several allegations of negligence on the part of defendant. That, when the south-bound car stopped at the intersection to permit the plaintiff to alight, the north-bound car approached and ran over said intersection at a high and dangerous rate of speed; that there was no headlight on the north-bound car; that the bell was not sounded; that the man in charge of the car failed to keep a sharp lookout or be prepared to stop the car; and that the conductor on the south-bound car negligently failed to warn plaintiff of danger from the approaching car on the parallel track.

The defendant offered in evidence four several photographs of the location where the accident is supposed to have occurred. These were received by the court, but afterwards, upon motion of the plaintiff, were stricken from the record. The ruling of the court in striking these photographs from the record is assigned as erroneous. The photographs show the location of the tracks, the location of the street on each side of the track, the location

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of the buildings and other similar matters, and we do not see how they could have misled the jury in any way. The plaintiff says that "photographs are not generally admissible where the situation they are intended to illustrate is capable of verbal description," and undoubtedly some courts have applied such a rule, but they are in the minority, and that is not the rule in this state. *Carlson v. Benton*, 66 Neb. 486. In *Omaha S. R. Co. v. Beeson*, 36 Neb. 361, quoting from *Thompson on Trials*, it was said: "Where an inspection of the premises is proper, but impracticable or impossible, a photographic view of it is admissible." It was not intended to say that photographs could not be received under any other circumstances. The admission of this evidence is largely within the discretion of the trial court, depending upon the circumstances and the condition of the evidence, and this evidence is not of so much importance in this case that the error in excluding it would necessarily require a reversal.

During the trial of the case, the plaintiff was permitted to amend his petition by inserting the allegation "that, notwithstanding it was dark and stormy, the conductor of the car on which plaintiff was a passenger negligently failed and omitted to warn plaintiff before he left the car, or at any time, of danger from an approaching car on the parallel or other tracks." The court submitted this question to the jury in the instructions. The defendant insists that there was no evidence before the jury justifying the submission of this question, and we have not found in the abstract sufficient evidence to justify it.

The condition of the plaintiff is indeed unfortunate. A laboring man in a strange country; he has lost his limb and has been otherwise injured so as to greatly affect, if not destroy, his ability to supply himself with the necessities of life. The jury might naturally think that there ought to be some remedy for him, but the defendant company cannot be required to provide for all who may use their cars and meet with accidents to their injury. Unless it is affirmatively proved that the company or its em-

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loyees were guilty of some negligent act which was the proximate cause of the injury, it is not liable. If society in general owes a duty to one so injured, it cannot shift that duty upon one not at fault. There seems to be no possible theory under this evidence upon which to charge negligence upon the defendant company, unless it could be found that while the south-bound car, upon which the plaintiff was a passenger, was standing for the plaintiff to alight therefrom, the north-bound car upon the parallel track passed it, and failed to reduce speed and advance slowly, ready to stop immediately if necessary, and that this neglect was the proximate cause of the injury. There is no affirmative evidence from which it could be found that there was no headlight on the approaching car, or no bell. These matters were not mentioned by the witness. He testified that he did not see or hear the car, and that he looked and listened. There is evidence that he was in a stupor or sleep from Omaha to the place of the accident, and that the conductor aroused him at G street. The car was an open one and so well lighted that he saw the lights until it was a block distant after it passed him. A car running at the rate he says this car did must have made sufficient noise to be heard by a careful listener before it struck him. The other car, he says, was between him and the approaching car until it began to move slowly just before the car struck him. This might have distracted his attention, if indeed he tried to give attention, and his statement that he did not see or hear the car tends as strongly to show the degree of care that he used, as it does to show that there was no sound or light to attract his attention. It does not amount to affirmative evidence of negligence in failing to show a head light or sound the bell.

Likewise, there was no evidence of negligence in failing to warn him of danger. He alighted from the west side of the car in a paved street. The parallel track was on the other side of the car. Two witnesses testified that after alighting from the car he went west nearly, if not quite, to

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the sidewalk. He denies this, and says he went north along the side of the car. He says that he intended to go west on G street, until after he left the car, when he saw a light to the east and concluded to go in that direction. There is no evidence of any indication before he left the car of intention on his part to cross the parallel track. He alighted from the car in safety and in a safe place. There was no danger known to the conductor, and not known to the plaintiff. It is said in plaintiff's brief that, conceding the plaintiff's intoxicated condition (there was some evidence tending to show that he was intoxicated), "the presumption would be that he would go into a place of danger." This might call for a general warning that he was unfit to care for himself, but would not enable the conductor to foresee what dangers he might run into. It was not negligence to fail to tell him not to go around the car from which he was alighting without looking and listening for a passing car. The plaintiff's danger was not increased by such failure on the part of the conductor, for the plaintiff by his own statement knew that he must be careful, and must look and listen, which he did, and which was all that the conductor could have suggested. There is no evidence that the conductor knew that another car was approaching; he could not therefore warn him of that fact.

The form and language of the instruction given by the court are above criticism. The issues that they present are well and carefully presented, but there was no evidence to support them, with possibly the one exception which we have indicated. The trial court should, as far as possible, eliminate all superfluous matters, and submit to the jury only the controverted questions of fact upon which their verdict must depend. To submit to the jury matters not in issue, or to submit issues that are so wholly unsupported upon the one side or so conclusively established upon the other that reasonable minds could not differ with regard to them, is erroneous.

Putting these unsupported questions before the jury was

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manifestly misleading and requires a reversal of the judgment.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

LETTON, ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

GEORGE D. DARLING, APPELLANT, v. ANNA KIPP, APPELLEE.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,214.

Sales: ACTION FOR PRICE: DEFENSE: PUBLIC POLICY. It is not a defense to an action to recover the price of goods sold that the vendor knew that the purchaser was conducting an illegal business, when it is no part of the contract that the goods shall be used for such illegal purpose, and the vendor has done no act in aid or furtherance of the unlawful design.

APPEAL from the district court for Box Butte county:
JAMES J. HARRINGTON, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

E. H. Boyd and C. C. Barker, for appellant.

William Mitchell, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

This action was brought to recover the alleged purchase price of one piano, one music roll, and a roll of carpet felt. Upon trial in the district court for Box Butte county, the court instructed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.

There was a written contract between the plaintiff and defendant, in which it was recited that the piano was leased by the plaintiff to the defendant, but the contract is, in substance, a contract of conditional sale, and not of lease. It provides that the defendant should pay \$25 a month until the sum of \$650 was paid for the piano, and that until that amount was paid the title should remain

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in the plaintiff. It was provided that the defendant might pay the amount with interest at any time. After several payments had been made the property was destroyed by fire. The contract, however, contained an agreement that the defendant should keep the property insured for the benefit of the plaintiff, and this agreement was not fulfilled on the part of the defendant; no insurance having been obtained on the property.

The defense was that, at the time the contract was made, the defendant "was running a house of prostitution," and that the plaintiff knew that fact, and that the contract was therefore contrary to public policy and not enforceable. The plaintiff, upon cross-examination, testified that he knew that the defendant was conducting a house of prostitution; that he delivered the piano at her house; that he knew that she was going to use it in her house of prostitution; that it remained in her house until it was destroyed by fire. The plaintiff was a retail dealer in furniture at Alliance. He sold these articles in the regular course of his business. He had no interest in the defendant's business and was in no way connected with it. There seems to be no reason for holding him responsible for her business, any more than one who should sell her groceries, fuel, wearing apparel, or any such like articles. Under such circumstances, he is not *particeps criminis*, and was entitled to recover for the goods sold. This was determined in this state in an early case, *Kittle v. De Lamater*, 3 Neb. 325. Mr. Justice GANTT, speaking for this court, quoted with approval from *Tracy v. Talmage*, 14 N. Y. 162, 176, "I consider it as entirely settled by the authorities that it is no defense to an action brought to recover the price of goods sold, that the vendor knew that they were bought for an illegal purpose," and pointed out that it is only in case "it is made a part of the contract that the goods shall be used for such illegal purpose, or if the vendor has done some act in aid or furtherance of the unlawful design, (that) there cannot be a recovery." In the same case, upon another hearing, 4 Neb. 426, it was held

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Don McLeod and John McLeod were engaged in general real estate business, and contracted with the plaintiff to assist them in the sale of lands. The contract between them was in writing, and provided that the plaintiff should be paid \$1 an acre for all lands sold by the McLeods through him for cash. The contract contained the following provision: "It is expressly understood and agreed that if first party shall not accompany, or arrange with general agent, J. McLeod, to accompany the party to whom any land is sold or with whom any trade is made, that he shall receive but one-half of the commission above mentioned." The plaintiff found a purchaser for 640 acres of land, and after the deal was consummated demanded his commission, \$1 an acre, \$640. He brought this action in the county court of Merrick county to recover that amount, and the defendants paid \$320 thereon, and answered that the plaintiff was not entitled to more than 50 cents an acre because the plaintiff did not accompany the purchaser to examine the land in making the contract of purchase. The plaintiff replied that he arranged with one Overton, who was the general agent of the defendants, and each of them, to accompany the prospective purchaser to the land "as and in the place of the said defendant J. McLeod, under the terms and agreements aforesaid," and that the said Overton did accompany the purchaser.

Upon the trial in the district court for Merrick county, the court instructed the jury: "There are only two questions for you to determine in this case under the pleadings filed, viz.: (1) Did the plaintiff arrange with B. J. Overton to accompany the purchaser of this tract of land? (2) If he did, was Mr. Overton authorized to make such an arrangement? To entitle the plaintiff to recover you must find both of these questions in favor of the plaintiff. And the burden is upon the plaintiff to satisfy you by a preponderance of the evidence that he made such an arrangement. * * * If upon either of these questions the evidence is evenly balanced, or if it preponderates in favor of the defendants, your verdict shall be for the defendants."

The defendants insist that the instruction is erroneous; that Overton had no authority to alter or vary the terms of the written contract between the parties, and, as the plaintiff did not comply with the terms of the contract by accompanying the proposed purchaser to the land, he could not recover more than the 50 cents an acre for the land sold. The evidence shows that Overton was, in general, acting as the agent for the defendants, and the plaintiff testified that, while he was negotiating with the purchaser for the sale of the lands in question, Overton told him that it would not be necessary for him to accompany the purchaser, and that other arrangements would be made, and that the plaintiff would be entitled to his full commission as though he had accompanied the purchaser. This was denied by Overton, but it presented an issue of fact for the jury to determine. It appears that the plaintiff had correspondence with John McLeod in regard to the matter, and, among other things, McLeod wrote the plaintiff in that connection: "You understand that the terms of the contract require you to accompany the men, but, if you had an agreement with Mr. Overton, all we need to understand is what the agreement was and you will receive credit for your commission." There is other evidence in the record tending to show that Overton was acting as the agent for McLeod, and that an arrangement with Overton to accompany the purchaser was in effect an arrangement with his principal, McLeod; and, while the evidence is somewhat conflicting upon this point, there is no doubt that the court was correct in submitting this question of fact to the jury. The instruction given fairly presented the question, and there appears to be nothing in the instructions inconsistent with this view. The verdict of the jury therefore must control.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

REESE, C. J., BARNES and FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

LETTON, ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

**HENRY W. O'NEILL ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. JACOB F.
LEAMER ET AL., APPELLEES.**

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,695.

1. **Drainage Districts: ORGANIZATION: INJUNCTION.** When the petition filed for the formation of a drainage district, under article IV, ch. 89, Comp. St. 1909, and the proceedings thereunder are sufficient to give the district court jurisdiction of the subject matter, and an order is entered therein declaring the organization a public corporation of this state, as provided in the third section of that act, the supervisors of the district, duly elected, cannot be enjoined from proceeding with the work for which the district was organized on the ground of irregularities in the organization thereof.
2. ———: **PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.** A drainage district organized under article IV, ch. 89, Comp. St. 1909, is a public corporation.
3. **Public Corporations: ORGANIZATION: CONSENT OF PUBLIC.** When a public corporation is organized for subordinate governmental purposes, such as a village, township, city, or drainage district, it is not necessary that all of the people embraced within the corporate limits should consent to incorporation. The legislature has power to provide for such incorporation by the required number of inhabitants and property owners therein without the unanimous consent of all.
4. **Drainage Districts: RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.** Condemnation proceedings are allowed under said statute (section 12) when the "board of supervisors are unable to agree with the owners" of the property. When the condemnation proceedings and the work thereunder are enjoined on the ground that the drainage district has no legal organization, and that no right exists to take the land for such purpose, and there is no evidence that the plaintiffs seeking the injunction are, or ever have been, willing to grant the right of way upon any terms, it sufficiently appears that the parties cannot agree.
5. ———: **INJURY TO LAND: INJUNCTION.** If lands not taken by the condemnation proceedings are damaged by the improvement, the law provides an adequate remedy. The owners of lands so damaged are not entitled to enjoin the prosecution of the work on the sole ground that the damaged lands are not included in the condemnation proceedings.
6. ———: **LANDS SUBJECT TO DRAINAGE ACT.** Under the statute in question, a district may be formed for the purpose of having

Neill v. Leamer.

lands "reclaimed and protected from the
nage or otherwise." Section 1. To pro-
water from flowing onto swamp lands is
om the effects of water as contemplated

N: DRAINAGE DISTRICT. The supervisors
condemnation "setting forth the location
light of way needed, and describing the
ection 12. If a petition is filed in county
ing point of the proposed ditch and the
ting the government subdivisions, it is
at regard to give the county court juris-
appraisers, and, if the damages assessed
e orders of the court thereon are not ap-
not subject to collateral attack on the
of the ditch is not sufficiently set forth

strict court for Dakota county:
Affirmed.

D. Tyler and William L. Dowling,

J. Evans, contra.

other citizens of Dakota county
ourt for that county to organize a
the provisions of article IV, ch.
e court made the order organizing
itle "Drainage District No. 2 of
a." Afterwards, these defendants
ors of the district, and began con-
in the county court of Dakota
t of way to their drainage canal
intiffs. The plaintiffs then began
et court for Dakota county to en-
n proceeding further to construct
ntiff's land. Upon trial, the court
plaintiff Elizabeth Leahy, and

against the plaintiffs O'Neill and Heffernan, and entered a decree dissolving the temporary injunction as to the last two named plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs O'Neill and Heffernan have appealed.

The pleadings are lengthy and involved, and, so far as we can see, contain considerable unnecessary and immaterial matter. A large number of questions are presented and discussed at length by the appellants, but we feel constrained to confine our discussion to the more important ones.

The plaintiffs contend that the drainage district was not regularly organized, and seem to insist that the proceedings were so defective that the court was without jurisdiction, and the district is not even a *de facto* corporation. The objections suggested, however, relate to supposed defects in serving of notice on some of the parties interested in the formation of the district, and other similar matters, none of which is of sufficient importance to affect the jurisdiction of the court or subject its judgment to this collateral attack.

The objection that the order incorporating the district was erroneous because some of the property included in the district was not sufficiently described might have been raised upon the hearing of the petition for the formation of the district, and upon appeal from the order, but cannot be insisted upon in this collateral proceeding.

Another contention of the plaintiffs is that, under our statute, a drainage district is not a public corporation, and that the attempt to give it the power of eminent domain is unconstitutional. The argument upon this point is interesting; but in view of the fact that this question has heretofore been fully considered by this court and determined adversely to the contention of the plaintiffs, and that the legislature has from time to time for many years past established and declared a public policy which is inconsistent with the view that these organizations are purely private corporations, and in view of the fact that other questions presented in this case are not so well

settled and will require somewhat lengthy discussion, we do not consider it advisable to review the grounds of our former decision. *Neal v. Vansickle*, 72 Neb. 105; *Barnes v. Minor*, 80 Neb. 189; *State v. Hanson*, 80 Neb. 724; *Drainage District No. 1 v. Richardson County*, 86 Neb. 355, 365.

The plaintiffs contend that it is not within the power of the legislature to authorize a portion of the property owners in a proposed drainage district to force others in the district to consent to the incorporation and to "bear the burden and liability of such an organization." No authorities are cited upon this proposition, and we doubt whether any can be found. The same objection would apply to the organization of counties, townships, villages, and other similar subordinate public corporations.

It was also objected that there was no lawful attempt by the drainage district to agree with the plaintiffs as to a right of way over their lands before beginning the condemnation proceedings. One of the parties interested in this land testified that the attorney for the district offered \$150 an acre for the land appropriated, and "I don't think I accepted it; I think I said I could not accept it. I don't remember what I said." It appears from the plaintiffs' petition and the evidence that the officers of the district were made to understand that these plaintiffs resisted the right of the district to purchase a right of way across the land. None of the parties interested testified that they were ready and willing to grant a right of way. The appraisers appointed by the county court fixed the amount of the condemnation money, and there is no serious objection to the amount so fixed as unjust or unreasonable. The briefs of the plaintiffs do not refer to any evidence of that nature. There is therefore no merit in this objection.

The plaintiffs contend that the condemnation proceedings were void because they do not condemn and take certain lands of the plaintiff O'Neill which would be flooded by the waters of the ditch. If the plaintiffs' lands, other than those taken by the condemnation proceedings,

are damaged by this improvement, the law affords them a remedy, including the right of appeal to the court of last resort. The statute provides that "the same proceedings for condemnation of such right of way shall be had in all other respects, as is provided by law for the condemnation of rights of way for railroad corporations, the payment of damages and the rights of appeal shall be applicable to the drainage ditches and other improvements provided for in this act." Section 12. The law is well settled in such case by many decisions of this court. When the remedy at law is adequate, the prosecution of the work cannot be delayed by injunction.

Another contention on the part of the plaintiffs is that a drainage district has no power to condemn and take the land of a private citizen for the purpose of constructing a ditch outside of the district, and to "take water before it reached the swamp or submerged lands within the district and carry it across the private property of a private citizen and empty it into a private lake." It is not seriously contended that the proposed ditch will "empty it into a private lake." *Campbell v. Youngson*, 80 Neb. 322, and, upon rehearing, 82 Neb. 743, is cited, but that case construed another statute. The statute controlling in the case at bar provides that a district may be formed for the purpose of having swamp or overflowed lands "reclaimed and protected from the effects of water, by drainage or otherwise." Section 1. This language clearly covers this objection.

It is objected that the application for condemnation did not describe and locate the proposed ditch with sufficient accuracy. The statute requires that, when the supervisors "have agreed upon a location or route for said ditch or ditches and formulated a plan for the other improvements contemplated, then they * * * may present to the judge of the county court of the county in which said land, easements or franchise are situated, a petition setting forth the location and character of the right of way needed and describing the lands to be crossed." Section 12.

The application for condemnation described the proposed right of way over each government subdivision of the lands of these plaintiffs substantially as follows: "A right of way 200 feet in width, being 100 feet on each side of the center line of said Elk Creek Cut-off Ditch as now located, over and across lot 4 or the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of section 29, township 29, range 8, being 5.8 acres, Henry W. O'Neill, owner." The starting point appears to be definitely stated in the petition. The evidence shows that the line of the proposed ditch was definitely located by the surveyors and was marked with stakes. When the drainage board went over the land the stakes were still in place. Some of them were missing when the appraisers viewed the land. The drawings, which the appraisers had, showed the exact location of the proposed ditch. There is nothing to indicate that the appraisal of damages was in any way affected by any supposed uncertainty as to the location. The county court had power to correct any irregularities in the method of appraisal. If by reason of the difference in the statute from that construed in *Trester v. Missouri P. R. Co.*, 33 Neb. 171, that case is not to be regarded as decisive of the case at bar upon this point, which we do not decide, it seems clear that the application was sufficiently definite to give the county court jurisdiction of the proceedings. Errors, if any, not affecting the jurisdiction of the court should have been corrected in that court or upon appeal.

We have not found any errors in the record requiring a reversal of the judgment of the district court. It is therefore

AFFIRMED.

FAWCETT and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

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FIRST TRUST COMPANY OF LINCOLN, APPELLEE, V. LANCASTER COUNTY, APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,795.

Taxation: ASSESSMENT: MORTGAGES. The act of 1911 (Laws 1911, ch. 105) Comp. St. 1911, ch. 77, art. I, provided that mortgages of real estate in this state should be considered as an interest in the land for purposes of taxation, and should be assessed to the mortgagee, unless the mortgagor agreed in the mortgage to pay the taxes thereon. Under section 56 of the revenue act, such mortgages should be deducted from the value of the capital stock of banks and trust companies, and the remainder assessed as capital stock. Such mortgages are assessed separately from the capital stock of the company whether the tax is paid by the mortgagor or by the mortgagee.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
ALBERT J. CORNISH, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, George W. Ayres, Frank E. Edgerton, J. B. Strode and G. E. Hager, for appellant.

Lincoln Frost and Walter L. Pope, contra.

SEDGWICK, J.

The First Trust Company of Lincoln demanded that the amount and value of the real estate mortgages which it held should be deducted from the gross value of its capital stock for purposes of taxation. The assessor refused, and the county board also refused to make the deduction. Upon appeal to the district court for Lancaster county, the action of the county board was reversed, and it was ordered that the petition of the company be granted. From this judgment of the district court the county has appealed.

The petition alleges the value of the capital stock of the company, and the amount and value of the real estate mortgages owned and held by the company, and alleges that the mortgages provided that the mortgagor shall pay

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res thereon, and that the taxes were paid by the
gors. Section 56, art. I, ch. 77, Comp. St. 1911,
as: "Whenever any such bank, association or com-
shall have acquired real estate or other tangible
ty which is assessed separately, the assessed value
real estate or tangible property shall be deducted
ie valuation of the capital stock of such association
pany." The act of the legislature of 1911 (Laws
h. 105), entitled "An act to provide for the taxa-
mortgages of real property and to prevent double
n on incumbered property in the state," provides:
tgage on real estate in this state is hereby declared
n interest in real estate for the purposes of assess-
nd taxation. The amount and value of any mort-
pon real estate in this state shall be assessed and
o the mortgagee or his assigns, and the taxes levied
shall be a lien on the mortgage interest; and the
excess in value of the real estate above the mortgage or
mortgages thereon shall be assessed and taxed to the
mortgagor or owner of the premises and be a lien on the
owner's interest. * * * And provided, further, that
when it is provided and agreed in any mortgage, that the
mortgagor shall and will pay the tax levied upon the mort-
gage, or the debt secured thereby, that such assessor or
county clerk shall not enter said mortgage for separate
assessment and taxation, but both interests shall be as-
sessed and taxed to the mortgagor or owner of the prop-
erty mortgaged." Comp. St. 1911, ch. 77, art. I, secs. 112b,
112c.

The first argument of the appellant seems to be that the
mortgages are not "assessed separately," within the mean-
ing of section 56, because, since the mortgagors agreed to
pay the taxes on the mortgages, they are required by the
statute to be assessed with the land. But this of course
is not the meaning of the statute. The capital stock is
supposed to represent all of the property of the company
and the full value thereof. If the company has acquired
any property that is assessed separately and independ-

ently of the capital stock, it would be twice assessed if the full value of the capital stock is also assessed. Therefore property that has been assessed separately from the capital stock of the company is deducted from the value of the capital stock, and the remainder only is assessed as capital stock.

If the mortgagor does not agree to pay the taxes upon the mortgage, the tax must be assessed against the mortgagee. The statute expressly makes the mortgage an interest in the real estate for taxation purposes; but, if it were not, it is plainly included in the words, "any other tangible property," so that, if the mortgagee was liable for the taxes upon the mortgage, there could of course be no doubt that such mortgages, being assessed to the mortgagee, and assessed separately from the capital stock, should be deducted from the value of the capital stock in determining the value of the stock for taxation. Does the fact that the mortgagor has agreed to pay the tax on the mortgage interest require a different construction of the statute? The statute regards the mortgage as an interest in the land. The value of the mortgage and the value of the equity of redemption together are the value of the land. When the rate of interest upon a loan is being agreed upon, the man who loans the money inquires who will pay the taxes. Both the lender and the borrower will have the matter of taxes on the loan in mind while negotiating as to the rate of interest. The inducement to loan money is the net income therefrom. If taxes upon the mortgage and other expenses are 1 per cent., both the lender and borrower would, of course, consider it fair that the rate of interest should be 1 per cent. less if the borrower pays taxes and expenses than if the lender pays them. The mortgage being regarded as a part of the land, if full value of the land is assessed to the borrower, and the value of the mortgage is assessed to the lender, and the rate of interest is agreed upon on that basis, the borrower pays taxes upon both, which is double taxation. These mortgages which the company has acquired have

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have been assessed separately from the company, and their assessed value from the valuation of the capital stock value of the stock for taxation purposes.

the district court is therefore right,

AFFIRMED.

FAWCETT, JJ., concur.

ROBINSON and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

A motion on motion for rehearing was filed and rehearing denied:

THE CAPITAL STOCK OF BANKS. The law requires the assessor to "determine and settle" the *true value* of the property of every bank or banking association, loan and trust company." For that purpose he must require a complete statement of the proper officer, under oath, of the number of shares of the capital stock and the value of the same. He must also examine the last report made by such institution pursuant to law. And if he finds that these statements and reports fall in with the actual value of the assets, he must estimate the value of such bank, association or company, under oath, and fixing the *true value* of such stock." If the market value is less than the *true value*, he must consider that, and must add the surplus and undivided profits." He must consider the assets but is not concluded by them. He must find the *true value* of the assets for himself.

— All property and assets and everything of this *true value* of the stock, and if any of that property is assessed separately from the capital stock, it is assessed, but must be deducted and the result added to the capital stock.

For hearing, another argument was again thoroughly and ably presented. It was argued by defendant is that upon the statute by our former opinion the bank will escape taxation. The following is

quoted in the brief from *State v. Karr*, 64 Neb. 514: "The legislature may direct the manner of ascertaining the value of property and franchises; but it cannot prescribe rules that prevent the assessment of the property and franchises of corporations on an equality with property in general in proportion to value." The brief then states this illustration: "Take the case of a bank having say a capital stock of \$50,000. It receives deposits to the amount of \$50,000 or more. Fifty thousand of its deposits are loaned upon real estate security. In each instance the mortgagor agrees to pay the tax upon the land. The \$50,000 of the capital stock of the bank, and in addition thereto its deposits in excess of the \$50,000 loaned by it on real estate, it loans out upon chattel or personal security. When it comes to the taxation of the value of its capital stock, if the opinion of this court heretofore rendered in this case is to be followed, it pays no taxes whatever upon same, owing to the fact that the \$50,000 loaned by it upon real estate mortgages, upon which it pays no taxes, same being paid under agreement by the various mortgagors, is deducted from the value of its capital stock, which leaves nothing for taxation." If an individual loans \$50,000 under the conditions named, he pays no taxes thereon, therefore to hold that a bank should would violate the rule of equality provided by the constitution. If the bank loans the remaining \$50,000 on chattel mortgages, such securities are a part of its assets and enter into the value of its capital stock, and are so taxed. Thus no part of the \$100,000 of the bank escapes taxation. The statute seems to avoid double taxation on real estate values, but no plan has been devised to avoid double taxation when money is loaned upon chattels. When the bank loans its \$50,000 upon chattel securities, it pays taxes on those securities, and the borrower pays taxes upon the chattel property mortgaged and also upon the money borrowed, or such property as he may exchange that money for.

Section 56 of the revenue law is plain and unequivocal.

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The proper officers "shall, on the first day of April of each year, make out a statement under oath, showing the number of shares comprising the actual capital stock * * * and the value of said shares on the first day of April. * * * The assessor shall determine and settle the true value of each share of stock after an examination of such statement, and in case of a national bank in (an) examination of the last report called for by the comptroller of the currency; if a state bank, the last report called by the state banking board; and if the county assessor deem it necessary, an examination of the officers of such bank, association or company, under oath, in determining and fixing the true value of such stock, and shall take into consideration the market value of such stock, if any, and the surplus and undivided profits." Comp. St. 1911, ch. 77, art. I, sec. 56. If a bank has any tangible property that is assessed as such and without reference to its capital stock, and the whole value of the capital stock is also assessed, there is double taxation, because this statute requires the assessor to find the true value of the capital stock, and he cannot do that without taking into account everything of value which the bank has. When he has done that, the law does not allow him to assess the full value of the capital stock, because some of the property which goes to make up that value has already been "separately assessed." He is required to assess all of the value of the capital stock that has not been already "separately assessed." It is a mistake to suppose that this does or can result in allowing some property to escape taxation. A little careful study will show that this does not so result. Assessors cannot by violating this law more accurately ascertain the true value of the property of a bank for taxation purposes. It is more likely that a failure on the part of some assessors to understand and obey the law has enabled banks to escape taxation in many cases. The law gives assessors ample means to enable them to do their duty. If they fail to avail themselves of these means, it is the fault of

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the assessors or of their advisors, and not the fault of the law. The assessor is not concluded by the statements of the bank as to the amount, character and value of its assets. In all cases of doubt he should investigate those matters fully in determining the true value of the capital stock, and should include all property and assets of every description at its true value, and when the true value is so ascertained he should assess all except the value of tangible property that has been separately assessed. This seems to be a just method of assessment, but whether it is or not, it is the law and must be enforced.

The motion for rehearing is

OVERRULED.

HAMER, J., not sitting.

WILLIAM R. STOCKING ET AL., APPELLEES, V. CITY OF
LINCOLN, APPELLANT.

FILED MAY 17, 1913. No. 17,050.

1. **Municipal Corporations: STREETS: CHANGE OF GRADE: DAMAGES.**
Where the record contains no competent evidence to show that the grade of a street had been established prior to the time a city grades a street from its natural to a lower grade, the city will be liable to an abutting lot owner for any damage inflicted upon him by such change of grade.
2. ———: ———: ———: ———. And in such a case the removal, or destruction of, or damage to, trees planted by the lot owner or his grantors, and growing upon that part of the street contiguous to his lot, is a proper element of damages so far as it may affect the difference in the value of the property before and after its change of grade.
3. **Appeal: INSTRUCTIONS: EVIDENCE.** No prejudicial error is found in the instructions given or in the denial of requests for instructions made by counsel for the defendant, and the evidence is examined, and found to support the verdict and judgment.

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county:
ALBERT J. CORNISH, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

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*D. H. McClenahan, C. C. Flansburg and
for appellant.*

ge and C. J. Campbell, contra.

on by the owners of lot 20, in block 5, in
on to the city of Lincoln, for damages to
used by the grading of Vine and Twenty-
said city. The lot in question is on the
of the intersection of said streets, and
s south. Vine street runs east and west
end of the property, and Twenty-third
and south on the east side of the plain-
intiffs became the owners of the property
th day of September, 1907. The grading
done by the city in 1910. The record
iffs' trees growing between the curb and
Vine and Twenty-third streets were dug
the sidewalk space was lowered from 3
he surface of the lot, and the plaintiffs
amages by reason of the grading in ques-
a trial to a jury, and a verdict against
h judgment was rendered for the plain-
he city appeals.

that the evidence is insufficient to sus-

Ida Leinberge testified that after the
ade the lot at the intersection of Twenty-
treets was about 5 feet higher than the
ence is sustained by the testimony of
ing and T. J. Hensley, the street com-
ter fixing the distance at 4½ feet. The
ing the damage done is in direct conflict.
of the record fails to disclose any negli-
; of the city in the manner of doing the
ng done seems to have been necessary.
ary to lower the sidewalk. The witness
stified that, in order to lower the side-

walk, it was necessary to remove the trees. The assistant engineer, Bates, testified on behalf of the city that the grade as made is the proper grade, that the sidewalks were left in good condition after the city completed its work. His testimony as to the grading and cutting down of the sidewalk space does not vary in substance from that given by the witnesses for the plaintiffs.

It is claimed by counsel for the appellant that there was error at the trial, because the court admitted evidence which allowed the jury to consider damages to improvements by reason of the grading of Vine street and Twenty-third street, and the lowering of the sidewalk space, and digging up and removing the trees. It is the defendant's contention that "no damages can be allowed, as the city was the owner of the street in fee, and that the trees were the property of the city." As we understand the matter, it is this: When the grading and lowering of the sidewalk space has been done, what is the damage, if any, to the plaintiffs? Section 21, art. I of the constitution, reads: "The property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor."

In *City of Omaha v. Flood*, 57 Neb. 124, it was held that, where property fronting on a public street is damaged by the method or manner adopted by the authorities of a municipal corporation in permanently grading such street, the corporation is liable to the owner of such property for such damages. In such case the owner's measure of damages is the depreciation in value of his property caused by the construction and permanent maintenance of the grade.

In *Bronson v. Albion Telephone Co.*, 67 Neb. 111, it was held that, where an abutting owner has planted trees along the street adjacent to his property, under the terms of a city ordinance pursuant to statutory provisions, a telephone company which removes, destroys, or injures such trees in erecting poles and wires under its franchise is liable for the resulting damage, even though no unnecessary injury is inflicted. In the body of the opinion

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d: "The right of an abutting owner rests upon or overhanging the sidewalk recognized."

Naha Electric Light & Power Co., 87 held that the electric light company abutting lot owner who plants trees in lot contiguous to his lot for all damage by reason of trimming and injury. Justice REESE in concurring said: "Trees growing on and in connection with property at the time the alleged franchise was granted to the usual course of nature, grow up. As well might defendant have acted in anticipation of their natural upgrowth until they had become more valuable without consent or payment and by the use of might, practically ruin them. The right to be held just as sacred as the right of the single individual as sacred property." LETTON, J., in concurring in the result among other things: "I am further to quote the language of the opinion in *Phone & Telegraph Co. v. Francis*, 109 Neb. 193, that, 'if the city or other corporation exercising the right of eminent domain, acting under authority, proceeds to cut or trim trees on the lot owned by the owner of abutting property, when no necessity for such cutting exists, and the cutting clearly exceeds the reasonable amount, so that substantial injury results therefrom to the property, the owner will have his appropriate remedy to redress the injury.'"

City of Harvard, 31 Neb. 635, this court recently held, in accordance with some part of the opinion given in the case, that, 'when a city, in exercise of an authority, under its charter, proceeds to cut or trim trees on the lot owned by the owner of abutting property, for its streets, and works them according to the usual course of nature, and no provision of law for the payment

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of damages, no action will lie.' This was the law in 1873, and was so held in the case of *Nebraska City v. Lampkin*, 6 Neb. 27. But the constitution of 1875, now in force, provided a different rule. The text of section 21 of the bill of rights now is that 'the private property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.' "

It is proper to remark that not all the states contain that clause of the Nebraska constitution relating to the liability incurred because property is "damaged" by the act complained of.

In *O'Brien v. Philadelphia*, 150 Pa. St. 589, 30 Am. St. Rep. 832, the question of law reserved was: "Whether a plaintiff who has built a house upon his lot in conformity with the existing physical grade of an old and open public highway can recover damages from the city of Philadelphia for depreciation in the value of the property occasioned by changing the *de facto* physical elevation of the highway in front of the lot to conform to a plan regulation legally confirmed after the building of the house, said plan being the first regulation of grade and differing from the *de facto* physical elevation of the old highway in front of the lot." There was judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict. The court said: "If any regard is to be had for the constitutional mandate that 'municipal and other corporations * * * shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by the construction or enlargement of their works, highways or improvements,' we are at a loss to see how the learned judge could do otherwise than decide the reserved question as he did. Nobody conversant with the history of the constitutional provision above quoted can entertain any doubt that it was intended to provide, *inter alia*, for the class of cases of which *O'Connor v. Pittsburgh*, 18 Pa. St. 187, is a conspicuous example. It has uniformly been so regarded from the date of its adoption until the present time. It is a fact conclusively established by the verdict that, as a direct consequence of the elevation of grade immediately

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front of plaintiff's property, its market value was lessened at least to the extent of \$240; but it is gravely suggested that 'such a *damnum* is not necessarily in *injuria*;' and hence plaintiff is remediless. That principle has no application to the class of cases to which this belongs. To hold that it has would defeat one of the objects of the constitutional mandate in question, and virtually overrule several well-considered cases. We do not propose to do so here. * * * Again, in *New Brighton Borough v. Winsol*, 107 Pa. St. 280, the claim was by a lot owner for second change of grade after he purchased the lot. That court, holding that he was entitled to recover, said: "The claim now is for change of grade made since defendant in 1871 purchased, and for damages sustained by work done since the adoption of the constitution." In *Ogden v. City of Philadelphia*, 143 Pa. St. 430, the claim was for damages caused by grading North street. After stating the undisputed facts were 'that the first grade * * * was established on the city plan in 1871, but nothing was done on the ground until 1887,' our brother Mitchell says: 'For the establishment of the grade of 1871 there was no right of action. *O'Connor v. Pittsburgh*, 18 Pa. St. 187; *City of Philadelphia v. Wright*, 100 Pa. St. 235. Therefore the statute of limitations could not begin to run from that date.' But the constitution of 1874, art. XVI, sec. 8, gave a right to the owners to have compensation for property injured, as well as for property taken, by municipal and other corporations in the construction or enlargement of their works. The right of action which this section gives is clearly for the actual establishment of the grade on the land. The general rule is that the cause of action arises when the injury is complete, and this has been uniformly applied to the taking of property for public use, from the case of *Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thoburn*, 7 Serg. & Wile (Pa.) 411, down to the present day.' "

When the property of an abutting owner is damaged by the establishment of a grade of a street for the first time, changing it from the natural grade, such property is

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“damaged” within the meaning of the constitution, as much as it is by reason of lowering the grade of the street as previously established. *Werth v. City of Springfield*, 78 Mo. 107; *Hutchinson v. City of Parkersburg*, 25 W. Va. 226; *Sheehy v. Kansas City Cable R. Co.*, 94 Mo. 574, 4 Am. St. Rep. 396; *Borough of New Brighton v. United Presbyterian Church*, 96 Pa. St. 331; *Hendricks’ Appeal*, 103 Pa. St. 358.

Defendant further contends that plaintiffs acquired title to the lot in question since the grade of Vine street was established, and therefore that they cannot recover for damages to their improvements, and, in support of that contention, *City of Omaha v. Williams*, 52 Neb. 40, is cited. As we view the record, the city failed to show by any competent evidence that a grade had been legally established on that portion of Vine street abutting on the plaintiffs’ lot at any time prior to the time the grading in question was done. It follows that the rule contended for has no application to the facts of this case.

We have examined the instructions given, as also the requests for instructions which were denied, and the other errors alleged. We are unable to find any alleged error which seems to us to be prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. We are unable to say that the verdict of the jury is wrong. It was upon a conflict of evidence, and apparently the evidence fully sustains it. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

SEDGWICK and LETTON, JJ., concur in conclusion.

SCOTT'S BLUFF COUNTY, APPELLANT, V. TRI-STATE LAND
COMPANY, APPELLEE.

FILED JUNE 16, 1913. No. 16,828.

1. **Eminent Domain: ESTABLISHMENT OF HIGHWAYS: DAMAGES.** Section 46, p. 130, laws 1879 (Comp. St. 1905, ch. 78, sec. 46), accepting the grant provided by the act of congress of 1866 (Rev. St. U. S. sec. 2477), reserves to landowners the right to recover damages for the opening of public roads on section lines in this state.
2. **Highways: ESTABLISHMENT: TRESPASS.** A county attempting to open a public road on a section line without giving notice or fixing a time for a hearing on the landowner's claim for damages, and without paying or providing for the payment of such damages, is a trespasser.

APPEAL from the district court for Scott's Bluff county:
HANSON M. GRIMES, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

Morrow & Morrow and R. W. Hobart, for appellant.

F. A. Wright, contra.

BARNES, J.

This was an action to recover the cost of the construction of a bridge built by the county of Scott's Bluff over and across an irrigation ditch of the defendant. The defendant had judgment, and the county has appealed.

It appears that during the years 1906 and 1907 the defendant was the owner of the northeast quarter of section 7, and the northwest quarter of section 8, in township 22 north of range 54 west, in said county; that during said years it constructed its irrigation canal over and across the section line between sections 7 and 8 aforesaid, about 20 rods south of the north line of said sections; that on the 28th day of May, 1908, the board of commissioners of the plaintiff county, without proceeding as required by law, and without any procedure for the location and establishment of a public highway, ordered a public road to

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be opened on said section line. No notice was given and no time was fixed for filing claims for damages sustained by the landowners, and no damages were allowed or paid the defendant as provided by law. Plaintiff caused plans and specifications to be drawn and prepared by a competent engineer for the construction of a bridge across said canal on the section line in question, which were duly approved and placed on file as required by sections 6135, 6136, Ann. St. 1907. Plaintiff notified the defendant to construct a bridge across its canal on said section line, and the overseer of public roads gave the defendant repeated notices to build the bridge in question, but defendant neglected and refused so to do. Plaintiff, to protect itself from damages to the traveling public, entered into a contract to build the bridge, and paid therefor \$274.80, for which sum, with interest, the plaintiff prayed judgment.

It appears that the title to the land in question was obtained by homestead entry under the laws of the United States after the year 1879. In the district court plaintiff contended that it was entitled to recover because the act of congress of 1866 (Rev. St. U. S. sec. 2477) granted all section lines for highway purposes; that the legislature of this state accepted the provisions of said grant by the passage of the act of 1879 (laws 1879, p. 130, sec. 46); that, the title to the land on either side of said section line having been acquired since the passage of those acts, the defendant took the land subject to the right of a highway on said section line, and was required to build and maintain a bridge over and across its said canal. The defendant contended that the plaintiff was a trespasser, and could not recover because it had failed to give notice as required by law, had failed to fix a time to file claims for damages, and because defendant's damages by reason of the establishment of said highway had never been paid, nor has payment been provided therefor.

There is thus presented for our determination the effect of the act of congress of 1866, and the legislative act of

this state passed in 1879. It is argued here that the act of congress passed in 1866 was a grant of all section lines as public highways, and that the legislative act of 1879 was an acceptance of the grant; that defendant took its title subject to the easement, and therefore plaintiff should recover in this action. In support of that argument the plaintiff cites many cases from other states where that contention is sustained, among which is *Wells v. Pennington County*, 2 S. Dak. 1, 39 Am. St. Rep. 758. There it appeared that the territorial legislature in 1877 passed an act declaring all section lines to be public highways, and providing that such highways shall be 66 feet wide, and shall be taken equally from each side of the line, unless changed as provided in the preceding section of that act. It must be observed, however, that that act, unlike our act of 1879, makes no provision relating to the payment of damages, and therefore that case can readily be distinguished from the one at bar. The other cases cited in support of plaintiff's contention are: *Van Wanning v. Deeter*, 78 Neb. 282; *Streeter v. Stalnaker*, 61 Neb. 205; *Eldridge v. Collins*, 75 Neb. 65; *Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Kansas P. R. Co.*, 97 U. S. 491; *Railroad Company v. Baldwin*, 103 U. S. 428. Some cases from other states are cited whose legislatures have unconditionally accepted the grant contained in the act of congress of 1866.

On the other hand, defendant contends that by the language of the act of 1879 the right of the landowner to damages for opening section line roads in this state is especially reserved, and such has been the universal holding of this court. *Scace v. Wayne County*, 72 Neb. 162; *Van Wanning v. Deeter*, *supra*; *Henry v. Ward*, 49 Neb. 392; *Howard v. Board of Supervisors*, 54 Neb. 443; *Barry v. Deloughrey*, 47 Neb. 354.

In *Beste v. Cedar County*, 87 Neb. 689, it was said: "It is further argued by defendant, in substance: Before plaintiff leased the land taken for a highway, the state had dedicated it to the public for that purpose. Plain-

tiff's leasehold was subject to the superior right which the county acquired by dedication. When the highway was opened the dedication was accepted by the public, and the acceptance related back to the original grant. To establish the dedication defendant relies upon language found in the following enactment of the legislature: 'Section lines are hereby declared to be public roads in each county in this state, and the county board of such county may, whenever the public good requires it, open such roads without any preliminary survey, and cause them to be worked in the same manner as other public roads: Provided, that any damages claimed by reason of the opening of any such road shall be appraised and allowed, as nearly as practicable, in manner hereinbefore provided.' Laws 1879, p. 130, sec. 46; Comp. St. 1905, ch. 78, sec. 46. This statute dispenses with formal, preliminary proceedings in the opening of highways on section lines, but preserves the landowner's right to compensation for property taken or injured. *Scace v. Wayne County*, 72 Neb. 162; *Barry v. Deloughrey*, 47 Neb. 354. If the legislature intended to donate a portion of the school lands to counties for highway purposes, as argued by defendant, the legislative grant was limited by the proviso: 'Any damages claimed by reason of the opening of any such road shall be appraised and allowed, as nearly as practicable, in manner hereinbefore provided.' The enactments to which the proviso refers provide a method of compensating an owner for land taken or damaged for highway purposes. Comp. St. 1905, ch. 78, secs. 18-29. The word 'owner' as used in such statute applies to all persons having an interest in the estate taken or damaged."

If the question were a new one in this state, it might be that we would hold differently, but it has been consistently held by this court that the right to damages for the dedicating of land for section line roads is given to the owner by the act above quoted, and we do not now see our way clear to hold otherwise.

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The plaintiff, having failed to award the defendant a hearing on his claim for damages, and having made no provisions for paying the same, was a trespasser when it built the bridge in question, and it cannot recover in this action.

The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

ROSE, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

R. C. ROPER, APPELLANT, v. A. L. MILBOURN, APPELLEE.

FILED JUNE 16, 1913. No. 17,224.

1. **Vendor and Purchaser: TRANSFER OF OPTION.** A contract granting an option to purchase a tract of land, and binding the owner to convey on stated terms, does not, before acceptance by the option-holder, vest in him an estate or interest in the land; but since he has such control of the title that by performance he may compel a conveyance, and secure the land to himself, he may, before the option expires, lawfully make sale of it to a third party.
2. ———: **BREACH OF CONTRACT: DAMAGES.** In an action for a breach of contract for the sale of real estate, a vendor may recover of the vendee the damages fairly within the contemplation of the parties at the time they made their contract.
3. **Damages: PROFITS.** Profits which are in the contemplation of the parties and certain of ascertainment may be recovered.

APPEAL from the district court for Dawson county:
BRUNO O. HOSTETLER, JUDGE. *Reversed.*

W. D. Oldham, George C. Gillan and R. C. Roper, for appellant.

H. M. Sinclair and W. A. Stewart, contra.

BARNES, J.

This case is before us on the ruling of the district court for Dawson county sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's

petition. The petition alleged, in substance, that on the 31st day of August, 1909, for a valuable consideration, plaintiff became the owner of an optional contract of purchase for the following described real estate, to wit: Section 1, section 11, and the southeast quarter of section 2, of township 12, range 45; and the south half of the southwest quarter of section 23, township 13, range 44, and the southwest quarter of section 6, township 12, range 44, all in Deuel county, Nebraska, consisting of 1,620 acres; 1,000 acres thereof lying on the south and west of the right of way of the Union Pacific railway, and 620 acres lying on the northeast of said right of way; that on or about the 13th day of September, 1909, defendant came to plaintiff and offered him the sum of \$30 an acre for all that part of the said tract of land, consisting of 1,000 acres, lying south and west of the said railroad right of way; that plaintiff accepted said offer, and entered into a contract whereby he agreed to convey said premises to the defendant; that by the terms of the contract defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of \$200 in cash, which was paid, and promised and agreed to pay the further sum of \$3,800 at once on the plaintiff's furnishing to the defendant an abstract showing clear title, and such further sum on the 1st day of March, 1910, as together with said sums of \$200 and \$3,800 would equal one-third of the total purchase price thereof, amounting to the sum of \$6,000, and defendant agreed to pay the balance of the purchase price in five annual payments, the same to draw interest at 6 per cent. per annum; that at the time defendant entered into the contract he was well aware, and informed, of all of the terms and conditions contained in the option contract existing between the plaintiff and one John Naslund for the purchase of the 1,620 acres of land described; that, in pursuance of the understanding and agreement, plaintiff proceeded at once to complete, perform and carry out the terms of his contract with the said John Naslund; that he paid \$1,000 to said Naslund to apply upon the purchase price of the land above mentioned

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and but for the promise and agreement of the defendant he would not have so paid the same; that on or about the 13th day of September, 1909, plaintiff sent to defendant an abstract of title to the said premises, requesting that defendant examine and cause his attorneys to examine the same, and point out any corrections that might be necessary to be made therein; that defendant kept the said abstract until about the 11th day of December, 1909, and made no objections thereto; that plaintiff demanded of the defendant the payment of the said sum of \$3,800, balance of the first payment, according to the terms of his contract, but that defendant failed and neglected to pay the same; that on the 15th day of February, 1910, plaintiff mailed to the defendant, at Overton, Nebraska, a registered letter containing the abstracts of title to the land purchased by the defendant of the plaintiff, which had been brought down to that date, and showed the right of the plaintiff to sell and convey said premises to the defendant upon the payment of the purchase money by the defendant, as agreed in his contract; that defendant never made any objections whatever to the sufficiency of said abstract, nor to the title therein represented, but, on the contrary, stated that the said abstracts were sufficient under the terms of the contract with the defendant, and that he had no objections to make thereto.

It was further alleged that the original tract of land, for which plaintiff obtained said option contract, consisted of 1,620 acres, exclusive of the right of way of the railroad; that according to the terms of said option contract, all of which were fully known to the defendant, both before and after the signing of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff agreed to pay the sum of \$19 an acre, or \$30,780; that after selling to defendant said 1,000 acres, plaintiff still had left 620 acres lying on the opposite side of said railroad right of way; that, if defendant had not defaulted in his contract with plaintiff, said 620 acres of land would have cost plaintiff only the sum of \$780; that said 620 acres of

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land on the 1st day of March, 1910, was reasonably worth, at its fair market value, the sum of \$12 an acre, or \$7,440; that the profits which plaintiff would have derived from the contract made with defendant, had he not defaulted therein, would have been the sum of \$7,440, less the sum of \$780, or the sum of \$6,660; that the defendant, when he entered into the contract with the plaintiff, was fully aware of the profit which plaintiff would make from the contract with the defendant, and from the sale of the 1,000 acres, as aforesaid, in event of defendant's performance thereof; that by reason of the default, breach and refusal to perform his contract as aforesaid, the plaintiff was damaged in the sum of \$6,660; that by reason of the default, failure, neglect and refusal of the defendant to perform and carry out his contract with the plaintiff, plaintiff was further damaged in the sum of \$1,500, no part of which has ever been paid by the defendant; that in pursuance of said contract with defendant, and in preparation to perform the same, and with the knowledge and consent of defendant, plaintiff was compelled to, and did, incur considerable expense, and to that end employed help and assistance to try and get other parties to assist plaintiff in swinging the deal with the said John Naslund, and to assist plaintiff in carrying out his contract aforesaid; that plaintiff hired and employed one S. J. Hyatt for that purpose, and was compelled to pay him, the said Hyatt, for his services, and did pay him therefor, the sum of \$345, no part of which has been paid to him by the defendant.

It was further alleged that on February 27, 1910, the defendant notified plaintiff by telephone that he had decided to perform and complete his contract in accordance with the terms thereof; that he desired plaintiff to be ready to perform his part of the agreement, and plaintiff thereupon agreed to meet defendant at Chappell, Nebraska, for the purpose of completing and performing their said contract, and plaintiff notified defendant that he would be there, ready, willing and able to perform his

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part of the agreement; that plaintiff went to Chappell, Nebraska, and was there on the 1st day of March, 1910, and until 12:15 o'clock P. M. of the 2d day of March, 1910, ready, able and willing to perform his contract with the defendant; that he had with him at Chappell, at the Commercial National Bank, the place agreed upon for the exchange of papers, all of the necessary deeds, mortgages, contracts and other papers duly prepared and executed and acknowledged, ready to be delivered to defendant in accordance with the terms of the contract; that the said John Naslund and Annie C. Naslund, his wife, were there present at Chappell, Nebraska, with all deeds and necessary papers prepared and executed, ready, able and willing to perform their contract with the plaintiff, and deliver to plaintiff conveyances sufficient to enable him in turn to convey a good and sufficient title to the defendant upon the payment by him of the amount due upon his contract with the plaintiff. Plaintiff then alleged certain special matters of damages, and concluded his petition with a prayer for judgment for \$9,755 damages, which he alleged he had sustained by failure of the defendant to perform his contract.

To the petition the defendant filed a general demurrer, which was sustained, and the plaintiff refusing to further plead, and standing upon his petition, his action was dismissed.

It is contended that the district court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's petition and dismissing the action. It was alleged in the petition that the plaintiff was ready, able and willing to perform his contract on his part. On the other hand, it is claimed that the plaintiff had nothing but an option on the land in question, and therefore had nothing which he could convey. It was alleged in the petition, however, that plaintiff was ready, willing and able to convey the premises to the defendant on the 1st day of March, 1910, and this allegation stands admitted by the demurrer.

In *Krnut v. Phares*, 80 Kan. 515, it was held: "A con-

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tract granting an option to purchase a tract of land and binding the owner to convey on stated terms does not, before acceptance by the option-holders, vest in them any estate or interest in the land; but since they have such control of the title that by performance they can compel a conveyance, and so secure the land to themselves, they may, before the option expires, lawfully make a sale of it to a third party." This rule is concisely stated in 39 Cyc. 1213, 1983; 29 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.) 608; *Hollifield v. Landrum*, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 187; *Easton v. Montgomery*, 90 Cal. 307; *McNeny v. Campbell*, 81 Neb. 754; *Beck v. Staats*, 80 Neb. 482.

It must be observed that in the case at bar the defendant had knowledge of the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's option, and it is alleged in the petition that defendant understood the fact to be that it was necessary for him to make the first payment in order to enable the plaintiff to secure his option and convey the land in question to the defendant according to his contract. In such a case the plaintiff may recover the damages that are fairly within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into. *Pillsbury v. Alexander*, 40 Neb. 242; *Canfield v. Tillotson*, 25 Neb. 857; *Weitzel v. Leyson*, 23 S. Dak. 367; 29 Am. & Eng. Ency Law (2d ed.) 609. Our court has frequently recognized the rule permitting the recovery of special damages which are contemplated by the contract. *Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux*, 55 Neb. 429; *Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Wilhelm*, 48 Neb. 910; *Hale v. Hess & Co.*, 30 Neb. 42; *Schrandt v. Young*, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 546; *Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co. v. Philbin*, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 340; *Seaver v. Hull*, 50 Neb. 878; *Beck v. Staats*, *supra*. The general rule, subject to qualifications hereinafter noted, for the measurement of damages sustained from the breach of the contract limits a party to such damages as arise out of a contract which has been broken, and which follow in the natural course of events from the breach itself, or which were within the contemplation of the parties when making the contract in

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13 Cyc. 32; 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.)
ley v. Barendale, 9 Exc. (Eng.) 341, 354; *Griffin*
 16 N. Y. 489.

ended petition brings the case squarely within
 rule. The profits which are in the contempla-
 e parties at the time the contract is made may
 red. 13 Cyc. 36; *Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce*
 139 U. S. 199; Mayne, Damages (8th ed.) 12;
v. Andrews & Co., 92 Wis. 214; *Allis v. Mc-*
Mich. 428; *Carlson v. Stone-Ordean-Wells Co.*,
 434, 107 Pac. 419; *Emerson v. Pacific Coast &*
Packing Co., 96 Minn. 1; *Wilson v. Wernwag*,
 t. 82.

dition alleged sufficient facts, if true, to consti-
 se of action; and the demurrer admits the truth
 tters well pleaded in the petition. It follows
 udgment of the district court should be, and is,
 and the cause is remanded for further proceed-

REVERSED.

, ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

BLUNT, APPELLEE, V. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON &
 UINCY RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT.

FILED JUNE 16, 1913. No. 17,226.

nd Servant: RELIEF FUND: APPLICATION: FALSE STATE-
 WARRANTIES. The statement contained in an application
 mbership in the voluntary relief department of the defend-
 npany that the applicant was only 25 years of age is a war-
 and it appearing that the applicant was in fact more than
 rs old when he made his application, that fact being un-
 to the company, will render the contract of insurance

———: ———: FRAUD. The plaintiff, while living at
 outh, had many times participated in the relief fund of
 fendant under the name of "Jesse F. Blunt." He after-

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wards removed to McCook, Nebraska, changed his name to "Jesse Blount," and represented his age to be 25 years, when, as a matter of fact, he was more than 35 years old, and thus again secured membership in the relief department of the defendant, which otherwise he could not have done. *Held*, That his membership was secured by fraud, and was void.

APPEAL from the district court for Cass county:
HARVEY D. TRAVIS, JUDGE. *Reversed*.

Byron Clark and William A. Robertson, for appellant.

Matthew Gering, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company to recover the sum of \$315, alleged to be due the plaintiff from the relief department of the defendant company. A trial in the district court for Cass county resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant has appealed.

It appears from the abstract and bill of exceptions that on the 19th day of September, 1907, the plaintiff, under the name of Jesse Blount, made an application to the relief department of the defendant company for membership therein, in which he stated that his name was Jesse Blount; that he was 25 years of age; that he had been a member of the relief department in 1901 and 1906. In answer to the question, "What long or serious sickness or sicknesses have you had?" he stated, "Not any." In answer to the question, "When were you last unable to work on account of injury?" he stated, "Never hurt." It is conceded that the answers to these questions were untrue, but it is contended that they were not warranties; that they were merely representations which in no way affected the policy of insurance in question.

It appears that plaintiff had previously made several applications to join in the distribution of this fund under the name of Jesse Blunt, and Jesse F. Blunt, and had been accepted, and had on 13 different occasions partici-

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tion of the fund. His former name was Blount, and when the name of "Blount," and this action is based. It was injured about the 8th day he received \$7.50, and the 1st received \$537, and again the 9; that from the time he received from the fund \$153. On the was ascertained that plaintiff for membership at different profits under the name of "Jesse defendant refused to make

determined at the outset of the statements made by plaintiff the relief department of the company? If so, then the policy of the company cannot maintain this action if the statement of the plaintiff is true. But it is claimed that the defendant would have known the falsity of the statement is not well founded for stating his age as only 25 years of age, and his employment as a locomotive engineer, he is entitled to wages at the rate of \$1.00 a day, which makes him eligible to the third class and entitled him to draw \$1.00 a day in case of sickness or injury or loss. If he had truthfully stated his age, he would have been eligible to the first class and entitled to draw only 50 cents a day. It is also shown by the testimony that the defendant used the name "Jesse Blount," instead of his true name, for the purpose of deceiving the defendant under the name of "Blunt" which is a participation in the third

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the relief fund, and by his application under the name of "Blount," and his statement therein contained that he was only 25 years of age when, as a matter of fact, he was over 35 years old, he was able to avoid that record, and did avoid the discovery of his fraud until the 13th day of August, 1909, when the exposure came, and he was denied further payments.

It is contended that the relief department might have known the falsity of the statements, or by the use of ordinary diligence could have ascertained their falsity. But it appears, without dispute, that they never connected the plaintiff with the man who had previously applied for membership under the name of "Blunt" until August 13, 1909, and the reason for the failure is explained by the testimony of Mr. Redfern, who stated that two different numbers were used, one being file number 22,018, and the other being number 121,290, and this explanation, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, seems conclusive. In view of the foregoing facts, we deem it clear that the statement was a warranty, was material, and the insurance contract was thereby rendered void. *Ætna Ins. Co. v. Simmons*, 49 Neb. 811; *Royal Neighbors of America v. Wallace*, 73 Neb. 409; *Koerts v. Grand Lodge Hermann's Sons*, 119 Wis. 520; *Callies v. Modern Woodmen of America*, 98 Mo. App. 521, 72 S. W. 713; *Cobb v. Covenant Mutual Benefit Ass'n*, 153 Mass. 176; *Thomas v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W.*, 12 Wash. 500; *Dunning v. Massachusetts Mutual Accident Ass'n*, 99 Me. 390; *Smith v. Supreme Lodge, K. & L. G. P.*, 123 Ia. 676; *Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Sale*, 121 Fed. 664.

It is also contended that the insurance contract was rendered void by plaintiff giving his name "Jesse Blount," instead of Jesse F. Blunt, which was his true name. Plaintiff argues, however, that the name was not material to the risk, and therefore should not affect the contract. As we view the case, the plaintiff's name was material. If he had truthfully given his name he would have been at once connected with his former applications and membership.

 Davis v. Haire.

d have been ascertained that he had incorrectly
ge, and his application would have been denied.
it is said that the name was *idem sonans*. We
contention is also unsound, for Blunt and
two distinct and different names. They do not
, and are not referable to one and the same
e are therefore of opinion that plaintiff's as-
f the name of "Blount" was material to the

etermined that in at least two respects the
tatements on which he obtained the insurance
nties and were material to the risk, and that
admittedly false, it follows that the trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant.

ment of the district court is reversed and the
anded for further proceedings.

REVERSED.

ROSE and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

DAVIS, APPELLANT, v. JAMES HAIRE, APPELLEE.

FILED JUNE 16, 1913. No. 17,239.

and Agent: SECRET PROFITS: LIABILITY OF AGENT. To
principal to recover for secret profits alleged to have
de by his agent in the exchange of properties, it must
hat at the time of the exchange or trade the agent was
l of some knowledge of the value of the property taken
nge that was unknown to his principal, and which the
erwards used to his own advantage.

—: ——. An agent agreed with a third party to
a restaurant taken by such third party in exchange with
lpal for other property in case such third party should,
mination, conclude that he did not desire to hold it.
it afterwards purchased the restaurant according to his
it, at a price much less than that fixed by his principal
g the exchange, but which was the fair market value of
want. *Held*, That he was not liable to his principal for
offs.

APPEAL from the district court for Boone county:
JAMES R. HANNA, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

C. E. Spear, F. J. Mack, A. E. Garten and H. C. Vail,
for appellant.

I. L. Albert and F. D. Williams, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action to recover secret profits alleged to have been made by plaintiff's agent in the sale or exchange of certain real estate. A trial in the district court for Boone county resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.

It appears that the plaintiff was the owner of a building situated on a leased lot in Albion, Nebraska, and used as a restaurant, which he desired to exchange for other property, and employed the defendant as his agent to accomplish that purpose. Some time thereafter the defendant informed the plaintiff that he had an offer to exchange some Holt county land for the restaurant and stock contained therein. Thereupon, plaintiff and defendant went to Holt county, where they met a party by the name of Morgan, who had the Holt county land for sale or exchange. The plaintiff looked at the land, which Morgan priced to him at \$4,500. After some negotiations Morgan agreed to take the plaintiff's restaurant, at a valuation of \$3,000, and \$1,200 for the Holt county farm, the plaintiff to pay Morgan Brothers a commission of \$100. A contract to that effect was made between the plaintiff and Morgan. At that time neither the plaintiff nor the defendant knew the owner of the Holt county land, nor had any information as to the cash price for which it could be purchased.

It also appears that, in order to induce Morgan to make the trade, defendant agreed that if he, Morgan, did not want the plaintiff's restaurant after examining it, he would purchase it for \$1,200. The trade as thus agreed upon

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made, and when the papers were exchanged it was ascertained that the owner of the Holt county farm only offered \$2,300 in cash for it. Plaintiff, however, accepted the offer, and executed a mortgage of \$1,200 on the land, thus obtaining the title, which he still holds. Morgan, wishing to keep the restaurant after he had examined it, sold it to the defendant for \$1,100, and plaintiff paid him a commission of \$85 in lieu of \$100 as was at first agreed upon. Thereafter plaintiff brought this suit over from his agent what he alleged to be secret property, amounting to \$2,000, and the trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant, as above stated.

Complaint is made of the giving of instructions numbers 5, 9, 10, 11 and 12, which, in effect, told the jury that the defendant caused the exchange to be made, and sold the restaurant property himself at less than its market price or value, then in such case alone would the defendant be liable. But, if he obtained the restaurant by misrepresentation of the facts at not more than its fair market value, there could be no recovery, and the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that the defendant obtained the restaurant property for less than market value. As we view the evidence, the instructions complained of were proper, and correctly measured the defendant's liability to the plaintiff. It seems clear that this was an exchange of property in which the plaintiff fixed the price at which his property was to be taken by Morgan Brothers in exchange for the Holt county farm, title of which was controlled by them, and Morgan Brothers fixed the price of the farm. The plaintiff, at the time the trade was made, saw the land and knew as much of the defendant as to its real value. The defendant was possessed of the same knowledge that the plaintiff had and no more. In order to facilitate the trade, defendant stated that, if Morgan Brothers did not want the restaurant after they had seen it, he would purchase it from them for \$1,200. They afterwards concluded to accept the offer. With the money thus obtained, and the mort-

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gage of \$1,200, Morgan Brothers paid for the Holt county land, which was conveyed to the plaintiff, and the conveyance accepted by him.

The case of *Leonard v. Omstead*, 141 Ia. 485, cited by the plaintiff, is not an authority in this case. There defendant having been plaintiff's agent in negotiations for an exchange of the plaintiff's land, which he was putting in at a cash value of \$70 an acre, for land of C., which C. was putting in at a cash value of \$25 an acre, having discovered that C. was willing to sell his land at a net cash price of \$14 an acre, and not having disclosed this to the plaintiff, as was his duty, but having arranged with C. that, after C. had exchanged with plaintiff, the defendant would buy the land of C. at a price which would net \$14 an acre for the land which he had exchanged with the plaintiff, it was held that defendant must account to plaintiff for the profit he made on the land which he resold at \$75 an acre, though it was not worth even \$70 an acre. In the case at bar it appears, without dispute, that defendant had no knowledge as to who owned the Holt county land, or what it could be purchased for in cash, and, in order to facilitate the trade, he agreed to take the restaurant himself at \$1,200 if Morgan Brothers did not desire to keep it. Neither are *Wiruth v. Lashmett*, 82 Neb. 375, *Durward v. Hubbell*, 149 Ia. 722, nor *Varner v. Interstate Exchange*, 138 Ia. 201, in point.

In the case at bar the plaintiff knew the terms of the trade, and that he was not getting \$3,000, nor any other sum in cash, for his restaurant. He went in person to examine the land, and knew exactly what he was getting. The defendant concealed nothing from him, and there is no evidence to show that he suffered any damages by reason of any concealment of the facts. The defendant made no secret profits. He bought the restaurant property after his agency had determined, and then at what the evidence abundantly shows was its fair market value.

It therefore seems clear that the district court correctly instructed the jury, and, the verdict having been given the

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fendant, we do not see our way clear to disturb it. The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

ROSE, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

M. R. EMBERSON, APPELLANT, V. ADAMS COUNTY, APPELLANT; U. S. ROHRER, APPELLEE.

FILED JUNE 16, 1913. No. 17,311.

1. **Counties: POWERS OF COMMISSIONERS.** County commissioners are clothed not only with the powers expressly conferred upon them by statute, but they also possess such powers as are requisite to enable them to discharge the official duties devolved upon them by law.
2. ———: ———: **EMPLOYMENT OF ASSISTANTS.** Such board has the power to employ and pay for clerical assistance to the county attorney where such clerical assistance is necessary for the purpose of enabling that officer to properly perform the duties devolving upon him in conducting the business of his office. *Berryman v. Schalander*, 85 Neb. 281.

APPEAL from the district court for Adams county:
HARRY S. DUNGAN, JUDGE. *Reversed with directions.*

John M. Ragan, M. A. Hartigan and J. W. James, for appellant.

John Snider, contra.

BARNES, J.

The plaintiff in this action was employed in the office of the county attorney of Adams county in the performance of clerical work which was necessary in order to enable the county attorney to properly perform the duties of his office. She presented a bill for her services to the county board amounting to \$25 for the month of November, 1910. The bill was audited and allowed, and one U.

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S. Rohrer, as a taxpayer, appealed to the district court, where a trial resulted in a judgment for the appellant rejecting the plaintiff's claim, and she has brought the case here by appeal.

The question involved is the power of the county board to furnish and pay for clerical help in the county attorney's office. The district court found that the services were performed, and were necessary to enable the county attorney to properly perform his duties, but further found that the board had no power to pay for such services.

In *Lancaster County v. Lincoln Auditorium Ass'n*, 87 Neb. 87, it was said: "The direction of county affairs is entrusted by law to the county board, and not to the courts. Neither are infallible. It is probable that, where no sinister influences are shown to exist, county affairs may in the long run be best administered by the men chosen by the people for that express purpose. While the intervener and other citizens of the county may be possessed of business acumen which would prevent them making such a contract, we are of opinion that it is not void for want of consideration." •

Berryman v. Schalander, 85 Neb. 281, was a case where the county attorney filed a claim for \$21.84 for expenses necessarily incurred in performing the duties of his office. The district court held that plaintiff could not recover. On appeal to this court it was said: "Section 4440, Ann. St. 1907, in defining the powers of a county, gives the county power 'to make all contracts and to do all other acts in relation to the property and concerns of the county necessary to the exercise of its corporate powers.' In construing this provision of the statute and determining the meaning of the word 'necessary' therein, in *Lancaster County v. Green*, 54 Neb. 98, we held: '(1) A board of county commissioners, in addition to the powers specially conferred by statute, has such other powers as are incidentally necessary to enable such board to carry into effect the powers granted. (2) The word "necessary" considered, and, in respect to the implied powers of boards

of county commissioners, held to mean no more than the exercise of such powers as are reasonably required by the exigencies of each case as it arises.' In the opinion 103) we said: 'The county commissioners, therefore, clothed not only with the powers expressly conferred upon them by statute, but they also possess such power as is requisite to enable them to discharge the official duties devolved upon them by law. It was not practicable to advance to enumerate all the powers which the county commissioners might be permitted to exercise, but to cover all contingencies very general language was employed, and from this consideration it necessarily follows that the question whether or not the board has such powers must be determined upon the circumstances of each case as it arises.' We do not think that the question of the power of the county board to contract in advance for expenditures of the kind in controversy is involved. The simple question involved is: Did the board have the power to pay the necessary expenses of the county attorney incurred while prosecuting the business of the county in a manner which was saving to the county large amounts of money each year? To hold that it did not have such power would not only be a strained construction of the statute, but would, we think, be against public policy. The action of the board in allowing plaintiff's claim, the reasonableness of which is not questioned, was a lawful exercise of the discretionary powers of such board, regardless of any prior agreement in that behalf."

In *Christner v. Hayes County*, 79 Neb. 157, it was held: "County officers have by implication such powers as are necessary to enable them to perform the duties enjoined upon them. A county attorney, who is employed by law and by the order of the county board to bring legal actions for the benefit of the county, may bind the county to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred therefor." *State v. Barton*, 88 Neb. 576; *Shepard v. Hering*, 61 Neb. 882; *Roberts v. Thompson*, 82 Neb. 4

In the case at bar it was established beyond a

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that the services were necessary in order to properly enable the county attorney to perform the duties of his office, and that the services were performed. Therefore we decline to take so narrow a view of the powers of the county board as would prevent them from paying a small compensation for such service. By furnishing the county attorney a small amount of clerical help he was enabled to perform the duties of his office more effectually, and thus better serve the county in prosecuting criminal cases and performing the other duties devolving upon him in his official capacity.

We are therefore of opinion that the county commissioners had the power to allow plaintiff's claim. The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to render a judgment for the plaintiff.

REVERSED.

ROSE, SENGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

STATE, EX REL. WILLIAM RAKOW ET AL., APPELLEES, V. E.
H. ALLEN ET AL., APPELLANTS.

FILED JUNE 16, 1913. No. 17,333.

Appeal: FINDINGS: PRESUMPTIONS. Where the district court makes general and special findings, and omits therefrom some fact conclusively established by the evidence essential to the decree, such fact, on appeal to this court, will be treated as found by the court.

APPEAL from the district court for Dixon county: GUY
T. GRAVES, JUDGE. *Affirmed.*

J. J. McCarthy, for appellants.

Kingsbury & Hendrickson, contra.

BARNES, J.

Action in mandamus to compel the defendants to move

the schoolhouse in district No. 31, Dixon county, Nebraska, to its former site. A trial in the district court resulted in findings and a judgment for the relators, and the defendants have appealed.

It appears that at the annual school district meeting held in school district No. 31, in the year 1910, there was submitted to the voters there assembled the question of moving the schoolhouse from its present site to one alleged to be nearer the center of the district. A vote on that question was taken, and resulted in 14 for and 10 against removal. According to the provisions of section 11537, Ann. St. 1911, the motion was declared lost. It further appears that within a few days thereafter E. H. Allen, H. B. Carr, two members of the school board, together with certain other persons, proceeded to remove the schoolhouse to another site. Thereupon this action was commenced to require the defendants Allen, Carr and others to replace the schoolhouse in its former position. Issues were joined, and the cause was tried to the court. who made certain general and special findings of the facts, and awarded the plaintiffs the writ of mandamus prayed for, restoring the schoolhouse in question to its former site.

The appellants contend that, the court having failed to find that there was a demand made upon the respondents to restore the schoolhouse to its former location, the judgment of the district court should be reversed. In *Lynch v. Egan*, 67 Neb. 541, it was said: "In a suit in equity, where the court makes special findings, and omits therefrom some fact, conclusively established by the evidence essential to the decree, such fact, on appeal to this court, will be treated as though found by the court."

It appears that respondent Allen told R. H. Cross, his fellow school district director, that he could not replace the schoolhouse on its former site. And Allen testified himself that he was present and hired Mr. Reed to move the schoolhouse from its former location; that he at that time was acting as a director of the school district. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to

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sustain a finding of the refusal of the respondents to replace the schoolhouse in its former position.

As we view the record, it contains no reversible error, and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

ROSE, SEDGWICK and HAMER, JJ., not sitting.

IN RE ESTATE OF J. M. STRAHAN.

FRANK E. STRAHAN ET AL.; MARY W. STRAHAN, APPELLANT, v. WAYNE COUNTY, APPELLEE.

FILED JUNE 16, 1913. No. 17,912.

1. **Taxation: INHERITANCE TAX: LIMITATIONS.** Where a petition is filed in a proceeding in the county court to recover the inheritance tax due from the heirs of a deceased person, and notice thereof is given to the persons interested within five years from the death of the decedent, a plea of the statute of limitations as a defense is of no avail.
2. ———: ———: **INTEREST OF SURVIVING SPOUSE.** Chapter 23, Comp. St. 1911, abolishing the estates of dower and curtesy, gives to the surviving spouse of a deceased person an enlarged estate of the same kind and nature as that of dower or curtesy, and such estate, like dower, is not subject to an inheritance tax. *In re Estate of Sanford*, 91 Neb. 752.

APPEAL from the district court for Wayne county: ANSON A. WELCH, JUDGE. *Reversed and dismissed as to Mary W. Strahan.*

Kingsbury & Hendrickson, for appellant.

A. R. Davis and F. S. Berry, contra.

Field, Ricketts & Ricketts, Lincoln Frost, W. L. Pope, S. L. Geisthardt and Tibbets, Anderson & Baylor, amici curiæ.

BARNES, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the district court for Wayne county, fixing the amount of an inheritance tax due from the estate of one J. M. Strahan, deceased. It appears that Strahan, a resident of the state of Iowa, died intestate on the 14th day of August, 1907, and left surviving him Mary W. Strahan, his widow, two adult sons, and three married daughters, hereafter designated as the heirs. At the time of Strahan's death he was the owner of certain real estate in Wayne county, Nebraska, valued at \$133,570, and an interest in the First National Bank of Wayne represented by 210 shares of its capital stock, valued at \$29,190. On the 19th day of July, 1912, the county attorney filed a petition in the county court of Wayne county, as provided by law, claiming the inheritance tax in question, and alleging that no part of said tax had been paid. On the filing of the petition the county court appointed an appraiser to value the said estate, and on the same day the appraiser gave notice, as provided by law, to the widow and the heirs that he would proceed to take testimony concerning the value of the estate, at his office in the First National Bank building in the city of Wayne, Nebraska, on August 3, 1912, at 10 o'clock A. M. The evidence was taken at the time and place stated in the notice. The appraiser duly filed his report in the county court on August 7, 1912, fixing the value of the estate at the sums above mentioned. On that day the widow and the heirs made a general appearance in the action, and requested the court to withhold its decree on the report filed by the appraiser until September 16, 1912, in order that they might file objections to the report. The request was granted. The widow and the heirs filed their objections, and a hearing was had on the 16th day of September, 1912, at which time the tax in question was assessed. The widow and the heirs prosecuted an appeal to the district court for Wayne county. The cause came on for hearing on the 20th day of November, 1912, and re-

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sulted in a finding that the total value of the estate was \$163,111.36. The court further found that the interest of the widow therein was \$40,752.84; that she was entitled to exemptions in the sum of \$10,000, leaving a balance of \$30,752.84 subject to the inheritance tax; that the interest of each of the heirs in the remainder of the estate was \$24,451.70, less an exemption of \$10,000 each, leaving the interest of each of them subject to the inheritance tax in the amount of \$14,451.70; that no part of the said inheritance tax had been paid, to all of which findings the widow and the heirs excepted. It was thereupon ordered, adjudged and decreed that an inheritance tax be assessed against the interest of the widow in the sum of \$307.52, with interest at 7 per cent. from August 14, 1907, and \$144.51, with interest at 7 per cent. from August 14, 1907, was assessed against the interest of each one of the heirs of the deceased. No appeal was taken by the heirs, but on the 22d day of November, 1912, the widow filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and she thereupon prosecuted this appeal.

Three questions are presented by the record: First. Was the bank stock assessable? Second. Is the tax barred by the statute of limitations? Third. Is the widow's interest assessable?

1. Appellant contends that the tax was barred by the statute of limitations because more than five years had elapsed after the tax accrued, and therefore it was conclusively presumed to have been paid. The record discloses that the proceeding to collect the inheritance tax was commenced within the five-year period above mentioned; that notice was given the widow and the heirs, as provided by law, within that period; that they each voluntarily made a general appearance in the action within said period, to wit, on August 7, 1912. It therefore follows that this contention is without merit.

2. Appellant further contends that her distributive share of the bank stock was not subject to an inheritance tax, for the reason that, being personal property, its situs

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was fixed by law at the place of the residence of her deceased husband, which was at the time of his death in the state of Iowa. This reason may not be decisive of the question, and therefore need not be considered. There is another reason, however, why appellant's interest in the bank stock was not subject to the inheritance tax, as we shall presently see.

3. Finally, appellant contends that none of her distributive share of her husband's estate, either real or personal, was subject to an inheritance tax under the laws of this state. Chapter 49, laws 1907, called the "King Inheritance Law," abolishes the estates of dower and curtesy, and in lieu thereof provides (sec. 1): "When any person shall die, leaving a husband or wife surviving, all the real estate of which the deceased was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, or in which the deceased was possessed of an interest either legal or equitable at the time of his or her death, which has not been lawfully conveyed, by the husband and wife while residents of this state, or by the deceased, while the husband or wife was a non-resident of this state, which has not been sold under execution or judicial sale, and which has not been lawfully devised, shall descend subject to his or her debts and the rights of homestead, in the manner following: First. One-fourth part to the husband or wife." By section 3 of the act it is further provided that the personal estate of the deceased shall be distributed in the same proportions to the same persons as prescribed for the descent of real estate. Comp. St. 1911, ch. 23, secs. 1, 176. It thus appears that the appellant, as the widow of her deceased husband, by operation of law became the owner of one-fourth of the real estate and bank stock in question, upon her husband's death. Under the present law the interest of the wife in the personal property of her husband is similar to that of a silent partner. The husband is, in effect, the managing agent and has control of the property. He can sell and dispose of it, or he may exchange it for other property. But at his death her interest

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therein comes to her in her own right. It does not pass to her by will, or by the intestate laws of the state. The husband cannot deprive her of that right. *Gaster v. Estate of Gaster*, 92 Neb. 6.

Many of the courts of last resort in this country have declared that the property of the widow, which comes to her by law, or by what has been designated as the "wife right," is immune from the payment of an inheritance tax. In *In re Estate of Sanford*, 91 Neb. 752, this court held: "The dower interest of the widow in the estate of her deceased husband, whether taken under his will or by operation of law, is not subject to an inheritance tax."

It is argued by counsel for the appellee that, the legislature having abolished the estates of dower and curtesy, that rule has no application to the present controversy. It appears, however, upon an examination of the authorities, that the legislature of the state of Iowa in 1873 passed an act abolishing estates of dower and curtesy, and giving to the surviving spouse a fee simple interest in one-third of the estate of the deceased. The provisions of our present inheritance law are, in effect, the same as those of the Iowa statute, with the exception that in this state the surviving spouse, under certain conditions, takes a fee simple interest in one-fourth of the estate of the deceased, both real and personal. Construing the Iowa statute, the supreme court of that state, in *Purcell v. Lang*, 97 Ia. 610, said: "A wife is entitled to dower in land alienated by her husband, in the deed of which she did not join, according to the law in force at the time of such alienation, notwithstanding his death takes place after the passage of Iowa Code 1873, section 2440, declaring the estates of dower and curtesy abolished, and giving the surviving spouse a fee-simple interest in one-third of the estate of the deceased, as such act merely abolishes the use of the words 'dower' and 'curtesy' as descriptive of the enlarged estate."

It has been held by the great weight of authority that dower is not immune because it is dower, but because it, like the right to the homestead, and to the distributive

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e of the widow of the estate of her deceased husband, nged to her inchoately during his life, and vested fully r at his death. The widow's share of the estate of her ased husband, by the present inheritance law, is given er in lieu of dower, and it follows that the interest of appellant in her deceased husband's estate, both real personal, comes within the test of immunity.

nder the present statute the wife takes her interest in estate of her deceased husband by operation of law. cannot be deprived of that interest by his will. It is ething which belongs to her absolutely and independ- y of any right of inheritance or succession. Strictly king, the widow's share should be considered as im- e, rather than exempt, from an inheritance tax. It is rather than freed, from such tax. It is not excepted i the taxable class because it never was in such class. : all debts, taxes, costs, expenses and other similar s, it is deducted before any inheritance tax is assessed. share of the realty and personalty, which under our go to the widow independent of any will or act of the and, is not, so to speak, a part of his estate, and is no e liable to a succession tax at his death than is her in- lual property derived from her own ancestors and in her own name, though the husband may have had management and control of the estate during his life-

he effect of our decedent law is practically the same as law of community of property, and the courts of those es which have adopted that law have held, with but a le exception, that the wife is not liable, upon the death er husband, to pay an inheritance tax on her one-half e community property, for the reason that the prop- does not pass to her by will or by the intestate laws e state. *Kohny v. Dunbar*, 21 Idaho, 258, 121 Pac. 544; *ession of Marsal*, 118 La. 212. As we view the ques- , this rule should be applied to the facts under con- ration. It is sustained by the greater weight of au- ity, and the more recent decisions of the courts of last

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resort in this country, and to our minds correctly disposes of the main question in this case.

It follows that the district court erred in assessing the amount of \$307.52 against the appellant as an inheritance tax upon her distributive share of her deceased husband's estate. The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed in so far as it affects the rights of the appellant, and as to her the action is dismissed.

REVERSED.

ROSE, J., dissenting.

FAWCETT, J., not sitting.

SEDGWICK, J., concurring.

Whether the personal property of the decedent to which the surviving spouse succeeds under the act of 1907, ch. 49, is subject to an inheritance tax is a question which is perhaps not clear from the wording of the statute, and which has provoked much discussion and required of the court unusual consideration. It is said in the brief: "In the reason of the rule, therefore, there is no distinction between realty and personalty, and such personalty as comes within the reason of the rule must be likewise immune from the tax." This proposition is ably presented and the position fortified by the collection of numerous authorities. The act of 1907 is a comprehensive act and is complete in itself; it repeals many sections of the former statutes which are inconsistent with its general provisions, and those which appear to be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the new act. The act of 1907 took several distinct and important rights that had existed under the former statute away from the surviving spouse, and, as all agree, intended to give something better in their place. It repealed dower and curtesy. The former statute provided that if the husband exchanged land for other lands the widow should not have dower in both, and that statute is repealed. The former statute provided that if the husband mortgaged his land before marriage the wife should

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not have dower as against the mortgagee, but against all other persons, and if the husband purchased land during marriage, and at the same time mortgaged it for the purchase money, the widow should not have dower as against the mortgagee, even if she did not sign the mortgage, and if such mortgaged lands were sold upon the mortgage after the husband's death the widow should have only an income of one-third part of the surplus, and if the heirs or other persons claiming under the husband paid the mortgage the amount so paid should be deducted from the land, and the widow should have only one-third of the rents. The old statute provided that if the husband had deeded land in his lifetime, and the lands had enhanced in value afterwards, the widow should have dower only in the value at the time they were alienated. The old statute also provided that when the husband died seized of land in several counties the widow's dower might be assigned in land in either county, and where the estate could not be divided, whether in one or more counties, the dower might be assigned in the rents, issues and profits. The old statute provided that any woman residing out of the state should have dower in the land of which her husband should die seized. All these provisions were repealed. There were other provisions in the old statute which were repealed by the new. The new statute provides simply that the surviving spouse shall have the same portion of personal property as of real property. In case there is only one child the surviving spouse gets one-half of the property, real and personal. Under the old statute, if there was no child, the wife took the whole property. Under the new statute apparently she only takes one-half. This applies to personal property as well as real. In view of all these changes, and in view of the fact that the rule under the new statute is the same for personal property as it is for real, it is not inconsistent to suppose that the legislature intended that the surviving spouse takes both by the same right, that is, by right and because of the marriage relation, and not by inheritance. Such construction is plain, and avoids many complications that might otherwise arise.

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The title of the present act is, "An act to provide for succession to the estates of decedents and to repeal (sections named)." Under this act the husband and wife are placed upon exact equality as to the rights of each in the property of the other. The surviving spouse "succeeds" to the rights which the statute gives in the property that was held in the name of the decedent. It does not "pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state." It therefore is not within the letter of the inheritance tax law, which by express terms provides only that property which so passes "shall be and is subject to a tax." Comp. St. 1911, ch. 77, art. VIII, sec. 1. If, therefore, a tax is imposed upon property to which the surviving spouse succeeds by virtue of this act of 1907, it must be by construction as a necessary implication from the general purpose and spirit of the act. It is true that there is no reference in this later act to the inheritance tax law; but no such reference was necessary, for that law was purposely and necessarily so framed as to adapt itself to any changes that might be made in the law of wills and the law of devolution of estates of decedents. The provision that all property "which shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state" contemplates that such laws may be changed from time to time, and is so worded as to apply to property which so passes under the law at the time. Our object of course is to ascertain and declare the intention of the lawmakers. It seems to me that the scope and purpose of the new legislation indicates that the legislature acted advisedly when avoiding any language that could be construed literally so as to impose a tax on property that passes from one spouse to the other. They use a new expression in the title of the act; it is "succession to the estates of decedents," an expression broad enough to include both inheritance and conjugal rights. The former act provided that the wife should take as a child, which was naturally construed to make her an heir. But now the husband succeeds to property of his deceased wife as the wife does to property of her deceased husband. The policy

law, as developed by legislation from time to time, more and more to place husband and wife upon an equality as to their property, and to regard each as interested in the property held in the name of either. It may be considered that the marital relation is of great importance to the state, and generally covers the active life of both parties. Their fortunes are made together, and they give mutual help and contribution. When their property is expended to their children it is taxed. In some states the property is taxed as if it goes to collateral heirs for whom children to inherit. Whatever may be just in that it seems clear that it is not unreasonable that such property as the surviving spouse takes as a matter of right, under the will of the decedent or the intestate laws, and in regard to whether decedent was testate or intestate, should be taxed, if at all, only when that surviving spouse passes it on to his or her children. Thus the whole estate, not used by those who produced it, is once taxed. It may very well be thought the reasonable intention of the legislature.

Douglas County v. Kountze, 84 Neb. 506, has no application. Herman Kountze died in 1906, before the present act fixing the rights of the surviving spouse in the property of the decedent, and if it is true that the act gives the right by virtue of the marriage, and by inheritance, then *Douglas County v. Kountze* is in conflict with the present opinion.

MR. JUSTICE N. J., dissenting as to personal property.

I am unable to concur in the holding that personal property inherited by a surviving husband or wife is not subject to the provisions of the inheritance tax law.

The majority opinion takes the broad ground that no personal property of a surviving spouse is taxable as being derived from the decedent by inheritance. The inheritance tax statute provides that property shall pass by inheritance to husband or wife from the other the tax shall be 1 per cent. on the value of all property received above \$10,000, while

a larger tax is assessed on persons related in a remoter degree. The opinion of the majority repeals this statute with respect to personal property without action by the legislature.

An examination of the only changes made by the law of 1907 in the inheritance of personal property shows that there is no basis for the theory that it in anywise affected or repealed the inheritance tax law in this regard. Prior to the enactment of the law of 1907, if the intestate left no children, all his real estate went to his widow for life, and at her death to his father. If he left a widow and no kindred, all his estate descended to his widow. The husband took nothing but his curtesy and homestead rights. By the 1907 law the surviving husband was also given the right to inherit, which was one of the most radical changes made. The share of both husband and wife was fixed at the same proportion, and the inheritance of the real estate was not made to depend upon the contingency of there being no children, but was taken in various proportions, depending upon the parentage of the children. As to personal property, however, under the new law the widow may in some cases receive identically the same amount of property as she would have received under the child's share provision of the old law. This inheritance was taxable before the law of 1907, and I am unable to see why it is not still taxable. The title to the act is, "An act to provide for succession to the estates of decedents and to repeal sections 4901," etc., and the act has nothing to do with taxation. If it is to be held that an act which merely creates a new class of inheritors and fixes the shares they shall take repeals the provisions of another statute relating to the taxation of inheritances, then we have in truth opened a wide door for evasions of the provisions of the constitution preventing surreptitious legislation. Moreover, there is no repugnancy between the new law and the taxing law, and consequently, there is no repeal by implication.

It is also worthy of mention that this holding is un-

dicted. No one has had the hardihood to argue that the shares of stock are not subject to the inheritance tax on account of any change made by the law of 1907. The appellant's claim is that the situs of personal property is at the residence of the owner, which was in Iowa, and that the shares are not within the jurisdiction of this court. The opinion, therefore, decides a point not presented or argued in the briefs. It also overrules *Douglas County v. Kountze*, 84 Neb. 506, without mentioning that case, which is directly in point as to the taxation of shares of stock.

The effect of the opinion will be that vast estates, consisting in large degree of personal property, such as involved in the *Kountze* case, and where the property is left either to the surviving husband or wife, will be relieved from taxation, which certainly was not in the legislative mind when the succession act was passed.

I also dissent from the opinion of Judge SEDGWICK, which has been furnished me since the foregoing was written. The use of the word "succession" in the title of the act seems to me to indicate the very reverse of what is construed to mean by Judge SEDGWICK. In a large number of instances the words "inheritance" and "succession" are used interchangeably. It has been said that a succession tax "is one upon the privilege of acquiring property by inheritance." *Wallace v. Myers*, 38 Fed. 184. Speaking of the Iowa inheritance tax law, Judge Deemer says: "Such taxes as are imposed by the act under consideration have been almost universally denominated succession taxes, and they have been upheld on the theory that the right to succeed to property upon the death of the owner is the creation of law, and that the state, which creates this right, may regulate it." *Ferry v. Campbell*, 10 Ia. 290. See, also, the definition of "inheritance" and "succession," in Words and Phrases, and 37 Cyc. 1553.

There can be no argument, therefore, predicated upon the use of the word "succession" instead of the word "inheritance" in the inheritance statute of 1907. If the act can be construed to mean that property passing to one

spouse on the death of the other passes "by virtue of the marital relations," and not by inheritance, as Judge SEDGWICK suggests, why does not property which passes from parent to child under the same act pass "by virtue of the parental relation," and not by inheritance. The argument based upon the use of the word "succession" instead of the word "inheritance" is equally as sound in one case as in the other, and is equally without merit.

The inheritance tax law makes all property taxable "which shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state." The succession law of 1907 is indubitably "the intestate law of this state." In fact, it is now the only intestate law there is in this state, and is clearly included within the terms of the taxing statute.

The quotation from the brief in the opinion by Judge SEDGWICK is incomplete. It is followed by language which shows that it is only certain classes of personalty that the writer considers to be immune from the tax, "the courts universally holding that her allowances for support pending administration, her right to certain specific articles of personalty, such as household furniture, wearing apparel, and the like, in fact, all personalty which by statute goes to her at his death regardless of any attempt by him to dispose of it by will, is immune from inheritance tax." This is the view the writer takes in this respect. Counsel nowhere contends that all personalty going from one spouse to the other is exempt, which is what the majority opinion holds, and the question is decided without argument.

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1. Condonation of acts of cruelty by a husband against his wife is conditioned on subsequent good conduct, and cannot constitute a defense to a suit for a divorce, if the husband is guilty of cruelty after the alleged condonation. *McNamara v. McNamara* 190
2. A false and malicious accusation of adultery by a husband against his wife is cruelty, and if, knowing it to be unfounded, he makes such accusation, and is guilty of other acts of cruelty while her suit for divorce is pending, such conduct will be considered as aggravating former acts of cruelty. *McNamara v. McNamara*..... 190
3. A decree of divorce will be affirmed if a cause of action alleged in the petition is supported by the evidence, though the trial court based the decree on another alleged cause of action not established by the evidence. *McNamara v. McNamara* 190
4. Evidence held to sustain decree of divorce. *McNamara v. McNamara* 190
5. Decree for alimony and custody and support of children modified. *McNamara v. McNamara* 190
6. Where a husband, having sufficient ability, without just cause refuses to support his wife, the court may grant her a divorce. *Svanda v. Svanda* 404
7. Evidence held to sustain decree awarding custody of child to the mother. *Mackey v. Frenzer* 584
8. Evidence in suit for divorce held not of such a character

Divorce—Concluded.

- as to justify a review of the decree of divorce. *Clute v. Clute* 755
- 9. In awarding alimony, property of the parties, accumulated by their joint efforts, should be treated as joint property in equal shares. *Clute v. Clute* ... 756
- 10. Where the joint possession and use of property have been terminated by decree of divorce for the wrong-doing of defendant, in whom the title rests, he should account to plaintiff for the reasonable value of her share. *Clute v. Clute*..... 756
- 11. After decree of divorce in plaintiff's favor, land in another state, recently inherited by plaintiff from her father, should not be included in an accounting of property rights. *Clute v. Clute* 756

Dower.

- Under the statutes in force in 1891, a widow was not entitled to dower in an equitable interest in lands held by her husband under an executory contract. *Moran v. Collett*..... 153

Drains. See EMINENT DOMAIN, 2.

- 1. For the purpose of organizing a drainage district, verified articles conforming to statutory requirements and containing a prayer for incorporation, and objections by interested landowners, may take the place of formal pleadings in a summary proceeding under art. IV, ch. 89, Comp. St. 1909. *Drainage District v. Wilkins*..... 567
- 2. The existence of swamps or overflowed lands and a purpose to drain them by a feasible drainage system are necessary to the legal organization of a drainage district, under art. IV, ch. 89, Comp. St. 1909. *Drainage District v. Wilkins*.. 567
- 3. In articles for the incorporation of a drainage district, defects in statements which are not required may be corrected by averments in objections filed in the summary proceeding authorized by art. IV, ch. 89, Comp. St. 1909. *Drainage District v. Wilkins* 567
- 4. A drainage district may be organized to provide a drain to prevent water from flowing onto swamp lands. *O'Neill v. Leamer* 786
- 5. Where the proceedings under art. IV, ch. 89, Comp. St. 1909, to establish a drainage district are sufficient to confer jurisdiction, the district supervisors cannot be enjoined from proceeding with the work. *O'Neill v. Leamer*..... 786
- 6. A drainage district organized under art. IV, ch. 89, Comp. St. 1909, is a public corporation. *O'Neill v. Leamer*..... 786
- 7. The legislature has power to provide for incorporation of a drainage district by a part of the inhabitants and property owners therein without the consent of all. *O'Neill v. Leamer*, 786

Drains—Concluded.

8. Plaintiffs held not entitled to enjoin condemnation proceedings and the work thereunder. *O'Neill v. Leamer*..... 786

Ejectment.

- Where the life estate of a mortgagor was sold at foreclosure sale, the remainderman, on the mortgagor's death, can sue in ejectment for possession. *Garrier v. Teske*..... 7

Eminent Domain.

1. Owners of lands not taken by condemnation proceedings which are damaged by the improvement, having an adequate remedy at law, cannot enjoin the prosecution of the work. *O'Neill v. Leamer* 786
2. Proceedings for condemnation of lands for a drainage ditch held not subject to collateral attack on the ground that the location of the ditch was not sufficiently set forth. *O'Neill v. Leamer* 786
3. Sec. 46, ch. 78, Comp. St. 1905, accepting the grant of lands for highways provided by sec. 2477, Rev. St. U. S., reserves to landowners the right to recover damages for land taken on the opening of such highways. *Scott's Bluff County v. Tri-State Land Co.* 805

Equity. See ACTION, 2. TRUSTS.

1. Where equity has jurisdiction over the subject matter and all the parties to a suit, it is the court's duty to adjudicate all questions, in order to do full justice to all parties. *Rakow v. Tate* 198
2. A purely equitable case should be determined according to the procedure and practice in equity. *Schultz v. Wise*..... 718

Estoppel. See CORPORATIONS, 2, 4.

- Where a surety has given a bond for a liquor license, and damages have accrued, the surety is estopped to plead that there was no valid ordinance in force when the license was issued. *Bulger v. Prenica* 697

Evidence. See DEEDS, 1, 2. INSURANCE, 2, 4, 10. INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 1-5. LIBEL AND SLANDER, 4. NEGLIGENCE, 1-3, 5-10. RAILROADS, 4. SALES, 2, 3. STREET RAILWAYS.

1. A properly authenticated copy of a liquor dealer's bond is sufficient *prima facie* proof of the existence of the bond and of its proper execution. *Bulger v. Prenica*..... 697
2. Objection may be made to competency and materiality of evidence in a deposition without filing objections under sec. 390 of the code. *In re Estate of Lyle*..... 768
3. In proceedings to establish heirship, a photograph offered in evidence held to have been improperly excluded. *In re Estate of Lyle* 768

vidence—Concluded.

4. A document, reciting that it is an "extract entry of birth," and signed "Hugh Pearce, Registrar," without other authentication or explanation, *held* properly excluded. *In re Estate of Lyle* 768
5. The question of the competency of the declarations as to family pedigree and history is for the court, and not the jury. *In re Estate of Lyle*..... 768
6. Declarations as to pedigree and history must relate to family relatives of decedent to be competent. *In re Estate of Lyle* 768
7. When, in determining next of kin, the issue is as to the identity of decedent with the ancestor of those claiming heirship, it is error to charge that such identity must be established before declarations as to the ancestor can be considered. *In re Estate of Lyle* 768

ecutors and Administrators. See MONEY RECEIVED, 2.

1. The use of the body of the personal estate by the widow *held* authorized by the terms of the will. *In re Estate of Nichols* 80
2. Evidence *held* to show that a claim was properly rejected on its merits. *In re Estate of Hinrichs* 551
3. Where the personal assets are sufficient to pay all debts, a sale of the real estate cannot be made for that purpose. *In re Estate of Sasac* 640

tradition.

In extradition, the governor must determine whether the person demanded is charged with a crime, and whether he is a fugitive from justice. *In re Willard* 298

od.

Under secs. 8, 22, ch. 33, Comp. St. 1911, where syrup is put up by a wholesaler and sold under a label stating that each half-gallon can contains a brand composed of cane syrup and maple syrup, there must be a statement showing the proportion of each. *State v. Paxton & Gallagher Co.*..... 216

rgery.

1. An information charging that accused did "knowingly" utter a forged check sufficiently avers guilty knowledge that the instrument was forged. *Round v. State*..... 427
2. Evidence *held* competent to identify accused as the person who uttered the forged instrument. *Round v. State*..... 427
3. Evidence *held* to identify accused and to establish guilty knowledge on his part. *Round v. State*..... 427
4. Evidence *held* competent to connect accused with the commission of the crime charged against him. *Round v. State*, 427

Forgery—Concluded.

5. Evidence *held* to sustain verdict. *Rownd v. State*..... 427

Fraud. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 6, 7.

Fraudulent Conveyances.

It is a defense to a suit to set aside conveyances as in fraud of a judgment that plaintiff is indebted on simple contract to the judgment debtor in an amount equal to the judgment.

- Lashmett v. Prall* 184

Garnishment.

The indebtedness of the maker upon a note before maturity is not liable to garnishment. *Fisher v. O'Hanlon*..... 529

Guaranty.

1. Guaranties of performance and of payment are controlled by the same principles of law. *Schultz v. Wise*..... 718
2. The liability of a guarantor does not extend beyond the terms of his guaranty. *Schultz v. Wise*..... 718

Guardian and Ward. See TAXATION, 15.

1. Sec. 2, ch. 34, Comp. St. 1911, confers on the probate court of each county jurisdiction to appoint a guardian to a minor who is an inhabitant or resident in the same county, or who has property in the county and resides in another state. *In re Connor* 118
2. The courts of Kansas have no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a minor whose domicile and property are in Nebraska. *In re Connor* 118

Habeas Corpus.

1. In habeas corpus by one held under warrant in extradition, if the return sets forth the warrant, and its recitals, together with the allegations of the application for habeas corpus, show facts justifying the detention of the accused, the return is sufficient. *In re Willard* 298
2. When requisition papers for extradition clearly show the county in which it is alleged the crime was committed and the proceedings begun, and the governor of this state has ordered the return of the defendant, the fact that the request for extradition names a different county will not require the court, in habeas corpus, to discharge the prisoner. *In re Willard* 298
3. When it appears, in habeas corpus, on what showing the governor acted in granting extradition, it is a question of law whether the accused has been charged with a crime against the demanding state. *In re Willard* 298
4. Evidence *held* to sustain judgment denying writ of habeas corpus to one held for extradition. *In re Willard*..... 298

Heirs. See EVIDENCE, 3-7. WITNESSES, 4.

In proceedings to establish heirship, it was error to charge that petitioners must prove that they are the only next of kin of decedent, the only issue being as to the identity of decedent with petitioners' ancestor. *In re Estate of Lyle*.. 768

Highways. See EMINENT DOMAIN, 3. NEGLIGENCE, 10.

A county attempting to open a public road on a section line without notice or fixing a time for a hearing on the land-owner's claim for damages is a trespasser. *Scott's Bluff County v. Tri-State Land Co*..... 805

Homestead. See MORTGAGES, 3.

Homicide. See CRIMINAL LAW, 9, 18.

1. Evidence held to sustain conviction of manslaughter. *Pruyn v. State* 237

2. Evidence held to sustain conviction of murder. *Rogers v. State* 554

Husband and Wife. See DREDS, 3, 5. MORTGAGES, 6-9.

1. The property of a married woman not being liable for necessities until after execution against the husband has been returned unsatisfied, a wife may enjoin a levy on her lands on a judgment not showing that it was rendered for necessities, or where there is no return of execution against the husband unsatisfied. *Scott v. House* 325

2. A married woman may make a valid contract to pay tuition for a course in osteopathy, though she has no separate estate. *Still College and Infirmary v. Morris*..... 328

3. A married woman may mortgage her separate estate to secure the individual debt, or to indemnify the sureties upon an official bond, of her husband. *Bode v. Jussen*..... 482

Indictment and Information.

An information for receiving stolen property does not state facts constituting an offense, where the property is described only as "the personal property of John Lightfoot of the value of \$48, then lately before stolen;" and, after verdict of guilty, it was error to overrule a motion in arrest of judgment. *Korab v. State* 66

Infants. See JUDGMENT, 1-4.

1: Under sec. 5371, Ann. St. 1911, the disabilities of a female, as a minor, are ended when she becomes 18 years of age, and she may thereafter sue and transact business in her own name. *Kiplinger v. Joslyn* 40

2. A court of equity should, on its own motion, protect the rights of minors involved in litigation to which they are not parties. *Jones v. Hudson* 561

Injunction. See DRAINS, 5, 8. EMINENT DOMAIN, 1. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 14. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.

1. One may enjoin repeated trespasses on his land, though the trespasser is solvent. *Ayres v. Barnett*..... 350
2. An owner of land is not required to permit devastation of his timber land by a trespasser and seek relief at law for damages, but he may prevent the trespass by injunction. *Ayres v. Barnett* 350
3. In a suit to enjoin trespass, evidence held to sustain decree for plaintiff. *Ayres v. Barnett* 350

Insane Persons. See MARRIAGE.

Insurance.

1. A misstatement of fact in the proof of loss, made after the parties settled the damages in dispute, is not a proper subject of suit or defense, where the insurer did not rely upon the misstatement, and it was made without fraudulent intent. *Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Peterson*..... 446
2. Where the physician who treated assured for an accidental injury has shown himself competent to testify as an expert, and has fully described the nature of the injury and the symptoms, he may state what in his opinion caused the death of the assured. *Rathjen v. Woodmen Accident Ass'n*..... 629
3. In an action on an accident policy, an instruction as to the cause of death held proper. *Rathjen v. Woodmen Accident Ass'n* 629
4. Where the question of waiver of conditions of a policy by letters notifying assured of default in payment of premiums is to be submitted to the jury, it is error to exclude any part of the correspondence. *Cady v. Travelers Ins. Co.*..... 634
5. Where a contract for paid-up term insurance is unambiguous and the parties have agreed as to the date when the policy will lapse, there can be no recovery on death of assured after that date. *Cady v. Travelers Ins. Co.*..... 634
6. Notice to the assured that a premium on his policy was past due, with request for payment, did not change the contract as to the date of its conversion into a paid-up policy of term insurance. *Cady v. Travelers Ins. Co.*..... 634
7. Requirements in a policy of health insurance as to notice of disability held not unreasonable. *Blunt v. National Fidelity & Casualty Co.* 685
8. Compliance with requirements as to notice of sickness held essential to recovery in a suit on a health policy, in absence of waiver or estoppel. *Blunt v. National Fidelity & Casualty Co.* 685

Insurance—Concluded.

9. Notice of the commencement of sickness to a health insurance company held a sufficient compliance with the policy. *Blunt v. National Fidelity & Casualty Co.*..... 685
10. Evidence, in an action on a health policy, held to be so defective as to justify directing a verdict for defendant. *Blunt v. National Fidelity & Casualty Co.*..... 685

Intoxicating Liquors. See ESTOPPEL.

1. Where, on appeal from a judgment affirming the action of a village board in granting a liquor license, the record is silent as to whether the license was authorized by an existing ordinance, there is no presumption that there was no such ordinance. *Maxwell v. Steen* 29
2. Allegation in remonstrance to liquor license held an admission that the signers to the petition were freeholders; and, there being no evidence of bad faith, the license was properly issued. *Maxwell v. Steen* 29
3. In order to defeat an application for a liquor license because the applicant has sold liquor to minors in violation of ch. 50, Comp. St. 1911, the burden is on remonstrator to establish that fact by a preponderance of evidence. *In re Phillips* 152
4. Evidence held to show that applicant for liquor license had violated ch. 50, Comp. St. 1911, by sales to minors during the previous year. *In re Phillips* 152
5. In an action on a liquor dealer's bond, testimony of a medical expert as to the effect of intoxicants upon the human system, and as to his personal knowledge of the impaired physical condition of deceased due to excessive drinking, held properly received. *Bulger v. Prenica* 697
6. Liquor dealers are liable in damages for all legitimate and proximate consequences of their traffic, and, if they induce habitual drunkenness in a sober and industrious man, they are liable for a dissipated career followed by him after they have ceased to furnish him liquors. *Bulger v. Prenica*..... 697
7. The constitutionality of ch. 61, laws 1881, regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors, having been repeatedly decided, will not be re-examined. *Bulger v. Prenica* 697

Joint Tenancy. See DEEDS, 5.

1. The right to create title in real estate by joint tenancy, with right of survivorship, has not been abridged in Nebraska. *Sanderson v. Everson* 606
2. If the purpose to create a joint tenancy is clearly expressed in a deed, the intent of the parties will control, and a joint tenancy with right of survivorship will be created. *Sanderson v. Everson* 606

Judgment.

1. Decree quieting title to real estate *held* conclusive as to defendants who were minors. *Sutphen v. Joslyn*..... 34
2. Where suit to quiet title was brought by agreement between vendor and purchaser, *held* that such agreement did not render the decree invalid as constructively fraudulent as to certain defendants who were minors. *Sutphen v. Joslyn*.... 34
3. To entitle a female, on arriving at her majority, to sue, under secs. 602, 609 of the code, to vacate an order or decree and for a new trial, suit must be commenced within two years after removal of her disability. *Kiplinger v. Joslyn*.. 40
4. To entitle a female to sue under sec. 442 of the code, the suit must be commenced within one year after she arrives at full age. *Kiplinger v. Joslyn* 40
5. A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction on questions directly involved in one suit is conclusive as to those questions in a subsequent suit between the same parties. *Upstill v. Kyner* 255
6. Ordinarily a judgment lien extends only to the interest and rights of the judgment debtor in the property at the date of the lien, or acquired during its existence. *Stannard v. Orleans Flour & Oatmeal Milling Co.*..... 389
7. A judgment granting relief outside of the pleadings and evidence is erroneous. *Peterson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.*..... 448
8. One not served with process, and who does not appear, is not bound by the judgment rendered. *Lipps v. Panko*..... 469
9. A judgment on constructive service *held* void. *Nelson v. Sughrue* 480
10. The provisions of sec. 602 of the code for vacating judgments are concurrent with independent equity jurisdiction. *Abbott v. Johnston* 726

Jury. See CRIMINAL LAW, 15.

- A law action is not triable without a jury because there are issues incidental to the main one which are equitable in their nature. *Alter v. Skiles* 597

Justice of the Peace.

- The rule that an order of a justice granting a change of venue on an *ex parte* hearing and before return day of summons is void has not been changed by secs. 958, 958a of the code, as amended in 1905 (laws 1905, chs. 180, 181). *Adams v. Anderson* 416

Landlord and Tenant.

- A lease may be made to secure liabilities existing and to be incurred; and, when the conditions and subsequent conduct of the parties show that such was its purpose, it will be so construed. *Stannard v. Orleans Flour & Oatmeal Milling Co.*, 389

Libel and Slander.

1. If the published words are libelous *per se*, it is not necessary by innuendo to explain their meaning, nor to allege special damages. *Callfas v. World Publishing Co.*..... 108
2. If the published words are ambiguous, or *prima facie* innocent, plaintiff must specifically allege and prove the defamatory meaning, and must allege and prove special damages. *Callfas v. World Publishing Co.* 108
3. Where the publication makes general charges against plaintiff, an answer in general terms that the charges are true is insufficient, but, if the facts are specifically stated in the charge, a general allegation that they are true is sufficient. *Callfas v. World Publishing Co.*..... 108
4. The defendant in an action for slander cannot, in mitigation of damages, prove the truth of the alleged defamatory charge under a general denial. *Murten v. Garbe*..... 589
5. Where a publication was not obviously defamatory, and there was no allegation and proof of facts showing special damages, judgment for defendant was right. *Callfas v. World Publishing Co.* 108

Licenses.

1. It is not the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, constitution of the United States, to prevent states from classifying the subjects of legislation and making different regulations as to the property of individuals differently situated. *Norris v. City of Lincoln* 658
2. Sec. 1, art. IX, constitution of Nebraska, does not forbid reasonable classification of persons for the purpose of taxation. *Norris v. City of Lincoln*..... 658
3. Where a city charter authorizes an occupation tax, the municipal authorities may classify the different occupations and impose a different amount of tax upon the different classes, provided the classification is reasonable. *Norris v. City of Lincoln* 658
4. A city ordinance providing an occupation tax, and placing persons lending money upon chattel security in a different class from chartered banks and negotiators of loans on realty, is not void as providing an arbitrary classification. *Norris v. City of Lincoln* 658
5. An ordinance providing a fine and imprisonment to enforce a license tax does not violate sec. 3, art. I, of the constitution of this state. *Norris v. City of Lincoln*..... 658
6. The penal provisions of an occupation tax ordinance providing for its enforcement by a fine held valid. *Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Franklin*..... 704

Licenses—Concluded.

7. Where an ordinance provides that refusal to pay an occupation tax shall render the person in default liable to a fine, and that suit may be brought in the name of the state by warrant and arrest or by common summons, the police court has jurisdiction to render judgment for the fine, whether defendant is brought into court by warrant and arrest or by service of summons. *Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Franklin* 704

Liens. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 9.

1. Where one advanced money to a corporation for improvements with the consent of a judgment creditor, who was a stockholder, and with the understanding that he should be reimbursed out of the property, his claim for the money advanced will be preferred to the lien of the judgment. *Stannard v. Orleans Flour & Oatmeal Milling Co.* 389
2. In a suit to determine priority of liens and foreclose the same, an account should be taken of the profits and expenses of a lien-holder in possession, and the net profits applied on his lien. *Stannard v. Orleans Flour & Oatmeal Milling Co.* 389

Life Estates. See MORTGAGES, 1-3. WILLS, 5, 6.**Limitation of Actions. See TAXATION, 27.**

1. Where the life estate is sold under foreclosure, limitations do not begin to run against the remainderman until the mortgagor's death. *Currier v. Teske* 7
2. A mere reference to a note, though implying no disposition to question its binding obligation, is not an acknowledgment of debt under sec. 22 of the code. *France v. Ruby*.... 214
3. To toll the statute of limitations, there must be an unqualified and direct admission of a present, subsisting debt on which the party is liable. *France v. Ruby*..... 214
4. Where V. verbally assigned corn to H. to market and pay certain of V.'s debts, and pay the remainder to V., and V. made no demand for a settlement for more than 25 years, the claim was barred by limitations. *In re Estate of Heinrichs* 551
5. Where husband and wife executed a mortgage on her estate to secure his debt, the relation of debtor and creditor did not arise between them until sale of the property under a decree foreclosing the mortgage. *Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mallory* 579

Marriage.

1. Fraudulent conspiracy between the wife's father and friends to induce one to marry his daughter will not authorize an-

Marriage—Concluded.

- annulment of the marriage, unless the husband was an idiot or insane at the time of the marriage. *Svanda v. Svanda*.. 404
2. Weakness of mind is not ground for annulment of marriage, unless it amounts to idiocy or insanity. *Svanda v. Svanda* 404
3. Mere weakness of mind will not invalidate a marriage, unless it produces derangement that destroys the power to consent. *Adams v. Scott* 537
4. A marriage will not be annulled on the ground of insanity or idiocy, unless there is such want of understanding as to render the party incapable of assenting thereto. *Adams v. Scott* 537

Master and Servant. See NEGLIGENCE, 1-4.

1. Where an employer, knowing the dangerous conditions of the work, orders an employee to perform the work notwithstanding his protest, and enforces the order with threats of discharge, he cannot maintain that the employee assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory negligence. *Thomsen v. Jobst* 375
2. Where a master requires an implement to be used in a manner and under conditions more dangerous than the usual method, he may be guilty of negligence in so doing. *Thomsen v. Jobst* 375
3. An employee does not ordinarily assume risks arising from conditions beyond his knowledge. *Elliott v. General Construction Co.* 453
4. The master held liable for death of an inexperienced servant whom he had put to work in a hazardous position among electric power wires carrying dangerous currents of electricity. *Elliott v. General Construction Co.*..... 453
5. In an action for money advanced to an employee, evidence held insufficient to sustain judgment for defendant on counterclaim for salary. *Omaha Folding Machine Co. v. Striplin* 740
6. A statement in an application for membership in a voluntary relief association that applicant was only 25 years of age is a warranty, and, he being more than 35 years old, rendered the contract of insurance void. *Blunt v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.* 815
7. Where plaintiff by changing his name and misrepresenting his age secured membership in the relief department of defendant company, held that his membership was secured by fraud. *Blunt v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*..... 815

Mechanics' Liens.

1. In a suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien, nonresidence of defendant, on whom plaintiff attempted to make service by publication, is a question of fact, when put in issue by the pleadings. *Bradford Lumber Co. v. Creel*..... 573
2. A subcontractor who furnished at different times materials for a house under a single contract is entitled to a lien, where he filed a proper statement with the register of deeds within the statutory period. *Bradford Lumber Co. v. Creel*, 573

Money Received.

1. Where money is paid to an attorney upon a claim of a third party, he cannot withhold it on the ground that he is also a creditor of the person paying it. *Wilder v. Millard*, 595
2. Where defendant received a note from executors, he could not resist payment of the amount collected thereon on the ground that their letters testamentary were not properly sealed. *Wilder v. Millard* 595
3. To recover the value of property from one who has disposed of it under plaintiff's authority, plaintiff must prove that defendant agreed to pay him the purchase price, or the market value thereof. *Coulter v. Cummings*..... 646

Mortgages. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3. PARTITION.

1. A foreclosure sale conveys only the interest of the mortgagor, and where he owns only a life estate that is all that is conveyed. *Currier v. Teske* 7
2. Where a foreclosure sale of a mortgagor's life estate satisfied the mortgage debt, the purchaser acquired no right in the interest of a remainderman not a party to the suit. *Currier v. Teske* 7
3. The life estate of a surviving spouse in the homestead may be mortgaged, and the purchaser on foreclosure will take the life estate. *Pulver v. Connelly* 188
4. Where a mortgage purports to convey the whole property, an after-acquired interest of the mortgagor by descent on the death of her son becomes subject to the mortgage immediately on the son's death. *Pulver v. Connelly*..... 188
5. An indebtedness secured by a chattel mortgage is sufficient consideration for a mortgage of land. *Pulver v. Connelly*.. 188
6. A married woman who mortgages her separate estate or homestead to secure a debt of her husband may have the lien canceled in a suit to foreclose, where she was induced to execute the mortgage by mortgagee's threats to imprison her husband. *Hoellworth v. McCarthy*..... 246
7. A mortgage executed by a wife on her separate property to indemnify a surety on an official bond of her husband, who

Mortgages—Concluded.

- has misappropriated the funds, in the hope of saving him from imprisonment, is not void for want of consideration. *Bode v. Jussen* 482
8. A mortgage by a wife to save her husband from imprisonment *held* not void as having been obtained under duress. *Bode v. Jussen* 482
9. Where M. and wife executed a mortgage on the wife's estate to secure a loan by a bank to M., and the wife died, leaving children surviving her, and thereafter the mortgage was foreclosed, but before sale M. conveyed his curtesy interest to a codefendant, *held* that the purchaser took only such interest as his grantor had, and that the amount of the mortgage should be deducted from such curtesy interest. *Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mallory*..... 579

Municipal Corporations.

1. Where separate buildings for different departments of city administration were erected on the same site under one general plan, *held* that each building was authorized by a vote conferring power to issue bonds "to purchase a site and erect a city hall thereon." *Champion Iron Co. v. City of South Omaha* 56
2. The installation of cells in a city hall to be used in connection with a police court held in the building, is incidental to, and not inconsistent with, the general purpose thereof. *Champion Iron Co. v. City of South Omaha*..... 56
3. The erection of cells in a police court building *held* to form a part of a general plan for a city hall, and the cost properly payable out of money appropriated by a vote for bonds for a city hall. *Champion Iron Co. v. City of South Omaha*, 56
4. Under subd. IV, sec. 67, art. I, ch. 13a, Comp. St. 1893, the mayor and council of the city of Lincoln had authority to vacate streets and alleys, and the vacated portions reverted to owners of adjacent lots. *State v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.* 263
5. City ordinance *held* to vacate the portion of a street occupied by a railroad company as its station and switching grounds, and that, the company being the owner of the adjacent lots, the vacated portion became its property. *State v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.*..... 263
6. The city of Lincoln cannot compel a railroad company to construct a viaduct over its property where there is no public way or street. *State v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.*.... 263
7. When a city engages in a purely business enterprise, it acts in a private capacity, and is bound by the rules of law

Municipal Corporations—Continued.

- applicable to any other corporation or person engaged in like enterprise. *Henry v. City of Lincoln*..... 331
8. Sec. 126, art. I, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1911, requiring the filing of a notice with the city clerk within 30 days after a right of action for an unliquidated claim accrues, applies to claims arising out of performance of its corporate duties, but not to those arising out of the conduct of a private business enterprise. *Henry v. City of Lincoln*..... 331
9. Land cannot be dedicated to the public for a street by deed, unless the deed is executed by the owner. *Morning v. City of Lincoln* 364
10. Where liens on land deeded to the public for a street ripen into title, an attempted dedication by the owner, without consent of the lien-holder, is futile. *Morning v. City of Lincoln* 364
11. Where a deed of dedication of land, subject to liens, to the public is not recorded, user by the public will not estop a lien-holder without notice to deny that he consented to the dedication. *Morning v. City of Lincoln*..... 364
12. Where a city charter required that ordinances be published in a newspaper published in the city, and there is no paper printed therein, publication in a newspaper printed outside the city, but circulated in the city, held sufficient. *Hadlock v. Tucker* 510
13. Where a bid for paving slightly exceeded the engineer's estimate as to one item, and the excess was eliminated from the contract, the contract was not void. *Hadlock v. Tucker* 510
14. Payment for street improvements will not be enjoined in a suit by a taxpayer, who, with full knowledge of the progress of the work, did not act until after the completion of the contract. *Hadlock v. Tucker* 510
15. In a city of the first class having more than 5,000 and less than 25,000 inhabitants, a three-fifths majority of the abutting owners in a paving district may determine the material to be used, but all details of construction are left to the city council. *Lanning v. City of Hastings*..... 665
16. Publication of notice of the time of meeting of city council to equalize assessments for paving held to comply with sec. 83, art. III, ch. 13, Comp. St. 1911. *Lanning v. City of Hastings* 665
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- preferred and notice and opportunity given him to be heard
in defense thereof. *State v. Strever* 762
18. A city *held* liable to an abutting lot owner for any damage
from grading a street from its natural to a lower grade.
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19. The removal of trees *held* a proper element of damages from
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Negligence. See CARRIERS, 1-3. RAILROADS.

1. The employers' liability act (Comp. St. 1911, ch. 21) does
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ciency of evidence of negligence or of contributory negli-
gence. *Disher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.*..... 224
2. Under the employers' liability act, where the existence of
negligence or contributory negligence is an issue, the court
may direct a verdict where the lack of evidence of negli-
gence, or the undisputed evidence as to more than slight
contributory negligence in comparison with that of defend-
ant, is so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ as to
its legal effect. *Disher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.*..... 224
3. Where the evidence shows both negligence and contribu-
tory negligence, the duty to make the comparison required
by ch. 21, Comp. St. 1911, rests with the jury, unless the
evidence as to negligence is legally insufficient, or contrib-
utory negligence is so clearly shown that the court would
set aside a verdict for plaintiff. *Disher v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. R. Co.* 224
4. In an action under the employers' liability act, *held* that
the comparative negligence of plaintiff and defendant was
for the jury. *Disher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.*..... 224
5. In an action for death, caused by a car being switched,
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6. There is a presumption that one in his right mind and in
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Co.* 258
7. Evidence of contributory negligence *held* not so conclusive
as to require an appellate court to hold as a matter of law
that the presumption of ordinary caution was overcome,
and contributory negligence established. *Armstrong v.
Union Stock Yards Co.* 258
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R. Co.* 419

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9. Negligence in the construction and use of electric wires carrying dangerous currents of electricity is a question for the jury, where the evidence is conflicting. *Elliott v. General Construction Co.* 453
10. Owner held not liable for damages to others on a highway by his team running away without his fault. *Brooks v. Kauffman* 682

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- Affidavit held insufficient to excuse delay in filing motion for new trial. *Murten v. Garbe*..... 589

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- The right of action for earnings of an unemancipated minor is in the parent, where the contract of employment was made by the parent. *Inness v. Meyer* 43

Partition. See WILLS, 4.

1. In a suit to sell land devised, certain defendants sought partition, and a mortgagee asked foreclosure, held that, the court having acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties, it was proper to direct a sale to satisfy the mortgage and distribution of the surplus. *Knauf v. Mack*..... 524
2. In a suit for the sale of land devised, the owner of a mortgage, executed by the testator, was made a party and asked a foreclosure, and a decree was entered without objection foreclosing his mortgage, held without error. *Knauf v. Mack* 524

Partnership.

1. Where partners transfer their stock to a committee of their creditors to conduct the business, pay all indebtedness, and return the remainder of the property to the partners, the partners alone cannot, before the claims have been paid in full, maintain an action at law against the committee for conversion of stock sold in bulk in violation of their duties as trustees. *Edwards v. Hatfield* 712
2. In an action by partners for conversion of partnership property, individual partners cannot recover to the exclusion of the others. *Edwards v. Hatfield* 712

Paupers.

1. Where a physician is employed by an overseer of the poor to aid a destitute person, the fact that the overseer has not made a written report to the county board will not defeat the liability of the county. *Meyers v. Furnas County*..... 313
2. The averment in a petition that a person had fallen sick,

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- under circumstances showing destitution and inability to procure assistance, is a sufficient allegation of dependence on the county as against a demurrer. *Meyers v. Furnas County* 313
3. Under sec. 14, ch. 67, Comp. St. 1911, if any person, not a pauper, shall fall sick within any county, not having money to pay for board, nursing, and medical aid, it is the duty of the overseers of the poor to furnish such assistance. *Meyers v. Furnas County* 313

Pleading. See **BILLS AND NOTES**, 2. **CONTRACTS**, 6. **LIBEL AND SLANDER**, 1-3, 5. **PAUPERS**, 2. **SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS**, 2. **TAXATION**, 11, 13.

1. Where one party alleges that a note has not been paid, and no objection is made to the allegation and description of the note, and no plea of payment, and proof is admitted showing the ownership of the note and that it is unpaid, these facts must be considered as established. *Lashmett v. Prall*, 184
2. Where a demurrer to a petition on *quantum meruit* was sustained, and an amended petition on an express contract was held demurrable, held not error to refuse to permit an amendment setting up a cause of action on *quantum meruit*. *Patterson v. Steele* 209
3. Permission or refusal to permit plaintiff to amend an amended petition, after commencement of trial, will be sustained, unless there has been an abuse of discretion. *Patterson v. Steele* 209
4. Where there was no motion to require a more complete statement of facts in an answer alleging fraud in procuring a signature to a note, the answer will be liberally construed to support the judgment. *American Case & Register Co. v. Catchpole* 276
5. In an action to recover money, an answer that the money was not due when the action was commenced is not demurrable. *Gergens v. Gergens* 546
6. Where a general demurrer *ore tenus* is made, after commencement of trial, the pleading will be liberally construed, and, if possible, sustained. *Macrill v. City of Hartington*.. 670
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Principal and Agent.

1. A principal cannot deprive an agent of his right to an accounting by improperly joining a cause of action on the contract of agency with a cause of action on a third person's guaranty of performance thereof. *Schultz v. Wise*.... 718

Principal and Agent—Concluded.

2. An agent who binds himself by a contract containing the terms of his agency does not increase his liability by signing a mere guaranty of performance on his part after it has been executed by a third person. *Schultz v. Wise*..... 718
3. To entitle a principal to recover for secret profits made by his agent in exchange of properties, it must appear that the agent possessed knowledge of the value of the property taken that was unknown to his principal, and which the agent used to his advantage. *Davis v. Haire*..... 819
4. Agent held not liable to his principal for secret profits alleged to have been made in exchange of properties. *Davis v. Haire* 819

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Quieting Title. See JUDGMENT, 1, 2.

1. A suit to quiet title to land must be brought in the county in which the land is situated. *Rakow v. Tate*..... 198
2. Where suit to quiet title is brought in the county where the land is situated, summons may be served on the principal defendant in any county of the state, and thereupon on any other necessary or proper defendant; and it is not essential that summons be served on any one within the county where the suit is pending. *Rakow v. Tate*..... 198
3. Disclaimer by the principal defendant in a suit to quiet title after another defendant has appeared and asked affirmative relief will not defeat jurisdiction. *Rakow v. Tate*.... 198
4. A written contract to sell land, recorded in the office of register of deeds and not canceled when the contract is abandoned, casts a cloud on vendor's title, authorizing a suit to quiet title. *Rakow v. Tate* 198
5. Though a part of the land described in a written agreement to sell land constitutes the homestead of the vendor, and

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- though the wife did not sign the agreement to remove the cloud created by agreement. *Rakow v. Tate*
6. In a suit by the owners of the fee tenant, who transferred his interest in improvements and surrendered possession commenced, is not entitled to relief claimants' act. *Moreland v. Berger* .
7. Evidence held to sustain decree qu *Rakow v. Tate*
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1. Evidence held to sustain verdict against for destruction of crops by fire from *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.*
2. It is not negligence for a railway company to run a passenger train at the rate of 50 miles an hour clear day, in the open country, where crossings. *White v. Chicago, B. & Q.*
3. That an animal is killed upon the railroad crossing is no evidence of negligence of the road company. *White v. Chicago, B. & Q.*
4. Negligence cannot be established by testimony in contradiction to the testimony of impeached eye-witness. *White v. Chicago, B. & Q.*
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5. It is not a defense to an action for goods sold that the vendor knew that the purchaser was conducting an illegal business, when the vendor did no act in furtherance thereof. *Darling v. Kipp* 781

Schools and School Districts.

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1. Sec. 11, art. III of the constitution, relating to amendments of statutes, requires that the amended section shall contain all that is substituted for the original section, and that the original section shall be repealed. *State v. Farmers & Merchants Bank* 1
2. So much of ch. 53, laws 1907, as authorizes county boards of counties having more than 100,000 inhabitants to contract with the lowest bidder for feeding prisoners in the county jail is violative of sec. 11, art. III of the constitution. *State v. McShane* 46
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Street Railways.

1. Where, in an action for injuries, plaintiff testified that the car which struck him was running from 25 to 35 miles an hour, *held* that, though the evidence was not competent to show the speed of the car, it was admissible to support the allegation that the motorman failed to reduce its speed

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- while passing another car. *Zancanella v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co.* 774
- 2. Photographs showing the location of an accident are not necessarily to be excluded because the situation is capable of verbal description. *Zancanella v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co.* 774
- 3. It was error to submit the question whether the conductor of a street car was negligent in not warning a passenger of danger in crossing a parallel track, there being no evidence that the conductor knew he intended to cross it. *Zancanella v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co.* 774
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- 1. Questions of valuation, and of the amount and value of money or other personal property to be assessed cannot be determined under secs. 162, 163 of the revenue law, but must be presented to the proper board of equalization. *Darr v. Dawson County* 93
- 2. Assessment, levy, and collection of taxes are not equitable proceedings, but are governed by special rules, which must be complied with by the taxing powers and taxpayers. *Darr v. Dawson County* 93
- 3. A taxpayer is entitled to a copy of the assessment when completed, but he may waive this and ascertain the amount of his assessment from the records before the meeting of the board of equalization. *Darr v. Dawson County* 93
- 4. Where a taxpayer, dissatisfied with his assessment, fails to appeal to the board of equalization, he cannot avail himself of the special remedies provided by secs. 162, 163 of the revenue law. *Darr v. Dawson County* 93
- 5. Where a tax has not been assessed without authority or for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, its collection cannot be enjoined; but secs. 162, 163 of the revenue law provide a remedy in other cases in which injunctions were formerly allowed. *Darr v. Dawson County* 93
- 6. The remedy provided for a taxpayer by subd. 1, sec. 162 of the revenue law, is available only when property has been wrongfully assessed, either because exempt or because the tax had already been assessed and paid. *Darr v. Dawson County* 93
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9. Where, after expiration of the time for assessment, plaintiff shipped to a member of a corporation sample buggles for exhibition, which were stored with the corporation, a levy and sale of the buggles for delinquent taxes of the corporation was wrongful, and the treasurer was liable for their value. *Parry Mfg. Co. v. Fink*..... 137
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11. The land not having been made a party to a suit to foreclose a tax lien, the court ordered that it be made a party, but no amendment was made to the petition or title, nor was the land described as a party in the published notice. *Held*, that the land was not brought in, and that the action was not *in rem*. *Moran v. Catlett* 158
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15. The legislature having failed to provide in which of two counties property of one under guardianship shall be listed, where the residence and property of the ward are in one county and the residence of the guardian in another, the state board of equalization and assessment may determine the question. *Nemaha County v. Richardson County*..... 171

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7. If the trial court would be required to set aside a verdict for defendant, a verdict for plaintiff should be directed. *Garry Iron & Steel Co. v. Omaha Coal & Building Supply Co.* 367
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2. A husband has a direct interest in the result of a suit by his wife for specific performance of a contract to convey real estate within the meaning of sec. 329 of the code. *Holladay v. Rich* 491
3. In a suit to set aside a deed, defendant held to be the representative of his deceased grantor, within the meaning of sec. 329 of the code. *Holladay v. Rich*..... 491
4. Witnesses held competent to testify to the fact that boys of a certain age were admitted into the British army, though they did not know whether they were legally admitted. *In re Estate of Lyle* 768

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HARVARD LAW

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